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2009 DIGILAW 3482 (ALL)

GHANSHYAM PANDEY v. D. I. O. S. , DEORIA

2009-11-12

SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2009
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Heard Sri I.R. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 and Sri S.K. Chaubey, Advocate who has put in appearance on behalf of respondent No. 4. 2. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 28.11.2006 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Deoria (hereinafter referred to as the “DIOS”) whereby he has directed that the respondent No. 4 shall discharge the duties of Incharge Principal of Sri Deo Kali Nath Sanskrit Pathshala, Barpar, Deoria (hereinafter referred to as the “College”) and the petitioner shall continue to work as Assistant Teacher of the College. 3. The facts in brief giving rise to the present dispute are that the College imparts education from Prathma to Uttar Madhyama, i.e., Class VI to XII and is being managed by the respondent No. 3. Earlier it was affiliated to Sampurnanand Sanskrit Viswavidyalaya, Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as the “University”) and governed by the provisions of U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the “1973 Act”) read with the First Statute of the University published on 20.12.1978 (hereinafter referred to as the “First Statute”). It is said that after the enactment of U.P. Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 2000”) the College is now a recognized institution by the U.P. Board of Secondary Sanskrit Education (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”) in view of Section 13 of the Act, 2000. 4. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher in the College on 1.8.1978 while the respondent No. 4 was appointed on 1.3.1977. Both were granted approval by the Vice Chancellor of the University as per the University’s letter dated 19.2.1987. It is said that the post of Principal fell vacant in 1980 due to the then Principal, Pt. Bajrang Bali leaving the job without giving any reason. The Committee of Management of the College permitted the petitioner to hold officiating charge of the Principal on 5.10.1980 and since then he is looking after the work of the Principal of the College in officiating capacity. The DIOS vide his letter dated 9.7.2005 granted financial approval to petitioner w.e.f. 25.12.2003 for payment of salary of the post of Principal. The Committee of Management of the College permitted the petitioner to hold officiating charge of the Principal on 5.10.1980 and since then he is looking after the work of the Principal of the College in officiating capacity. The DIOS vide his letter dated 9.7.2005 granted financial approval to petitioner w.e.f. 25.12.2003 for payment of salary of the post of Principal. A complaint thereafter appears to have been made by the respondent No. 4 and one Ramakant Yadav, both teachers, claiming themselves to be senior to petitioner as Assistant Teacher in the College, pursuant whereto the DIOS issued a show cause notice to the petitioner and stopped payment of salary on the post of Principal. A reply submitted by the petitioner on 2.6.2006 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition), whereafter the impugned order has been passed. 5. The sheet anchor of the petitioner’s argument for assailing the impugned order is that after 26 years such dispute could not have been raised as the petitioner has a vested right and the same cannot be challenged after such a long time. 6. On behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 a counter-affidavit has been filed stating that the then Principal of the College left the College on 5.10.1980 whereafter the petitioner was allowed to look after and officiate as Principal. The financial approval was accorded to petitioner for payment of salary as Principal by DIOS vide order dated 9.7.2005 w.e.f. 25.12.2003 treating him to be officiating Principal of the College since 1.7.1983 since no one has objected to his functioning as Officiating Principal. However, after the financial approval was granted, the respondent No. 4 claiming himself to be the senior most teacher submitted an application stating that he is entitled for the post of Principal and pursuant thereto the matter was heard and the impugned order has been passed. It is said that from the record it has been found that the respondent No. 4 was the senior most teacher in the College and, therefore, the petitioner could not be allowed to be appointed as Principal even on ad hoc basis, therefore, the impugned order has been passed. 7. Another counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 4, Sri Lal Bachan Dwivedi stating that the Management never sought from the senior most teacher consent for appointment as officiating or ad hoc Principal. 7. Another counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 4, Sri Lal Bachan Dwivedi stating that the Management never sought from the senior most teacher consent for appointment as officiating or ad hoc Principal. Besides, the continuance of petitioner as Officiating Principal for such a long time was wholly illegal and, therefore, the impugned order has been passed rightly. 