JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Viresh Mishra, learned Senior Advocate who appeared to press the second bail application moved on behalf of Vikash son of Harcharan Singh and learned A.G.A. 2. Appellant has been punished for an offence punishable under Section 304-B, IPC and Section 3/4, Dowry Prohibition Act and he is to serve out the sentence so provided in the judgment. 3. Submission is that the ingredients to bring the offence within the purview of dowry death are not available and in fact, on the facts it is proved to be a suicidal death and the appellant being the husband has been falsely implicated. 4. Submission is that theory of demand of dowry etc. is a routine narration and as the appellant is in jail after conviction since last about 2-1/2 years and he did not misuse the bail during the trial and therefore he is entitled for bail. 5. Learned A.G.A. opposed the aforesaid and it is submitted that it is a case where the lady died unnatural death in the house of the appellant and thus the burden is on the appellant to prove the circumstances in which the lady is said to have committed suicide. 6. Submission is that if the learned trial judge believed the prosecution version so corroborated by the independent evidence then it is not a fit case in which second bail application is to be allowed. 7. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is to consider the matter. 8. The first question which needs consideration is that what can be criteria/consideration while considering the second bail application. 9. At the very out set this Court is to observe that the, at the time of considering the second bail application, unless there are serious/material changes in the facts and a noticeable development is there, which existed while disposing the first bail application, the reconsideration is difficult. 10. It is not to be emphasized that right to move the second bail application is not meant for the purpose of rehearing/argument on same facts and evidence either with the change of the counsel or with the new flavour of arguments nor the consideration of the second bail application is permitted to be like an exercise on a review petition or as an appeal by the same Bench or another Bench to scrutinize the view so expressed by the earlier Bench. 11. 11. The consideration of the second bail application has to be based on a major change of facts which was not available or it was not in offing at that time and it is something new development i.e. passage of some long time, very ripe age or if the rejection of the first bail application is without considering ground/consideration. 12. It is again to be emphasized that there cannot be hard and fast rule and fixed criteria for the purpose and the facts of each and every case may have an impact and guiding factor so as to form an opinion. It is not to be reiterated that lack of reasons in an order having an effect on the rights of the parties and at the same time conclusion so arrived if is not supported by positive things on record rather the consideration is not on the basis of the founded facts then one can be permitted to advance the arguments touching the merit. If this is not taken care then firstly the effort by an unsuccessful party will be endless and the liberty which is otherwise not forbidden in law may be in a position of being misused. One may not be satisfied with the arguments, with the reasons, with the vehemence, with the confidence in respect to the merits of his case unless he is able to get the result. This will not be a healthy thing to the system. 13. At one place we are experiencing and we are making observation and we are feeling on a public note also being overburdened and not in a position to dispose of number of cases/sizeable figure so as to compel the litigant to remain in queue for long and at the other place we are to permit the hearing and rehearing of the same matter time and again in the same set of facts/evidence and thus it will be for all concerned to keep in mind while dealing with the situation. 14. We are not to be misunderstood from the observations made above to be giving a signal of curtailment of the right of a litigant if that is not forbidden in law but at the same time a satisfaction that it is a case for reconsideration on the settled norms is there has to be there. 14. We are not to be misunderstood from the observations made above to be giving a signal of curtailment of the right of a litigant if that is not forbidden in law but at the same time a satisfaction that it is a case for reconsideration on the settled norms is there has to be there. Instead of going into the further length of the issue we are to conclude by leaving it to everybody to think over the matter before moving the Court time and again for the same purpose on the same facts, may be with a different idea/approach. 15. So far the case in hand is concerned the argument is that it is not a case of demand of any dowry and terms, if any, were already settled and in fact the lady committed suicide due to disparity in education of the couple which was an embarrassing position to both sides. 16. It is further submitted that the appellant in due course started tempo driving at Delhi and the lady insisted to keep her at that place and on its refusal it gave frustration to the lady so as to commit the suicide. 17. Learned counsel referred to a suicidal note also and at the same time the arguments were tried to be advanced that from the text as provided in the Modi Medical Jurisprudence the kind/manner of the death is to be accepted as suicidal death. 18. On the grounds mentioned above, the second bail application is pressed. 