Judgment : This appeal is preferred by the unsuccessful plaintiffs in O.S.No.22/78 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Mahaboobnagar. The said suit was instituted praying for the relief of eviction after demolishing the construction made on a portion of the plaint schedule property and also for the relief of injunction restraining defendants 1 to 5 or any of them from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs relating to the area marked in red in the sketch and for mesne profits and also for the other appropriate reliefs. 2. The learned Subordinate Judge, Mahaboobnagar, in the light of the respective pleadings of the parties, having settled the issues, recorded the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 and D.Ws.1 to 7, marked Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.24, Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.11 and Ex.X.1 and on appreciation of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for and accordingly dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal. It is brought to the notice of the Court that the suit was instituted as against the then Members of the Committee and subsequent thereto, the present Members of the Committee had been substituted. 3. Contentions of Sri Suresh:- Sri Suresh representing Sri Mahipathy Rao, the learned Counsel representing the appellants had taken this Court through the respective pleadings of the parties and the evidence available on record and would maintain that the findings recorded in relation to the genuineness of the gift deed - Ex.B.10 are not sustainable findings. The Counsel also would maintain that there is no evidence to establish the actual delivery of possession by late Bugga Reddy and hence it may have to be taken that the gift deed - Ex.B.10 was not acted upon. The Counsel also further pointed out that here is a case where it is stated that the joint family property had been gifted away by the father. The Counsel also would maintain that it cannot be said that a Hindu has an authority under the Personal Law to make such an alienation in favour of Muslim Community. Even otherwise, the Counsel would maintain that it cannot be said that such gift had been made for "pious purpose". Hence, viewed from any angle, the findings recorded by the trial Court cannot be sustained and the appeal to be allowed. Even otherwise, the Counsel would maintain that it cannot be said that such gift had been made for "pious purpose". Hence, viewed from any angle, the findings recorded by the trial Court cannot be sustained and the appeal to be allowed. The Counsel also relied on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 4. Contentions of Sri Mirza Safiulla Baig:-Sri Mirza Safiulla Baig, the learned Counsel representing the respondents had taken this Court through the respective stands taken by the parties and would maintain that in the eye of law, there is no prohibition or bar imposed on a Hindu in making a gift of a reasonable portion of the joint family property for "pious purposes" in favour of muslim community. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the oral and documentary evidence available on record and would further maintain that though the very execution of Ex.B.10 and whether it was acted upon or not, these questions were put into controversy, in the light of the clear evidence available on record there cannot be any doubt or controversy relating to the genuineness of Ex.B.10. The Counsel also would maintain that at the best the question to be decided is whether there is any legal bar imposed by Law on a Hindu in executing such a document for "pious purpose" in favour of the Muslim community. The Counsel also would maintain that in a way the provisions of the Wakf Act also would support the stand taken by the respondents. The Counsel also pointed out to the relevant portions of the decisions and ultimately would conclude that in the light of the findings which had been recorded in elaboration by the trial Court, the said findings need not be disturbed in the appeal and hence the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard the Counsel on record. Perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record and also the findings recorded by the trial Court in this regard. 6. Before taking up further discussion, it may be appropriate to have a glance at the respective pleadings of the parties, the issues settled, the evidence available on record, the findings recorded by the trial Court, in nutshell. Pleadings of the Parties:- 7. 6. Before taking up further discussion, it may be appropriate to have a glance at the respective pleadings of the parties, the issues settled, the evidence available on record, the findings recorded by the trial Court, in nutshell. Pleadings of the Parties:- 7. Averments made in the plaint:-It was pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiffs are the members of the joint family consisting of 1st plaintiff and his father late A.Bugga Reddy. After the death of late A.Bugga Reddy in 1967, the 1st plaintiff and his sisters continued to be joint and the joint family properties have not been partitioned till now. It is also stated that the suit property comprising of 2 acres of land in the boundaries specified in the schedule is the part and parcel of Sy.No.201 situated in the Farooknagar village. After the death of A.Bugga Reddy, the lands have been mutated in the Tahsil in the name of the 1st plaintiff and the lands include Sy.No.201 measuring over Ac.14.28 guntas in which the suit land is located. Some time in January, 1978 the defendant No.1 assisted by some of his henchmen and servants began construction of house on southeast corner of Sy.No.201 measuring about 10 yards x 4 yards and also sunk a small well adjacent to the said construction. When objected to and a protest was lodged on behalf of the plaintiffs, the defendants 1 to 3 made aggressive overtures against the men of the 1st plaintiff and threatened to beat them if they interfered with the construction. When the matter was brought before the elders, who had influence over the defendants 1 to 3, the defendants 1 to 3 alleged that the father of the 1st plaintiff had gifted the land in favour of the defendant No.1 and 4 for the benefit of the Muslim Public and that they were constructing a shed for housing a school for Muslim boys. The defendant No.4 also said that there was some sort of deed executed by late A.Bugga Reddy to give about 2 acres of land in Sy.No.201 and that he was Chairman of the Committee