8. In the rejoinder affidavit filed by petitioner, in reply to the counter-affidavit of respondents No. 1 and 2 it is said when no objection about his functioning as Principal for the last 26 years was raised by the respondent No. 4 or anyone else, it could not have been undone after such a long time and, therefore, the complaint was liable to b e rejected by the DIOS on the ground of such a long delay. Besides the respondent No. 4 is not physically fit as he is suffering from hard hearing and unable to function as Principal. It is submitted that the application submitted by respondent No. 4 was highly belated and barred by limitation. 9. Same thing has been repeated in the rejoinder affidavit filed in reply to the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 4. 10. Sri I.R. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order is illegal and void ab initio for the following reasons: (i) Before passing the impugned order no opportunity was afforded; (ii) DIOS had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order; (iii) Without the approval of the Vice-Chancellor no such order could have been passed; (iv) No power of review is vested in the DIOS; and, (v) Criteria for appointment to the post of Principal would have to be objective and not subjective and without considering any of these aspects the impugned order has been passed. 11. On behalf of respondents, however, it is said that the petitioner was never appointed on the post of Principal in accordance with law and the then DIOS without looking and examining this aspect of the matter passed an order granting financial approval for payment of salary to the petitioner as Principal. When he found that the alleged appointment was not in accordance with law the financial approval for payment of salary was withdrawn. It is said that if an order has been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation and even otherwise it is illegal it can always be recalled or cancelled. 12. When he found that the alleged appointment was not in accordance with law the financial approval for payment of salary was withdrawn. It is said that if an order has been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation and even otherwise it is illegal it can always be recalled or cancelled. 12. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record. 13. From the facts and rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, in my view, the issues up for consideration in the case in hand would be : (i) Whether the petitioner was ever appointed as Officiating Principal of the College; (ii) Whether the procedure prescribed in the Statute was ever followed; (iii) Whether the petitioner in law could have claimed salary on the post of Principal; (iv) Whether the dispute raised by respondent No. 4 regarding payment of salary on the post of Principal to petitioner treating him as having been appointed on the said post though on officiating basis is in any manner barred, i.e., on the principle of waiver, acquiescence, estoppel, delay etc. or for any other reason; and, (v) Whether the order impugned in this writ petition is wholly without jurisdiction and otherwise illegal or erroneous in law. 14. Before considering the above issues, it would be appropriate to have a bird eye view of the relevant statutory provisions relevant in this case. Since it is an admitted position that prior to the enactment of Act, 2000 the College was governed by the provisions of 1973 Act and the First Statute of the University, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions then available for making appointment on the post of Principal in an affiliated College of the University. There were four types of affiliated Colleges of the University as provided in Chapter 12, Part I of the First Statute of University. Statute 12.01 giving details of the four categories of the Colleges is reproduced as under : “12.01. The affiliated colleges of the University shall be of the following four categories : (1) Post-Graduate Degree Colleges—The affiliated colleges which are recognised for imparting instruction for Acharya course and fulfil the following conditions shall be the the Post-Graduate Colleges of the university: (a) At least 40 students are enrolled for regular study in the College. The affiliated colleges of the University shall be of the following four categories : (1) Post-Graduate Degree Colleges—The affiliated colleges which are recognised for imparting instruction for Acharya course and fulfil the following conditions shall be the the Post-Graduate Colleges of the university: (a) At least 40 students are enrolled for regular study in the College. (b) At least 15 students appear at Shastri and Acharya examinations of the university and not less than 35 per cent of them are successful at the said examinations. (2) Degree Colleges—The affiliated colleges which are recognised for imparting instruction for Shastri course and fulfil the following conditions shall be the Degree Colleges of the university; (a) At least 40 students are enrolled for regular study in the college. (b) At least 30 students appear at Prathama to Shastri examinations of the university and at least 10 students appear at Shastri examination of the University and not less than 35 per cent of them are successful at the said examinations. (3) Uttara Madhyamika Vidyalayas—The