Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 3503 (ALL)

RATAN KUMAR SOLANKI v. STATE OF U. P.

2009-11-16

S.RAFAT ALAM, SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2009
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—This intra-Court appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court has arisen from the judgment dated 7.1.2009 of the Hon’ble Single Judge dismissing the writ petition No. 281 of 2009 of the petitioner-appellant on the ground of alternative remedy of filing a civil suit. 2. The counsel for the petitioner-appellant submitted that the last election was held on 17.7.2005 which was challenged in Writ Petition No. 53512 of 2006. This Court passed an interim order in the above writ petition on 17.10.2006 staying the operation of the order dated 5.9.2006 whereby the above elections were recognized as also the consequential order dated 8.9.2006 whereby the District Inspector of Schools, Bulandshahar (hereinafter referred to as “DIOS”) recognised Sri Bahadur Singh as Manager and Sri Haridatta Sharma as president of the Committee of Management. Ultimately, the above writ petition was dismissed on 23.10.2008 for the reason that the term of three years has already elapsed, hence the writ petition has rendered infructuous. Thereafter, the District Inspector of Schools passed order on 5.12.2008 recognising the Office Bearers elected on 17.5.2009 treating dismissal of the writ petition as if this Court has granted recognition to the officer bearers elected on 17.5.2005. He submits that it is wholly erroneous. He further submits that there being no factual dispute at all, the order of DIOS was patently illegal as it ought to have allowed fresh elections through the Authorized Controller who was already appointed during the pendency of the writ petition, therefore, the Hon’ble Single Judge was not right in relegating the parties to avail the remedy of civil suit observing that there was disputed questions of fact requiring oral and documentary evidence and, therefore, the power under Article 226 ought not to be exercised. He submit that the Hon’ble Single Judge did not consider the matter in correct perspective and has not appreciated the real issue involved in the writ petition which did not require any investigation into the facts, hence, the judgment of the Hon’ble Single Judge is liable to be set aside and the writ petition needs to be decided on merit. 3. On behalf of the respondents, the learned Standing Counsel, Sri G.K. Singh and Sri Manu Saxena, Advocates appeared. 3. On behalf of the respondents, the learned Standing Counsel, Sri G.K. Singh and Sri Manu Saxena, Advocates appeared. It is not disputed by the learned counsels for the respondents that no factual dispute was involved in the matter and, therefore, prima facie, this Court was satisfied that the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed by the Hon’ble Single Judge by observing that the matter involves disputed questions of fact relegating the petitioner-appellant to avail the remedy of civil suit and the matter ought to have been considered on merits. In these circumstances, we were inclined to remand the matter to the Hon’ble Single Judge to decide the matter on merits, but learned counsels for the parties submitted that already the dispute between the parties has prolonged and resulted in several litigations. Now the issues involved in this matter are purely legal and, therefore, instead of remitting it to the Hon’ble Single Judge, this Court itself may hear the parties on merits and decide the issue as this will lessen the agony of the parties due to protracted litigation and would be in the larger interest of the institution and public at large. In these circumstances, we have proceeded to hear the matter further and decide the issues raised before us based on the submissions advanced by the rival parties and the record of this appeal as well as the writ petition. 4. The first question, which is a preliminary objection raised by Sri Singh, counsel for the Committee of Management, is whether the writ petition itself was maintainable at the instance of a individual member of the society challenging election of the officer bearers though no rival claim was set up nor such collective body has come up before this Court nor the society itself has authorized the individual to challenge the entire election of the Office Bearers of the society. Reliance is placed on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Dr. P.P. Rastogi and others v. Meerut University, Meerut and others, (1997) 1 UPLBEC 415 and two single-Judge decisions in Smt. Vimla Devi v. Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra and others, 1997 (3) ESC 1807 (by Hon’ble S.P. Srivastava, J.) and Bhagwan Kaushik v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(2) ADJ 631 (by Hon’ble Vineet Saran, J.). 5. P.P. Rastogi and others v. Meerut University, Meerut and others, (1997) 1 UPLBEC 415 and two single-Judge decisions in Smt. Vimla Devi v. Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra and others, 1997 (3) ESC 1807 (by Hon’ble S.P. Srivastava, J.) and Bhagwan Kaushik v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(2) ADJ 631 (by Hon’ble Vineet Saran, J.). 5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant while submitting that the writ petition at the instance of the individual member of the society would be maintainable since recognition of an illegally constituted committee affects the democratic right of the individual member of the society also placed reliance on two single-Judge judgments of this Court in Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, Sultanpur, District Haridwar and another v. Joint Director of Education, I Region, Meerut and others, (1999) 1 UPLBEC 170 (by Hon’ble D.K. Seth, J.) and Satya Narain Tripathi v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (4) ESC 2957 (by Hon’ble Janardan Sahai, J.). 6. On merits, The submission on behalf of the appellant is that the term commenced as soon as the declaration of result is made. However, on behalf of the respondent-Committee of Management it is submitted that the Committee of Management elected on 17.7.2005 could not function at all for a single day and, therefore, its term would commence only when the Office Bearers could take charge on 8.9.2006 as a result of the recognition of the above election. Hence, the DIOS committed no illegality or error in recognising the Committee of Management, which was elected on 17.5.2005. The crucial question up for consideration in this case is, “when the term of Committee of Management would commence, whether from the date of election or the date of result or the date of recognition granted by the competent authority or the date on which the Office Bearers take charge of their office as a result of the election. 7. Out of the two issues, the first one is like a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition and the second one is an important question of law necessary for adjudication to determine the validity of the order impugned in this writ petition. 7. Out of the two issues, the first one is like a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition and the second one is an important question of law necessary for adjudication to determine the validity of the order impugned in this writ petition. It would thus be apt first to have a bird eye view of certain background facts giving rise to the present dispute which would be necessary for understanding the problem and for arriving at a proper decision. 