and defendant No.1 was its Secretary. But the Wakf could not be operated as possession was not given and certain other formalities also like permission from the Revenue Authorities etc., were not obtained and in the meanwhile A.Bugga Reddy had died. But the Wakf could not be operated as possession was not given and certain other formalities also like permission from the Revenue Authorities etc., were not obtained and in the meanwhile A.Bugga Reddy had died. He also said that he and other elders of the community could sit and consider and settle the matter and that the 1st plaintiff should not precipitate matters by taking any drastic action. The 1st plaintiff believed in the advice of defendant No.4 and the other elders and that defendants No.1 to 3 or other responsible for the aggrieve construction could desist from aggression. The defendant No.1 to 3 and other henchmen of them did not however heed the advice of either defendant No.4 or other elders of the place and continued construction. The 1st plaintiff got enquiries as to whether they had got any permission for constructing the house from the Gram Panchayat, Shadnagar and found that no previous sanction was taken and nor the formalities for sanction followed. The defendant No.1 seems to have used his influence and some post-haste and irregular entries got made in the Panchayt records. Recently the defendant have fraudulenly are trying to mutate the land in the Revenue records in the name of defendants No.1 and 4 to whom it was alleged that the suit land was made a gift by late A.Bugga Reddy. The 1st plaintiff's enquiries also elicited that A.Bugga Reddy had also never applied for permission to alienate under Section 47 of the Tenancy Act either before the alleged alienation or subsequent thereto. At the time of mutation of the lands in favour of the 1st plaintiff, after the death of A.Bugga Reddy, no claims or objections are made before the Tahsil Authorities. The 1st plaintiff also understands that neither any Wakf was got registered, as per the Muslim Wakf Act 1954 although it was alleged that the Wakf was made more than 13 years back nor to the best of the knowledge of the 1st plaintiff any valid Wakf be made by Hindu in favour of a Muslim Institution. It is stated that the Village Records or the Revenue records do not lend any support to the land in dispute being given in possession at any support to the defendants. It is stated that the Village Records or the Revenue records do not lend any support to the land in dispute being given in possession at any support to the defendants. A.Bugga Reddy was in possession as Manager of the family and after his death, the 1st plaintiff had continued his possession till now and the defendants have never been in possession of the suit property till now. They occupied the portion now covered by the construction which still remains incomplete. Of course, the plaintiff came to understand that the defendant No.1 or somebody interested in him got interpolations made in the pahanies in the year 197576 and inserted the name of the defendant No.1 in column No.16 of the said Pahani Patrik and immediately coming to know of this, the 1st plaintiff got a Criminal Complain for appropriate action against the Village Officer. The 1st plaintiff submits that the gift if any without possession is a nullity and ineffective. The 1st plaintiff also submits that the property being joint family and ancestral property, the alleged gift in favour of defendant No.1 and 4 is neither valid nor binding on the plaintiff nor effective in law and the defendants cannot got any manner of right to the land, which they have wrongfully occupied and made wrongful construction thereon. Defendants No.1 to 3 have recently attempted to encroach the land adjacent to the western side to the wrongful construction measuring about one and a half acre and odd and attempted to fix stones. The plaintiff had got them removed but the defendants No.1 to 3 are again trying by sheer force of members comprising of some stranger supporting them, to re-fix the stones and encroach the extra portion. Therefore, the 1st plaintiff is constrined to seek the help of the Court in preventing the defendants from further encroaching on the land by a permanent injunction. Therefore, the 1st plaintiff is constrined to seek the help of the Court in preventing the defendants from further encroaching on the land by a permanent injunction. The present suit is therefore filed for the relief of possession of the land on which the construction is made by demolishing the construction wrongly made and to fill the well wrongfully dug in portion marked in green in the rough sketch annexed herewith and for perpetual injunction marked in record colour portion comprising about one and a half acre of land to the west of the illegal construction restraining the defendants No.1 to 3 and their servants interfering with and also the plaintiffs are entitled for mesne profits at Rs.150/-per year for the portion marked in greed in the plan as the defendants wrongfully occupied and construction of the house made thereon and fug a well as the defendants No.1 to 3 are entitled to the same and they are mere trespassers. It is also stated that the document had been executed by late A.Bugga Reddy in favour of defendant No.4 jointly with the defendant No.1 and as such defendant No.4 has been impleaded as a party. The 1st plaintiff is not furnished with any copy of the alleged gift deed. As and when the document is produced, the plaintiff will file his detailed objections in regard thereto. As stated above, the gift deed of ancestral joint family property is not binding on the other members of the joint family. The plaintiffs are therefore not bound to got the gift deed set aside and it is open to the 1st plaintiff to file the suit in the present form for possession and injunction. The 1st plaintiff is a minor under the protection of his grandfather. His mother also having been died two years back. The grandfather of the 1st plaintiff has no interest adverse to that of the minor and he is the best and fit person to be the next friend of the minor. The present suit is therefore filed by minor acting through his next friend who is his maternal grandfather. 8. Written statement filed by defendants No.1 to 3:-The following averments were made in the written statement filed by defendants 1 to 3:- "The averments made in paras 1 to 3 of the plaint are in valid. The present suit is therefore filed by minor acting through his next friend who is his maternal grandfather. 