JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—As agreed and requested by learned counsel for the parties this writ petition has been heard and is being decided finally under the Rules of this Court at this stage. 2. Heard Sri Puskar Kushwaha, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Chief Standing Counsel for respondents No. 1 to 4 and Sri B.P. Singh, learned counsel for respondent No. 5. 3. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 29.11.2007 passed by the Regional Assistant Director of Education (Basic), Varanasi/Vindhyachal Mandal stating that as per the Director of Education (Basic) letter dated 29.11.2007 all the transfers/amendments made by Sri Rakesh Singh, the then District Basic Education Officer, Mirzapur after 26.11.2007 shall stand cancelled. 4. From the pleadings in the writ petition it appears that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher on 19.04.1999 and posted at Prathmik Vidyalaya, Shobhi, Block Mariyan, District Mirzapur. For promotion to the post of Assistant Teacher in Senior Basic School/Head Master of Junior Primary School, a selection committee was constituted. The petitioner opted for promotion as Headmistress at Prathmik Vidyalaya, Patihata II, Shiksha Kshetra Rajgarh, District Mirzapur. List of selected candidates was prepared by the selection committee of U.P. Basic Education Board (in short the ‘Board’) which included the name of petitioner also. She was posted accordingly as Headmistress, Prathmik Vidyalaya, Patihata II, Shiksha Kshetra Rajgarh, District Mirzapur but when the petitioner reached there she found one Smt. Jamwanti Devi already working as Headmistress thereat who informed that she has not been informed of her transfer from the said place and, therefore, by letter dated 05.08.2007 addressed to the District Basic Education Officer, Mirzapur she informed him that she cannot allow joining of the petitioner as Headmistress in the said school. The petitioner in the circumstances, also submitted a letter dated 09.08.2007 requesting the District Basic Education Officer, Mirzapur to make alteration in her place of posting and instead of Prathmik Vidyalaya, Patihata II, Shiksha Kshetra Rajgarh, District Mirzapur, she may be posted at Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya Dayalpur (Mohammadpur), Block Narainpur, District Mirzapur as Assistant Teacher. When no decision was taken on the matter, the petitioner approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 54514 of 2007 which was disposed of vide judgement dated 6.11.2007 directing the District Basic Education Officer to take appropriate decision on the petitioner’s representation expeditiously, preferably within a period of two months. When no decision was taken on the matter, the petitioner approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 54514 of 2007 which was disposed of vide judgement dated 6.11.2007 directing the District Basic Education Officer to take appropriate decision on the petitioner’s representation expeditiously, preferably within a period of two months. The said judgement was communicated to respondent No. 2 alongwith letter dated 17.11.2007 whereafter Sri Rakesh Singh, the then District Basic Education Officer, Mirzapur passed an order dated 25.11.2007 amending earlier promotion/posting order dated 28.7.2007 and posted the petitioner as Assistant Teacher at Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya Dayalpur (Mohammadpur), Block Narainpur, District Mirzapur. The petitioner was relieved from the Primary School Chowkiya, Vikas Khand Rajgarh on 25.11.2007 and she took charge at Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya Dayalpur on 26.11.2007. However on 29.11.2007 the impugned order was passed and the respondents are treating petitioner’s posting in the said institution cancelled. It is contended that the respondents have illegally cancelled the said posting order of the petitioner and, therefore, they should be restrained from interfering in the functioning of petitioner as Assistant Teacher at the Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya Dayalpur, Block Narainpur, District Mirzapur. 5. A supplementary affidavit dated 5.11.2009 has also been filed on behalf of petitioner stating that the petitioner sent a representation dated 30.11.2007 to respondent No. 2 seeking clarification of the order dated 29.11.2007 as to whether the effect thereof is that the petitioner should join her earlier institution on the lower post or whether she would be posted to some other place or whether she should continue at the present place of posting, annexing therewith a copy of the judgement dated 6.11.2007 passed in the petitioner’s earlier writ petition as also the promotion/posting amendment order dated 28.7.2007. The petitioner also said that in the absence of any clarification, she would continue to work at Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya Dalyalpur, Block Narainpur, District Mirzapur. In order to show that she was continuously working at Dayalpur, Annexure-SA 2 has been filed which is an order assigning duties to various teachers in Board Examination, 2009 issued by the Assistant District Basic Education Officer, Narayanpur, Mirzapur on 28.02.2009 which also shows that the petitioner is shown thereat as Assistant Teacher working at Purva Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Dayalpur, Block Narainpur, District Mirzapur, meaning thereby it was well known to the authorities concerned that the petitioner was continuously discharging duties at Dayalpur. For assigning the duties of Board Examination she was relieved by the Principal, Junior High School, Dayalpur on 31.3.2009. She also has filed copies of the attendance register of the said school at Dayalpur. However, she further complained that despite of her continuous discharge of duties she has not been paid salary since 26.11.2007 till date on the post of Assistant Teacher, Junior High School. 