affiliated colleges which are recognised for imparting instruction for Uttara Madhyama course and fulfil the following conditions shall be the Uttara Madhyamika Vidyalayas of the University : (a) At least 35 students are enrolled for regular study in the college. (b) At least 25 students appear at Prathama to Uttar Madhyama examinations of the university and among them at least 10 students appear at Uttara Madhyama examination of the University and not less than 35 per cent of them are successful at the said examinations. (4) Purva Madhyamika Vidyalayas—The affiliated colleges which are recognised for imparting instruction for Purva Madhyama course and fulfil the following conditions shall be the Purva Madhyamika Vidyalayas of the University: (a) At least 25 students are enrolled for regular study in the college. (b) At least 15 students appear at Prathama to Purva Madhyama examinations and among them at least 5 students appear at Purva Madhyama examination of the University and not less than 35 per cent of them are successful at the said examinations.” 15. The classification of teachers of affiliated colleges is provided in Chapter 10, Part II, Statute 10.05 and it reads as under : “10.05. The classification of teachers of affiliated colleges is provided in Chapter 10, Part II, Statute 10.05 and it reads as under : “10.05. There shall be the following classes of the teachers other than Principals, of the affiliated colleges in Uttar Pradesh : (a) In the Post-Graduate Colleges: (1) Pradhanacharya, (2) Professor/Vibhagadhyaksha, (3) Sahayak Professor/Sahayak Vibhagadhyaksha, (4) Shikshaka (b) In the Degree Colleges: (1) Pradhanacharya, (2) Adhyapaka, (3) Sahayak Adhyapaka, (c) In the Uttar Madhyamika Vidyalayas: (1) Pradhanacharya, (2) Sahayak Adhyapaka, (3) Sahayak Adhyapaka (Kanistha), (4) Adhyapaka, (d) In the Purv Madhyamika Vidyalayas: (1) Pradhan Adhyapaka, (2) Sahayak Adhyapaka (Jayestha), (3) Sahayak Adhyapaka (Kanistha), (4) Adhyapaka.” 16. Chapter 11, Part II deals with the qualifications and appointment of teachers in affiliated colleges. Statute 11.15 provides that the Principal and teachers of the affiliated colleges shall be appointed by the Management on whole time basis on the post and in the pay scales approved by the Government on the recommendation of a selection committee in the manner provided in the Statute. For appointment of a Principal the constitution of selection committee is provided in Statute 11.16(1) which reads as under : “11.16(1) The Selection Committee for appointment of Principal of an affiliated college shall consist of— (a) the Head of the management or a member of the management (not being the Principal or a teacher of the college) nominated by him, who shall be the Chairman; (b) one member of the management (not being the Principal or a teacher of the college) nominated by the management; (c) one Principal of another college, nominated by the Vice-Chancellor; and (d) two experts including one from amongst the teachers of the University, nominated by the Vice-Chancellor.” 17. Statute 11.21 provides that a vacancy likely to last for more than six months (not being a vacancy caused by grant of leave to a teacher for a period not exceeding ten months) shall be filled in except after advertisement in at least one newspaper having adequate circulation in the State or the Union Territory concerned and the advertisement shall ordinarily allow the candidates at least three weeks time from the date of issue of the newspaper in which the advertisement is published. 18. Statute 11.24 provides that all appointment of Principal or of Teachers of an affiliated College shall be made by the management subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. 18. Statute 11.24 provides that all appointment of Principal or of Teachers of an affiliated College shall be made by the management subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. It would be appropriate to reproduce the same as under : “11.24. All appointments of Principals or of teachers of an affiliated college made by the management shall be subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor may call for the applications and other papers concerning the appointment and if in his opinion the candidate so appointed is not fit for appointment, he shall refer the matter, back to the management for reconsideration and report. In the case of difference between the Vice-Chancellor and the management the matter shall be referred to the Executive Council and its decision shall be final.” 