8. Written statement filed by defendants No.1 to 3:-The following averments were made in the written statement filed by defendants 1 to 3:- "The averments made in paras 1 to 3 of the plaint are in valid. The averments made in para 4 are all false, fabricated and hence denied. The true facts are that the permission for construction of Arabia School was obtained from the Gram Panchayat, Shadnagar, vide proceedings bearing No.410/76 dated 25-10-76 along with the site plan for the said construction on a plot of land measuring 645 yards X 45 yards on the portion of two acres of land in Sy.No.201 situated within the limits of Faruknagar village, Shadnagar Taluq and also sunk a drinking water well. Immediately after obtaining the said permission in October, 1976, the construction work of the school building was taken up and to this neither any protest was made nor any objections were raised by anybody much less the plaintiff. It is false to over that any aggressive oertuers were made by the defendants 1 to 3 against the men of the plaintiff, as alleged, hence denied. The true facts are that neither the plaintiff nor his men or associates have ever came to site for the entire duration of construction and raised any objection for the said construction. It is also not correct to aver that the matter was brought before the elders who had influence over these defendants 1 to 3 and that they informed that the father of the plaintiff had gifted the land in favour of defendants 1 and 4. No such occasion has aroused wherein such a discussion took place. There was no need for defendants 1 to 3 to inform the plaintiff about the gift having been made. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff is well aware of there being a registered gift deed of two acres of land in suit land, as he obtained the certified copy of the said gift deed from the office of the Sub-Registrar of Registration Department on 3-6-76. It is also false to aver that the gift deed could not be operated, as possession was not delivered. It is also false to aver that the gift deed could not be operated, as possession was not delivered. As a matter of fact, the recitals of the registered gift deed bearing No.61 of 1965 dated 22-1-65 speaks for itself about the possession of the donee over the gifted land from 12-8-63. Hence it is denied. The averments in para 5 of the plaint are fabricated, false and hence denied. These averments are made to introduce new elements in the case to suppress the real facts and to misled the Court. That the averments made in para 6 of the plaint, it is stated that they are all incorrect and false and hence denied. As stated in para 2 of this written statement, the permission for construction was duly obtained and on the expiry of the period of permission, the same was got renewed and time extended up to one year from the date of issue for construction of Arabia School vide order of the Gram Panchayat, Shadnagar, bearing No.410 of 1976 dated 4-2-78. It is further stated that the said Gram Panchayat has allotted a house number to the said building as No.2-1/B and issued a certificate in this regard. The said school building is also supplied with the electricity and a consumer No.1019 is allotted to this supply. The averments made in para 7(a) of the plaint, it is stated that it is very vaguely worded, false averments is made and hence denied. In reply to para 7(b) it is stated that they are all false, hence denied. The true facts are that a petition for mutation of the suit land was filed before the Patwari of Fakrunagar village, Shadnagar taluq to mutate the extent of suit schedule land in the name of defendant No.1 herein on 21-1-76 under Section 5 of the Hyderabad Record of Rights in Land Regulation 1358 F (Regulation No.LVIII of 1358 F) and after due enquiries and observing all the requisite formalities, competent authority has finally sanctioned the entries made in mutation register of the village. Finally the transfer entries were carried out in register No.5, 6 and 7 (Faisal Patti) for the year 1977-78. The plaintiff is fully aware of all the above proceedings. As regards the contents made in para 7(c) of the plaint, it is stated that these defendants are not concerned with those proceedings. Finally the transfer entries were carried out in register No.5, 6 and 7 (Faisal Patti) for the year 1977-78. The plaintiff is fully aware of all the above proceedings. As regards the contents made in para 7(c) of the plaint, it is stated that these defendants are not concerned with those proceedings. The averments made in para 7(d) of the plaint, it is stated that they are all false. The father of the plaintiff late Bugga Reddy, in fact, donated an extent of two acres of suit schedule land through a registered gift deed, as mentioned supra, for the specific purpose of running a "Deeni Talim" school on the suit land. As such, it can be seen, that the suit land has been donated and not endowed. It has been held by the Highest Courts of Law, several times, that a Hindu can donate his property to any Muslim Institutions. The averments made in para 7(e) of the plaint, it is stated that they are false,fabricated and hence denied. The recitals of the gift deed, certified copies of pahanies do land full support of the possession of these defendants over the suit schedule land. From 12-8-63 neither Sri Bugga Reddy was in possession of the suit land nor after his death, the plaintiff was in possession. The other averments made in this para about filing a criminal complaint against the Village Officer does not concern to these defendants. The averments made in para 8, it is stated that they are all false and were brought into circumvent the case and hence denied. The true facts of the case are that late Bugga Reddy, the father of plaintiff herein, purchased with his self-exertions a Rice Mill and some agricultural land including the suit land through a registered deed of sale bearing No.4 of 1351 Fasli dated 15-2-1351 Fasli. The suit schedule property is thus the self-acquired property of Sri Bugga Reddy, the father of the plaintiff herein. It is not the ancestral property of late Bugga Reddy nor any ancestral nucleous was utilized for its acquisition. During the life time of Sri Bugga Reddy, he has donated the suit land and got a deed registered and possession was delivered as stated supra. The averments made in para 9 of the plaint, it is stated that that they are all false, fabricated and hence denied. During the life time of Sri Bugga Reddy, he has donated the suit land and