6. Initially a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of respondents No. 2, 3 and 5 sworn by Sri Jai Pratap Singh, District Basic Education Officer, Mirzapur through Sri C.K. Rai, Advocate wherein the process of selection undergone through the selection committee for promotion to the post of Assistant Teacher in Junior High School/Principal in Junior Primary School, and selection and promotion of the petitioner was not disputed. However, it is said that if there was no vacancy at Primary School, Patihata II, the matter ought to have been informed to the committee again for granting approval and change in place of posting. The District Basic Education Officer, Mirzapur without having consent from the committee passed the order dated 25.11.2007 which was not in accordance with law. It is said that the amendment was made by the then District Basic Education Officer, Mirzapur to give undue advantage to petitioner. It is in these circumstances the order dated 29.11.2007 is justified and it is said that it was rightly passed. It is suggested that after cancellation of the promotion/amendment order of the petitioner posting her at Dayalpur, she ought to have joined at her earlier school on the lower post wherefrom she was illegally transferred and posted to another school. 7. The petitioner has filed rejoinder affidavit reiterating the facts stated in the writ petition and, therefore, are not being repeated except that she has stressed therein that her salary has not been paid by the respondents illegally. 8. 7. The petitioner has filed rejoinder affidavit reiterating the facts stated in the writ petition and, therefore, are not being repeated except that she has stressed therein that her salary has not been paid by the respondents illegally. 8. When this matter initially was taken up, and during the course of arguments, Sri R.P. Yadav, Advocate, holding brief on behalf of Sri C.K. Rai, learned counsel for the respondents was asked whether the order of promotion of petitioner was ever cancelled, he replied in negative and in the circumstances when he was further required to explain as to in what circumstances the petitioner ought to have joined lower post in earlier school and why salary could not be paid, he could not assist the Court at all. 9. When the same question was asked from learned Standing Counsel he said that through the respondents No. 2 and 3 are the Government Officers and the counter affidavit has also been filed sworn by respondent No. 2 who is a Government Officer yet they have engaged a private counsel and, therefore, he is not in a position to assist the Court. It is stated at the Bar that as per the policy of the Government, the Government Officers, in the cases filed in this Court, where the officers in their official capacity are represented, are not supposed to be represented by private counsels but through the Chief Standing Counsel or the Standing Counsel of the State of U.P. Sri R.P. Yadav, however, informed the Court that Sri C.K. Rai, Advocate is the Standing Counsel of the U.P. Basic Education Board, U.P., Allahabad and he has accepted notice on 7.12.2005 on behalf of respondent No. 5 only but the counter affidavit which was filed by the respondent No. 2 said to have been filed on behalf of respondents No. 3 and 5 also through Sri C.K. Rai, Advocate though he did not represent the respondents No. 2 and 3 in this case. Since this Court did not get proper assistance from the learned counsel who had filed counter affidavit on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 and further there was an apparent conflict between the sets of the counsels of the State which created a lot of difficulty during the course of hearing, this Court was constrained to direct the Secretary, Basic Education, U.P., Allahabad and Director, U.P. Basic Education, Lucknow to appear before the Court and explain the things, also as to why the petitioner has not been paid salary for almost 2 years and fixed 16.11.2009. 10. On 16.11.2009, one adjournment application was received by the Court, filed on behalf of Sri C.K. Rai, Advocate representing himself as counsel for respondents No. 2, 3 and 5 and he sought adjournment on account of his illness. Another application was moved on behalf of Director of Education (Basic) who is also the Chairman, Basic Education Board, U.P., Allahabad through Sri Bhanu Pratap Singh, Advocate who also filed his Vakalatnama. The third application has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, i.e., Secretary, Basic Education, Government of U.P., Lucknow, stating that he was not aware of the controversy and the matter was never placed before him earlier. Basic Shiksha Adhikari is responsible for payment of salary to the teachers of Primary School. The Secretary, respondent No. 1, has already directed the Director of Basic Education to hold inquiry into the matter to fix responsibility for delay in payment of salary to the petitioner and submit report. 11. Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Chief Standing Counsel appeared and informed the Court that he is representing the respondents No. 1 to 4 and made a statement, after receiving instructions from the Secretary, Basic Education, U.P. Government, Lucknow that the respondents No. 2 and 3 were never authorised nor can be represented through a counsel other than Standing Counsel unless they are pursuing the case in their personal capacity before the Court. 12. Sri B.P. Singh, Advocate stated that he is Standing Counsel of Board of Basic Education, U.P., Allahabad and is representing the matter on behalf of respondent No. 5, i.e., Board of Basic Education, U.P., Allahabad. 13. In compliance of this Court’s order dated 12.11.2009 Sri Anup Chandra Pandey, Secretary, Basic Education, Government of U.P., Lucknow, Sri D.C. Kanaujia, Director of Education (Basic)/Chairman, Basic Shiksha Parishad, U.P., Allahabad are present. 13. In compliance of this Court’s order dated 12.11.2009 Sri Anup Chandra Pandey, Secretary, Basic Education, Government of U.P., Lucknow, Sri D.C. Kanaujia, Director of Education (Basic)/Chairman, Basic Shiksha Parishad, U.P., Allahabad are present. Sri Dinesh Kumar Yadav, District Basic Education Officer, Mirzapur is also present. Sri Pandey, Secretary, Basic Education, U.P. Government, Lucknow stated that the State Government has not authorised any District Basic Education Officer or Assistant District Basic Education Officer to be represented through a counsel other than Standing Counsel of the U.P. Government, but, he further said that in respect to the Primary Schools maintained by the Board of Basic Education, U.P., Allahabad, under the Rules, the District Basic Education Officer is the appointing authority and is responsible to pass various other orders with respect to the teachers of such institutions in his capacity as appointing authority. Therefore, whenever a case pertaining to teacher of primary schools, maintained by Board of Basic Education, comes before this Court, being an appointing authority, the counter affidavit is filed by him and simultaneously he also represent the Board of Basic Education and probably under that misconception without appreciating the distinction between two different capacities, it appears that in most of the cases the counter affidavit on behalf of District Basic Education Officer have been filed by the Standing Counsels of Board of Basic Education since stand of both is common. He admits that this confusion and misconception has created lot of complication and confusion in the conduct of the cases in this Court and assured this Court that the matter would be resolved by the Government by issuing necessary instructions in this matter so that in future the cases may effectively be represented by the competent persons without their being any confusion causing inconvenience to the Hon’ble Court. He also tenders apology that despite of the State of U.P. through Secretary, Basic Education, being a party in the matter, at no point of time this case was ever brought to his notice and that is how the monitoring of case could not properly be made at Secretariat level though it ought to have been. He also tenders apology that despite of the State of U.P. through Secretary, Basic Education, being a party in the matter, at no point of time this case was ever brought to his notice and that is how the monitoring of case could not properly be made at Secretariat level though it ought to have been. When this Court pointed out that this lack a lustre attitude and indifference is shown in most of the cases, by the State of U.P., and is one of the major cause of delay in disposal of the cases, since the Court do not get proper assistance, he repeatedly tendered his apology and assured the Court that this matter shall also be examined and appropriate steps would be taken at the level of the Government forthwith so that inaction or lack of assistance on the part of State authorities may not cause delay in disposal of cases by this Court. 14. In similar fashion Sri D.C. Kanaujia, Director of Education (Basic)/Chairman, Basic Shiksha Parishad, U.P., Allahabad also expressed his apology and stated that before the communication of the order dated 12.11.2009 he was not aware of the matter. When inquired as to why the cases pending in the High Court are not being properly handled and monitored at the level of the Board, he, while admitting shortcomings on the part of Board as well as himself, assured the Court that he would take appropriate steps in very near future so that the cases filed against the Board may not go without proper representation. 15. Both the authorities, however, informed the Court that after receiving notice in this matter, it was examined by the District Basic Education Officer and he found that neither there was any wrong in promotion of the petitioner nor anything was wrong in her posting, therefore, the same has been recognised and he had already passed an order for payment of salary to the petitioner, and in fact has paid vide order dated 13.11.2009 and vide Cheque No. 533074 dated 14.11.2009. 16. 