8. Janta Inter College, Rupwas Pachgain, District Bulandshahar (hereinafter referred to as “College”) is recognised under the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as “1921 Act”) and for the purpose of salary, since it is in grant-in-aid, the matter is governed by provisions of U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Teachers and other Employees) (Payment of Salary) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as Act, 1971). The management of the College is by a Committee of Management which is elected in accordance with the provisions of the scheme of administration duly approved by DIOS. In the year 2005, the management of the College was in the control of the Administrator, i.e. Associate District Inspector of Schools, Bulandshahar, who was required to hold elections of the Committee of Management. It is admitted to all the parties that 17.7.2005 was the date of polling on which date election took place and after the counting of votes, the Election Officer Sri Dayanand Tyagi, a retired Principal of the College declared the result. The petitioner-appellant Ratan Kumar Solanki was a candidate contesting for the post of Manager. Alleging certain irregularities in the above election, he claims to have filed an objection dated 17.7.2005 before the Returning Officer requesting for re-counting. The same remained unheeded, he claims to have sent a complaint to the District Magistrate, Bulandshahar on 22.7.2005 and copy endorsed to Joint Director of Education, I Region Meerut, Meerut (hereinafter referred to as “JDE”) and DIOS. It appears that DIOS sought comments from Authorized Controller who sent his letter dated Nil recommending for re-counting of the votes. The DIOS, thereafter, on 16.11.2005 passed order for re-counting of votes in the supervision of Sri Sardar Singh, Associate District Inspector of Schools, who was also the Authorised Controller of the College and to submit the report within a week for further action. The DIOS, thereafter, on 16.11.2005 passed order for re-counting of votes in the supervision of Sri Sardar Singh, Associate District Inspector of Schools, who was also the Authorised Controller of the College and to submit the report within a week for further action. Thereafter, Sri Sardar Singh, Associate District Inspector of Schools informed the concerned parties and fixed 8.12.2005 for re-counting but it appears that no re-counting took place due to non availability of the ballot box containing ballots. Since nothing proceeded thereafter, the petitioner-appellant sent a letter dated 1.4.2006 to DIOS making complaint that re-counting has not been done till date. He also sent a similar complaint on 2.5.2006 to the Director of Education (Secondary), Lucknow. In the meantime, it appears that the DIOS sent documents pertaining to election held on 17.7.2005 to the Joint Director level committee along with his letter dated 18.2.2006. On some query made by the JDE in respect to the complaint made by the petitioner-appellant, he submitted his comments vide letter dated 21.7.2006 along with the report of the Associate District Inspector of Schools dated 10.7.2006. After considering all the above material and documents, the Regional Level Committee granted approval to the Office Bearers elected on 17.7.2005 in its meeting dated 29.8.2006. Consequently the DIOS was informed of such recognition by letter dated 5.9.2006 issued from the office of JDE. The DIOS accordingly granted approval to the newly elected Committee of Management vide his letter dated 8.9.2006. These two orders granting recognition by Regional Level Committee and DIOS were challenged by the petitioner-appellant in Writ Petition No. 53512 of 2006 contending that on his complaint when the orders were already issued for re-counting of votes, without such re-counting, recognition granted to the Committee of Management elected on 17.7.2005 was wholly illegal particularly since the above orders were passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-appellant. In the above writ petition, this Court passed an interim order on 17.10.2006 after hearing concerned parties including the newly elected Committee of Management, which is reproduced as under : “Learned Standing Counsel has filed short counter affidavit annexing therewith copy of the proceeding of the Regional Level Committee held on 29.8.2006. He prays for and is granted three weeks’ time to file counter affidavit to the averments made in the writ petition. He prays for and is granted three weeks’ time to file counter affidavit to the averments made in the writ petition. Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel alongwith Sri P.K. Bhardwaj, who have appeared on behalf of respondent No. 5, may also file counter affidavit by the next date. The petitioner shall have a week thereafter to file rejoinder affidavit. List in the week commencing 20.11.2006. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order has been passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It has further been contended that the said order dated 5.9.2006 passed by the Joint Director of Education, Meerut Region, Meerut as well as the report of the Regional Level Committee, Meerut Region, Meerut do not contain any reason for granting the recognition to the elections held on 17.7.2005. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case and keeping in view the aforesaid submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, in my view, prima facie a case for grant of interim relief has been made out. Accordingly, it is provided that till the next date of listing, the effect and operation of the impugned order dated 5.9.2006 passed by the respondent No. 3 and the consequential order dated 8.9.2006 passed by the respondent No. 4 shall remain stayed.” 9. The counter and rejoinder affidavits were exchanged in the above writ petition but subsequently, when it was listed before the Hon’ble Single Judge on 23.10.2008, the writ petition was dismissed with the following order : “Sri Manu Saxena, learned counsel for the respondent is present. This matter has become infructuous by efflux of time. It relates to the elections held on 17.7.2005 and the term itself has come to an end as stated in paragraph 7 of the writ petition. This writ petition is dismissed as infructuous.” 10. It would be interesting to notice at this stage that the above order was passed by this Court in the presence of the counsel for the respondent No. 5, i.e., Committee of Management of the College through its Manager Bahadur Singh, who was represented through Sri Manu Saxena, Advocate before the Hon’ble Single Judge. It is nobody’s case that an application for recall of the said order was filed by either of the parties in the above writ petition. 11. It is nobody’s case that an application for recall of the said order was filed by either of the parties in the above writ petition. 11. After communication of the above order to DIOS, it appears that the members of society requested JDE vide letter dated 18.9.2008 to hold elections of the Committee of Management of the College at the earliest and similar requests were made vide letters dated 8.12.2008. Another letter signed by the petitioner-appellant as well as about 23 other members was submitted on 15.12.2008 but in the meantime DIOS passed order on 5.12.2008 which in substance means that since the Writ Petition No. 53512 of 2006 has been dismissed, it means that the Committee of Management elected on 17.7.2005 stands recognised, hence, in pursuance and compliance of High Court’s order, Sri Haridatta Sharma and Sri Bahadur Singh were recognised as President and Manager of the Committee of Management. 12. The petitioner-appellant when came to know about this order of the DIOS, claims to have made a complaint to the District Magistrate, Bulandshahar vide his letter dated 17.12.2008 and thereafter approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 281 of 2009 assailing the order dated 5.12.2008 passed by DIOS and sought a further relief of mandamus commanding the respondents to hold fresh election of the Committee of Management of the College within a specified period. 