JUDGMENT Honble Amitava Lala, J.—All the aforesaid appeals are connected and have been heard analogously, therefore, all are being decided by this common judgement having binding effect in all the appeals. 2. The brief facts of the aforesaid appeals are that on 17th February, 1988 a gazette notification was issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter in short called as the ‘Act’) for acquiring the land having a total area of 603-13-0 bigha (377.281 acre) situated in Village Rasoolpur Nawada, Pargana Loni, Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad for the purpose of planned development under New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter in short called as ‘NOIDA’), the then District Ghaziabad. In the said notification it was provided that since the land is urgently required, provisions of Section 17 (1) & (1-A) of the Act will be applicable but not Section 5-A of the Act. Local publication of such acquisition was made on 11th March, 1988, whereas publication in two newspapers, namely, Dainik Hint and Dainik Pralayankar was done on 12th March, 1988. Notification under Section 6 read with Section 17 (1) of the Act was published on 16th June, 1988 and accordingly, publication in two newspapers, namely, Dainik Hint & Gau Ganga and local publication was done on 26th September, 1988 and 28th September, 1988 respectively. Since there were some shortcomings in the recorded area, further notifications under Sections 4 (1) and 6 (1) of the Act were published and possession of 603-5-0 bigha of land was taken over by the appropriate authority on 28th February, 1989. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, NOIDA, the then District Ghaziabad (hereinafter in short called as the ‘SLAO’) after hearing the objectors/land loosers under Section 9 of the Act and after consideration of 32 sale-deeds found that the sale-deed at Serial No. 32, which was executed by one Sri Pratap Singh in favour of Dayal Sahkari Awas Samiti Ltd. (a Co-operative Society) dated 5th December, 1987 @ Rs. 34.71 per square yard, is the most appropriate and justifiable sale-deed to form basis for determining the amount of compensation. On the basis of the aforesaid, the SLAO by its award dated 24th September, 1990 awarded compensation of the land @ Rs. 34.71 per square yard, is the most appropriate and justifiable sale-deed to form basis for determining the amount of compensation. On the basis of the aforesaid, the SLAO by its award dated 24th September, 1990 awarded compensation of the land @ Rs. 34.71 per square yard, solatium @ 30% of the compensation for land, 12% additional compensation from the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act till the date of taking over possession, interest @ 9% from the date of taking possession till the date of award, and other compensations for house and well etc. 3. Against the aforesaid award the claimants proceeded before the Court of reference under Section 18 of the Act saying that the land is situated only at a distance of three kilometres from Delhi border and nearby areas have already been developed residentially and industrially and is also developing very fast. The land is situated within the regulated area of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) and is full of potential value. NOIDA itself has decided to pay compensation @ 90/- per square yard to the land loosers of the adjacent village Makanpur, which was acquired with the land of Rasoolpur Nawada i.e. claimants’ land, and for the village Mamura award has been made for Rs. 50/- per square yard, whereas land of the claimants is in much useful position than that of said villages. NOIDA itself is selling the adjacent lands @ Rs. 850/- and Rs. 1250/- per square meter for industrial and residential purposes respectively. Since the land under sale-deed at Sl. No. 32 comes within the regulated area, therefore, either sale-deed is not executed or the sale-deed is executed at a lower rate in order to save the stamp duty and the SLAO has arbitrarily rejected the other sale-deeds without properly considering the same; and the compensation has been awarded at a very lower rate, whereas for other adjacent villages, namely, Makanpur, Khoda and Mamura compensation has been awarded @ Rs. 90/-, Rs. 70/- and Rs. 50/- per square yard respectively. Against this background, the claimants demanded compensation @ Rs. 200/- per square yard. 4. Before the Court of reference the defendants therein filed written statements. The State filed its written statement saying that the reference is against the law and facts and being barred by time is not maintainable. The allegations made in the reference are wrong. Against this background, the claimants demanded compensation @ Rs. 200/- per square yard. 4. Before the Court of reference the defendants therein filed written statements. The State filed its written statement saying that the reference is against the law and facts and being barred by time is not maintainable. The allegations made in the reference are wrong. The SLAO has well considered all the surrounding circumstances prevailing at the time of acquisition. The claimants have accepted the award and have received the amount of compensation without protest. The claims of the claimants are barred by the provisions of Section 25 read with Section 9 of the Act. No claim or objection was preferred