JUDGMENT MUKUL MUDGAL,J . 1. This appeal challenges the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 25th August 1998 by which he had dismissed the objections filed by the appellant herein, who was respondent No.1 before the learned Single Judge. 2. Before the learned Single Judge three plea were raised by the appellant. The first plea was in respect of the maintainability of the counter claim raised by the respondent herein. The learned Single Judge found that before the Arbitrator, the plea of maintainability of the counter claim was not raised and the appellant participated in the arbitration proceedings without protest and had challenged the award on this score only after the award went against the appellant. The learned Single Judge had relied upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Prasun Roy v. The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority & Anr., AIR 1988 SC 205 to hold that long participation in such proceedings amounted to acquiescence and precluded the parties from contending that the proceedings were conducted without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge rejected this objection of the appellant and in our view rightly so. 3. The second plea of the appellant is that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction and acted contrary to the contract by allowing adjustment of Rs.7,79,432.60 made by the respondent towards penalty on the basis of formula which was not part of the contract. 4. The learned Judge observed that the Arbitrator in his finding had stated that evidence had been led by the respondent to show that deduction had been made on the basis of inspection reports which were proved on record. The Arbitrator considered the evidence adduced by the parties and gave his finding that although the formula adopted for calculation of the penalty was not a part of the contract but that the formula adopted was not arbitrary or unjust. In fact the same was found to be reasonable and fair. A perusal of the award itself shows that the Arbitrator had considered the evidence led by Sh. K.B. Sachdeva, Deputy Manager (MTLS) of the corporate office of the respondent. He had explained that HDPE bags were introduced for packing since 1982-83 in place of jute bags. Specifications for the jute bags were laid down in the contract. The respondent had the right to reject the supplies if they were found below specifications. K.B. Sachdeva, Deputy Manager (MTLS) of the corporate office of the respondent. He had explained that HDPE bags were introduced for packing since 1982-83 in place of jute bags. Specifications for the jute bags were laid down in the contract. The respondent had the right to reject the supplies if they were found below specifications. Out right rejection of the bags which do not meet the specifications resulted in a loss to the supplier because the bags were supplied with the monogram of the respondent and cannot normally be used except as scrap. To save the suppliers of such defective bags from total loss on account of rejection of the supplies, in a meeting with the suppliers representatives, a reasonable formula for calculation of penalty to be levied on supplies of defective bags were evolved. 5. The learned Arbitrator also relied upon the principle of Section 59 of the Sale of Goods Act according to which the buyer has the option to elect, to treat any breach of a condition of the contract on the part of the seller as a breach of warranty, and in such an event, he may set up against the seller the particular breach of warranty in dimunition of the price payable to the seller. The Arbitrator held that this is precisely what had been done by the respondent when it accepted the defective bags supplied by the appellant subject to deduction/dimunition in their prices. This formula was adopted to avoid the possibility of discrimination between one supplier and the other so that the dimunition is made objectively and uniformly. The formula was found to be a general rule of principle to be relied upon by the respondent in case of defective/deficient supplies for calculating the dimunition in price. The learned Arbitrator further held that the appellant had been accepting the price of bags after deductions so made. These bags were received and acknowledged to be in full and final payment of the claims of the appellant incurred to supplies made to Bhatinda unit. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the application of Section 59 of the Sale of Goods Act by the learned Arbitrator was erroneous since no notice had ever been issued by the respondent to the appellant to claim that the bags were defective and were being accepted subject to the price being reduced upon application of the formula. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the application of Section 59 of the Sale of Goods Act by the learned Arbitrator was erroneous since no notice had ever been issued by the respondent to the appellant to claim that the bags were defective and were being accepted subject to the price being reduced upon application of the formula. In support of this submission, learned counsel has sought to place reliance upon the decision of City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd., Bombay and Another V. M/s. Nagpur Steel and Alloys Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur, AIR 1992, Bombay 55. 7. We find no merit in the submission of the appellant for the simple reason that the respondent made the deductions regularly and the same were never objected to by the appellant contemporaneously. In fact in his cross examination the witness of the appellant had admitted regarding the deductions being made in Exhibit P-98 after discussion and with mutual consent and after the appellant had agreed to the same. He had further objected to deduction on account of late delivery. The aforesaid argument of learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted also for the reason that the appellant had accepted the deduction of Rs.3,05,460.59 in respect of supplies to Bhatinda unit to be valid while issuing receipts acknowledging full and final payment of the dues in respect of supplies made to the said unit. The contention of the appellant that the said receipt was issued under coercion and duress was rejected by the learned Arbitrator. It was for the appellant to have proved duress, undue influence or coercion. It appears that no evidence was led by the appellant before the Arbitrator and consequently this stand of the appellant was rejected by both the Arbitrator and the learned Single Judge. These are findings of fact which cannot be gone into by either this Court or the learned Single Judge in these proceedings. 8. The learned Single Judge relied upon the judgment in the case of Food Corporation of India v. Joginder Pal Mohinderpal and Anr., AIR 1989 SC 1263 , that even if the order of the Arbitrator is erroneous, it is not open to the Court to interfere and in the present case, the learned Single Judge found and we endorse those findings, that the formula was correctly applied. Accordingly, this plea is rejected. 9. Accordingly, this plea is rejected. 9. Finally, a plea of coercion and undue influence was raised in respect of receipt dated 14th August 1986 which after appreciation of evidence was found wholly unsustainable by the learned Single Judge and therefore, no ground is made out to interfere with the findings of the learned Single Judge and accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.