13. Now in the above background of the facts, we shall endeavour to answer the above two questions. No doubt it is true that an individual cannot represent the Committee of Management to challenge an order or action of any authority whereby the Committee of Management is allegedly affected. If an action or order affects the Committee of Management, a collective body, the body itself can challenge the same or may authorize an individual to represent it and challenge such action or order of an authority etc. 14. However, at this stage, we may clarify certain aspect of the matter which normally creates confusion in a dispute like the present one. The maintainability of the writ petiton at the instance of an individual has to be seen from two angles. Firstly, whether the individual has any locus standi to maintain the writ petition. If the answer is in positive, still the maintainability would depend on certain further issues namely availability of alternative remedy, delay, laches etc. The maintainability of the writ petiton at the instance of an individual has to be seen from two angles. Firstly, whether the individual has any locus standi to maintain the writ petition. If the answer is in positive, still the maintainability would depend on certain further issues namely availability of alternative remedy, delay, laches etc. If the answer is in negative, obviously the writ petition would not be maintainable since the petitioner has no locus standi. Therefore, the issue has to be considered from twin angles, firstly, whether the individual has locus standi or not and in that context some judgments have been placed before this Court. Though some of the observations are worded widely but only in the context of the issue before the Court, we have to consider the matter and not beyond that. Similarly, maintainability of the writ petition on the issue other than locus standi is a different aspect. In the case before us, the context of the writ petition regarding maintainability is confined to the “locus standi” of the petitioner and not other aspects. 15. In this context, the first judgment, being a Division Bench decision would be necessary to be considered, i.e. Dr. P.P. Rastogi (supra). It appears that the writ petition was filed by the Committee of Management but when the same was decided by this Court on 27.11.2005, a review application was filed by certain individual members of the Committee of Management. Holding that the individual members have no locus standi to file review application, this Court in para 3 and 4 held as under : “3. In our opinion this application is liable to be rejected on the short ground that the applicants have no locus standi in the matter. Admittedly, this application for review has not been filed by the Committee of Management, but by certain members of the Committee of Management. 4. In our opinion, an individual member of the Committee of Management has no locus standi in such cases and it is only the Committee of Management alone which can appear as a party in the case. To permit individual members of the Committee of Management to appear before us would create a lot of problems because any individual member or several members may file applications at any time through his/their own separate counsel, resulting in confusion. To permit individual members of the Committee of Management to appear before us would create a lot of problems because any individual member or several members may file applications at any time through his/their own separate counsel, resulting in confusion. For instance, if there are 15 members of the Committee of Management and we permit each of them to appear before us through their separate counsel, it would result in chaos. In our opinion, the only legal entity which can appear in Court for the management is the Committee of Management itself through its Manager or person authorised by a resolution of the Committee of Management.” 16. The observation in Dr. P.P. Rastogi (supra), therefore, were in the context of the aggrieved party and this Court held that in a case where the Committee of Management is aggrieved, the grievance of such collective body cannot be allowed to be raised through an individual member or the Office Bearer of the Committee of Management unless it is shown that he has been authorized by the Committee of Management. This judgment cannot be read as if it creates an embargo in general sense that an individual member whether that of Society or the Committee of Management of the College can never approach this Court in the context of some transaction of the Society or the Committee of Management of the College even if he can show that he is aggrieved person. In our view if such a person, who himself can show to be an aggrieved person, he has locus standi and can maintain writ petition. Therefore, the context in which the Divison Bench in Dr. P.P. Rastogi (supra) made the above observation, we find no reason to take a different view but the manner and the extent to which the above observations are sought to be extended and argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that in no case pertaining to transaction of the collective body like Society or the Committee of Management of the College, an individual can ever file a writ petition, we find it difficult to accept the same. We are clearly of the view that the above judgment has no application to the present case at all. 17. We are clearly of the view that the above judgment has no application to the present case at all. 17. In Smt. Vimla Devi (supra) the writ petition was filed by a life member of the general body of the society challenging the order of Deputy Director of Education and seeking a mandamus commanding the respondents not to interfere in the functioning of the Authorized Controller appointed by DIOS. It appears that in an election held in the year 1996, two rival bodies claim to be elected as Committee of Management of the College and consequentially a reference was made under Section 16-A (7) of 1921 Act which was challenged by Smt. Vimla Devi. This Court held that since neither she claimed to be an Office Bearer of any Committee of Management which have raised claim for recognition as duly elected Committee of Management of the College entitled to run and manage the institution nor she could show as to how she was otherwise directly affected hence she has no locus standi to maintain the writ petition. In above case, none of the affected Office Bearers alleged to have been elected for running and managing the institution chose to approach the Court, and, since they, at the best, could have been really affected party, this Court held that it was not a fit case for intervention at the instance of Smt. Vimla Devi specially when the petition is directed against an interlocutory order as is evident from para 12 of the judgment. The judgment is not an authority for the proposition that an individual member of the Committee of Management cannot file a writ petition, but the Court declined to interfere in the matter observing that the petitioner actually was not affected party and really affected parties have not chosen to file the writ petition and further that the writ petiton was directed against an interlocutory order. 18. Now we come to the judgment of the Hon’ble Single Judge in Bhagwan Kaushik (supra). Here also a life member of the general body of the Society challenged the order dated 24.4.2004 passed by DIOS attesting the signatures of the respondent No. 5 in that case as Manager of the Committee of Management of the College in view of the approval granted to the election of the Committee of Management by Regional Committee on 19.4.2004. Here also a life member of the general body of the Society challenged the order dated 24.4.2004 passed by DIOS attesting the signatures of the respondent No. 5 in that case as Manager of the Committee of Management of the College in view of the approval granted to the election of the Committee of Management by Regional Committee on 19.4.2004. This Court found that there was no dispute of two rival committees said to have been elected in the elections held on 17.4.2003, which was recognised by the Regional Committee on 19.4.2004 and, therefore, the individual member of the general body of the society has no locus standi to challenge the decision of the DIOS attesting the signatures particularly when the election was recognised by the Regional Committee. This Court also held if such a recourse to the individual members of the general body of the society is allowed, it would open a flood gate of litigation to frustrate the very purpose of the democratic set up of managing the societies. This judgment, in our considered view, is again of no help to the facts and dispute involved in the case in hand. 19. Then we come to another single-Judge judgment of this Court in Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, Sultanpur, District Haridwar (supra). There one Haji Yasin filed a Writ Petition No. 23615 of 1998 challenging the election of the Committee of Management held on 29.6.1998 on the ground that election was illegal whereagainst he has submitted his objection before the DIOS. The