by the claimants as envisaged under Section 9 of the Act in time. NOIDA had also filed its written statement and apart from taking the pleas as taken by the State, also taken various pleas regarding nature and price of the land. 5. Out of all the references made by the claimants, two sets were made. Leading land acquisition reference number of one of which was L.A.R. No. 337 of 1991 (Charan Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others) along with other five references, which were decided by the Court of reference by its common judgement dated 26th May, 1995, arising out of which the aforesaid first appeals of the year 1996 have been filed. The other references were clubbed together and decided by its common judgement dated 22nd July, 1999 taking the L.A.R. No. 334 of 1991 (Daulat Ram and others v. State of U.P. and others) as leading one, from which other appeals have been preferred. 6. So far as bunch of L.A.R. No. 337 of 1991, in which judgement dated 26th May, 1995 has been delivered, is concerned, the claimants have adduced certified copies of three sale-deeds before the Court of reference, particulars of which are as under : Sl./ Date Vendor Vendee Area/ Rate Nature of Paper Village Plot No. 17Ga 23.2.1988 Raja Ram Rajesh 226.35 sq. yard Rs. 135/-per Developed Pandey Singh Makanpur sq. yard urban plot 18Ga 23.2.1988 Raja Ram Kailash 226.35 sq. yard Rs. 135/-per Developed Pandey Singh Makanpur sq. yard urban plot 19Ga 23.2.1988 Raja Ram Umesh 200 sq. yard Rs. 135/-per Developed Pandey Kumar Khoda sq. yard urban plot 7. yard Rs. 135/-per Developed Pandey Singh Makanpur sq. yard urban plot 18Ga 23.2.1988 Raja Ram Kailash 226.35 sq. yard Rs. 135/-per Developed Pandey Singh Makanpur sq. yard urban plot 19Ga 23.2.1988 Raja Ram Umesh 200 sq. yard Rs. 135/-per Developed Pandey Kumar Khoda sq. yard urban plot 7. Apart from aforesaid, the claimants also adduced before the Court of reference the copies of the judgements dated 30th September, 1994 passed in L.A.R. No. 305 of 1993 (Balraj Singh v. State of U.P. and others) and 24th March, 1993 passed in L.A.R. No. 1 of 1992 (Surendra v. State of U.P. and others), which were arising out of land acquisition proceeding of the adjacent villages, namely, Khoda and Makanpur respectively and notifications under Section 4 of Act of such villages were published on 8th April, 1988 and 2nd April, 1988 respectively i.e. within one month from the date of local publication of the acquisition in question. In both the aforesaid references compensation for the land was granted @ Rs. 108/- per square yard. 8. The Court of reference after taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the evidences adduced by the parties discarded the sale-deed to form basis for determining the compensation. Considering the fact that though both the aforesaid judgements are identically and similarly placed and are appropriate for determining the compensation but since the judgement of L.A.R. No. 1 of 1992 is older than that of L.A.R. No. 305 of 1993, the Court of reference took the judgement of L.A.R. No. 305 of 1993 to be most appropriate piece of evidence to come to an appropriate conclusion. Thus, the Court of reference taking into account the period of acquisition as well as nature, situation, potentiality, use etc. of the lands under the acquisition in question and that of the lands under the judgement of Court of reference referred above, awarded compensation for the land @ Rs. 108/- per square yard, additional compensation @ 12% from the date of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act till the date of possession, solatium @ 30%, interest @ 9% for one year from the date of possession and after that @ 15% till the date of actual payment. 9. 108/- per square yard, additional compensation @ 12% from the date of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act till the date of possession, solatium @ 30%, interest @ 9% for one year from the date of possession and after that @ 15% till the date of actual payment. 9. So far as L.A.R. No. 334 of 1991 and others, in which judgment dated 22nd July, 1999 has been passed, are concerned, the Court of reference after considering the material facts, evidences adduced and the judgment dated 26th May, 1995 passed in other six similarly situated references as well as judgement of L.A.R. No. 305 of 1993, came to the conclusion that the SLAO has arbitrarily and in a cursory manner given the award at a very low rate and ultimately, not only on the ground of parity but also taking into account the other factors awarded the compensation for land @ Rs. 106/- per square yard (without any discussion about reducing the rate from Rs. 108/- to Rs. 106/- possibly with a bonafide mistake) and other compensation as awarded by the earlier Court of reference by judgement dated 26th May, 1995. 