Judgment A.L.Dave, J.—This appeal arises out of the judgment and order rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C. No. 4, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 119 of 2004 on 2/4/2005 convicting the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code [IPC] and sentencing him as under : 1. Under Section 363 of IPC— R.I for two years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, i/d. S I for ten months, 2. Under Section 366 of IPC— R.I for three years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, i/d. S I for ten months, 3. Under Section 376 of IPC— R.I for ten years and fine of Rs.3,000/-, i/d. S I for twenty months. 2. As per the prosecution case, the appellant kidnapped the daughter of one Dayaram Purandas Dudhrejia, who according to the prosecution, was aged 15 years and 3 months on the day of the incident. According to the prosecution, the appellant raped the prosecutrix on number of occasions after kidnapping her. The uncle of the prosecutrix - Kandas Purandas Dudhrejia lodged an FIR on 11/4/2004, initially for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC, on basis of which offence was registered and investigation started. The prosecutrix and the appellant were traced by the police on 02.05.2004 and came to be apprehended. Both were subjected to medical examination and on basis of the medical examination, offence punishable under section 376 of the IPC also was added. The police having found sufficient evidence against the accused - appellant, filed charge-sheet in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Botad, who in turn committed the case to the Court of the Sessions at Bhavnagar as the offences were triable by Court of Sessions. Sessions Case No. 119 of 2004 thus came to be registered. 2.1. The Sessions Court framed charge against the appellant at Exhibit 2, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The Sessions Court, after considering the evidence led by the prosecution, came to the conclusion that the prosecution was successful in establishing charges against the appellant and recorded his conviction and awarded sentence as stated in the earlier part of this judgment. The convict has, therefore, preferred this appeal challenging the judgment on various grounds. 3. Llearned Advocate for the appellant Ms. The convict has, therefore, preferred this appeal challenging the judgment on various grounds. 3. Llearned Advocate for the appellant Ms. Nita Merchant submitted that the conviction is based on a premise that the prosecutrix was under-aged, but if the evidence is seen, the evidence regarding her age is doubtful. She has drawn our attention to the birth certificate issued by the Local Health Authority Exhibit 28, where name of the child born is not indicated. In the column of sex of child, female is scored out and Column No. 5 indicates that child is born at CHC Botad. She has then turned our attention to the deposition of mother of the prosecutrix, wherein she stated that prosecutrix was born at Botad at home and not at the hospital and she then submitted that the school leaving certificate and the extract of general register of the school though indicate the date of birth of the prosecutrix to be 15.12.1988, they are not the conclusive evidence of date of birth and, therefore, the evidence regarding age of the prosecutrix being less than 16 years is doubtful. She submitted that the conduct of the prosecutrix would clearly go to show that she was a consenting party. The prosecutrix has admitted that earlier also she had gone away with the appellant on 2 to 3 occasions, but no complaint was made. This time also the prosecutrix had gone with the appellant and stayed together for a period of about 20 days, during which she has not made any complaint nor has she tried to escape from the appellant. She, therefore, submitted that the prosecutrix was consenting party and, therefore, no offence can be said to have been constituted punishable under Section 376 or Section 366 of the IPC. She submitted that the sentence awarded by the trial Court is even otherwise on higher side and, therefore, appeal may be appropriately allowed. 4. Llearned APP Mr. M.R. Mengdey has opposed this appeal. According to him, the school leaving certificate as well as the school register Exhibit 36 and Exhibit 35 respectively carry the same date as indicated in the birth certificate Exhibit 28. The entries were made in the register or school leaving certificate at point of time when nobody could have anticipated such an incident and, therefore, it may be accepted at face value. Mr. The entries were made in the register or school leaving certificate at point of time when nobody could have anticipated such an incident and, therefore, it may be accepted at face value. Mr. Mengdey further submitted that the evidence of the father of the prosecutrix, if seen, it is clear that his say in examination-in-chief about the age of prosecutrix has remained unchallenged. While relying on decision of the Apex Court, he submitted that a school entry made in the ordinary course of business even on basis of horoscope, if any, other evidence can be accepted at face value without insisting for other aspects and the evidence may be appropriately accepted. 4.1. Mr. Mengdey submitted that barring age aspect, there is no other dispute. According to Mr. Mengdey, the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age in any case and, therefore, offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 are rightly held to have been proved. So far as the offence punishable under Section 376 is concerned, according to Mr. Mengdey, consent is of no significance once the age of the prosecutrix is proved to be below 16 years. Mr. Mengdey, therefore, submitted that the appeal may be dismissed. 5. We have examined the record and proceedings in the context of the arguments advanced before us. We may note at the outset that since the appellant persists this appeal only on evidence of age of the prosecutrix and consent on her part, we may not examine other aspect relating to the question whether coitus is established or not since that is already accepted by the appellant. 