16. Though in view of the above subsequent events and progress normally this Court would have closed the chapter but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, one aspect needs to be considered that a poor Primary Teacher was forced to starve for almost 2 years without there being any fault on her part and not even a single penny was paid by the respondents. In fact nobody even bothered as to how she is passing her days and taking care of herself and her family. The only defence taken by the respondents is that after receiving the order dated 12.11.2009 of this Court, they immediately looked into the matter and passed order for payment of salary and have paid the same. This Court finds it obligatory, legal as well as constitutional to redress a citizen who has been denied, may be temporarily, her/his right to earn livelihood by not paying wages despite the fact that she/he was continuously discharging duty. Can the employer or the agents of the employer be left free simply for the reason, that, when the Court took stern steps, they immediately issued orders for payment of salary but could not give any satisfactory reason for not making payment for such a long time. 17. The answer may be emphatic ‘No’. In these days of high inflation and price rise where the salary of the employees, if delayed for even a month or two, creates a lot of hue and cry, can the Government officers be excused for such an indifferent and inhuman attitude shown by them towards a poor employee by not paying her salary for full two years and that too only on the ground that either the matter was not placed before them by their subordinate authorities or that they joined the office later on, particularly when this writ petition was pending for the last almost two years, and, the respondents being party to the writ petition are supposed to have knowledge of the pending case, if not in fact but in law. 18. 18. Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Chief Standing Counsel and Sri B.P. Singh, Advocate appearing for the respondents attempted to defend the respondents by submitting that the Board of Basic Education has passed a resolution on 19.01.2002 that a transfer/posting and promotion of teachers of primary schools shall require approval of district level selection committee and communicated said resolution vide letter dated 12.3.2002, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-3 to the counter affidavit filed by Chairman, Basic Shiksha Parishad, U.P., Allahabad. It is submitted that the then District Basic Education Officer while making changes in the posting of petitioner had not obtained approval from the committee and, therefore, the said order was not a valid order. In the circumstances, the petitioner ought to have joined her post of Assistant Teacher in Junior Primary School Chowkiya, Block Rajgarh i.e. lower post but since she did not join thereat her salary could not be paid. 19. Having given my anxious thoughts to the above defence, however, I find it difficult either to accept the same or the bona fide of such defence. It is not in dispute that conditions of service of petitioner are governed by U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the “1981 Rules”). Rule 2(b) of 1981 Rules defines the appointing authority and reads as under : “2(b) “Appointing Authority” in relation to teachers referred to in Rule 3 means the District Basic Education Officer: Provided that the Additional District Basic Education Officer (Women) shall be deemed to be the appointing authority in relation to woman teacher in a district where such officer is posted;” 20. The Basic Schools are such which imparts instructions from Class-I to Class-VIII. The said schools have been classified in two categories; Junior Basic School which imparts instructions from Class-I to Class-V; and Senior Basic School imparting instructions from Class-VI to Class-VIII which are also known as Junior High School. Rule 5 provides for sources of recruitment and Rule 5(b)(ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) provides for appointment of Head Masters/Head Mistresses in Junior Basic Schools and Head Masters and Head Mistresses of Senior Basic Schools and all such post are to be filled in by promotion as provided in Rule 18 which reads as under: “18. Rule 5 provides for sources of recruitment and Rule 5(b)(ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) provides for appointment of Head Masters/Head Mistresses in Junior Basic Schools and Head Masters and Head Mistresses of Senior Basic Schools and all such post are to be filled in by promotion as provided in Rule 18 which reads as under: “18. Procedure for recruitment by promotion.—(1) Recruitment by promotion to the posts referred to in clause (b) of Rule 5 shall be made on the basis of seniority subject to rejection of unfit through the Selection Committee constituted under Rule 16. (2) The appointing authority shall prepare an eligibility list of candidates in order of seniority and place it before the Selection Committee alongwith their character rolls and such other records pertaining to them as may be considered proper. (3) The Selection Committee shall consider the cases of the candidates on the basis of the records referred to in sub-rule (2). (4) The Selection Committee shall prepare a list of selected candidates in order of seniority as disclosed from the eligibility list referred to in sub-rule (2) and forward the same to the appointing authority.” 21. The appointment thereafter is to be made under Rule 19 which reads as under : “19. Appointment.—(1) The appointing authority shall make appointment to any post referred to in Rule 5 by taking the names of the candidates in the order in which they stand in the list prepared under Rule 17 or 17-A or 18, as the case may be. (2) The appointment authority may make appointments in the temporary and officiating vacancies also from the lists referred to in sub-rule (1). (3) No appointment shall be made except on the recommendation of the Selection Committee and, in the case of direct recruitment, except on production of residence certificate issued by the Tehsildar.” 