10. Aggrieved against the aforesaid judgements of the Court of reference dated 26th May, 1995 and 22nd July, 1999 the aforesaid first appeals have been filed by the NOIDA. On the other hand, the land loosers have also filed cross-objections in as many as 32 appeals arising out of judgement dated 22nd July, 1999 for enhancing the compensation from Rs. 106/- to Rs. 150/- per square yard. 11. On the other hand, the land loosers have also filed cross-objections in as many as 32 appeals arising out of judgement dated 22nd July, 1999 for enhancing the compensation from Rs. 106/- to Rs. 150/- per square yard. 11. At an initial stage we wanted to get answer from the appellant as to whether they want to take the plea that adjudication of the case in the reference can not be made when the compensation fixed by the SLAO was accepted by the land owners without raising any protest because such point amongst others has been considered by this Bench in the judgement reported in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Chandra Bhan and others, 2008 (6) ADJ 42 (DB) but it appears to us from the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant that they require adjudication of the cause on merit irrespective of the factum whether the compensation was received by the land owners with protest or without protest, as a result whereof we had no other alternative but to enter into the merit of the matter. 12. We have gone through the factual aspect of the matter as aforesaid. So far as land acquisition matters are concerned, so many discussions are made and so many judgements are delivered not only by the Supreme Court but also by the different High Courts that detail discussion in connection with such judgements will be mere repetition. In any event, in Chandra Bhan (supra) we have considered ratio of various judgements of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, as follows : (1) Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona and another, AIR 1988 SC 1652 ; (2) Suresh Kumar v. Town Improvement Trust, Bhopal, AIR 1989 SC 1222 ; (3) Spl. Tehsildar, Land Acqn., Vishakapatnam v. Smt. A. Mangala Gowri, AIR 1992 SC 666 ; (4) Ashwani Kumar Dhingra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 974 ; (5) Bhagwathula Samanna and others v. Special Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Visakhapatnam Municipality, AIR 1992 SC 2298 ; (6) M/s. Printers House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mst. Saiyadan (Deceased) by L. Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 1160 ; (7) The Special Land Acquisition Officer and another etc. etc. v. Sri Siddappa Omanna Tumari and others etc., AIR 1995 SC 840 ; (8) K. Posayya and others v. Special Tahsildar, AIR 1995 SC 1641 ; (9) P. Ram Reddy etc. Saiyadan (Deceased) by L. Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 1160 ; (7) The Special Land Acquisition Officer and another etc. etc. v. Sri Siddappa Omanna Tumari and others etc., AIR 1995 SC 840 ; (8) K. Posayya and others v. Special Tahsildar, AIR 1995 SC 1641 ; (9) P. Ram Reddy etc. v. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad etc., JT 1995 (1) SC 593; (10) Tarlochan Singh and another v. The State of Punjab and others, JT 1995 (2) SC 91; (11) Land Acquisition Officer, Eluru and others v. Jasti Rohini (Smt.) and another, 1995 (1) SCC 717 ; (12) Kummari Veeraiah and others v. State of A.P., 1995 (4) SCC 136 ; (13) K.S. Shivadevamma and others v. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer and another, 1996 (2) SCC 62 ; (14) U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and another v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and others, 1996 (3) SCC 124 ; (15) Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivabai and others, AIR 1997 SC 2642 ; (16) Meharban and others etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1997 SC 2664 ; (17) Jai Prakash and others etc. etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1997 SC 2664 ; (17) Jai Prakash and others etc. etc. v. Union of India, JT 1997 (4) SC 112; (18) Kanwar Singh and others v. Union of India, 1998 (8) SCC 136 ; (19) The Land Acquisition Officer Revenue Divisional Officer Nalgonda (A.P.) v. Morisetty Satyanarayana and others, JT 2001 (10) SC 200; (20) Union of India v. Zila Singh and others, 2003 (10) SCC 166 ; (21) Union of India and another v. Ram Phool and another, 2003 (10) SCC 167; (22) Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Sahaswan, District Budaun through its Secretary v. Bipin Kumar and another, 2004 (2) SCC 283 ; (23) Land Acquisition Officer, Kammarapally Village (A.P.) v. Nookala Rajamallu and others, AIR 2004 SC 1031; (24) Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Khushi Ram and others, (2004) 2 SAC 235; (25) Allahabad Development Authority v. Ekhlaque Hussain and others, 2007 (3) ADJ 413 (DB); (26) National Thermal Power Corporation v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (7) ADJ 595 (DB); (27) Gafar and others v. Moradabad Development Authority and another, 2007 (7) SCC 614 ; (28) Nelson Fernandes and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, South Goa and others, 2008(1) ADJ 253 (DB); (29) National Thermal Power Corporation, Vidyut Nagar, Ghaziabad v. State of U.P. and another, 2007 (8) ADJ 665 (DB); (30) Jagdish Chandra and others v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, NOIDA and another, 2008(1) ADJ 253 (DB). 13. In Chandra Bhan (supra) amongst all the judgements we have taken note of Chimanlal Hargovinddas (supra) to keep plus minus factors on the mental screen to come to an appropriate conclusion. The relevant part of such judgement, as referred in the above judgement of the Division Bench of this Court, is set out hereunder : “4. The following factors must be etched on the mental screen : (1) A reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award and the Court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his Award unless the same material is produced and proved before the Court. (2) So also the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not to be treated as a judgment of the trial Court open or exposed to challenge before the Court hearing the Reference. (2) So also the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not to be treated as a judgment of the trial Court open or exposed to challenge before the Court hearing the Reference. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the Court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the Court to sit in appeal against the Award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate Court. (3) The Court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. (4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the Court. Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose. (5) The market value of land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (dates of Notifications under Sections. 6 and 9 are irrelevant). (6) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price. (7) In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value. (8) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of Acquisition of land.) (9) Even post-notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of Acquisition of land.) (9) Even post-notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects. (10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations : (i) proximity from time angle (ii) proximity from situation angle. (11) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-a-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. (12) A balance-sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do. (13) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors. (14) The exercise indicated in clauses (11) to (13) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do. We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors : Plus factors 1. Smallness of size. 2. Proximity to a road. 3. frontage on a road. 4. nearness to developed area. 5. regular shape. 6. level vis-a-vis land under acquisition. 7. special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage. Minus factors 1. largeness of area. 2. situation in the interior at a distance from the road. 3. narrow strip of land with very small frontage compared to depth. 4. lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up. 5. remoteness from developed locality. 6. some special disadvantageous factor which would deter a purchaser. (15) The evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of each case. There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. (15) The evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of each case. There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. yds cannot be compared with a large tract or block of land of say 10000 sq. yds. or more. Firstly while a smaller plot is within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a lay out, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction byway of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approx. between 20% to 50% to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up, and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur would be locked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards. (16) Every case must be dealt with on its own fact pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the Judge must place himself. (17) These are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense.” 14. Factually, a sketch map of the Revised Master Plan NOIDA-2021 has been placed by the appellant-authority before this Court, from which it appears that Villages Makanpur, Khoda, Rasoolpur Nawada, Hazaratpur Vazidpur were, at the relevant point of time, adjacent to each other and all such villages are part and parcel of the planned development area. National Highway-24 is going across the Village Makanpur to Delhi bifurcating into two important districts of Uttar Pradesh i.e. District Ghaizabad and District NOIDA (at present). Other above villages are adjacent to Village Makanpur situate on the side of NOIDA. However, let us go back to the period when the land was acquired or before thereto. In the year 1995 six matters, as above, have been decided by the Court of reference awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. Other above villages are adjacent to Village Makanpur situate on the side of NOIDA. However, let us go back to the period when the land was acquired or before thereto. In the year 1995 six matters, as above, have been decided by the Court of reference awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 108/- per square yard relying upon various materials particularly position of other villages i.e. Khoda and Makanpur. From the said judgement and order passed by the Court of reference appeals have been preferred before this High Court and initially an order of stay has been obtained from the High Court. Subsequently, in the year 1999 rest of the matters came up for hearing before the Court of reference which were disposed of by awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 106/- per square yard. However, the Court of reference relied upon the evidential value of the judgement and order passed by the Court of reference in the year 1995 at the time of disposing of rest