Judgment : GHOSE, J. (1) This application has been filed by the petitioners for modification and/or clarification of the judgment and/or order dated 23rd September, 2005 delivered by the Division Bench. (2) The facts of the case briefly as follows:-A suit was filed on 28th September, 1983 by Vishanji Dungarmal Futnani against his brothers and other members of the family and various companies and firms, for specific performance of an agreement and/or family arrangement dated 5th July, 1981 and other ancillary reliefs. In the said suit "a terms of settlement" dated 30th December, 2003 was filed and a compromise decree was passed by the Court on 19th January, 2004. Subsequent thereto an application was filed challenging the said decree on 4th February, 2005 whereby the Court was pleased to refuse the prayer of the petitioner to recall the said decree dated 19th January, 2004. It is also to be noted that in the said compromise decree the Court was pleased to record a settlement between the parties in the said suit and decreed the suit in terms of compromise dated 30th December, 2003. (3) Subsequent thereto it appears that at the time of drawing up the decree in question the parties brought to the notice of the Court the terms of settlement could not be filed in Court and an application was filed seeking permission from the Court to file the same. By an order dated 10th May, 2005 the First Court was pleased to grant leave to the plaintiff to file such original terms of settlement in the said suit. Thereafter, an application was filed by the appellants before the trial Court for recalling of the said order dated 10th May, 2005 which was refused by the Court after hearing the parties. (4) Being aggrieved with the said order and/or judgment, an appeal was preferred by the appellants challenging the order dated 19th January, 2004 by which the said terms of settlement dated 30th December, 2003 were duly recorded by the Court. The appeal was heard and after hearing the submissions made on behalf of the parties, the Division Bench dealt with the matter extensively and decided the questions on merits in favour of the respondents and upheld the compromise decree so passed by the learned trial Court. The appeal was heard and after hearing the submissions made on behalf of the parties, the Division Bench dealt with the matter extensively and decided the questions on merits in favour of the respondents and upheld the compromise decree so passed by the learned trial Court. The Division Bench after analyzing the facts and on the basis of inference arising from the documents placed before it recorded its conclusions, on merits. The Division Bench also recorded the concession made on behalf of the appellants. These applications have been filed by the applicants/appellants for modification and/or clarification of the said order and/or judgment delivered by the Court dated 23rd September, 2005, on the grounds mentioned in the said application. (5) Mr. Jayanta Mitra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants drew our attention to Paragraph-18 of the said modification application which reads as follows:-"Under the circumstances, it is respectfully stated and submitted that Their Lordships would be pleased to suitably clarify and/or modify the Judgment and Order dated 23rd September, 2005 in A.P.O.T. No.62 of 2005 and A.P.O.T. No 115 of 2005 by recording that it was the consistent case of the petitioners that the properties at Semmenchary Village, Chennai were not a part of the joint family properties of the Futnani family and the original Power of Attorney was never produced before the Appellate Court." (6) Mr. Mitra, contended that the petitioner ail through alleged that the Mohanlal Dungarmal Futnani had no authority to sign the terms of settlement on behalf of the appellants and, therefore, "the terms of settlement" which was signed by Mohanlal is without any authority. The appellants duly challenged the said authority of Mohanlal. He further submitted that at no point of time any concession was made on behalf of the appellants that the properties at Semmenchary Village, Chennai are joint family properties. On the contrary it was submitted the said properties were never a part of the joint family properties. Therefore, the said properties cannot be included in the said settlement. He further pointed out that the alleged Power of Attorney was never executed by the petitioners at any point of time. On the contrary it was submitted the said properties were never a part of the joint family properties. Therefore, the said properties cannot be included in the said settlement. He further pointed out that the alleged Power of Attorney was never executed by the petitioners at any point of time. He further submitted that the original Power of Attorney was never produced before the Appeal Court but it has been recorded that a carbon copy of the Power of Attorney was produced before the Court by the respondent No.3 and the said document contains the original signature of the parties. Mr. Mitra submitted that the said fact has been incorrectly recorded in the judgment and order dated 23rd September, 2005. He submitted that no authority was ever given on behalf of the petitioners/appellants to sign the terms of settlement by the Madhusudan Dungarmal Futnani. Therefore, the said defendant No.1 was not authorized to enter into or sign any compromise on behalf of the appellants/petitioners. Mr. Mitra further submitted that the said judgment and order dated 23rd September, 2005 has inadvertently recorded that a concession was given on behalf of the appellants/petitioners. According to him no such concession was ever given on behalf of the