got a deed registered and possession was delivered as stated supra. The averments made in para 9 of the plaint, it is stated that that they are all false, fabricated and hence denied. The true facts are that the defendants 1 to 3 herein are in uninterrupted, continuous possession of the suit land from 12-8-63, therefore, the question of endorsement upon his own land does not arise at all. The suit schedule land has been secured by the stone pillars erected by the defendants 1 to 3 herein. No extra portion of land is encroached upon. The defendants 1 to 3 do not claim any other extent of land except the suit land measuring two acres in Sy.No.201. As such the granting of permanent injunction does not arise. The averments made in para 10 of the plaint, it is stated that the plaintiff cannot claim any right, title no doubt interest on the suit schedule land of two acres extent in Sy.No.201. He further cannot claim nor is he entitled for any of the reliefs prayed for. The defendants 1 to 3 vehemently deny that they have wrongfully occupied the suit land as trespassers. As a matter of fact, the suit land belonged to the institution represented by defendant No.1 herein and a School building was constructed thereon after obtaining the valid permission from competent authority and the mutation entries of transfer of land has been sanctioned by the competent revenue authorities. As such the plaintiff herein has no locus-standi in the suit land much less under the alleged ownership. In reply to the averments made in para 12 of the plaint, it is stated that the name of the defendant No.4 has been deleted in the suit and hence no remarks are offered. In reply to para 13 of the plaint, it is stated that the original gift deed has been filed by the defendant No.1 herein. However, it is stated that the plaintiff herein is fully aware of the recitals of the gift deed as he has already obtained the certified copy of the same from the Office of the Sub- Registrar, Shadnagar. The plaintiff should have filed his objections, if any, at the time of filing of the suit itself. He is now precluded from doing the same. The plaintiff should have filed his objections, if any, at the time of filing of the suit itself. He is now precluded from doing the same. As stated in para 6, the suit property is the self-acquired property of late Bugga Reddy, the father of the plaintiff herein. As such by any stretch of imagination, cannot form part of the nucleous of joint family property. During the life time of late Bugga Reddy he donated the land. The plaintiff has no claim over the suit land. The legal heirs of the donor have nothing to do, whatsoever, with the suit property. Late Bugga Reddy died leaving the plaintiff and three daughters and the daughters are also necessary parties and hence the suit without them is bad for non-joinder of parties and he cannot alone question the gift. The suit as framed is not maintainable. The plaintiff is not in possession of the red portion of the suit sketch land and hence the relief of perpetual injunction cannot be granted and hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. The alleged cause of action on second week of April, 1978 is self- styled, fictitious, and hence denied. No cause of action arose on that day and all other subsequent days and events mentioned in para 15 of the plaint. He does not have any continuous cause of action. The gift deed executed by late Bugga Reddy is binding on the plaintiff and other legal heirs of late Bugga Reddy and without seeking for setting aside the gift deed, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek any relief. The contention that the gift deed was executed without permission under Section 47 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act is not tenable. The Revenue Authority accepted the validity of gift deed and ordered mutation. Even otherwise the plaintiff has no right to question the same. The gift made by a Hindu father of a negligible portion of his property for religious or charitable purposes is binding on his heirs and the heirs like plaintiff cannot question it. The claim for mesne profits of Rs.150/- per year is untenable as these defendants are not trespassers as they were put in possession under gift deed by late Bugga Reddy. The amount claimed is highly exaggerated and the plaintiff is put to strict proof. The claim for mesne profits of Rs.150/- per year is untenable as these defendants are not trespassers as they were put in possession under gift deed by late Bugga Reddy. The amount claimed is highly exaggerated and the plaintiff is put to strict proof. The suit is barred by limitation as the daughters of late Bugga Reddy who are majors have not questioned the gift, as late Bugga Reddy died intestate, and his daughters are also equally entitled to succeed his properties. The plaintiff is not the sole heir and any succession obtained by him is not valid. The market value of the suit land is maliciously exaggerated. At the time of gift, the land in question was Rs.300/-per acre and as it is now became valuable, the plaintiff became grudge and filed this suit with false allegations." 9. Issues settled:- On the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the following issues had been settled:- 1) Whether the suit land is the joint family property of the plaintiff and late Bugga Reddy? 2) Whether late Bugga Reddy gifted the suit land to the defendants 1 to 4? 3) Whether the gift of suit land by late Bugga Reddy is valid and binding on the plaintiff? 4) Whether the daughters of late Bugga Reddy are necessary parties to the suit? 5) Whether the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land within 12 years before filing the suit? 6) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 7) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of possession of the suit land shown in green colour in the plaint plan? 8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction as prayed for? 9) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the mesne profits as prayed for? 10) To what relief? 10. ORAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE:-Witnesses examined:-For plaintiff :- P.W.1 :- Manohar Reddy P.W.2 :- G.Goverdhan Rao P.W.3 :- Challa Vithal Reddy P.W.4 :- K.V.Raghavender Rao For defendants:- D.W.1 :- Ahmed Mohiuddin D.W.2 :- Mohd.Mustafa-ul-Hussain D.W.3 :- Mohd.Yakoob D.W.4 :- Cangapuram Ramaswamy D.W.5 :- L.Chandra Mouli D.W.6 :- M.A.Hameed D.W.7 :- Syed Vaquiruddin Exhibits marked:- For plaintiff :- Ex.A.1 :- plaint plan Ex.A.2 :- Certified copy of pahani (1963-64) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.3 :- Certified copy of pahani (1964-65) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.4 :- Certified copy of pahani (1965-66) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.5 :- Certified copy of pahani (1966-67) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.3 :- Certified copy of pahani (1964-65) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.4 :- Certified copy of pahani (1965-66) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.5 :- Certified copy of pahani (1966-67) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.6 :- Certified copy of pahani (1972-73) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.7 :- Certified copy of pahani (1973-74) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.8 :- Certified copy of pahani (1974-75) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.9 :- Certified copy of pahani (1976-77) of Farooqnagar village. Ex.A.10:- Dt.17-12-77, Original land revenue receipt. Ex.A.11:- Dt.27-6-77, Original land revenue receipt. Ex.A.12 :-Dt.25-12-76, Original land revenue receipt. Ex.A.13 to Ex.A.21:- L.R.R. for 21-6-76, January 1967, 18-7-75, 1-9-75, 23-12-74, 5-6- 74, 24-12-73, 7-6-73, 8-1-73. Ex.A.22 :- 1329 F. C.C. of Sethwar of Sirpur village, Ex.A.23 :- 1954-55, C.C. of Khasra Pahani of Ainepalli. Ex.A.24:- 1955 to 58 C.C. of pahani of Enapur village. For defendants:- Ex.B.1 :- dt.12-8-63, Original resolution Ex.B.2 :- 12-8-63, Original application of Bugga Reddy. Ex.B.3 :- 25-10-76, Proceedings of G.P., Faruknagar. Ex.B.4 :- 25-10-76, Sketch map annexed to Ex.B.3, Ex.B.5 :- 4-2-78, Permission letter of G.P. Ex.B.6 :- 15-2-78, Certificate issued by Gram Panchayat. Ex.B.7 to Ex.B.9 :- C.C. of pahni of Faruknagar for 1975-76 to 78, Ex.B.10:- 21-1-65 :- Registered gift deed executed by Bugga Reddy Ex.B.11 :- C.C. of Faisal Patti (1977-78) of Faruknagar village. Exhibits marked by Court:-Ex.X.1 :- Dt.28-4-66, Original Registered sale deed executed by Bugga Reddy in favour of Viquaruddin. 11. Findings recorded by the trial Court in nutshell:- The learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Mahaboobnagar, while answering issue No.6 held that the plaintiffs 2 to 5 as the heirs of late Bugga Reddy could claim rights in the properties of late Bugga Reddy left by him under inte-state succession since the suit was filed within 12 years after the death of late Bugga Reddy. The learned Judge further appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record - P.Ws.1 to 4, D.Ws.1 to 7, Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.24, Ex.B.1 to Ex.A.11 and Ex.X.1 and also after referring to the decisions, while answering issue No.1 came to the conclusion that the suit land was the joint family property of the plaintiffs and late Bugga Reddy. The learned Judge further appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record - P.Ws.1 to 4, D.Ws.1 to 7, Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.24, Ex.B.1 to Ex.A.11 and Ex.X.1 and also after referring to the decisions, while answering issue No.1 came to the conclusion that the suit land was the joint family property of the plaintiffs and late Bugga Reddy. While answering issues No.2 and 3, the learned Judge further relied on certain decisions and came to the conclusion that late Bugga Reddy, the then Manager of the family, had power to make the gift of disputed property for pious purpose and it is within reasonable limits and hence it is valid and binding on the plaintiffs. The learned Judge after recording further findings answered issue No.5 and came to the conclusion that there was delivery of the suit land to Muslim community and further the learned Judge recorded certain further findings relating to issue Nos.7 to 9 and ultimately while answering issue No.10, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the suit is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed the same with costs. 12. In the light of the submissions made by the Counsel on record, which already had been referred to supra, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal:- 1) Whether the gift made by late Bugga Reddy in favour of the Muslim community can be said to be true, valid and binding in the facts and circumstances of the case? 2) Whether the findings recorded by the trial Court negativing the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs to be confirmed or to be disturbed or to be modified in the facts and circumstances of the case? 3) If so, to what relief, the parties would be entitled to? 13. Points 1 and 2:- For the purpose of convenience these points are being discussed together. The respective pleadings of the parties, the evidence available on record and the findings recorded by the trial Court, in brief, already had been referred to supra. The 1st plaintiff got himself examined as P.W.1. This witness deposed that his father died in the year 1967 and he was minor as on the date of the suit and other plaintiffs were added as parties by virtue of the order made by the Court in I.A.No.762/80 dt.15-7-80. Ex.B.10 is the registered gift deed executed by Bugga Reddy dt.21-1-65. The 1st plaintiff got himself examined as P.W.1. This witness deposed that his father died in the year 1967 and he was minor as on the date of the suit and other plaintiffs were added as parties by virtue of the order made by the Court in I.A.No.762/80 dt.15-7-80. Ex.B.10 is the registered gift deed executed by Bugga Reddy dt.21-1-65. It is no doubt true that Ex.A.22, Ex.A.23, Ex.A.24 and also Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.9 and Ex.A.1- to Ex.A.21 had been relied upon and apart from the evidence of P.W.1, the evidence of P.W.2 also is available on record. P.W.4 also had supported the version of P.W.1 to the effect that Bugga Reddy had ancestral property and that these are joint family properties of the plaintiffs. Reliance also was placed on BAIKUNTA NATH v. SAHI BASHAN (AIR 1972 S.C., 2501) wherein the Apex Court held as hereunder:- "When a joint family is found to be in possession of nucleus sufficient to make the impugned acquisition then the presumption arises that the acquisition standing in the name of the persons who are in the management of family properties are family acquisitions." 