of the matters in 1999. There is a reason of doing so. The order, which has been passed in the year 1995, is based on the order of Court of reference in respect of other villages Khoda and Makanpur about increasing the compensation at an uniform rate of Rs. 108/- per square yard irrespective of the fixation of the rate by the Ghaziabad Development Authority at Rs. 90/- per square yard for Village Makanpur, Rs. 70/- for Village Khoda and Rs. 50/- for Village Mamura. Against this background, the observation of the Court of reference on certain evidential values are required to be seen. The Court of reference in disposing of the matters in the year 1995 relied upon not only the evidences but also considered the spot inspection report as well as the then saleable rates of land by the NOIDA. The relevant part of the respective evidences as taken into account by the Court of reference in paragraphs-25, 31, 32, 43 and 49 of the judgement dated 26th May, 1995 in connection with the other villages are given hereunder : “25. Copy No. 21 Ga of NOIDA’s master plan was filed on record by the applicants from perusal of which it clearly transpires that the three villages, namely, Rasoolpur Navada, Khoda and Makanpur are adjacent to one another. Copy No. 21 Ga of NOIDA’s master plan was filed on record by the applicants from perusal of which it clearly transpires that the three villages, namely, Rasoolpur Navada, Khoda and Makanpur are adjacent to one another. As P.W. No. 1 co-reference applicant Fateh Singh has stated on oath on this point that the acquired land is situated between the lands which are in question in the award of Khoda village and in that of Makanpur. This witness has also clearly stated that a consolidated area has been formed by NOIDA by taking together the land of three villages. In this continuity, D.W. 1, Narayan Singh, who is an Amin with the office of NOIDA has stated that the borders of Khoda and Makanpur do not touch that of the acquired land. Nevertheless, this statement is baseless inasmuch as D.W.2 Nathu Ram, working as Lekhpal with NOIDA has confirmed the fact that the land of Khoda, Makanpur and Rasoolpur Navada villages is situated in Sector No. 62 of the NOIDA and a part of it is situated in Sector No. 63. In this way, the oral evidence given by the reference applicant to the effect that the land of the three villages are adjacent to one another, gets corroborated both by the NOIDA’s master plan (paper No. 21 Ga) and by the oral evidence of D.W.2, Lekhpal Nathu Ram. 31. It is observed in Periyar Parikanni Rubber Ltd. v. State of Kerala II, 1991 II 4 SCC 195 that despite being exemption for making calculation on the basis of certain possibilities in the computation of compensation it is necessary that the quantum of compensation should be proper and justifiable; it should not be improper. It is observed in the case of Vivke (No. nil) also that it will be for the reference applicant to prove that the acquired land has the capacity to fetch price at a higher rate in comparison to the compensation given. It is observed in the case of Vivke (No. nil) also that it will be for the reference applicant to prove that the acquired land has the capacity to fetch price at a higher rate in comparison to the compensation given. In order to meet the requirement inherent in this observation and in continuation of his effort to establish that the compensation given in reference to the acquired land is inadequate and that the acquired land is more valued, P.W.1 Fateh Singh has deposed that the acquired land is even and metalled and it is situated between the land involved in Award No. 118 of Khoda village and in Award No. 119 of Makanpur village and that by amalgamating the acquired land and the land involved in the aforesaid two awards a consolidated area has been formed by NOIDA which has been sold by NOIDA itself at the rate of Rs. 1500 per square yard up to 19.11.1994 and at the rate of Rs. 2400 per square yard after the said date. In this very respect, this witness has also stated that the acquired land is adjacent to the National Highways and on its other side lie Indirapuram colony developed by Ghaziabad Development Authority and also Vasundhara, Kaushambi and Vaishali colonies with multi-story buildings the construction of which colonies precede the acquisition. To the west of the acquired land and on the border of Delhi lie Kodli and Ghadauli housing complexes, the construction of which precedes the acquisition by nearly 20 years. Lying towards its west, Sector Nos. 55 & 56 of NOIDA-developed housing colony also precede the acquisition, and in this very situation the building of Oil India is also constructed, and towards the south lie the fully developed settlements of NOIDA being Sector Nos. 58, 59 & 60, all of which precede the acquisition. To the east of the acquired land there is a 100-metre wide Road No. 2 which is constructed right from before the acquisition and Connaught Place of National Capital Delhi is merely 12 Km. from the acquired land. From these statements of this very witness it transpires that the area in which the acquired land is situated, is surrounded by valuable properties existing right from before its acquisition and famous and valuable sites like Connaught Place of Delhi are not at a considerable distance from it. from the acquired land. From these statements of this