6. The age aspect emerges from Exhibit 28, which is the copy of birth certificate, where in column indicating name of child is kept blank, the second column indicating sex of the child is also kept blank, but the male/female indicated in bracket, the “female” is scored out. Column No. 5 indicates the place of birth to be CHC, Botad. 6.1. The general register maintained by the Government High School, Botad as produced and proved through Manojkumar Mahadevbai Upadhyay Exhibit 34, is produced at Exhibit 35. The name of the prosecutrix is entered at Serial No. 30226 where her date of birth is indicated to be 15.12.1988. The school leaving certificate is at Exhibit 36, which also indicates the date of birth to be 15.12.1988. Both these documents relate to the prosecutrix. 6.2. The name of the prosecutrix is entered at Serial No. 30226 where her date of birth is indicated to be 15.12.1988. The school leaving certificate is at Exhibit 36, which also indicates the date of birth to be 15.12.1988. Both these documents relate to the prosecutrix. 6.2. It is in evidence that the prosecutrix has a brother, but no cross-examination is carried out of either of the parents of the prosecutrix to show the date of his birth, place of his birth and whether it was registered or not. 7. It is true that the birth certificate does not bear name of the child born, but this is not uncommon in Indian society; giving name to a newly born child itself is a ceremony which is to be performed at a later point of time and, therefore, when the birth is registered, the child may not be even christianized. Similarly, the scoring out of the female sex in Column No. 2 also would be of no much significance when the date of birth indicated in this birth certificate gets corroborated by evidence in form of school leaving certificate and the general register maintained by the school. Differently put, the school leaving certificate, the general register maintained by the school and the birth certificate, they corroborate each other and in absence of any material to accept or even to suspect that this birth certificate does not relate to the prosecutrix, these copies of public documents can be accepted at face value. Llearned APP would right in contending that while these entries were made in the school register, such case could never have been contemplated and there is no reason to infer any other possibility. 7.1. It is also worth a note that the father of the prosecutrix, Dayaram in his deposition has in terms stated that the age of the prosecutrix at the time of incident was 15 years and 6 months. This assertion of his has not even been challenged by the defence. 7.2. So far as the inconsistency between the birth certificate and the oral evidence of the mother of the prosecutrix regarding place of birth is concerned, it has to be noted that the birth certificate is an authentic proof of registration of birth. This assertion of his has not even been challenged by the defence. 7.2. So far as the inconsistency between the birth certificate and the oral evidence of the mother of the prosecutrix regarding place of birth is concerned, it has to be noted that the birth certificate is an authentic proof of registration of birth. That certificate gets corroboration from other contemporaneous documentary material in form of school leaving certificate and the general register maintained by the school and say of the mother of the prosecutrix that the prosecutrix was born at home and not a the hospital may not assume so much of significance so as to brush aside the entire evidence. The possibility of mistake cannot be ruled out. 8. What emerges from the evidence is that the age of the prosecutrix was below 16 years when the incident occurred. Considering the provisions contained in Section 375 of the IPC, consent or otherwise of the prosecutrix, therefore, would pale into insignificance. The factum of the appellant having established physical relationship with the prosecutrix is not in dispute because defence is that of consent by the prosecutrix and, therefore, the conviction for offence of rape recorded by the trial Court is fully justified. 9. When the age of prosecutrix is established to be below 16 years and at the time of incident it is shown that the prosecutrix was staying with her parents, the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC would be constituted and the trial Court was, therefore, justified in convicting the appellant for those two offences as well. 10. The learned Advocate for the appellant during the course of argument, tried to suggest that the punishment awarded by the trial Court is too harsh and the Court may take a sympathetic approach towards the appellant. 11. However, learned Advocate was at loss to indicate any mitigating circumstances which may call for the interference by the appellate Court in a judicial discretion used by the trial Court while awarding sentence. It is worth while to note that the age of the appellant at the time of incident was 29 years as compared to 15 years and 3 months of the prosecutrix. It is worth while to note that the age of the appellant at the time of incident was 29 years as compared to 15 years and 3 months of the prosecutrix. This was not the first time that the appellant and the prosecutrix had gone away from the lawful custody of the parents of the prosecutrix, but on earlier occasions the parents chose not to take action probably because of social constraints. In this set of circumstances, we are of the view that no interference is called for in the judicial discretion used by the trial Court once it is not shown that the discretion is used arbitrarily or that the punishment awarded is unduly harsh. The appeal, therefore, must fail and it stands dismissed. The judgment rendered by the Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, F.T.C. No. 4, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 119 of 2004 on 2/4/2005 convicting the appellant for offences punishable under sections 363, 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code is hereby confirmed.