14. Hence, in the light of the oral evidence available on record and also the documentary evidence which had been referred to in detail even by the trial Court, the findings recorded that these are the ancestral joint family properties of the plaintiffs and also late Bugga Reddy, cannot be found fault. Ex.B.10 was duly proved by the attestors - D.Ws.2 and 3. The 2nd defendant examined himself as D.W.1. Apart from the evidence of D.W.1, there is evidence of D.W.2, D.W.3, D.W.4, D.W.5, D.W.6 and D.W.7. Ex.X.1 is the registered sale deed executed by Bugga Reddy in favour of Viquaruddin dt.28-4-66. There is no doubt some discussion about the controversy relating to the permission of the Gram Panchayat and the approval of the plan. These aspects need not detain this Court any longer for the reason that the principal question which had been argued in elaboration is that a non-muslim cannot gift away the reasonable portion of the joint family property for the benefit of the muslim community and it would not fall within the meaning of "pious purpose". These aspects need not detain this Court any longer for the reason that the principal question which had been argued in elaboration is that a non-muslim cannot gift away the reasonable portion of the joint family property for the benefit of the muslim community and it would not fall within the meaning of "pious purpose". In THIMMAIAH v. NINGAMMA ((2000) 7 S.C.C., 409) while dealing with the power of Kartha of a Hindu joint family relating to disposal of coparcenary property, it was held that it is limited in order to protect the interest of the other coparceners but however Karta may dispose of such property if the disposition is of a reasonable portion and is for a recognized "pious purpose"; or permission has been taken of other persons having an interest in the property, whether inchoate or otherwise. Reliance also was placed on A.PERUMALAKKAL v. KUMARESAN BALAKRISHNAN (AIR 1967 S.C., 569) wherein the Apex Court at para 8 observed as hereunder:- "Hindu law on the question of gifts of ancestral property is well settled. So far as moveable ancestral property is concerned, a gift out of affection may be made to a wife, to a daughter and even to a son, provided the gift is within reasonable limits. A gift for example of the whole or almost the whole of the ancestral moveable property cannot be upheld as a gift through affection:. But so far as immovable ancestral property is concerned, the power of gift is much more circumscribed than in the case of moveable ancestral property. A Hindu father or any other managing member has power to make a gift of ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits for "pious purposes"; (see Mulla's Hindu Law, 13th Edn. , para. 226, p. 252 ). Now what is generally understood by "pious purpose" is gift for charitable and/or religious purposes. A Hindu father or any other managing member has power to make a gift of ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits for "pious purposes"; (see Mulla's Hindu Law, 13th Edn. , para. 226, p. 252 ). Now what is generally understood by "pious purpose" is gift for charitable and/or religious purposes. But this Court has extended the meaning of "pious purposes" to cases where a Hindu father makes a gift within reasonable limits of immovable ancestral property to his daughter in fulfilment of an antenuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms of her marriage, and the same can also be done by the mother in case the father is dead : (see Kamala Devi v. Bachu Lal Gupta, 1957 SCR 452 : ( AIR 1957 SC 434 ) ." Strong reliance also was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in M.S.WAKF BOARD, MADRAS v. KHAZI MOHIDEEN (AIR 1974 Madras 225) wherein it was observed at paras 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 as hereunder:- "Another question of fact raised is as to whether the grant has been made by a muslim or a non-Muslim. Really there is no evidence on record either way. The plaintiff as P. W. 1 stated in the witness box that the grant had been made by a hindu ruler. But that statement cannot be accepted as evidence and that is a statement of only his case and nothing more. The plaintiff himself had to concede in cross-examination that he did not know who was the grantor, whether he grantor was a Muslim or a non-Muslim. No documentary evidence had been placed either by the plaintiff or by the defendant in order to find out who the grantor was. Due to complete lack of evidence regarding this aspect, the burden of proof becomes important. Alagiriswami, J., has held that the defendant, namely the board has to prove that the grant was made by a muslim, if it wants to support its case that the property is wakf on the ground that it has been granted by a Muslim. The learned Counsel for the defendant contends that the Board having made an enquiry and held that the property is wakf in consequence of which a notification to that effect was published in the Fort St. The learned Counsel for the defendant contends that the Board having made an enquiry and held that the property is wakf in consequence of which a notification to that effect was published in the Fort St. George Gazette when the plaintiff questioned that notification, the initial burden to prove that the property is not wakf is on him. The contention is that if the plaintiff wants to support his case that if the plaintiff wants to support his case that the property is not wakf on the ground that the grant had been made by a non-Muslim, the initial burden is on him to prove such a case. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the defendant invited our attention to Mahant Sri Srinivasa Ramanujadas v. Suryanarayandas (AIR 1967 S.C., 256). That was a case under the Orissa Hindu religious Endowments Act. Under Section 64 of that Act, if any dispute arises as to whether an institution is a math or temple or whether a temple is an excepted temple or not, such a dispute has to be decided by the Commissioner under that Act. The said section further provided that any person affected by a decision of the commissioner may within one year, institute a suit in a Civil Court to modify or set aside such decision and subject to the result of such suit, the order of the commissioner shall be final. The learned Counsel contends that Sections 4 and 5 of the Wakf Act are on par with Section 64 of the Orissa Hindu Religious endowments act and once the Wakf Board causes a notification to be published, it must be held that there has been a quasi-judicial finding regarding the character of the property. The learned counsel contends that under such circumstances, the initial burden is on the plaintiff, who institutes the suit in a Civil Court to show that the property is not wakf. However, we