very witness it transpires that the area in which the acquired land is situated, is surrounded by valuable properties existing right from before its acquisition and famous and valuable sites like Connaught Place of Delhi are not at a considerable distance from it. In other words, the acquired land is situated at an important focal point due to which it has greater importance and value. Though D.W.1 Narayan Singh and D.W. 2 Nathu Ram, working as Amin and Lekhpal respectively with the office of NOIDA who have been examined on behalf of the opposite parties have by giving contrary evidence unsuccessfully tried to establish that the acquired land is valueless yet in view of the picture shown in paper No. 28Ga, the joint map of Delhi, Faridabad and Ghaziabad districts file on the record, the oral statements of defence witnesses appear to be baseless. Instead, this map goes on to prove the oral statement of the co-applicant, Fateh Singh. 32. From the aforesaid discussion held so far it has become clear that it is not proper to base the calculation of the market price of the acquired land on the sale papers provided on behalf of reference applicant. In this respect it is also necessary to mention that as paper No. 36Ga copy of that very sale deed has been submitted on behalf of the opposite parties whereby the Special Land Acquisition Officer has awarded compensation at the rate in question and this sale document is in question in review of this award, hence the question of basing the calculation of compensation on this sale document by the Court is in itself void. 43. As P.W.1 co-reference applicant Fateh Singh has in his oral statement mentioned at length about the strategic location, residential capacity etc. of the land. It finds mention in para No. 25 of this judgement in respect of which a conclusion has been drawn that the location of the land in question is strategic and it also has better residential capacity. This conclusion gets corroborated also from the following portion of page No. 6 of the award : “An on-the-spot observation of the land in question was carried out where upon it was found that this land is filled with residential ability. This conclusion gets corroborated also from the following portion of page No. 6 of the award : “An on-the-spot observation of the land in question was carried out where upon it was found that this land is filled with residential ability. On three of its borders there exists land of those villages that are full of residential ability. Pieces of land are being acquired at Makanpur in the east, at Khoda in the north and Mamura in the south. The land of this village is filled with considerable utility and usefulness. . . . . . . .” 49. It is observed in the case of A. Gopalakrishnan v Special Dy. Collector, AIR, 1980, Supreme Court 1870 that in the assessment of the the market price of the acquired land, the nature of the land, its current use, its high residential ability, its location vis-a-vis its neighbouring land, the effect of use of the neighbouring land on the acquired land, etc. must be taken into account. In view of this, it will be absolutely justifiable to award equal compensation in lieu of the acquired land by taking into account similar category, nature, residential ability, location and purpose which the land involved in the instant reference suit shares with the land involved in reference suit No. 305 of 93, Balraj Singh v State of U.P.” (Translated copy as supplied) 15. If we take overall view, we would be able to find from the above that in the judgement of 1999 in respect of Village Rasoolpur Nawada the Court of reference followed the judgement of 1995 rendered in respect of the same village i.e. Rasoolpur Nawada, when the judgement of 1995 of the Court of reference followed the judgements of the Courts of reference of the year 1993 and 1994 in respect of Villages Makanpur and Khoda respectively and everywhere arrived at a similar compensation particularly based on the fact that the lands of all such villages situated adjacent to each other have similar potentiality and are nearer to fast developing city adjacent to the capital city of the country i.e. Delhi. Admittedly, the land in question is at a distance of 3 Kms. from Delhi border and 12 Kms. from Cannaught Place at Delhi. In coming to conclusion all the evidential values of the earlier judgement were taken into account by the respective Courts of reference. Admittedly, the land in question is at a distance of 3 Kms. from Delhi border and 12 Kms. from Cannaught Place at Delhi. In coming to conclusion all the evidential values of the earlier judgement were taken into account by the respective Courts of reference. From the evidential value of first of such matters as aforesaid it appears that even on or before 19th November, 1994, the saleable rate of the land by NOIDA was at Rs. 1500/- per square yard when after such date it was Rs. 2400/- per square yard. Though we are aware that saleable rate by the authority to others after making development can not be equated with the purchase value of the land from the land loosers but huge difference of both sale and purchase price of NOIDA at the relevant point of time can create doubt in the mind of the Court of reference to arrive at a compensation of Rs. 34.71 per square yard by the SLAO. The saleable rate of NOIDA is not the recent one but of the