19. For making officiating or temporary appointments Statute 11.32 and 11.33 provides the following procedure : “11.32. The Vice-Chancellor’s approval shall not be necessary for an officiating or temporary appointment of a Principal or a teacher— (a) in a vacancy likely to last for not more than six months: (b) in a vacancy caused by grant of leave to a Principal or a teacher for a period not exceeding ten months: and (c) in a temporary vacancy against a temporary post. 11.33 (1) The management of a college may, in consultation with the head of the Department concerned of the University nominated by the Vice-Chancellor in that behalf, make an officiating appointment of a teacher in a vacancy caused by the grant of leave to an incumbent for a period not exceeding ten months without reference to the selection committee, but shall not fill any other vacancy or post likely to last for more than six months without such reference. (2) Where any teacher is appointed to a temporary post (after reference to a selection committee) likely to last for more than six months and such post is subsequently converted into a permanent post, the management may, without fresh reference to the selection committee, appoint such teacher in a substantive capacity to the post.” 20. It is not in dispute that U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1980”) was enacted and was enforced w.e.f. 31.08.1980. It was applicable to the College affiliated to the University. It is not in dispute that U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1980”) was enacted and was enforced w.e.f. 31.08.1980. It was applicable to the College affiliated to the University. Vide Section 30 of Act, 1980 it was given overriding effect over 1973 Act and the Statutes and Ordinances framed thereunder. Section 12 provides that every appointment as a Teacher of any College shall be made by the management in accordance with the provisions of Act, 1980 and every appointment in contravention thereof shall be void. It is not in dispute that the word “Teacher” in view of Section 2(g) of Act, 1980 read with Section 2(18) of Act, 1973 includes a Principal of the affiliated College. Act, 1980 provides for recruitment through Higher Education Service Commission and only such candidates who are recommended by the said Commission, liable to be appointed as Teacher in the College. Section 16 of Act, 1980 confers power upon the management to make ad hoc appointment and reads as under : “16. Appointment of ad-hoc teachers.—(1) Where the management has notified a vacancy to the Commission in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 12, and the Commission fails to recommend the names of suitable candidates in accordance with sub-section (1) of that section within three months from the date of such notification, the management may appoint a teacher on purely ad hoc basis from amongst the persons holding qualification prescribed therefore. (2) Every appointment of an ad hoc teacher under sub-section (1) shall cease with effect from the earliest of the following dates, namely— (a) when the candidates recommended by the Commission joins the post; (b) where the period of two months from the date of receipt of the recommendation of the Commission under sub-section (1) of Section 12 expires; (c) thirtieth day of June following the date of such ad hoc appointment.” 21. It is worthy to mention at this stage that the aforesaid provision was deleted from the Statute book by U.P. Act No. 2 of 1992 w.e.f. 22.11.1991. 22. Section 25 of Act, 1980 provides that appointment of Teacher in contravention of the provisions of the said Act shall be an offence punishable, on conviction, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or fine which may extend to Rs. 5000/- or with both. 23. 22. Section 25 of Act, 1980 provides that appointment of Teacher in contravention of the provisions of the said Act shall be an offence punishable, on conviction, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or fine which may extend to Rs. 5000/- or with both. 23. In exercise of power under Section 31-A(1) of Act, 1980, U.P. Higher Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the “Order, 1982”) was published on 3.1.1982 which provides for the manner in which an ad hoc appointment can be made and Clause 2 and 3 thereof reads as under : “2. Vacancies in which ad hoc appointments can be made and eligibility for appointment.—(1) The Management of a College may appoint a teacher on purely ad hoc basis, in accordance with the provisions of this Order, in the vacancies occurring in any of the following manner, namely : (i) creation of a new post; (ii) suspension, removal or dismissal of a teacher; (iii) resignation or death of a teacher; (iv) a teacher going on leave for a period of more than ten months; (v) a teacher proceeding on “teachers fellowship” under any scheme of University Grants Commission or any other body. (2) The candidates to be appointed under Paragraph (1) must possess the prescribed minimum qualification. 3. Manner and duration of appointment.—Every appointment of a teacher under Paragraph 2 shall be made in consultation with an expert, nominated by the Vice-Chancellor, and shall cease on the date when the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission recommends a candidate for appointment in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980.” 24. The above Order, 1982 was enacted for a period of one year. Thereafter again U.P. Higher Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the “Order, 1983”) was issued providing for the manner and contingency when ad hoc appointment of a Teacher can be made and though the provisions were substantially similar but there was a slight distinction inasmuch as sub-clause (vi) was added in Order, 1983 but para 2(2) was omitted. Para 3 was substantially similar. Therefore, this Court finds it expedient not to reproduce it being similar to Order, 1982. 25. Para 3 was substantially similar. Therefore, this Court finds it expedient not to reproduce it being similar to Order, 1982. 