are unable to agree with this contention. The decision contemplated under Section 64 of the Orissa High Court Religious endowments Act is certainly a quasi-judicial decision. That section contemplates an enquiry to be made by the Commissioner and it further says that subject to the result of a suit which might be instituted in a Civil Court, the order of the commissioner shall be final. The decision contemplated under Section 64 of the Orissa High Court Religious endowments Act is certainly a quasi-judicial decision. That section contemplates an enquiry to be made by the Commissioner and it further says that subject to the result of a suit which might be instituted in a Civil Court, the order of the commissioner shall be final. But as far as the Wakf Act is concerned, there is no provision for the Wakf Board to make any enquiry regarding the character of the property. The very heading of Chapter II of the Act and the caption to Section 4 makes it clear that the Commissioner or the Board is not making any enquiry to determine the character of the property. The Commissioner makes only a preliminary survey regarding wakfs and a publication of the list of wakfs is made under Section 5. Section 6 which refers to filing of civil suits makes it clear that the decision of the Civil Court shall be final. It is nowhere stated that any decision of either the Commissioner or the Wakf Board shall be final subject to the decision by a Civil Court for the simple reason that neither the Commissioner nor the Wakf board makes any decision after an enquiry regarding the character of the property. As already stated, only survey is made and a list of wakfs is published. This is only an administrative act and not a quasi-judicial act. Therefore, it is the defendant-Board which wants to establish that he property is wakf should shoulder the burden of proof initially. As there is no evidence on either side, the conclusion of the learned Judge that it has not been proved that the learned Judge that it has not been proved that the grant had been made by a Muslim has to be accepted as correct. Therefore, we have to proceed on the footing that the grant might have been by a non-Muslim and it was for Kazi service. Now, we have to examine, on the above finding, whether the property would be wakf. Therefore, we have to proceed on the footing that the grant might have been by a non-Muslim and it was for Kazi service. Now, we have to examine, on the above finding, whether the property would be wakf. Section 3 (1) of the Wakf Act defines the work 'wakf' as follows:-- "Wakf' means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam of any moveable or immovable property for any purpose recognized by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes (i) a wakf by user; (ii) grants (including mushrut-ul-khidmat) for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and (iii) a wakf-alal-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable. " The question is whether a grant made by a non-Muslim, whatever be the purpose for which the grant is made, would come under the above definition. We are quite clear that it would not. The main part of the defining section makes it clear that the dedication should be by a Muslim. Only then it could be wakf. The contention on behalf of the defendant-appellant is that in the latter part of the section which contains the inclusive definition, there is no reference to the grant being made either by a Muslim or by a non-Muslim and therefore the grant made for any of the purposes mentioned in clauses (i), (ii) or (iii) in the latter part of the section does not necessarily be one made by a Muslim to make a wakf. We are unable to agree with this contention. The inclusive definition contained in the latter part of the section cannot go beyond the terms of the first part, which is the main part of the section. In the first part, it is clearly stated that the dedication should be by a person professing Islam. That is one of the qualification for making a dedication a wakf. The second qualification, in order to make a dedication, a wakf, is that it should be for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable. This second qualification is in general terms. Then comes the inclusive definition. It specifies certain items. That is one of the qualification for making a dedication a wakf. The second qualification, in order to make a dedication, a wakf, is that it should be for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable. This second qualification is in general terms. Then comes the inclusive definition. It specifies certain items. But there can be no doubt that the items mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) in the latter part of the section which gives the inclusive definition should come within the general clause in the first part of the section which, as already stated, refers to the purpose of the dedication as one recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable. It is not possible to dissociate the three clauses in the inclusive definition in the latter part of the section from the first part of the section itself. Under the Madras Wakf (Supplementary) Act, 1961, Madras Act 19 of 1961, the term 'wakf' as defined by the Central Act was amended. Section 2 of the Madras act is as follows- "The term 'wakf' defined in clause (1) of Section 3 of the Wakf Act, 1954 (Central Act 29 of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), shall include all property given or endowed by any person professing any religion other than Islam for the support of--(i) mosque, idgahs, imambaras, dargahs, khangahs or maqbaras; (ii) graveyards of persons professing Islam; and (iii) choultries for, or musafarikhanas for, the benefit or persons professing Islam; and the term 'wakf' defined in the clause aforesaid shall include any person aforesaid". This amendment introduced by the above Madras Act has since been incorporated in the Central Act by the Central Act 34 of 1964 by the introduction of Section 66 c. The said Section 66-C is as follows:- "Application of the Act to properties given or donated by persons not professing Islam for support of certain wakfs--Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act where any movable or immovable property has been given or donated by any person not professing Islam for the support of a wakf being (a) a mosque, idgath, imambara, dargah khangah or a maqhara; (b) a Muslim graveyard; (c) a choultry or a musafarkhana, then such property shall be deemed to be comprised in