appellants/petitioners. Therefore, he submitted that recording of such concession ought to be deleted. (7) On the contrary, Mr. B.K.Bachawat, Mr. Pratap Chatterjee, Mr. Anindya Mitra and Mr. S.N Mookherjee, learned Senior Advocates all appeared on behalf of the respondents and contended that the allegations which have been made in the petition are without any basis and not supported by any material. It is submitted that the case of the petitioners the properties at Semmenchary village, Chennai, do not form part of the joint family properties or that the said properties are their personal properties is without any basis and no document was ever produced before the Court by the appellants to establish their independent rights in respect of the said properties. It is further submitted that though the respondents repeatedly called upon the petitioners to disclose how, when and which of the Semmenchari properties are allegedly acquired by the petitioners out of their own funds and the source of the funds out of which same were acquired, the petitioners have failed to disclose any materials and/or documents to show that the Semmenchary properties were acquired by the petitioners or that the same and their personal properties. On the contrary it is stated that the Semmenchary properties are nothing but joint family properties and a bald statement has been made by the appellants/ petitioners that the said properties are self-acquired properties by the petitioners. It was further submitted that the submissions and/or the admissions which have been recorded in the order and the judgment of the Division Bench have been correctly recorded and there cannot be any dispute with regard thereto. It is further submitted that a carbon copy of the original Power of Attorney with the original signatures were produced before the Court at the time of hearing of the appeal. After the appeal was heard at a length, the Court recorded its conclusion on merits as well as on such concessions that were made. Now that the appellants/applicants find it difficult to press the Special Leave Petition filed by them before the Supreme Court, a chance has been taken by them at this scope by filing this application. The appellants are merely trying to drag the litigation, so that they can enjoy the fruits of the said properties. The said Power of Attorney was also produced before the trial Court as well as before the Division Bench. It is submitted that no case has been made out by the petitioner/appellant for clarification and/or modification of the order dated 23rd September, 2005. It is further submitted that the application has been made with the mala fide intention of the petitioners to prolong the litigation between the parties and to frustrate the said family arrangement dated 30th December, 2003, which has put an end to the long, bitter and acrimonious litigation; for the benefit of all the members of the family. It is further submitted that the petitioners seek to reopen and re-agitate the subject-matter which has already been settled by Division Bench. Accordingly, it is submitted it should not be re-opened in any manner at this stage. (8) The following decisions were cited at the Bar:-(1) 1982 (2) SCC 463 (State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr.), (2) 1999 (6) SCC 337 (Syed Dastagir v. T. R. Gopalakrishna Setty), (3) 1998 (6) SCC 304 (Commissioner, Corporation of the City of Bangalore, Bangalore v. K. N. Vasudeva Murthy and Ors.), (4) AIR 1951 Madras 796 (Timmalapalli Virabhadra Rao v. Sokalchand Chunilal and Ors.), (5) 2002 (6) SCC 281 (United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. Ltd. and Ors. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan and Ors.). (9) Our attention was drawn to the decision of State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr. (supra) in Paragraph-4 which is reproduced hereunder:-"When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney-General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A. K. Sen, who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submissions made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. "Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation." We are bound to accept the statement of the judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in Court. We cannot allow the statement of the judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks . that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the judges, to call the attention of the very judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an appellate Court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and had led to gross injustice; but, he may not call in question the very fact of making the concession as recorded in the judgment." (10) Our attention was drawn to the decision of Syed Dastagir v. T. R. Gopalakrishna Setty (supra) and it was submitted that the prayers must be read along with the pleadings made in the petition and it is further submitted that in interpreting a pleading wherever there be two possible interpretations the one which defeats justice should be rejected and the one which sub-serves to justice should be accepted. (11) Our attention was also drawn to the decision of Timmalapalli Virabhadra Rao v. Sokalchand Chunilal and Ors. (supra), where the Honble Court held that a statement in a judgment and/or order as to what had taken place in Court is conclusive and cannot be allowed to be controverted by an affidavit or otherwise and a party who is aggrieved by what he considers a wrong statement in a judgment should apply to the very same Judge by way of review. (12) After considering the facts of the case and the decisions cited at the Bar and after analyzing the said facts and submissions made before us on behalf of the parties, it appears to us that the question of Power of Attorney and the Semmenchary properties at Chennai were duly dealt with by the Division Bench on merits. Therefore, at this stage, in our considered opinion, no case has been made out to re-open or to re-hear the same. It is also to be noted that all the relevant facts and legal issues were duly dealt with by the Division Bench at that point of time. It appears from the facts which are not in dispute that the defendant No.1 is the father of the defendant No.3 and the father-in-law of defendant No.4. The defendant Nos. 5 and 6 are his grand-children. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that the Carbon copy of the Power of Attorney was produced by the father. It appears from the facts which are not in dispute that the defendant No.1 is the father of the defendant No.3 and the father-in-law of defendant No.4. The defendant Nos. 5 and 6 are his grand-children. Furthermore, it is not in dispute that the Carbon copy of the Power of Attorney was produced by the father. (13) It appears to us that the compromise was entered into between the parties to settle an acrimonious and long-standing litigation which was continuing between the members of the Futnani family and to save the family properties. In fact a family arrangement dated 5th July, 1981 was confirmed by the said compromise. (14) It further appears that the defendant No.1 acted as the karta of his branch as the constituted attorney of the defendant Nos. 3 and 4. The supremacy of the karta is based on the rule that the management of the family property is vested in him. In order to deal with the interest of the coparceners in the joint family properties, including that of the minors, previous permission is not necessary for the karta. Any fraud or mala fide intention could not be proved either before the trial Court or before the Division Bench. No piece of evidence or any document was produced by the appellants before this Bench which can prove the right, title and interest of defendant Nos. 3 to 6 independently in their favour in respect of the Semmenchary properties at Chennai. This fact is also recorded in the order passed by the Single Bench, which reads as follows:-"It is clear from the materials-on-record as to what was the persona! property of the defendant Nos.3 to 6 acquired by them independently. All the items of properties involved in this suit have been acquired from the joint funds." (15) From the aforesaid facts it would be evident that by the said terms of settlement, the parties to the suit confirmed the family arrangement dated July 5, 1981 entered into between the parties or on their behalf by the plaintiff and the defendant No.1. At no point of time the defendant No.3 questioned the said family arrangement dated July 5, 1981. At no point of time the defendant No.3 questioned the said family arrangement dated July 5, 1981. In fact, it would be evident from the records that the defendant No.3 filed an application in Suit No. 89 of 1992, inter alia, contending that the said suit should be disposed of in accordance with the said family arrangement dated July 5, 1981. (16) No documents at any point of time even at the time of hearing of these applications were produced before us or annexed to the petitions which could alter our conclusion that the properties situated at Semmenchary Village, Chennai are not the personal properties of the petitioners. A carbon copy of the Power of Attorney was produced at the time of hearing of the appeal before the Division Bench containing the original signature of Mohanlal on the said document. (17) On these facts we do not find that it is necessary for us to modify and/or to clarify the order or the opinion expressed by the Division Bench in respect of the Power of Attorney or the Semmenchary properties. We came to the conclusion on the basis of the materials placed before us and the submissions made at that point of time. However, we feel that the concession recorded in the said order and/or judgment (at page 65 of Judgment) dated 23rd September, 2005, if not deleted, the petitioners may suffer for such recordings and they may loose their chance to have the benefit of testing the said judgment. (18) In these circumstances, we only delete the said portion from the said order and/or judgment dated 23rd September, 2005, so that the said recording cannot stand in the way of the petitioners to test the order so passed by the Division Bench. However, we make it clear that we are modifying the said portion of the order reluctantly only to allow the petitioners to take steps in the appeal so filed by them before the Honble Supreme Court. (19) We must express our thanks to Mr. P. C. Sen, learned Senior Advocate who appeared on behalf of some of the petitioners and in his usual fairness, has submitted that the litigants should not suffer in view of the concession recorded by the Court on their behalf. (19) We must express our thanks to Mr. P. C. Sen, learned Senior Advocate who appeared on behalf of some of the petitioners and in his usual fairness, has submitted that the litigants should not suffer in view of the concession recorded by the Court on their behalf. Accordingly, we dispose of these applications only deleting the admission and/or the concession recorded at page 65 of the said judgment and/or order dated 23rd September, 2005. (20) Similar application is also filed by the son and daughter of Madhusudan Dungarmal Futnani which is identical and also disposed of on same terms. (21) For the reasons stated hereinabove, applications are disposed of.