25. Under Act, 2000 procedure for appointment of Head of an institution, Teacher or other employees is governed by Section 25 which reads as under: “25. Procedure for appointment of Head of institution, teachers and other employees.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Head of institution and teachers and other employees of an institution shall be appointed in accordance with the regulations.” 26. No other provision has been placed by learned counsels for the parties before this Court to show the procedure or manner in which Principal of an affiliated College in the University whether on substantive basis or ad hoc or temporary basis could be appointed. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to dispute, though hesitantly, application of Act, 1980 to the College affiliated with the University but I find that this issue has already been concluded by a Division Bench of this Court in Swaminath Mishra v. Director of Education (Higher Education) U.P., Allahabad and others, 1996 AWC 21 where, after considering the Act, 1973, First Statute of University as also the provisions of Act, 1980, this Court in paras 8, 9 and 10 observed as under : “8. Section 30 of the Act declares that the provisions of the Act, shall have effect notwithstanding to the contrary contained in the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 or the Statutes or Ordinances made thereunder. 9. It is not in dispute that the Institution is an affiliated college to which the privilege of affiliation has been granted by the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya which is, indisputably, a University. 10. The expression “teacher” used in Section 12 of the Act has not been defined by the Act. Therefore, the definition of the expression “teacher” given in sub-section (18) of Section 2 of the State Universities Act shall apply by virtue of sub-section (g) of Section 2 of the Act. A combined reading of the provisions of Section 2(g) of the Act and 2(18) of the State Universities Act make it abundantly clear that the expression “teacher” used in Section 12 of the Act will also include in its ambit a “Principal”. A combined reading of the provisions of Section 2(g) of the Act and 2(18) of the State Universities Act make it abundantly clear that the expression “teacher” used in Section 12 of the Act will also include in its ambit a “Principal”. Thus, the procedure for appointment of a teacher given in Section 12 of the Act shall apply to the appointment of a Principal of the college also.” 28. Coming to the first question, I find that no material has been placed on record by the petitioner as to whether he was ever appointed as Principal of the College in any capacity including that of officiating. On the contrary, his case is throughout that since the then Principal was not coming to the College the management allowed the petitioner to discharge the duties of Principal on 5.10.1980 and onwards. No letter of appointment has been placed on record. Even from a bare perusal of Annexure-3 to the writ petition, which is said to be a certificate issued by the associate DIOS on 6.3.1987, it appears that the petitioner was found discharging duties of Principal and the College was functioning under his signatures as Principal. His signature however was attested by the Assistant Inspector, Sanskrit Schools, Gorakhpur on 29.4.1987 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition). The counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the DIOS’s show cause notice dated 9.7.2005 to show that it is mentioned therein that the erstwhile Principal was removed from service and thereafter the management passed resolution on 26.06.1983 appointing the petitioner as Principal of the College in officiating capacity w.e.f. 1.7.1983 and submits that this letter clearly shows that the management appointed the petitioner as Officiating Principal in the College. However he failed to point out or place any such letter of appointment ever issued to the petitioner appointing him as Officiating Principal of the College. In the absence of any letter of appointment, whether a person can be said to be appointed on a post merely because he is discharging duties of that post and/or a decision was taken by the appointing authority to appoint him even if no order of appointment was formally issued is the next ancillary question necessary to be decided hereat. The factum that a person is looking after the duties of a post does not mean that he is appointed on that post. The factum that a person is looking after the duties of a post does not mean that he is appointed on that post. This is what has been held by a Division Bench (of which I was also a Member) in Smt. Vijay Rani v. Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools Region-I, Meerut and others, 2007 (2) ESC 987 wherein this Court held : “In other words, it can be said that the Petitioner-Appellant was given only current duty charge in addition to her substantive post and this arrangement did not result in promotion to the post of which, the current duty charge was handed over. In State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma, AIR 1993 SC 2273 , the Chief Administrator of the Board entrusted Sri S.M. Sharma, with the current duty charge of the post of Executive Engineer, which was subsequently withdrawn as a result of his transfer to other post. He challenged the said order stating that it amounts to reversion. The Apex Court held that Sri Sharma was only having current duty charge of the Executive Engineer and was never promoted or appointed to the aforesaid post and therefore, on transfer to some other post, it did not result in reversion from the post of Executive Engineer. A somewhat similar situation occurred in Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar v. Union of India and others, 1991 Supple (2) SCC 733 and the Apex Court observed as under : “The distinction between a situation where a government servant is promoted to a higher post and one where he is merely asked to discharge the duties of the higher post is too clear to require any reiteration. Asking an officer who substantively holds a lower post merely to discharge the duties of a higher post cannot be treated as a promotion.” It was further held that such situations are contemplated where exigencies of public service necessitate such arrangements and even consideration of seniority do not enter into it sometimes. However the person continues to hold substantive lower post and only discharges duties of the higher post essentially as a spot-gap arrangement. However the person continues to hold substantive lower post and only discharges duties of the higher post essentially as a spot-gap arrangement. A further contention was raised that if such an arrangement continued for a very long period it would give some kind of right to continue on the post but negativing such contention, it was held that an in-charge arrangement is neither recognition nor is necessarily based on seniority and therefore, no rights, equities and expectations can be built upon it.” 29. Therefore, mere discharge of duty of a higher post does not meant that one is appointed on the post. 30. Now coming to the next aspect that a decision to appoint does not mean order of appointment. It is well settled that a decision unless partakers the status of an order, cannot confer any right upon the persons in whose favour the decision is taken since it is liable to be changed at any point of time. The petitioner was allowed to look after the duties of the office of Principal as admitted by him on 05.10.1980 and he continued to look after the same thereafter. Though it is alleged that the committee of management passed resolution on 26.06.1983 for appointing him as Officiating Principal but the said decision or resolution could not be shown to be given effect to by issuing consequential order of appointment to the petitioner as neither any such order has been placed on record nor it is the case of the petitioner that the same was actually issued. The Apex Court in the case of Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395 considering the distinction between a “decision” and an “order” held as under : “Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be communicated to the person who would be affected by that order before the State and that person can be bound by that order. For, until the order is communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over against and, therefore, till its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character” 31. For, until the order is communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over against and, therefore, till its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character” 31. In the absence of any order of appointment, therefore, issued in favour of petitioner as Officiating Principal of the College, I find it difficult to answer the first question in favour petitioner and, therefore, answer the same in negative and against the petitioner. 32. Now coming to the second question, it is evident from the facts discussed above that the procedure laid down either in the Statute 11.32 and 11.33 or that provided in the Order, 1982 and Order, 1983 was not followed at all. Neither the appointment was made by selecting the petitioner through the committee as referred to in para 3 of Order, 1982 or 1983 nor it appears that any intimation of appointment of petitioner on the post of Principal ever conveyed to the Vice Chancellor seeking his approval. Here one more thing is necessary to be considered. Before 1982 Order, the management could have made ad hoc appointment in a vacancy of the Principal in the College in the contingencies prescribed in the said provision but since the then Principal of the College had not been terminated till then, the management, treating him as absent unauthorisedly, did not find the post vacant, so as to attract the provisions of Section 16 of Act, 1980 and, therefore, did not take any step for appointment of petitioner. It appears that the aforesaid Principal was terminated some times in the year 1983. Thereafter it was incumbent upon the respondent No. 3 to make appointment, officiating or ad hoc, on the post of Principal in accordance with the procedure under Para 2 or 3 or the Order, 1982 or 1983 as the case may be but that was never observed. The alleged resolution dated 26.6.1983 though proposed appointment of petitioner as officiating Principal treating him senior most teacher w.e.f. 1.7.1983 but the same also not given effect to. Only the