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2009 DIGILAW 348 (MP)

PRINCIPAL KENDRIYA VIDYALAYA v. JHINGARIA BHIJHANDE

2009-03-19

DIPAK MISRA, R.K.GUPTA

body2009
Judgment ( 1. ) THE present writ appeal has been preferred under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 against the order dated 13. 07. 2004 passed in W. P. No. 3835/2000 whereby the learned Single Judge has partly allowed the petition and the award passed by the central Govt. Industrial Tribunal has been modified to the extent by allowing 50% of the back wages instead of 100% back wages. ( 2. ) ON behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that after when the petitioner Institution has been notified, jurisdiction has been conferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal by issuing a notification under the provisions of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal constituted under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any dispute relating to such matter. ( 3. ) BEFORE we advert to the question raised on behalf of the appellant, it is to be seen that the respondent was employed as a class IV employee. Since he was illegally terminated from the services by the present appellant, therefore, he raised an industrial dispute by submitting an application for conciliation under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On failure of the conciliation proceedings, the matter was referred to the Central govt. Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication and an order was passed by the Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal on 09. 11. 90 wherein the following dispute was referred to for its adjudication by the tribunal. "whether the action of the management as principal, Kendriya Vidyalaya, Sarni in terminating the services of Shri Jhingaria Bhijhande with effect from 30th April, 1987 is justified ? If not, what relief the workman is entitled for?" ( 4. ) A written statement was filed by the present appellant. In the reply, the Management admitted that no notice of retrenchment was given and no retrenchment compensation was paid. The tribunal has recorded a finding that the concerned workman had worked for more than 240 days in one calendar year. ( 5. ) A written statement was filed by the present appellant. In the reply, the Management admitted that no notice of retrenchment was given and no retrenchment compensation was paid. The tribunal has recorded a finding that the concerned workman had worked for more than 240 days in one calendar year. ( 5. ) BEFORE the tribunal, the present appellant who is the management did not adduce any evidence but only filed the written statement and the tribunal in the absence of any evidence by the present appellant, quashed the termination and directed for the reinstatement of the respondent employee and also awarded the back wages along with interest @ 12% p. a. and the cost of rs. 5000/- to the workman. The award passed by the tribunal was placed as Annexure P/1 along with the writ petition. The learned single Judge has partly allowed the writ petition and modified the award by reducing the quantum of back wages from 100% to 50%. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed the present writ appeal. ( 6. ) WE have perused the writ petition to appreciate the submission made on behalf of present appellant with regard to the jurisdiction of the Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The present appellant did not raise the aforesaid ground relating to jurisdiction of Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal in the writ petition. However, the aforesaid question was raised by him while arguing the writ appeal. ( 7. ) IN this reference, it is to be seen that similar question was raised before the Apex Court with regard to ousting of jurisdiction of courts in view of Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the Apex Court in 1994 Supp (2) SCC 587 Union of india and Others Vs. Baleshwar Singh has held in paragraphs 4 and 5 as under:- "4. Baleshwar Singh has held in paragraphs 4 and 5 as under:- "4. Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 in terms states that on and from the date from which any jurisdiction, power and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post or service matters concerning members of any service or persons appointed to any service or post, no court except (a) the Supreme Court; or (b) any industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the time being in force, shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters. " "5. In view of this legal position, there can be no doubt that the High Court does not have the jurisdiction in matters of the type referred to in the section. The learned counsel for the respondent was not in a position to point out how the High court could exercise jurisdiction in regard to a service matter. We, therefore, think that the preliminary contention raised by the learned counsel for the Union of India must be accepted. We accept the same and set aside the impugned order of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition, but in the facts and circumstances of the case we permit the respondent to approach the tribunal, if so advised, with a fresh petition within 15 days from today whereupon the Tribunal will consider the matter on merits without raising the issue of limitation and without being influenced by the observations of the High Court in the impugned matter on merits. The appeal will stand allowed accordingly with no order as to costs. " ( 8. ) AS it is evident from the same, the Apex Court in the said judgment had an occasion to deal with the question relating to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in the light of the provisions as contained under Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and ultimately a conclusion is drawn that the Central Govt. ) AS it is evident from the same, the Apex Court in the said judgment had an occasion to deal with the question relating to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in the light of the provisions as contained under Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and ultimately a conclusion is drawn that the Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 shall have the jurisdiction to entertain a case inspite of the fact that the undertaking or the Institution as such has been notified under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. ( 9. ) SINCE the question as such has been directly decided by the apex Court, therefore, the said judgment has the binding precedent on this Court and we hold that the Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal constituted under the provisions of Industrial disputes Act, 1947 has the jurisdiction. ( 10. ) ON merits, it is to be also seen that before the Tribunal though the present appellant filed the written statement but did not adduce any evidence to substantiate the plea which was raised to justify the termination by the present appellant while filing the written statement. In the absence of any averment as such and particularly keeping in view the fact that the tribunal had arrived at a conclusion that the respondent employee had worked for a period of more than 240 days in one calendar year, we even otherwise are not inclined to interfere into the order passed by the learned Single Judge. ( 11. ) THE Learned Single Judge has already given relief to the present appellant by reducing the quantum of back wages and the back wages has been reduced from 100% to 50%. ( 12. ) IN view of the aforesaid, we do not find any jurisdictional error or error of law committed by the learned Single Judge. Consequently, we affirm the findings recorded by the learned single Judge and the present writ appeal stands dismissed.