writ petition was disposed of by judgment dated 24.7.1998 directing the DIOS to pass appropriate reasoned order on the objection of Haji Yasin. The DIOS, however, despite of communication of the said order granted recognition to the above election. Thereafter, one Bashir Ahmad who had lost election filed Writ Petition No. 24599 of 1998 alleging that the recognition was granted without considering and deciding objections of Haji Yasin. This writ petition was also disposed of on 31.7.1998 observing that if the petitioner has any grievance, he may approach the JDE making representation who shall decide the same after hearing the parties. The representation of Bashir Ahmad was decided by the JDE who cancelled the recognition granted by the DIOS, held the election illegal, and, recommended for appointment of authorised controller with the direction to hold a fresh election. The representation of Bashir Ahmad was decided by the JDE who cancelled the recognition granted by the DIOS, held the election illegal, and, recommended for appointment of authorised controller with the direction to hold a fresh election. It is this order, which was challenged before the Hon’ble Single Judge in Committee of Management, Janta Inter College (supra). It was submitted before the Hon’ble Single Judge that the JDE has no power since there was no rival dispute of the Committee of Management, therefore, he could not have treated the representation as a reference under Section 16-A (7) of 1921 Act and hence declaration of election illegal by him was wholly without jurisdiction. It was also argued that by referring to the High Court’s order directing JDE to decide the representation, he could not have treated it to be at par with power to be exercised under Section 16-A (7), which was circumstanced by a fact that there ought to have been a dispute of rival Committees of Management which was absent in that case. However, on behalf of the other side, reliance sought to be placed on Rule 16 (8) of the Education Code which confer general power of supervision upon the JDE and submitted that the said power was wide enough to cover up all such cases of irregularity and illegality including that of election particularly when no other remedy was available to the aggrieved members. This Court from the perusal of the facts noticed that the objection of Haji Yasin was regarding his complaint of prevention of four members from participating in the election and casting their votes. It also noticed that the difference of votes was more than four between the winning candidate and the next loosing candidate, therefore, even if the said four persons would have participated and cast their votes in favour of the loosing candidate namely, Bashir Ahmad, that would not have effected the result of the election. In this backdrop of the factual situation, this Court proceeded to consider that the four persons who were prevented from participating in the democratic system, i.e. exercise of democratic right of participation in election did not approach the Court. In fact, initially only one of them sought to approach this Court but after the election was recognised, even he gave up the matter. In fact, initially only one of them sought to approach this Court but after the election was recognised, even he gave up the matter. It is the loosing candidate Bashir Ahmad who filed the writ petition raising complaint of those four persons. This Court held that Bashir Ahmad had no right to expouse the cause of non-participation of those four persons in order to achieve some oblique gain i.e. to gain the lost ground. The Court further said that once he has participated in the election and lost, the right, if any, he has, is to challenge the election either through the procedure laid down within the scope and ambit of 1921 Act and the rules and regulations framed thereunder or under Societies Registration Act if the said school is a society registered under the said Act or otherwise as may be advised or by filing a suit but a ground which was available to four persons, who were prevented from participation in the election could not have been a basis for him to file a writ petition in the High Court expousing their cause though for his own advantage. This Court held that in the earlier writ petition filed by Haji Yasin this Court intervened since he was prevented from exercising his democratic right of franchise but the same was not available to Bashir Ahmad. Then addressing on the scope of Section 16-A (7) this Court also held that it would be attracted when there is a rival claim of two Committees of Management but no individual could have raised such a dispute and as such an election cannot be challenged by an individual. We are in respectful agreement with the above observations of the Hon’ble Single Judge but this shows that if an individual is aggrieved by some act or omission on the part of the authorities concerned affecting his rights, he can approach the Court for redressal of his grievance and in such a case, he cannot be non suited on the ground that he is an individual member and not the body of the society or the collective body of the Office Bearers of the society or the management of the College. 20. 20. Wherever, the rights of in individual are affected adversely, if otherwise permissible in law, we find no reason to non suit such individual in availing extraordinary, equitable remedy under Article 226 though it is always open to this Court to decline to exercise its equitable jurisdiction for the self imposed reasons like delay, laches, alternative remedy, conduct of the petitioner etc. but merely because he is not the entire body, his individual rights which are affected, cannot be allowed to remain unchallenged merely on the ground that he is an individual. But, in a case where rights of the entire body are affected, in that case obviously an individual member may not be permitted to approach this Court unless he is able to show that besides infringement of the rights of the body collective, there is an infringement of his individual right also which is enforceable in a Court of law by filing a writ petition under Article 226. This is what has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Indian Sugar Mills Association through its President Shri Hari Raj Swarup v. Secretary to Government, Uttar Pradesh Labour Department and others, AIR 1951 All 1 where it was held that only those persons whose interest are directly affected by a statute or an order can seek for redressal of their grievance under Article 226 of the Constitution. It also held that it is the interest of the petitioner which must be directly affected and the extraordinary jurisdiction is not to be used for all kinds of disputes even where the remedy in common law otherwise is available, but it should be sparingly used more particularly in those particular cases where the right of a person has been seriously infringed and he has no such efficacious remedy available to him. 21. 21. In Committee of Management, Sri Kachcha Baba Inter College, Varanasi and others v. Regional Committee, Pancham Mandal, Varanasi and others, 2007 (4) ESC 2000 (All), the Hon’ble Single Judge (Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.) followed the decision of this Court in P.P. Rastogi (supra) and Bhagwan Kaushik (supra) to observe that an individual member has no locus standi to challenge the result of the election by filing a writ petition but if he is aggrieved, the remedy lie by filing a civil suit seeking an appropriate relief against the election and for this purpose, he also placed reliance on two Division Bench decisions in Committee of Management, Kisan Shiksha Sadan, Banksahi, Basti and another v. Assistant Registrar, Firms Societies and Chits, Gorakhpur, (1995) 2 UPLBEC 1242 and Special Appeal No. 194 of 2007 (Anjani Kumar Mishra v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 19.2.2007. The above judgment must also be read in the context and in the light of the discussion we already made in the above paragraphs. Here also the Hon’ble Single Judge has not said that an individual member can never file a writ petition even if his individual rights are affected but from the context of the case before his Lordship, we find that the individual member of the Society