22. In certain cases of transfer approval of Board has been made necessary but those cases are restricted as provided in Rule 21 of 1981 Rules which reads as under : “21. In certain cases of transfer approval of Board has been made necessary but those cases are restricted as provided in Rule 21 of 1981 Rules which reads as under : “21. Procedure for transfer.—There shall be no transfer of any teacher from the rural local area to an urban local area or vice versa or from one urban local area to another of the same district or from local area of one district to that of another district except on the request of or with the consent of the teacher himself and in either case approval of the Board shall be necessary.” 23. Posting and transfer of petitioner in the case in hand is not covered by the conditions as provided in Rule 21 and to this extent there is no dispute raised by counsel for the parties before this Court. 24. Perusal of the above statutory provision makes it clear that the appointing authority is the District Basic Education Officer and once it is admitted that the selection committee rightly made selections recommending the petitioner for promotion to the post of Headmistress of Junior Primary School/Assistant Teacher of Senior Primary School, and pursuant thereto the then District Basic Education Officer, Mirzapur passed promotion order on 28.7.2007, which was neither found illegal nor otherwise contrary to any provision, this Court failed to understand as to how the subsequent change in the school in which the petitioner was to take charge on the promoted post can be said to be illegal or irregular when it was not a case falling within the category of the cases governed by Rule 21. In rest of the matters i.e. other than those caused by Rule 21 it is the appointing authority who is fully competent to pass appropriate order. No provisions could be shown by learned counsels for the respondents that the decision of the appointing authority under Rule 19 would have required any approval or sanction of any other authority except that for the purpose of making selection/promotion, the matter shall be placed before the selection committee and the role of the selection committee is only to consider the candidates on the basis of the records and make selection on the criteria of seniority subject to rejection of unfit and thereafter prepare the list of selected candidates and refer the same to the appointing authority for making further orders. 25. 25. Even the impugned order dated 29.11.2007 does not touch upon the promotion order dated 28.7.2007 which was passed long back. The counsels for the respondents stated before this Court that by order dated 29.11.2007, the various orders passed by Sri Rakesh Singh, the then District Basic Education Officer, after declaration of his suspension on 26.11.2007, in the review meeting of the Chief Minister, were sought to be cancelled since they were made after such declaration. For the purpose of present case, there is no necessity to make any comment on the validity of this part of the order since I am not considering the case of Sri Rakesh Singh, the then District Basic Education Officer but suffice it to mention that from the stand taken by the respondents it is evident that they had no doubt over the correctness of the promotion order dated 28.7.2007 and if that be, so they could not have required the petitioner to join on the lower post in the Primary School Chowkiya, Block Rajgarh, after the impugned order was passed, and to get salary of the lower post. Moreover, from the order dated 13.11.2009 passed by the District Basic Education Officer, Mirzapur it is evident that the petitioner was not relieved by the then Assistant District Basic Education Officer, Narayanpur after her joining at Dayalpur and this also shows that it was not possible for the petitioner of her own, to come back and join at Primary School Chowkiya, Block Rajgarh on the lower post since after joining on the promoted post at Dayalpur she was not relieved by the Assistant District Basic Education Officer, Narayanpur who was the competent authority for the same. In the circumstances to blame the petitioner for not joining at Chowkiya is wholly imaginary and shows shifting of responsibility from the responsible person to a person who has no control over the things. 26. In any case, if the District Basic Education Officer was of the view that some other order is required to be passed with respect to the posting of petitioner after getting approval from the committee, even that could have been done at his level inasmuch as for the said purpose nothing was required to be done by the petitioner. 26. In any case, if the District Basic Education Officer was of the view that some other order is required to be passed with respect to the posting of petitioner after getting approval from the committee, even that could have been done at his level inasmuch as for the said purpose nothing was required to be done by the petitioner. If the respondents themselves failed to take appropriate steps and necessary orders or approval from whatever authority the same was required according to their understanding, though in law, the Court is of the view that no such approval was required, it was for the respondents to obtain the same. They cannot shift its responsibility to the petitioner in any circumstance. Inaction on the part of the respondents in the case in hand is clearly unpardonable having no justification or excuse and, therefore, is wholly unreasonable, irrational and travels in the realm of sheer arbitrariness and discrimination. This is ex facie violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India besides Article 21. 