that Wakf and be dealt with in the same manner as the wakf in which it is so comprised". The very introduction of this section, namely, Section 66-C would go to show that unless a grant made by a non-Muslim comes under any one of the clauses mentioned in that section, it would not be wakf. In other words, a dedication made by a non-Muslim, even if it is for the purposes contemplated under Section 3 (1) of the Central Act, it would not be wakf. As already noted, Section 66-C says that the act is being applied to properties given or donated by persons not professing Islam for support of certain wakfs. But for this section which applies the Act to certain grants made by non-Muslims, no dedication made by a non-Muslim would be part of wakf property. The learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant relies upon Syed Anwar Batcha sahib v. Jamia Masjid Mosque, 1966-1 Mad LJ 379, which is a decision rendered by one of us. No doubt the observations contained in that judgment support the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, that even if the dedication is made by a non-Muslim for Kazi service, it would be wakf. But in that case, the definition of the word, 'wakf' as contained in Section 3 (1) of the Act, had not been considered along with Section 66-C of the Act. That decision has proceeded on the footing that the definition of the word 'wakf' had been amended so as to include all dedications by non-muslims as well. But in that case, the definition of the word, 'wakf' as contained in Section 3 (1) of the Act, had not been considered along with Section 66-C of the Act. That decision has proceeded on the footing that the definition of the word 'wakf' had been amended so as to include all dedications by non-muslims as well. But, as already stated, the amendment of the definition of the word 'wakf' was by the Madras Act 19 of 1961 and that has now been incorporated in Section 66-C of the Central Act. That means all the dedications by a non-Muslim, even if the purpose of dedication is one contemplated under Section 3 (1) of the Act would not be wakf; and a dedication by a non-Muslim can be wakf only if it comes within the four corners of Section 66-C. Whether the present dedication comes under Section 66-C is another question which we would consider presently. We want to make it clear that in order to treat the property as wakf, as defined in Section 3 (1) of the Act, one of the pre-requisites is that the grant ought to have been made by a person professing Islam. Now, the question is, whether the property can be brought under the provision of Section 66-C. As already noticed, under Section 66-C, the grant should be for the support of a wakf as described in clauses (a) to (c) in that section. A plain meaning of Section 66-C indicates that it does not contemplate a non-Muslim creating a wakf himself. He can donate property to an already existing wakf and that too if the wakf is one coming under any of the three clauses mentioned in that section. As we have already said, the grant in this case is for Kazi service. Kazi service which would be a mushrut-ul-khidmat is not one of the wakfs mentioned in any one of the three clauses in Section 66-C. That is why the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant had been trying to establish that the grant was to a mosque, there would be no difficulty in holding that the property is wakf, because under Section 66-C, a non-muslim can dedicate property for the support of a mosque and such dedication shall be deemed to be wakf. As we are clear that the dedication in this case is not to a mosque but only to Kazi service to be done in a mosque, we agree with the conclusion of Alagiriswami, J. , that this does not come under Section 66-C either." 15. It is pertinent to note that Bugga Reddy executed Ex.B.10 for the purpose of running a religious school and educating the children in Urdu and Arabic media. The question which had been raised and argued in elaboration is that the this would not fall within the meaning of "pious purpose". The further contention which had been advanced is that even otherwise, at any rate, when a non-muslim i.e., Hindu had executed such document - Ex.B.10 in favour of Muslim community, it cannot be said that such gift was made for "pious purpose". It is pertinent to note that it is not in serious controversy that late Bugga Reddy had executed Ex.B.10 only relating to a reasonable portion of the joint family property. The intention of late Bugga Reddy in donating Ac.2.00 of land under Ex.B.10 would definitely fall within the expression "pious purpose" and the trial Court recorded findings in elaboration after discussing Ex.B.1, Ex.B.2, Ex.B.3, Ex.B.4, Ex.B.5, Ex.B.6, Ex.B.7, Ex.B.8, Ex.B.9 and Ex.B.11 apart from Ex.B.10 as well and the certified copies of pahanies relied on Ex.A.2 to Ex.A.9, the land revenue receipts Ex.A.10, Ex.A.11, Ex.A.12 and Ex.A.13 to Ex.A.21 also had been discussed apart from Ex.A.1 - the plaint plan. When the father or Karta of a Hindu Joint Family had executed a gift of a reasonable portion of the joint family property for the purpose of running a school for children to learn Urdu and Arabic, merely because it is beneficial to the muslim community, it cannot be said that it would not fall within the meaning of "pious purpose". The Counsel representing appellants was unable to convince this Court on this aspect since this is the crucial question which was argued in elaboration. The Counsel representing appellants was unable to convince this Court on this aspect since this is the crucial question which was argued in elaboration. When that being so, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that late Bugga Reddy, the Karta of the Hindu Joint Family exercised his power within the permissible limits permitted by Law and executed Ex.B.10 and in the light of the voluminous evidence available on record, both oral and documentary, since the genuineness of Ex.B.10 cannot be doubted in any manner whatsoever, this Court is not inclined to disturb the well-considered findings of the trial Court. Accordingly, the findings are hereby confirmed. Since these are the questions which had been argued in elaboration, the other oral and documentary evidence need not be dealt within in detail especially in a case of this nature where the findings are being affirmed in appeal. 16. Point No.2:- In the result, the appeal being devoid of merit, the same shall stand dismissed. But however in the peculiar facts of the case, let the parties to bear their own costs.