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2009 DIGILAW 3486 (ALL)

BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. v. SHIV DULARI

2009-11-12

RAJESH CHANDRA, SATYA POOT MEHROTRA

body2009
JUDGMENT By the Court.—The present Appeal has been filed against the Judgment and Order/Award dated 27.5.2009 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kanpur Nagar in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 403 of 2008 filed by the claimant -respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in respect of the accident which took place on 20.2.2008 resulting in death of Kripal Singh. 2. It is, inter alia, stated in the Claim Petition that the said Kripal Singh accompanied by his brother, namely, Vijai Singh Bhadoria ( claimant -respondent No. 2) was going from Kanpur to Unnao on the Vehicle Scorpio bearing Registration No. U.P. 78 B.J.3767 on 20.2.2008; and that at about 7 O’ Clock in the evening, a Vehicle Bolero bearing Registration No. U.P. 71 E 7333 coming from the direction of Lucknow and being driven by its Driver rashly and negligently, hit the aforesaid Scorpio resulting in serious injuries to the aforesaid Kripal Singh alias Pahlu Singh, Ram Charan Singh and others; and that the said Kripal Singh died at about 11.25 O’ Clock in the night on the said date during the treatment at Madhuraj Singh Nursing Home; and that the accident took place solely on account of negligent and rash driving by the Driver of the aforesaid Vehicle U.P.71E-7333 ( hereinafter referred to as “the vehicle in question”). 3. The respondent Nos. 3 and 4 herein, stated to be the owner of the vehicle in question, filed their Written Statement denying negligence on the part of the Driver of the vehicle in question. It was, inter alia, stated that the vehicle in question was being driven by the respondent No. 3 (Radhey Lal) himself for which the respondent No. 3 (Radhey Lal) was having valid driving licence ; and that the vehicle in question was insured with the Appellant / Insurance Company for the period from 12.8.2007 to 11.8.2008. It was, inter alia, further stated in the Written Statement that the accident in fact took place on account of negligence on the part of the Driver driving Scorpio bearing Registration No. U.P. 78 B.J.3767. 4. Written Statement was also filed on behalf of the respondent No. 6 herein, insurer of the aforesaid Vehicle Scorpio bearing Registration No. U.P. 78BJ3767. It was, inter alia, stated in the said Written Statement that the accident took place on account of negligence on the part of the Driver of the vehicle in question. 4. Written Statement was also filed on behalf of the respondent No. 6 herein, insurer of the aforesaid Vehicle Scorpio bearing Registration No. U.P. 78BJ3767. It was, inter alia, stated in the said Written Statement that the accident took place on account of negligence on the part of the Driver of the vehicle in question. 5. Written Statement was also filed on behalf of the Appellant-Insurance Company, inter alia, admitting that the vehicle in question (namely, Bolero bearing Registration No. U.P. 71E7333) was insured with the Appellant/ Insurance Company. In the said Written Statement, it was denied that the said Kripal Singh sustained any injury on 20.2.2008 resulting in his death. It was further stated in the said Written Statement that the accident, if any, took place on account of negligence on the part of the Driver of the Vehicle Scorpio bearing Registration No. U.P. 78 B.J.3767. It was further stated in the said Written Statement that the driver of the vehicle in question was not having valid and effective driving licence at the time of the accident; and that the said vehicle was being plied in breach of the terms and conditions of the policy, as such, the Appellant/Insurance Company was not liable to pay compensation. The allegation regarding contributory negligence on the part of the Driver of the aforesaid Vehicle Scorpio bearing Registration No. U.P. 78BJ 3767, was also made in the said Written Statement. 6. Written Statement was also filed on behalf of the respondent No. 5 herein ( Dharampal Singh Bhadauria), owner of the Vehicle Scorpio bearing Registration No. U.P. 78 B.J.3767. It was stated in the said Written Statement that the accident took place on account of the sole negligence on the part of the Driver of the vehicle in question. 7. The Tribunal framed five issues in the case. 8. Issue No. 1 was regarding the factum of the accident having taken place on 20.2.2008 on account of rash and negligent driving of the Driver of the vehicle in question thereby hitting the said Scorpio resulting in serious injuries to the said Kripal Singh and consequent death of the said Kripal Singh. 9. Issue No. 4 was as to whether the accident took place on account of contributory negligence of the Driver of the said Vehicle Scorpio bearing Registration No. U.P.78BJ3767. 10. The Tribunal decided Issue Nos. 9. Issue No. 4 was as to whether the accident took place on account of contributory negligence of the Driver of the said Vehicle Scorpio bearing Registration No. U.P.78BJ3767. 10. The Tribunal decided Issue Nos. 1 and 4 together and concluded that the accident took place on account of contributory negligence on the part of the Drivers of the two Vehicles, namely, Vehicle No. U.P.71 E-7333 and Vehicle No. U.P.78BJ3767, resulting in the death of the said Kripal Singh. 11. Issue No. 2 was as to whether the vehicle in question was duly insured with the Appellant/ Insurance Company on the date of the accident. 12. The Tribunal held that the vehicle in question was duly insured with the Appellant/ Insurance Company for the period from 12.8.2007 to 11.8.2008. 13. Issue No. 3 was as to whether the Driver of the vehicle in question was having valid and effect licence on the date of the accident. 14. The Tribunal held that the Driver of the vehicle in question, namely, Radhey Lal ( respondent No. 3) was having valid and effective driving licence for the period from 9.9.1994 to 27.2.2016. 15. Issue No. 5 was as to whether the claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were entitled to any compensation. 16. The Tribunal held that the claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were entitled to compensation amounting to Rs. 6,09,500/- with interest at the rate of Rs. 6% per annum. Out of the said amount, 70 % would be payable by the Appellant /Insurance Company, while 30% would be payable by the respondent No. 6 herein. 