27. Right to life and liberty under Article 21 is not mere a term of art. It is a living phrase and now has been held to constitute basic feature of our Constitution. It is a compendious term include within itself the various facets of life. Right to get unpolluted clean drinking water, healthy environment and sustainable development, reputation of a person, right to education in a quality school at least up to primary level, right to study in a school having appropriate safety measures, speedy trial, a decent life, right to live with dignity and privacy etc. have been held as part of right to life, and, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Earlier the Courts understood the term ‘right to life’ in its barest of connotation implying right to mere survival but the Constitution being a living document and the law being dynamic, with the experience, it was found that this is the most fundamental of all rights. It is a source of all other rights. Other rights may be limited and may even be withdrawn and then granted again but their ultimate living is to be found in the preservation of right to life. It is a source of all other rights. Other rights may be limited and may even be withdrawn and then granted again but their ultimate living is to be found in the preservation of right to life. Right to public employment which includes right to continue to in employment till the employee is superannuated as per Rules or compulsorily retired or duly terminated in accordance with the procedure established by law is an integral part of right to livelihood which is an integral facet of right to life enshrined by Article 21 of the Constitution as observed by the Constitution Bench in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and others, AIR 1991 SC 101 followed recently in Punjab National Bank by Chairman and another v. Astamija Dash, AIR 2008 SC 3182 . 28. In Virendra Gaur and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1995(2) SCC 577 the Court observed that right to have living atmosphere congenial to human existence is a right to life. The State has a duty in that behalf to shed its extravagant unbridled sovereign power and to forge in its policy to maintain ecological balance and hygienic environment. If this is what held with respect to environment and ecology, can it be said that compelling an employee to starve by not paying any salary whatsoever for years together, making her even mere existence and survival difficult would not amount to infringement of right to life of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution. 29. In Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame and others, AIR 1990 SC 630 while considering the width and ambit of Article 21of the Constitution the Court said that it includes right to shelter. It also observed that right to life would take within its sweep the right to food, right to clothing, right to decent environment and reasonable accommodation to live in. The Court insisted that the difference between the need of animal and a human being for shelter has to be kept in view. 30. Instead of burdening this judgement giving numerous similar circumstances which have now been included within the ambit of right to life under Article 21 it would be suffice to conclude that anything which deny means to live, affects human dignity etc. 30. Instead of burdening this judgement giving numerous similar circumstances which have now been included within the ambit of right to life under Article 21 it would be suffice to conclude that anything which deny means to live, affects human dignity etc. and that too not for the fault of the person concerned but for the authorities, in my view, without any further discussion can certainly be held as violative of Article 21 for the simple reason that the expression ‘life’ under Article 21 does not connote mere physical or animal existence. In the present case, the petitioner and her family has been made to starve for two years, that too not for any fault attributable to her but for sheer inaction and indifferent attitude on the part of respondents. 31. Deprecating inhuman and indifferent attitude of executive authorities having wide powers on the matters affecting the right to life and liberty of a person but not exercising the same in the way they are excepted in law, this Court has observed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 43344 of 2006, Amit Kumar Verma v. State of U.P. and others, decided on 19.8.2009 as under : “7. The respondents should not forget that they are employees of a statutory body constituted under an Article of the State Legislation. The body, constituted ‘State’, under Article 12 of the Constitution. The employees are the servants of the people. Use of their power must always be subordinate to their duty of service. If a public functionary acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but it is abuse. The same would apply to a case of inaction also i.e. where it is bound to