sought to challenge the election without showing any individual right affected of his own, and, in these circumstances, His Lordship observed that a single member has no locus standi. These observations have to be read with the further observation that he has a remedy of challenging election by filing a civil suit which was an alternative remedy, since it requires investigation into the facts also. The decision relied upon by His Lordship, Committee of Management, Kisan Shiksha Sadan, Banksahi, Basti (supra) was for the purpose of alternative remedy. Under the Societies Registration Act, the alternative remedy is provided under Section 25 thereof, hence this Court rightly declined to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. The decision relied upon by His Lordship, Committee of Management, Kisan Shiksha Sadan, Banksahi, Basti (supra) was for the purpose of alternative remedy. Under the Societies Registration Act, the alternative remedy is provided under Section 25 thereof, hence this Court rightly declined to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. Where the matter does not pertain to the election of Society, but to the dispute pertaining to Committee of Management of the College and the Court find that the matter involves investigation into the disputed questions of facts, the parties can be relegated to avail alternative remedy of filing civil suit but that does not mean that the individual can never file a writ petition under Article 226 even if his individual rights are infringed. All the above decisions, therefore, have to be read in the context of the facts as were up for consideration before this Court. 22. At this stage, we may make it clear that in educational matters there are two types of disputes, one pertaining to the parent body and another pertaining to the Committee of Management entitled to manage the affairs of the College. Both these bodies are governed differently and are supervised by different authorities. In the matter of former, it is governed by the bye-laws of the Society and the provisions of the Societies Registration Act but in later case it is governed by the scheme of administration approved under the provision of 1921 Act and therein the authorities, who have been given certain powers to interfere at different level are the educational authorities like DIOS or JDE etc. 23. In Satya Narain Tripathi (supra) the question whether a member of the general body can challenge the election by filing a writ petition was considered by the Hon’ble Single Judge (Hon’ble Janardan Sahai, J.) and his Lordship held that participation either by contesting election or exercising right to franchise is not a fundamental right, but merely a common right originating from the statute or the rules and bye-laws of an association etc. A breach of such statutory rights or right under the rules and regulations can be redressed by the available remedy which the statute or bye-laws provide or by a civil suit where such remedy is not otherwise barred. A breach of such statutory rights or right under the rules and regulations can be redressed by the available remedy which the statute or bye-laws provide or by a civil suit where such remedy is not otherwise barred. Where the elections are held under statutory provision, the remedy of challenging the election, if provided under the statute, has to be availed as an alternative remedy which would ordinarily bar the maintainability of a writ petition. The infringement of a right under the bye-laws of the society would not make the writ petition maintainable under Article 226 but in such a case the incumbent would have to avail remedy either by filing a civil suit or under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act. His Lordship also observed if there is a breach of a right of a person affecting his right to form an association, which is a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution, in that case or where there is breach of the statute, the writ petition may be maintainable subject to the Court exercising its discretion if an alternative remedy is available. The proposition, therefore, that an individual member cannot challenge an election in any circumstance is not correct. When a writ petition can be maintainable at the instance of an individual member of the general body of the society or the office bearer of the society or by the body itself is a different issue but when an election itself can be challenged is another aspect. Similarly whether a writ petition would be maintainable at the instance of an individual or the collective body and in what circumstances stands on different footings. 24. What is discernible from the above discussion is where the right of an individual is affected or infringed, and, he has no other effective remedy, if such rights of the individual concerned are borne out from the statute or the provision of bye-laws etc. having the flavour of statute, a writ petition at his instance may be maintainable subject to attracting the condition where the Court may decline to interfere namely availability of alternative remedy, delay, laches etc. having the flavour of statute, a writ petition at his instance may be maintainable subject to attracting the condition where the Court may decline to interfere namely availability of alternative remedy, delay, laches etc. but where a legal right of an individual is not directly affected, a writ petition expousing the cause of the collective body or other members of the collective body would not be maintainable at the instance of an individual who himself is not directly affected. We may add here that in a given case, if it is found that an election was held by an imposter and he is supported by DIOS or other educational authorities, such an action of DIOS as also the election can be challenged by the individual member since it cannot be said that he is not a person aggrieved but whether a writ petition at his instance would be maintainable or he can challenge the election by filing a civil suit etc., would be a different aspect of the matter and has to be considered in each and every case considering the facts, relevant provision and other relevant aspects of the matter. 25. Now coming to the present dispute, we find that here the election was held in accordance with scheme of administration which has been prepared in accordance with 1921 Act and the Regulations framed thereunder and is duly approved by the educational authorities. The petitioner was a contestant in the election. Complaining some irregularities, he made a complaint before DIOS who after getting a report from the Authorised Controller and prima facie getting satisfied directed for re-counting of the votes and accepted the request of the petitioner to this extent. But thereafter no re-counting took place. The elections were recognised by the education authorities without such recounting. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner is not an aggrieved person or has no locus standi. Whether the writ petition was filed for infringement of a legal or statutory right or a right under bye-laws having force of law is not an issue raised by the respondents in the earlier petition as well as the present one but their basic objection is that the petitioner cannot be said to be an aggrieved person and thus has no locus standi. From the record of the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner, we find that the respondents at no point of time raised this issue since the locus standi of the petitioner-appellant was writ large. It is a different aspect as to why and in what circumstances, the writ petition was dismissed as having rendered infructuous by observing that term of the Committee of Management has expired. It is the consequential order passed by the DIOS after dismissal of the first writ petition of the petitioner-appellant that he has to file the second writ petition which is concerned with the correctness of the order of DIOS, and in the above facts and circumstances, we find it difficult to subscribe the view as canvassed by the respondents that the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the writ petition and, therefore, reject the same. We hold that the petitioner is a person aggrieved and has locus standi in the matter. 