Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.:- 1. The petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 21st September 2007 whereby the learned Civil Judge allowed an application under Section 151 CPC made by Respondents No. 1 and 2, and dismissed the suit. 2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this petition are that the petitioners in this case filed a suit for declaration of ownership and consequential reliefs of mandatory and permanent injunction on the basis of an agreement to sell, GPA, Will etc. qua premises No. A-20, Gulmohar Park, New Delhi. The agreement to sell, GPA, Will etc were alleged to have been executed by the defendant No. 3 (Mr. K.S. Kulkarni). Another suit was filed by the defendants No. 1 and 2, before the court below, in 1989 being Suit No. 2718 of 1989 (current number 154 of 2006) regarding the same property for recovery of possession and mesne profits and damages against petitioner No. 1 herein and defendant No. 3 Mr. K.S. Kulkarni. In that suit, the issue involved was whether Late Shri D.G. Kulkarni had executed a GPA and agreement to sell dated 10.6.1980 in favour of K.S. Kulkarni and whether D.G. Kulkarni had executed a special power of attorney and a Will dated 1.2.1984 in favour of Mr. K.S. Kulkarni and its effect. The Suit bearing number 2781 of 1989 was decided by the Court of learned Civil Judge on 20th September 2006 and it was held that the claim of defendant No. 3 of having become owner of the property by virtue of documents executed by Mr.D.G Kulkarni was a baseless claim and no title in the property got transferred to him. After decision of this suit, defendants No. 1 and 2 before the court below, who were plaintiffs in the suit bearing number 2781 of 1989 [154 of 2006] made this application under Section 151 of CPC that the principle of res judicata would be attracted and the present "suit would be barred by the principle of res judicata and was liable to be dismissed. 3. There is no denial of the fact that the plaintiffs herein have claimed their title through defendant No. 3 Mr. K.S. Kulkarni on the basis of documents like agreement to sell, Will and power of attorney etc. 3. There is no denial of the fact that the plaintiffs herein have claimed their title through defendant No. 3 Mr. K.S. Kulkarni on the basis of documents like agreement to sell, Will and power of attorney etc. If K.S. Kulkarni had been the true and real owner of the property then only he could have transferred the property to the plaintiffs. If K.S. Kulkarni had no title over the property, he could not have transferred anything to the plaintiff. The title of Mr. K.S. Kulkarni was itself under cloud. Mr. K.S. Kulkarni was the tenant in the property and when the suit for recovery of possession against him in respect of this property was filed, in defence he had set up certain documents and set up a claim over the property. The Court below after a prolonged trial from 1989 to 2006 i.e. 16 years held that Mr. K.S. Kulkarni had no title over the property. The present petitioners claim to have purchased the property from Mr. K.S. Kulkarni during pendency of the suit. It is obvious that the petitioners were also hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Properties Act and they were bound by the decree of the Court where lis qua the property was pending. Section 52 of the Transfer of Properties Act makes it abundantly clear that if a person takes a risk to purchase a property which is the subject matter of a suit during pendency of the suit, he is bound by the outcome of the suit even if he has not been made as a party to the suit. In Sunil Gupta v. Kiran Girhotra and others, (2007) 8 SCC 506 :2007 (99) DRJ 53[SC], the Supreme Court held that if a property is purchased during pendency of the suit/probate petition, the transferor would be deemed to have noticed all such proceedings and by purchasing the property, takes a calculated risk and he would be bound by the judgment of the Court in respect of the property. The Supreme Court went to the extent of saying that it was not even necessary to make him a party to the pending suit. 4. The Supreme Court went to the extent of saying that it was not even necessary to make him a party to the pending suit. 4. Since the petitioners had claimed their title from defendant No. 3 and the title of the defendant No. 3 was not based on title deeds but was based on the fishy documents and the Court of competent jurisdiction has held that defendant No. 3 had no title, the judgment of the Court was binding on the petitioners in view of Section 52 of the Transfer of Properties Act and also in view of the fact that the petitioner was a party to the suit. The trial court, therefore, allowed the application under Section 151 of CPC and dismissed the suit of the petitioners pending before the trial court on the ground of res judicata. 5. The order of the trial court is challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the earlier application of the respondent to stay the present suit was dismissed by the Court below. Both suits were continuing together. If an application under Section 10 CPC made by the defendant No. 1 and 2 was dismissed, then an application under Section 151 CPC could not have been allowed. I consider that this argument must fail. An order on application under section 10 CPC is an interim order. The Court at that time found that since the parties in the suit were not exactly the same, the continuation of suit would not be bad in law. However, after passing of the judgment in Suit No. 2718 of 1989, the core issue in the matter has already been conclusively decided and this suit cannot be proceeded further since the plaintiff were bound by the judgment given in suit No. 2718 of 1989, the Court was at liberty to exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of CPC and dismissed the suit in view of the judgment in Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers and others, (2004) 11 SCC 168 wherein the Supreme Court observed as under: "25. Thus it is clear that by the subsequent event if the original proceeding has become infructuous, ex debito justitiae, it will be the duty of the court to take such action as is necessary in the interest of justice which includes disposing of infructuous litigation. Thus it is clear that by the subsequent event if the original proceeding has become infructuous, ex debito justitiae, it will be the duty of the court to take such action as is necessary in the interest of justice which includes disposing of infructuous litigation. For the said purpose it will be open to the parties concerned to make an application under Section 151 of CPC to bring to the notice of the court the facts and circumstances which have made the pending litigation infructuous. Of course, when such an application is made, the court will enquire into the alleged facts and circumstances to find out whether the pending litiga­tion has in fact become infructuous or not." 6. In the present case, the decision of the suit filed by defendant No. 1 and 2 against the petitioner and defendant No. 3 wherein the issue was whether defendant No. 3 had become the owner of the property or not, has rendered this suit as infructuous since the petitioners claimed that they had purchased the property from defendant No. 3. The Court below was, therefore, justified in entertaining the application under Section 151 of CPC and take note of the subsequent judgment. 7. One of the pleas of the petitioner is that the decision in Suit No. 2718 of 1989 was not final and the appeal has been preferred against the suit and in view of the pendency of an appeal, the issue of res judicata was still open and unless and until the decision does not attain finality, the principle of res judicata could not have been applied on the suit filed by the petitioner. It is true that an appeal has been preferred against the judgment of the Civil Judge in Suit No. 2718 of 1989 and the appeal is pending. It is obvious that in case the appeal is allowed and the appellate court holds that defendant No. 3 was the owner of the property, the right would accrue to the petitioner herein. The trial court has also observed this and held that in such an eventuality, the petitioners would have sufficient opportunities to approach the Court for appropriate remedy as would be open to the petitioners. 8. I consider that the decision of appeal filed by the petitioner against judgment in Suit No. 2718 of 1989 would have material effect on the rights of the petitioners. 8. I consider that the decision of appeal filed by the petitioner against judgment in Suit No. 2718 of 1989 would have material effect on the rights of the petitioners. It would be appropriate that the suit filed by the petitioner be adjourned sine die instead of dismissing and the petitioner is given a liberty to revive the suit if the decision of the Civil Judge is ultimately upset. 9. In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the petition is allowed only to the above extent. The impugned order is modified in above terms and the Suit No. 2718 of 1989 of the petitioners shall remain adjourned sine die with liberty to, the petitioner to get it revived on succeeding in appeal. However, the pendency of this suit lying adjourned sine die shall not affect the rights of the decree holder if the decree attains finality and pendency of this suit shall not stand in the way of execution of the decree, since the petitioners herein would be bound by the decree. The petition stands disposed of.