exercise its power but fail to do so. An ordinary citizen or a common man is hardly equipped to match the might of the State, its instrumentalities or authorities. It is the duty of the Court, therefore, to check such arbitrary, capricious action on the part of the public functionaries to rescue the common man. It is a matter of common knowledge and judicial cognizance can be taken of the fact that in most of the matters where the sufferance is minor, the common man does not even complain and silently suffer it. He takes it as destiny or fate. It is a matter of common knowledge and judicial cognizance can be taken of the fact that in most of the matters where the sufferance is minor, the common man does not even complain and silently suffer it. He takes it as destiny or fate. The time has come when this Court has to remind the public authorities that harassment of a common man is socially abhorring and legally impermissible. It may harm the common man personally but injury to society is far more grievous. Crime and corruption thrive and prosper in the society due to lack of public resistance. Nothing is more damaging than the feeling of helplessness. The ordinary citizen instead of complaint and fight normally succumbs and surrender to the undesirable functioning instead of standing against it. He has to be given a confidence and strength enough to stand and expose such illegality and apathy of public functionaries. The Courts have onerous responsibility to generate such confidence and strength in common man. 8. It would also be useful to remind the public functionaries that in a democratic system governed by rule of law, the Government does not mean a lax Government. The public servants hold their offices in trust and are expected to perform with due diligence particularly so that their action or inaction may not cause any undue hardship and harassment to a common man. Whenever it comes to the notice of this Court that the Government or its officials have acted with gross negligence and unmindful action causing harassment of a common and helpless man, this Court has never been a silent spectator but always reacted to bring the authorities to law.” 32. Regarding harassment of a Government employee, referring to observations of Lord Hailsham in Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome, 1972 AC 1027 and Lord Devlin In Rooks Vs. Barnard 1964 AC 1129 the Apex Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, JT 1993 (6) SC 307 held as under; “An Ordinary citizen or a common man is hardly equipped to match the might of the State or its instrumentalities. That is provided by the rule of law..........public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. No law provides protection against it. That is provided by the rule of law..........public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. No law provides protection against it. He who is responsible for it must suffer it...........Harassment of a common man by public authorities is socially abhorring and legally impermissible. It may harm him personally but the injury to society is far more grievous.” 33. In Registered Society v. Union of India and others, (1996) 6 SCC 530 the Apex Court held as under: “No public servant can say “you may set aside an order on the ground of mala fide but you cannot hold me personally liable” No public servant can arrogate in himself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary”. 34. In Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 558 the Apex Court held as follows : “An arbitrary system indeed must always be a corrupt one. There never was a man who thought he had no law but his own will who did not soon find that he had no end but his own profit.” 35. In Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction and another, AIR 1996 SC 715 the Apex Court held as follows: “A democratic Government does not mean a lax Government. The rules of procedure and/or principles of natural justice are not mean to enable the guilty to delay and defeat the just retribution. The wheel of justice may appear to grind slowly but it is duty of all of us to ensure that they do grind steadily and grind well and truly. The justice system cannot be allowed to become soft, supine and spineless.” 36. In view of the above discussion, in my view, it is a fit case where the petition should be disposed of with exemplary costs against the respondents. This Court can well understand that the trauma, torture and harassment, the petitioner has suffered in misery for the last two years by not getting her salary from the respondents, cannot be compensated in terms of money since it would be maligning the human dignity to assess it in terms of money as money cannot be a substitute for the real pain which one has borne for such a long time. However, it can give a satisfaction to the person concerned that at least somebody has taken care of his/her plights and the guilty persons have not been left free. This would be a little solace to already suffered soul. 37. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order dated 29.11.2007 is hereby quashed to the extent of the petitioner, who shall also be entitled to cost quantified to Rs. 25,000/- which shall be deposited by the respondents with the Registrar General of this Court within two months failing which it would be open to Registrar General to recover the same as arrears of land revenue. After realising the above cost the same would be paid to the petitioner. ————