19. Learned Government side opposed the aforesaid and it was submitted that it is a case where the lady died in unnatural circumstances in the house of the appellant and thus the probable reasons for taking such harsh step having not been established, the appellant is not entitled for bail. 20. Now we are to test arguments on the merits also. 21. This Court is to take note of the fact that first bail application was rejected by the Court by noticing the argument of the appellant side on 4.2.2008. By that order Smt. Sumitra and Harcharan Singh mother-in-law and father-in-law were granted bail. 22. Argument of the counsel for the appellant that the case is fabricated; there is false implication was noticed by the Court and the Court did not agree. By that order Smt. Sumitra and Harcharan Singh mother-in-law and father-in-law were granted bail. 22. Argument of the counsel for the appellant that the case is fabricated; there is false implication was noticed by the Court and the Court did not agree. There is a clear observation that there are ante mortem injuries and at the same time the defence which was placed during the course of argument was never placed/proved before the learned trial judge and thus there being a positive defence having not been pushed, inference can be drawn against the appellant at this stage. 23. It is not to be reiterated that in these kind of matters direct evidence of the incident can be hardly forthcoming and it is the probability and circumstances, that is to matter. 24. The ground of frustration of the lady on account of disparity in the education, not being kept at a comfortable place at Delhi, is not acceptable to be such a strong ground/reason on which the Court can accept such a great depression to the lady to take extreme step and to commit suicide. Disparity in her education can be a matter of knowledge at the time of marriage. The appellant was not in an established job and a full time worker so the lady may claim her living at Delhi and in any view of the matter there is no positive evidence to support the aforesaid stand and thus the Court finds the argument to be not so sound to accept the plea of deep frustration of the level so as to result into unnatural happening. 25. Learned trial judge has discussed the prosecution witnesses, defence witnesses and he recorded the finding that appellant and his family members were not happy with the things they have delivered at the time of marriage. There is a further finding that the appellant was called for a negotiation in the matter and it is then the talks took final shape. The lady was again sent to the house of the appellant. These facts were corroborated by the prosecution witnesses namely Rajpal Singh and Rajiv Kumar. 26. There is a further finding that the appellant was called for a negotiation in the matter and it is then the talks took final shape. The lady was again sent to the house of the appellant. These facts were corroborated by the prosecution witnesses namely Rajpal Singh and Rajiv Kumar. 26. In respect to the argument of Sri Mishra, learned Senior Advocate that Court is to take into account cases of false implication in such kind of matters vis-à-vis the liberty of a person, we are to simply observe that if his contention for the sake of argument is accepted then the Court being swayed on the aforesaid, will have to leave every accused at liberty. Thus the general and emotional arguments about the growing trend in the society on the complete trial and after conviction, unless the facts of that very case permits the release of the discretion in favour of the accused is not to matter. 27. In this connection we are to just refer the judgment given by the Apex Court in the case of Gomti v. Thakurdas and others reported in (2007) 11 SCC 160 . The observation in this respect, as referred in the judgment given in the case of Gomti (supra) is to be again quoted at this place— “In the cases involving conviction under Section 302, I.P.C., it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. The impugned order of the High Court does not meet the requirement. In Vijay Kumar case it was held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder.” 28. In the recent judgment given by the Apex Court in case of State of Punjab v. Deepak Mattu reported in (2007) 11 SCC, 319 and another decision given in the case of Sidhartha Vashisth alias Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2008)5 SCC, 230 it was clearly observed that possible delay in disposal of the appeal and presence of arguable point by itself may not be sufficient to grant bail and to suspend the sentence so awarded to the accused after the trial. 29. The death of lady under unusual circumstances in the family of the appellant is not to be lightly taken. Defence of suicidal death unless is proved beyond reasonable doubt may not be in a position of being believed in a routine manner. The Court will have to cautiously examine the reason/root. Even it is a case of death by her own act under compelling circumstances on a proof in favour of the accused on a defence like it, it may be a case of not so severe treatment/punishment but that may not totally absolve the husband and other family members of the pious respect which they owe to the innocent lady coming to that family on being departed from her parental love and affection in a hope to receive if not more but at least same respect and honour in the family from where she comes. 30. It is not a case that lady was of unsound mind and thus has committed suicide. 31. The appellant is not in jail since long and the appellant is not of very ripe age and there is no special feature of which special notice can be taken note. The first bail application was rejected on 4.2.2008. Keeping in mind the nature of the charge, this Court is not satisfied that appellant has made out any case for allowing the second application for bail. 32. The detention in jail after conviction now in terms of the recent decision of the Apex Court may not be considered to be the sole criteria for grant of bail during the pendency of the appeal and that can have only an additional factor to be kept in mind while considering the arguments on the merits. 33. 32. The detention in jail after conviction now in terms of the recent decision of the Apex Court may not be considered to be the sole criteria for grant of bail during the pendency of the appeal and that can have only an additional factor to be kept in mind while considering the arguments on the merits. 33. Observation of the Apex Court as noted/quoted above has been recently noticed by this Court in the order passed in Criminal Appeal No. 3731 of 2006 dated 28.10.2009 (Anil Kumar v. State of U.P.). 34. For the reasons given above, this Court has to decline. 35. Accordingly bail application is rejected. ————