26. We again clarify that our observations are only confined for the purpose of the present case to the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner-appellant has no locus standi i.e. he is not the person aggrieved. In respect to the wider issue as to when a writ petition can be entertained challenging the validity of an election is a different aspect of the matter and in this respect neither any objection has been raised by the respondents nor the arguments have been advanced, therefore, we are leaving this issue to be considered in some other case at appropriate time. 27. Now we come to more crucial aspect of the matter as to whether the term of the Committee of Management had actually expired or not and when it can be treated to have commenced in law. 28. At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provision in the scheme of administration dealing with the term of the Committee of Management. A copy of the scheme of administration is available on record as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. Para 4 provides for a Committee of Management which shall be responsible for the management of the College. Para 5 provides that the Committee of Management shall consist of 15 members including Adhayksha, Upadhyaksha, Prabandhak, Sahayak Prabandhak and Koshadhayaksha. A copy of the scheme of administration is available on record as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. Para 4 provides for a Committee of Management which shall be responsible for the management of the College. Para 5 provides that the Committee of Management shall consist of 15 members including Adhayksha, Upadhyaksha, Prabandhak, Sahayak Prabandhak and Koshadhayaksha. Para 7 provides for the term of the office bearers and member of the Committee of Management and reads as under : ^^7- lnL;ksa dk dk;Zdky-&inkf/kdkfj;ksa rFkk insu lnL;ksa ls fHkUu lnL;ksa dk dk;Zdky muds pqus tkus ds fnukad ls rhu o"kZ dk gksxkA fdUrq ;g ÁfrcUèk ;g gS fd izR;sd inkf/kdkjh dk dk;Zdky mlds mRrjkf/kdkjh ds pqus tkus rd le>k tk;sxkA** 29. From the perusal of the scheme of administration, it is apparent that there is nothing to show as to when the period of the elected members would commence though it talks of the continuance of the member till the successor in office is elected and period of three years from the date of election meaning thereby if that is treated to be an indication for the purpose of determining the period of the Committee of Management, that would mean that the date on which the election is held and result is declared but if we take this literal interpretation, there are several circumstances in which the elected members can be allowed not to function even for a day and yet their tenure would come to an end. Can it be said that tenure of an elected member of the Committee of Management of the College would expire even if the elected members, for the reasons beyond their control have not been able to function or hold the office effectively. Since this issue has come up for consideration before this Court time and again, therefore, before embarking upon the discussion of our own, it would be a prudent way to look into the dispute by first of all going through the earlier precedents to find out as to what has been held therein and whether they cover the issue having similar set of facts as in our case so as to constitute a binding precedent for deciding the issue in question. 30. 30. The earliest decision on this issue cited before us is a Division Bench judgment in Committee of Management, Jangali Baba Intermediate College, Garwar, District Ballia and another v. Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi and others, (1991) 2 UPLBEC 1183. The scheme of administration up for consideration in the above case contained the following provision with respect to the period of the Committee of Management : ^^izcU/k lfefr ds dk;Zdky-&inkf/kdkfj;ksa ,oa lfefr ds lnL;ksa dk dk;Zdky rhu o"kZ dk gksxkA dk;Z vof/k lekIr gks tkus ij vxys ,d ekg rd gh inkf/kdkjh cus jgsaxsA ;fn rhu o"kZ ds ckn ,d ekg ds vUnj rd uo p;u lfefr dk;ZHkkj ugha xzg.k djrh rks rhu o"kZ ,d ekg ckn dkykrhr lfefr dk dk;Zdky Lor% lekIr le>k tk;sxk vkSj foHkkxh; f’k{kk mi funs’kd }kjk euksuhr ,d O;fDr lapkyd dk;Zjr ekuk tk;sxk ftls izcU/kkf/kdj.k ds iw.kZ vf/kdkj gksxsaA ;g izcU/k lapkyd p;fur lfefr dks kh?kzkfr’kh?kz dk;Zjr djk;sxk vkSj izcU/k lfefr;ksa esa vf/kdkj dk nkok gS rks ftlds i{k esa laHkkxh; f’k{kk mi funs’kd dk fu.kZ; gks mls dk;Z djk;sxkA** 31. The provision was very clear and did not admit of any doubt. The election therein was held on 7.7.1985 but due to stay granted by this Court on 17.7.1985, the newly elected Committee of Management could not work. The writ petition was dismissed on 24.7.1986. In these circumstances, it was ordered that three years’ period would commence after 24.7.1986, since the period from the date when the Committee of Management took over charge would be the reckoning point of time for determining the term of the Committee of Management. This Court observed that in view of the scheme of administration and the provisions contained therein, it is clear that the period prescribed therein is three years and the earlier validly elected Committee of Management would automatically cease after one month thereafter and the language therein leaves no option. It is mandatory and seizure is automatic but then the question which was considered further as to when this three years’ period would commence. It is mandatory and seizure is automatic but then the question which was considered further as to when this three years’ period would commence. This Court in para 6 of the judgment held that the purpose of prescribing period of three years is that the elected Committee of Management must function, and if for some reason, even after election, the newly elected Committee of Management is not made to take charge from the earlier Committee of Management or the Authorised Controller, the period of that Committee of Management would not commence. However, the day such elected Committee of Management takes over charge or starts functioning as such, the period of three years would start running and would not be extended even if intermittently said Committee of Management is unable to discharge its function on account of litigation between the parties or the stay order granted by the High Court or otherwise. Thus, this Court took the view that it is the date on which the Committee of Management has taken charge or start function as such. 32. Though in the context of Section 29 sub-section (4) of U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965, another Division Bench in Malkiyat Singh v. Cane Commissioner, U.P. and another, (1992) 2 UPLBEC 937 had an occasion to consider as to when three years’ tenure of Committee of Management would commence if it could not function due to a stay order granted by the Court and following the Division Bench judgment in Committee of Management, Jangali Baba Intermediate College (supra) this Court in para 9 of the judgment held as under : “9. If a Committee could not take charge and could not start functioning after its election on account of the stay orders passed by the court, the term will not commence till it takes over charge after the stay orders are vacated. These Committees are constituted so as to function for a particular period. No person or an authority can disobey the order of the Court and it is not open to them to take charge and start functioning in defiance of the court’s orders. The two maxims, mentioned herein above, viz. (I) the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform and (ii) the act of the court shall prejudice no man, will fully apply to a case. The two maxims, mentioned herein above, viz. (I) the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform and (ii) the act of the court shall prejudice no man, will fully apply to a case. The position would be different if the Committee had taken charge and had started working and thereafter it is restrained from performing its function by the Court’s order or by the orders of the State. If the term has begun to run the period of three years will be counted from that date even if the Committee of Management could not function for some period thereafter. 33. It was clarified in the said judgment in para 5 that the position may be different if the statute has specified a particular date from which period of any body or a right will commence and in this regard reliance was placed on a Division Bench judgment of Orissa High Court in Board of Management Nayagarh Co-operative Development Bank Ltd. v. Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, AIR 1983 Ori 105 and the following extract of the judgment was quoted with approval : “There may be instances where the right would be up to a particular date, for instance, a lease would be for a term of 5 years beginning from one date and ending with another. When the term expires the lessee’s rights automatically terminate. The fact that there had been injunction for a period during the term would not bring about an extension. Take also, for instance, the case of an elected Member to the legislature. If on account of an election dispute, he be restrained from functioning, that does not entitle him to an additional period over and above the term of the legislature to which he is elected. With the lapse of time, the House dissolves and that dissolution brings about an end to membership.” 34. If on account of an election dispute, he be restrained from functioning, that does not entitle him to an additional period over and above the term of the legislature to which he is elected. With the lapse of time, the House dissolves and that dissolution brings about an end to membership.” 34. In Ram Kripal Singh (supra), which is also a decision cited on behalf of the respondents, the question was not as to when the period would commence but the issue up for consideration was once the term of the Committee of Management has started, if due to some intervening events, it could not function for full term of three years and one month, whether such intervening period can be excluded or not and in this regard following the earlier Division Bench in Committee of Management, Jangali Baba Intermediate College (supra) and Malkiyat Singh (supra), this Court held that such intervening period cannot be excluded. This judgment, therefore, is of no assistance on the issue in question. 35. Another Division Bench Judgment in Committee of Management, Sukhpura Inter College, Sukhpura, District Ballia and another v. Alleged Committee of Management, Sukhpura Inter College, Sukhpura, District Ballia and others, (1998) 1 UPLBEC 379 which has been relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant, in our view, would throw no light on the issue raised before us inasmuch therein the Committee of Management elected in 1981 actually function till 1992 and after dismissal of the writ petition, it held election with the sanction of the educational authorities. This Court held that since the provision in the scheme of administration is mandatory and shows that the maximum period for which Committee of Management can continue is three years and one month time to hold election, no extra time would be available to the Committee of Management but such election has to be held thereafter by the Authorised Controller and it is in this context, the Court referred to the earlier judgments in Prithvi Pal Tripathi v. District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur and others, (1993) 1 UPLBEC 355 (DB), Committee of Management Sri Gandhi Inter College v. Deputy Director of Education, Meerut, 1989 ALJ 214, Committee of Management Sri Krishna Inter College, Niwari, Ghaziabad and another v. District Inspector of Schools, Ghaziabad, (1991) 1 UPLBEC 646 and Committee of Management Brij. Hoshiar Singh Memorial Inter College, Shamli and another v. Deputy Director of Education, 1st Region, Meerut and others, (1994) 3 UPLBEC 1728 (DB) and single-Judge decision in Ram Kripal Singh and another v. Committee of Management, Uchchttar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Newarhiya District Jaunpur and others, (1993) 1 UPLBEC 344. We are in respectful agreement with the same but we find that the said decisions do not assist in deciding the issue which is up for consideration in this case. 36. Then comes, certain single-Judge decisions cited by the respective parties. In Committee of Management, Janta Uchchattar Madhyamik Vidyalaya Mahuwa Distt. Bijnor v. Deputy Director of Education and others, 1995 (2) ESC 428 (All) (by Hon’ble N.L. Ganguly, J.), the question was whether the period would commence from date approval was granted by DIOS. Referring to earlier Division Bench decision in Committee of Management, Jangali Baba Intermediate College (supra) it held that it is the date on which the Committee of Management has taken over charge and not when the approval was granted by DIOS. 37. In Committee of Management, Sri Kachcha Baba Inter College (supra) Hon’ble Single Judge (Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.) also considered the question of commencement of the term of Committee of Management and in para 4 observed that it would commence on the date of declaration of result. However, from the perusal of the judgment, it appears that the date 18.4.2001 therein was a common date on which the result of the election which was conducted on 31.12.2003 but was stayed by this Court after decision of the writ petition was declared and simultaneously the Regional Committee granted recognition to the election and the Committee of Management also started functioning and in that context, the Court observed that it is the date of declaration of the result. Since the Division Bench decision in Committee of Management, Jangali Baba Intermediate College (supra) has also been considered and referred to in para 13 of the judgment, the observation of the Hon’ble Single Judge cannot be read in conflict to what has been held by the Division Bench in Committee of Management, Jangali Baba Intermediate College (supra), but the same would have to be read in the context of the facts of that case and consistent with the Division Bench decision in Committee of Management, Jangali Baba Intermediate College (supra). 38. 38. In Committee of Management, Lakhori Inter College, Moradabad and another v. District Inspector of Schools, Moradabad and others, (2002) 1 UPLBEC 199 (by Hon’ble S.K. Singh, J.), clarifying position regarding the term “taking over charge”, after referring to Committee of Management, Jangali Baba Intermediate College (supra) and another Division Bench decision in Committee of Management v. Dy. Director of Education and others, (1995) 1 UPLBEC 149; Committee of Management Brij. Hoshiar Singh Memorial Inter College, Shamli (supra), His Lordship observed as under : “In both the cases aforementioned, it was held that commencement of the term of the Committee of Management was not dependent on attestation of signature by the DIOS but at the same time, the Court did recognise that the term of the Committee in a given case may begin to run from the date the elected Committee of Management takes over charge of the management. It would depend upon the facts of each case that whether term of Committee of Management will begin from the date of election or from the date of taking over charge. In a case where the affairs of the college are managed by the Committee which holds the elections in accordance with the scheme of administration, before expiry of its term, the newly elected Committee of Management will begin to run not from the date of election but from the date of taking over charge of the management after expiry of the term of the outgoing Committee.” 39. We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the above observations. 