17.The Appellant/Insurance Company filed the present Appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the aforesaid Judgment and Order/ Award dated 27.5.2009 passed by the Tribunal. 18. We have heard Sri Rakesh Dhar Dubey, learned counsel for the Appellant/ Insurance Company and Sri Manish Tandon, holding brief for Sri M.N.Sidhiqui, learned counsel for the claimant/respondent Nos. 1 and 2, and perused the record. 19. Sri Rakesh Dhar Dubey, learned counsel for the Appellant/Insurance Company has fairly drawn our attention to paragraph No. 9 of the Affidavit accompanying the Stay Application filed with the present Appeal wherein it is stated that “during the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal below, the Insurance Company/Appellant has not moved an application under Section 170 of the M.V. Act,”. 20. 20. In view of the above, it is evident that no permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been granted to the Appellant / Insurance Company. 21. Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, lays down as under : “170. Impleading insurer in certain cases.-Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that— (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made.” 22. Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, referred to in Section 170 of the said Act, provides as follows: “149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks.—(1) ............................................... Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, referred to in Section 170 of the said Act, provides as follows: “149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks.—(1) ............................................... (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely : (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely : (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle- (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organized racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. (3) to (7)......................................” 23. (3) to (7)......................................” 23. Reading Section 170 and sub-section (2) of Section 149 together, it is evident that in case the Tribunal grants permission to the insurer under Section 170, the insurer will get right to contest the claim petition on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. However, if such permission under Section 170 of the said Act is not granted to the insurer by the Tribunal, then the insurer will be entitled to contest the Claim Petition only on the limited grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the said Act. One such ground is that the vehicle in question was being driven by a person who is not duly licensed, or by a person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification. 24. As in the absence of permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Claim Petition can be contested by the insurer only on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the said Act, it follows that in case an appeal is filed by the insurer against an award passed by the Tribunal in such a case, it (insurer) will be able to challenge the award only on the limited grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the said Act. 25. In the present case, as noted above, the insurer (i.e. Appellant/Insurance Company) has not obtained permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Therefore, in the present Appeal filed by the Appellant/Insurance Company under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Appellant/Insurance Company can challenge the award only on the limited grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the said Act. 26. In view of above, it is evident that the Appellant/Insurance Company in the present Appeal can question only the findings recorded by the Tribunal in regard to Issue Nos. 2 and 3. 27. Issue No. 2, as noted above, was regarding the factum of the insurance of the vehicle in question with the Appellant/Insurance Company on the date of the accident. The said Issue has been decided by the Tribunal holding that the vehicle in question was duly insured with the Appellant/Insurance Company with effect from 12.8.2007 to 11.8.2008. 28. 27. Issue No. 2, as noted above, was regarding the factum of the insurance of the vehicle in question with the Appellant/Insurance Company on the date of the accident. The said Issue has been decided by the Tribunal holding that the vehicle in question was duly insured with the Appellant/Insurance Company with effect from 12.8.2007 to 11.8.2008. 28. Learned counsel for the Appellant/Insurance Company has fairly stated that he cannot show any error in the finding recorded by the Tribunal on Issue No. 2. 29. Issue No. 3, as noted above, was as to whether the Driver of the vehicle in question, namely, Radhey Lal (respondent No. 3 herein), was having valid and effective licence on the date of the accident in question. 30. It is submitted by Sri Rakesh Dhar Dubey, learned counsel for the Appellant/Insurance Company that the Tribunal in holding that the Driver of the vehicle in question was having valid and effective licence relied upon photostat copy of the Driving Licence which was filed as Paper No. 22 “ga”. It is submitted that photostat copy of the driving licence could not be relied upon by the Tribunal for recording finding in regard to Issue No. 3. Sri Rakesh Dhar Dubey, learned counsel for the Appellant/Insurance Company has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Company Limited v. Ambari and others, 2000 (2) TAC 789 (SC). 31. In the said decision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as under ( Paragraph No. 2 of the said T.A.C.): “2. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the point regarding validity of the driver’s licence was raised by the appellant before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the Claims Tribunal in accepting photocopy of a document purporting to be the driver’s licence and recording a finding that the driver had a valid licence has committed a grave error of law. He also submitted that the High Court has not dealt with the said contention of the appellant and without giving any reason has dismissed the appeal. The Tribunal and also the High Court have failed to appreciate that production of a photocopy was not sufficient to prove that the driver had a valid licence when that fact was challenged by the appellant and the genuineness of the photocopy was not admitted by it. The Tribunal and also the High Court have failed to appreciate that production of a photocopy was not sufficient to prove that the driver had a valid licence when that fact was challenged by the appellant and the genuineness of the photocopy was not admitted by it. Therefore, the judgment and order passed by the High Court in F.A.O No. 2368 of 1998 deserves to be set aside. We accordingly allow this appeal and remit the matter back to the High Court for deciding the said appeal afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties.” 32. This decision, thus, lays down that production of a photostat copy of the driving licence was not sufficient to prove that the driver had a valid licence when that fact was challenged by the Insurance Company and the genuineness of the photostat copy was not admitted by it. 33. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was distinguished on facts by a Division Bench of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta and others, 2002 (1) TAC 268 (All). 34. The Division Bench of this Court laid down as follows ( Paragraph No. 6 of the said TAC) “6. We have heard Sri V.C. Dixit learned Counsel for the appellant. He contented that the photostat copy of the driving licence was filed and such photostat copy was not admissible in evidence. He has placed reliance upon the decision United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Ambari and others, 2000 (2) T.A.C. 789, wherein the Apex Court observed that if an objection is raised in regard to a photostat copy of a driving licence, that matter should be considered before taking a decision in that regard. This aspect has been considered by the Tribunal. It has recorded a finding that the genuineness of the photostat copy of the driving licence was never challenged by the appellant, nor it was accepted. On the facts of this case, the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant is not applicable.” 35. This decision, thus, lays down that if genuineness of the photostat copy of the driving licence was not challenged by the insurer nor was it accepted by the insurer, then reliance may be placed on the photostat copy of the driving licence. 36. This decision, thus, lays down that if genuineness of the photostat copy of the driving licence was not challenged by the insurer nor was it accepted by the insurer, then reliance may be placed on the photostat copy of the driving licence. 36. In the present case, by the order dated 22.10.2009, Sri Rakesh Dhar Dubey, learned counsel for the appellant was granted time to file certified photostat copy of the driving licence ( paper No. 22 ‘ga’). 37. Sri Rakesh Dhar Dubey, learned counsel for the appellant has fairly stated today that genuineness of the photostat copy of the driving licence ( paper No. 22 ‘ga’) was never questioned by the Insurance Company. 38. In view of the above statement made by Sri Rakesh Dhar Dubey, learned counsel for the Appellant/ Insurance Company, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal did not commit any illegality in relying upon the photostat copy of the driving licence ( paper No. 22 “ga”), as the genuineness of the same was never questioned by the Appellant/ Insurance Company. This conclusion is supported by the decisions noted above. 39. In consequence of the above discussion, we are of the view that the Appeal filed by the Appellant/ Insurance Company lacks merits, and the same is liable to be dismissed. 40. The present Appeal is accordingly dismissed. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 41. The amount of Rs. 25,000/- deposited by the Appellant- Insurance Company while filing the present Appeal will be remitted to the Tribunal for being adjusted towards the deposit to be made by the Appellant/ Insurance Company under the impugned Award. 42. We note that the impugned Award has directed the Appellant/Insurance Company and the respondent No. 6 to deposit the respective amounts awarded against them under the impugned Award. The impugned Award further permits disbursement of the entire amount so deposited to the claimant-respondent Nos 1 and 2. 43. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and having considered the submissions made by Sri Manish Tandon holding brief for Sri M.N.Siddiqui, learned counsel for the claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2, we are of the opinion that it will be in the interest of justice that on deposit of the amount awarded to the claimant-respondent Nos. 43. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and having considered the submissions made by Sri Manish Tandon holding brief for Sri M.N.Siddiqui, learned counsel for the claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2, we are of the opinion that it will be in the interest of justice that on deposit of the amount awarded to the claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as against the Appellant/Insurance Company, being made by the Appellant/Insurance Company, the entire amount so deposited be not disbursed to the claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2; instead, direction be given that 50% of the amount so deposited will be paid to the claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 immediately, while remaining 50% of the deposit will be invested in maximum interest -bearing Fixed Deposit in a Nationalized Bank, renewable from time to time, in the names of the claimant -respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for a period of three years. 44. We accordingly direct that on deposit of the amount awarded to the claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under the impugned award as against the Appellant/Insurance Company being made by the Appellant/Insurance Company, 50% of the amount so deposited will be paid to the claimant-respondent Nos. 1 and 2 immediately while the balance amount of the deposit will be invested in maximum interest -bearing Fixed Deposit in a Nationalized Bank, renewable from time to time, in the names of the claimant -respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for a period of three years. 45. Subject to the above directions, the impugned Award passed by the Tribunal is confirmed. 46. We order accordingly. ————