year 1994 available in the original proceeding before the Court of reference, therefore, the same can not be ignored to justify the figure of just compensation based on various balancing factors. It is also to be remembered that the Court of reference ignored the yearly escalation and only wanted to maintain parity when found surrounding lands are uniform in nature. We have considered in this regard the post Chandra Bhan (supra) judgements of the Supreme Court hereunder. The first following case is factually similar with the present case. 16. In State of Haryana v. Gurbax Singh (Dead) by Lrs. and another etc., 2008 (11) SCC 65 : 2008 (4) Supreme 174 , it has been considered by the Supreme Court that commercial potentiality of the land is important factor for deciding compensation of land under acquisition based on another Supreme Court judgement reported in Union of India v. Hannder Pal Singh and others, 2005 (12) SCC 564. The relevant portion of Hannder Pal Singh (supra) as relied upon by the Supreme Court in Gurbax Singh (supra) is as follows: “.......From the sketch plan of the area in question, it appears to us that while the lands in question are situated in five different villages, they can be consolidated into one single unit with little to choose between one stretch of land and another. The entire area is in a stage of development and the different villages are capable of being developed in the same manner as the lands comprised in Kala Ghanu Pur where the market value of the acquired land was fixed at a uniform rate of Rs. 40,000/- per acre.” 17. It was further held by the Supreme Court that all the lands involved in the acquisition proceedings had similar potential for commercial exploitation and could be consolidated into a single unit where the process of development and improvement had already commenced. There was little to differentiate between the lands comprised in either of the villages. The lands are abutting to a developed town and can easily be said to be part and parcel of such town having great potential. 18. Again in Mummidi Apparao (Dead) through LRs. v. Nagarjuna Fertilizers and Chemicals Limited and another, 2009 (4) SCC 402 , the Supreme Court has given an emphasis over the location and development all around and its full potential value of developing into housing sites and fast taking up the character. In General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel and another, 2008 (14) SCC 745 , the Supreme Court held that primarily, the increase in land prices depends on four factors: situation of the land, nature of development in surrounding area, availability of land for development in the area, and the demand for land in the area. In rural areas, unless there is any prospect of development in the vicinity, increase in prices would be slow, steady and gradual, without any sudden spurts or jumps. On the other hand, in urban or semi-urban areas, where the development is faster, where the demand for land is high and where there is construction activity all around, the escalation in market price is at a much higher rate as compared to rural areas. In Faridabad Gas Power Project, National Thermal Power Corporation Limited and others v. Om Prakash and others, 2009 (4) SCC 719 , close vicinity of the planned development area was determined as one of the factor for fixation of higher compensation. Thus, these judgements are supporting the contention of the land loosers. 19. Hence, the appeals on the part of the NOIDA do not succeed, therefore, the same are dismissed, however, without imposing any cost. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. Thus, these judgements are supporting the contention of the land loosers. 19. Hence, the appeals on the part of the NOIDA do not succeed, therefore, the same are dismissed, however, without imposing any cost. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. So far as cross-objections are concerned, we are not inclined to pass any order for enhancing the amount in view of the aforesaid circumstances when parity of price on account of uniformity of the land was the sole issue to consider the same, except one small modification in the judgement dated 22nd July, 1999 to the effect that the compensation for the land is fixed at the rate of Rs. 108/- per square yard in the place and instead of Rs. 106/- per square yard, which appears to be inadvertent mistake of the Court of reference. Thus, only with such modification the cross objections on the part of the respondents-land loosers, instead of dismissing, are treated to be disposed of also without imposing any cost. 20. In view of the aforesaid, the substitution applications pending in First Appeal Nos. 289 of 2000, 308 of 2000, 369 of 2000 and 371 of 2000 are allowed upon condoning the delay, if any, without any order as to costs and the order, which has been passed herein, will also be binding upon the substituted respondents. 21. It has been made to known to this Court that substantial part of the compensation has already been paid to the land loosers which are not required to be recovered, and the rest of the amount at the aforesaid rate will be paid as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months. 22. Let the records of the lower Court be returned to the concerned Court as early as possible. Honble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ————