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2009 DIGILAW 348 (PNJ)

National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sushma Rani

2009-02-17

JASWANT SINGH

body2009
Judgment Jaswant Singh, J. 1. This order will dispose of FAO Nos. 1729/1993, Cross Objection No. 21-CII/1994 and FAO No. 1742/1993, arising out of common award dated 22.5.1993 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Patiala (for short Tribunal), whereby the claim petition Nos. 1T and 2T of 31.1.1991/7.8.1992 filed by the dependents of deceased Kuldip Singh and Jasmer Singh respectively were allowed and the following compensation was Awarded :- IT No. FAO No. Compensation awarded Rs. P. 1T of 31.1.1991/7.8.1992 1742/1993 2,16,000-00 2T of 31.1.1991/7.8.1992 1729/1993 1,92,000-00 2 While FAO Nos. 1729 and 1742/1993 have been filed by the appellant- Insurer of the offending vehicle (Swaraj Mazda No. CHW 6017), Cross Objection No. 21- CII of 1994 has been filed by claimants-respondents Sushma Rani in FAO No. 1729 of 1993. 3. None has put in appearance on behalf of the Cross Objectors in FAO No. 1729/1993. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company. 5. The sole contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant- Insurance Company is that the accident in question took place on 3.1.1991, whereas Naresh Mahajan, owner of offending vehicle (insured) had already sold the said vehicle to one Rupinder Singh before the date of accident and the possession of the offending vehicle alongwith all relevant documents/liabilities already stood handed over to said Rupinder Singh as far back as September 1988. It is the case of the appellant-Insurance Company that since on the date of the accident the subsequent purchaser-Rupinder Singh had not got the insurance certificate transferred in his name, the Insurance Company was not liable to pay the compensation. 6. In my considered opinion, in view of the provisions of Section 157 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the Act) the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company is wholly misconceived and liable to be rejected. 7. 6. In my considered opinion, in view of the provisions of Section 157 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the Act) the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company is wholly misconceived and liable to be rejected. 7. As per provisions contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 157 of the Act, "where a person in whose favour the certificate of insurance has been issued in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter transfers to another person the ownership of the motor vehicle in respect of which such insurance was taken together with the policy of insurance relating thereto, the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate shall be deemed to have been transferred in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred with effect from the date of its transfer". 8. The procedure to get the insurance transferred in favour of transferee is prescribed under Sub-section (2) of Section 157 of the Act. In case a transferee fails to take necessary steps for getting insurance transferred in his favour, the insurer cannot be absolved of its liability to pay compensation during the currency of the insurance policy. 9. The Honble Supreme Court in United India Insurance Company Limited v. Tilak Singh, 2006(3) RCR(Civil) 168 : 2007(4) RAJ 404 : Accidents Claims Journal 2006 (Volume III) 1441, after relying upon Rikhi Ram v. Sukhrania, 2003(1) RCR(Civil) 756 : 2003 ACJ 534 (SC) held that failure to transfer the ownership of the insured vehicle in so far as liability towards a third party is concerned, the insurer cannot be absolved of its liability during the currency of the insurance policy as the purpose of legislation was to protect the rights and interest of the third party. The relevant paragraphs 12 and 13 of Tilak Singhs case (supra) are reproduced hereunder :- "12. In Rikhi Ram v. Sukhrania, 2003 ACJ 534 (SC), a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court had occasion to consider Section 103-A of the 1939 Act. This Court re-affirmed the decision in G. Govindans case, 1999 ACJ 781(SC) and added that the liability of an insurer does not cease even if the owner or purchaser fails to give the intimation of transfer to the insurance company, as the purpose of the legislation was to protect the rights and interests of the third party 13. This Court re-affirmed the decision in G. Govindans case, 1999 ACJ 781(SC) and added that the liability of an insurer does not cease even if the owner or purchaser fails to give the intimation of transfer to the insurance company, as the purpose of the legislation was to protect the rights and interests of the third party 13. Thus, in our view, the situation in law which arises from the failure of the transferor to notify the insurer of the fact or transfer of ownership of the insured vehicle is no different, whether under Section 103-A of the 1939 Act insofar as the liability towards a third party is concerned. Thus, whether the old Act applies to the facts before us, or the new Act applies, as far as the deceased third party was concerned, the result would not be different. Hence, the contention of the appellant on the second issue must fail, either way, making a decision on the first contention unnecessary, for deciding the second issue. However, it may be necessary to decide which Act applies for deciding the third contention. In our view, it is not the transfer of the vehicle but the accident which furnishes the cause of action for the application before the Tribunal. Undoubtedly, the accident took place after the 1988 Act had come into force. Hence, it was the 1988 Act which would govern the situation." 10. Learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company has not been able to cite any case law which may be contrary to Tilak Singhs case (supra). 11. In view of the aforesaid provisions of the Act and law laid down by Honble Supreme Court, FAO Nos. 1729 and 1742/2003 stand dismissed being devoid of any merit. 12. So far as Cross Objection No. 21-CII/1994 in FAO No. 1729/1993 is concerned, the same has been filed by claimants for enhancement of compensation. 13. As already noticed above, though no one has put in appearance on behalf of the Cross Objectors, yet with the assistance of the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company, I have gone through the record and considered the cross objections. 14. It is averred in the Cross Objections that the Kuldeep Singh deceased was working as a Halwai and his monthly income from all sources was about Rs. 5000-6000/-, whereas the learned Tribunal has wrongly determined the monthly dependency at Rs. 800/-. 15. 14. It is averred in the Cross Objections that the Kuldeep Singh deceased was working as a Halwai and his monthly income from all sources was about Rs. 5000-6000/-, whereas the learned Tribunal has wrongly determined the monthly dependency at Rs. 800/-. 15. After carefully examining the impugned award, in my considered opinion, the objection raised herein is totally against the evidence led by the claimants. 16. Claimants examined one Rajwinder Singh (AW-4), Sarpanch of the Village where the deceased was residing. It was stated by said witness that Kuldip Singh was not running any regular Halwai Shop and he used to attend the marriages and social functions on daily wages. The learned Tribunal on the basis of said evidence assessed the monthly dependency at Rs. 800/- p.m. 17. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that marriages are not held round the year and is a seasonal affair. Accordingly, the deceased being a Halwai attending marriage functions etc. cannot be said to be in regular employment. No other evidence, to prove the claim that deceased was engaged in dairy business etc., was led before the learned Tribunal. 18. Moreover, learned Tribunal, considering the age of deceased Kuldip Singh (22 years at the time of his death) generously applied a multiplier of 20, which can certainly not be said to be on the lower side. 19. Thus, no case for enhancement of compensation is made out. Accordingly, Cross Objection No. 21-CII of 1994 also stands dismissed. Order accordingly.