petitioner was allowed to function as Principal but without appointing him on the said post so as to create a right on him to hold the post of Principal, may be for short duration, and for other benefits like salary etc. 33. Only the petitioner was allowed to function as Principal but without appointing him on the said post so as to create a right on him to hold the post of Principal, may be for short duration, and for other benefits like salary etc. 33. Learned counsel for the petitioner admitted the fact that he was paid salary throughout, i.e., for about 25 years, i.e., from 1980 to June 2005 as Assistant Teacher. It is only pursuant to the order dated 9.7.2005 he was allowed payment of salary on the post of Principal w.e.f. 25.12.2003. However, this payment was stopped by order dated 6.3.2006. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not show anything to this Court which may give even a colour of observance of statutory provisions in order to entitle him to claim right to hold office of the Principal. A person can claim salary of a particular post only when he is appointed on the post and not otherwise. Mere holding the charge, looking after the work in addition and over and above his substantive post does not result in conferring a right upon the incumbent concerned to claim salary on higher post on which he has never been appointed and that too after following the procedure prescribed in law. Despite of repeated query made by this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner could not show anything which may suggest that any provision of law referred above was observed by respondent No. 3 for enabling the petitioner to claim a right to hold the post of Principal or salary thereof. I, therefore, answer the second question in affirmance and hold that the statutory provision was not at all observed in the case in hand. 34. Sri I.R. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a senior most teacher is not necessary to be appointed as Principal of the College since the appointment is to be made objectively and if the senior most teacher is not competent, the person junior to him can be appointed and in this regard placed reliance on the Apex Court’s decision in Ram Murti Singh v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria, 1995 (Suppl.) (3) SCC 170. In my view, the submission in principle admits no exception but has no application to the facts of this case. In my view, the submission in principle admits no exception but has no application to the facts of this case. Here it is not the case of the respondent No. 3 that the respondent No. 4 was considered for appointment to the post of Principal on officiating basis but was not found fit and thereafter the petitioner was considered. Therefore, this question does not arise in the case in hand and the submission of Sri Singh in this regard is wholly misconceived. 35. The issues No. 1 and 2 thus answered against the petitioner. This Court is clearly of the view that having never been appointed on the post of Principal even on officiating capacity, the petitioner is not at all entitled to claim salary on the post of Officiating Principal and without looking this aspect of the matter the DIOS in granting financial approval for salary on the post acted wholly illegally and that order was totally without jurisdiction and also without considering the facts that unless the petitioner could have been appointed on the post, the question of payment of salary does not arise. The DIOS misguided himself from the alleged resolution of the committee of management and treated the petitioner as senior most teacher of the College. It appears that the order dated 9.7.2005 was passed on misrepresentation or due to lack of relevant material but when it was brought to the notice of DIOS that neither the petitioner was senior most teacher nor otherwise appointed under law, he rightly passed the impugned order dated 28.11.2006. In the case in hand once it has been held that the petitioner was neither appointed on the post of Principal nor the procedure laid down was ever followed, the petitioner had no right at all either to the post of Principal or for salary on the said post. Issue No. 3 is answered accordingly. 36. In the case in hand once it has been held that the petitioner was neither appointed on the post of Principal nor the procedure laid down was ever followed, the petitioner had no right at all either to the post of Principal or for salary on the said post. Issue No. 3 is answered accordingly. 36. It cannot contend that the respondents could not have passed an order directing the petitioner to discharge duties of his substantive post while permitting the senior most teacher of the College to look after the duties of the Principal inasmuch as in the absence of any right to the post, no question of estoppel, waiver or delay in the case in hand arises inasmuch as a local arrangement, if made by the management, even if continued for long time, would not create either a vested interest or a right upon the incumbent concerned for claiming that such local arrangement should continue. I, therefore, find no substance in the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that after a long time and particularly when no objection was raised by respondent No. 4 for such a long time, he could not raise the dispute at this stage. So long as no substantive benefit was given, the senior most teachers could have expected consideration of their case but when an order was passed for salary of higher post, treating this arrangement as appointment, it immediately results in suppression of those teachers giving them an occasion to dispute the same. The question No. 4 thus is also replied in negative. 37. The management never passed any order with respect to appointment of petitioner on the post of Principal on officiating basis. The DIOS, however, misguided himself by alleged resolution of respondent No. 3 and, therefore, granted approval for payment of salary from the State Exchequer but on the complaint made and realizing the fact that the petitioner had no right at all to the post having never been appointed on the said post, he has rightly held that the petitioner should continue to look after his substantive post. In my view the decision of DIOS for not to pay salary to the petitioner on the post of Principal on which he was never appointed cannot be said to be without jurisdiction in any manner. In my view the decision of DIOS for not to pay salary to the petitioner on the post of Principal on which he was never appointed cannot be said to be without jurisdiction in any manner. An order giving financial approval for the purpose of giving salary is an administrative order and if it is found to have been passed wrongly or illegally, it is always liable to be revoked by the same administrative authority. Generally it is said that an administrative order having civil consequences may not be passed without issuing show cause notice. In the case in hand even that compliance has been made inasmuch as the petitioner was permitted to file his objections which he submitted on 2.6.2006 and thereafter the impugned order has been passed. Learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage submitted that though the petitioner has mentioned so many things in his representation but nothing has been considered in the impugned order and the same is a non-speaking, unreasoned order. Having considered the petitioner’s reply I find that it is nowhere stated therein that the petitioner was ever appointed on the post of Principal in accordance with law. In absence of any such averment, the other aspect which he tried to explain in his representation had no legal consequences at all and, therefore, it is difficult to accept the submission that the petitioner’s reply has not been considered. If a person submits a voluminous reply without giving any substantive reason, it is not necessary for the executive authority to pass a long order but it would be a suffice compliance of the require of law if from the order it appears that the authority has applied his mind. The impugned order shows that the DIOS has considered petitioner’s reply and the representation of respondent No. 4 and thereafter has passed the same. The question No. 5 is answered accordingly. 38. In the result, I find no merit in this writ petition and it deserves to be dismissed. 39. However, before parting it would be appropriate to notice that the College in the case in hand is running for such a long time without any regularly appointed Principal in accordance with law. This situation is highly deplorable and disturbing. 38. In the result, I find no merit in this writ petition and it deserves to be dismissed. 39. However, before parting it would be appropriate to notice that the College in the case in hand is running for such a long time without any regularly appointed Principal in accordance with law. This situation is highly deplorable and disturbing. It is also surprising that the official respondents have also not cared to look into this aspect of the matter by compelling the respondent No. 3 to take steps for regular appointment of Principal in the College in accordance with law. This situation could not have continued for more than two decades unless there is some collusion of the authorities. Apparently this Court is satisfied that inaction on the part of the State authorities and omission in noticing lapses on the part of respondent No. 3 is intentional and lacks bona fide, and, may be for reasons other than just and valid. 40. In the circumstances, the respondents No. 1 and 2 are directed to make an inquiry into the matter of the College as to why steps for appointment of Principal on regular basis have not been taken in the College for such a long time and if management failed to discharge its function in accordance with law, why appropriate preventive measures as permissible in law were not taken against the management. If the management’s lapses had collusive support of the educational authorities also, they are also liable to be proceeded in accordance with law. 41. The respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 are also directed to take steps for making appointment on the post of Principal in the College on substantive and regular basis in accordance with law within three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 42. With the above observations and directions this writ petition is dismissed with cost which is quantified to Rs. 10,000/-. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. ————