40. The above discussion makes it clear that the term of Committee of Management would commence when the Committee of Management starts functioning as a result of the election. If a Committee of Management which is already existing and the same Office Bearers have come to be elected in the new election, if the election has been held after expiry of the term of the earlier Committee of Management, the newly elected Committee of Management can start function from the date its result is declared but where Office Bearers are different, for newly elected Committee of Management the same can be said to have taken over charge after the term of the earlier Committee is over and newly elected Committee is allowed to function. However where the newly elected Committee of Management is not able to function not on account of any lapse on its part, but for the reasons beyond its control, namely, some order issued by the educational authorities restraining it from functioning or an order by the Court or similar other circumstances, the term of the Committee of Management would commence after it takes over charge and starts function. We make it clear that there may be a case where despite of a new election having taken place, the term of the earlier Committee of Management is over, and, in the absence of any prohibitive order by any competent authority, Committee of Management newly elected does not take any step on its own to take over charge of the management of the College, in that case we are clearly of the view that the lapse on the part of the newly elected Committee of Management would not give it any advantage to differ or postpone the commencement of the period inasmuch it cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong but where despite of efforts etc., the rival Committee or the Authorised Controller, as the case may be, has not permitted the newly elected Committee of Management to function, in that case the dictum as laid down above that the term would commence from the date of taking over the charge would apply. 41. Now, considering the facts of the present case in the light of the above exposition of law, we find that the result of the election was declared on 17.7.2005. It is true that the petitioner-appellant made a complaint alleging irregularities in the election and requested the educational authorities for recounting, the DIOS also passed an order for re-counting, but, thereafter, he found that there was no apparent irregularity in the election having seen the video of the election of the Committee of Management and granted approval to the election but throughout this period the counsel for respondent-Committee of Management could not place anything before us to show what prevented the newly elected Committee of Management from taking charge or requesting the educational authorities or the Authorized Controller to hand over charge to them. Learned counsel for the respondent, Committee of Management, could not place any material to show that any step whatsoever was taken by the respondent-Committee of Management to take over charge of the College for more than a year inasmuch the stay order was passed by this Court on 17.10.2006. Counsel for respondent-Committee of Management in fact only refers to the dispute raised by the petitioner-appellant before the educational authorities and contended that the matter was pending but on his part whether any effort was made to have the charge has not been stated. Thus we are clearly of the view that in the absence of any prohibitive order of any competent authority, the respondent-Committee of Management in this case is itself guilty of not assuming charge and start functioning in the College, hence it cannot take the advantage of the above dictum of law that the period would commence from the date when the Committee of Management has taken over charge as it would not apply in the case in hand in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, in our view, the period in this case would commence from the date of the declaration of the result since there was no hurdle before the respondent-Committee of Management to take over charge and start function in the College. 42. Moreover, besides above, we are constrained to take the above view for some more reasons as are evident from the facts of this case. The earlier writ petition of the petitioner-appellant was dismissed by the Court in the presence of counsel for the newly elected Committee of Management. In his presence, this Court found that since the last election took place on 17.7.2005 and more than three years have elapsed, therefore, the writ petition has rendered infructuous and this order was not objected to by the respondent-Committee of Management whose counsel was present when this order was passed. Meaning thereby that he accepted and conceded to the said order that the term of Committee of Management has elapsed on the date when such writ petition was dismissed by making such observation. Meaning thereby that he accepted and conceded to the said order that the term of Committee of Management has elapsed on the date when such writ petition was dismissed by making such observation. It is true that the Hon’ble Single Judge in its order dated 23.10.2008 has referred to para 7 of the writ petition with respect to the date of holding of the election and in reference thereto has observed that by efflux of time, the writ petition has rendered infructuous but the fact remains that this order was passed in presence of Sri Manu Saxena, learned counsel for the respondent-Committee of Management meaning thereby he also accepted that by efflux of time since more than three years and one month have passed, the writ petition has rendered infructuous. Having given this impression to the Court and having allowed the writ petition to be dismissed as infructuous and not on merits, the respondent can not now revert back to contend that the period would commence only when the Committee of Management had taken charge, i.e. after the recognition granted by the Regional Committee and even if the period of stay is not to be excluded, the term of three years would end in August 2009. The respondent-Committee is estopped from contending so. 43. So far as the order passed by DIOS is concerned, we find that he has gone absolutely erratic. It appears that he has not passed the above order in a bona fide manner. It smells of collateral and extraneous reasons on the part of the concerned DIOS for the simple reason that he has given an impression in the impugned order as if he is complying a direction of this Court and thereby recognising the respondent-Committee of Management though the writ petition was dismissed by this Court having rendered infructuous and not by issuing a direction to DIOS to recognise a particular Committee of Management. The DIOS has not passed the impugned order by treating as if the tenure of the Committee of Management has not come to an end as canvassed by learned counsel for the respondents before us but he has proceeded on the assumption as if this Court has issued direction for recognition of the respondent- Committee of Management and he is simply complying with the said direction. The order of the DIOS smells favouritism and lack of bona fide. The order of the DIOS smells favouritism and lack of bona fide. We are fully satisfied that the impugned order is patently illegal and is an attempt on the part of the concerned DIOS to mislead the parties as also this Court as if he is passing an order in compliance of a direction of this Court which, in fact, was never given to him. The order speaks volume of lack of bona fide on the part of DIOS. We have no hesitation in condemning his approach in passing such kind of illegal and erratic order. 44. In view of the above discussion, this special appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 7.1.2009 of the Hon’ble Single Judge is hereby set aside. The order dated 5.12.2008 passed by DIOS, Bulandshahar, respondent No. 3, (Annexure-8 to the writ petition) impugned in the writ petition is hereby quashed. The writ petition stands allowed. Since the institution is already being managed by the Authorised Controller appointed during the pendency of the writ petition, we direct the Authorised Controller to hold election afresh if not already held pursuant to our earlier order dated 5.2.2009 in accordance with law within three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order and hand over charge to the newly elected body without any further delay thereafter. We further direct the Joint Director of Education, Meerut Range, Meerut, respondent No. 2, to appoint two responsible officers as Observers of the election to be conducted by the Authorised Controller as directed above so that the above election be held smoothly, fairly and without any further complication. If the election have already been held, the direction for fresh election and appointment of Observers, this order shall not affect the same. 45. There shall be no order as to costs. ————