JUDGMENT Hon’ble Krishna Murari, J.—Heard Shri S.K. Verma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri V.D. Ojha appearing for the petitioners. 2. Facts giving rise to the dispute are as under. 3. In the basic year, the land in dispute was recorded in the name of respondent No. 3. During consolidation, an objection was filed by the petitioners claiming 1/3rd share. Consolidation Officer vide order dated 29.11.1975 allowed the objection on the basis of the compromise between the parties, and accordingly, the petitioners were given 1/3rd share in the khata in dispute. After about 13 years, the order passed by Consolidation Officer was put to challenge by respondent No. 3 by filing an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, inter alia, on the grounds that he was given in adoption to one Pran Nath and the khata in dispute after death of Pran Nath was inherited by him as adopted son and his name came to be recorded and he was the sole bhoomidhar; order dated 29.11.1975 said to have been passed by the Consolidation Officer in respect of khata in dispute giving 1/3rd share to the petitioners was forged and fabricated. During the pendency of the appeal, an application was filed by the petitioners to summon the appellant (respondent No. 3 herein) for cross-examination, which was rejected vide order dated 1.8.1992. The petitioners went up in revision. Again a compromise is said to have been filed before the revisional Court. Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated 18.1.1993 dismissed the revision and set aside the order dated 1.8.1992 and remanded the case back. Settlement Officer Consolidation vide order dated 18.3.1993 condoned the delay in filing the appeal, set aside the judgment passed by the Consolidation Officer and remanded the case back to decide the same afresh on merits keeping in view the compromise alleged to have been filed by the parties before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The predecessor-in-interest of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 challenged the order before this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 31460 of 1994. The predecessor-in-interest of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 challenged the order before this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 31460 of 1994. This Court finding that delay of 13 years in filing the appeal has been condoned without recording proper reasons and the matter was remanded back without testing the judgment of the Consolidation Officer, set aside the appellate order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation as well as revisional order of Deputy Director of Consolidation and remanded the case back to the Settlement Officer Consolidation to decide the appeal afresh. After remand the Settlement Officer Consolidation vide order dated 7.3.2008 finding that there are sufficient grounds, condoned the delay and after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal. Aggrieved, the petitioners went up in revision. Deputy Director of Consolidation vide impugned order dated 25.11.2008 dismissed the same. 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order dated 29.11.1975 was passed by the Consolidation Officer on the basis of compromise accepting the claim of the petitioners which amounts to admission of antecedent and title of the petitioners and the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation have wrongly and illegally rejected the compromise. It is next submitted that it is not necessary that a dispute can only be compromised between family members and there can be compromise even with a stranger in order to bring the dispute to an end. It has further been contended that in view of the provisions of Section 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act, such a compromise decree does not require registration and non registration shall not stand in the way of transfer of rights and title. It has next been contended that both the authorities have also wrongly and illegally failed to take into consideration the subsequent compromise presented before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and also the admission made by the respondent No. 3 in his statement in Civil Suit No. 1027 of 1994 admitting the compromise before the Consolidation Officer. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 has tried to justify the impugned order. 6. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties, it may be useful to refer to the following pedigree set out by the petitioners themselves during the course of argument. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 has tried to justify the impugned order. 6. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties, it may be useful to refer to the following pedigree set out by the petitioners themselves during the course of argument. Raj Kumar l l———————————————l—————————————l Jagdamba Lalta Avadh Narain (Respondent No. 3) Smt. Indrakali (petitioner No. 1) (petitioners No. 3) l l———————————————l—————————————l Bal Mukund Rajeshwar Bhupendra (Respondent No. 4) (petitioner No. 2) (Respondent No. 5) 7. Above pedigree would show that respondent No. 3 Jagdamba originally belonged to the family of the petitioners. However, the case set up by him in appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation was that he was taken in adoption by one Pran Nath. In support of the case, documentary evidence in the shape of khatauni 1375 to 1377 fasli, 1378 to 1380 fasli with respect to khata in dispute, adoption deed, copy of the ‘Parivar Register’, was filed. The Settlement Officer Consolidation after analysing the said evidence recorded a finding that the land in dispute is recorded in the name of respondent No. 3 as adopted son of Pran Nath since 1360 fasli. Settlement Officer Consolidation also placed reliance upon other evidence, such as certificate of residence issued by the Tehsildar, ‘Kisan Bahi’ and also ‘Parivar Register’ to come to the conclusion that respondent No. 3 was taken in adoption by Pran Nath. 8. It is undisputed rather admitted to the petitioners that Pran Nath does not belong to their family. The documentary evidence filed by the respondent No. 3 analysed and relied upon by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, undisputedly goes to show that land in dispute came to be recorded in the name of respondent No. 3 as adopted son. There can also be no dispute with the settled legal proposition that once a child is given in adoption, his connection is severed from the family and he becomes a member of the adoptive family. The petitioners have failed to bring on record any evidence to dislodge that respondent No. 3 was not given in adoption. This fact has not even been denied in the pleadings either before the Courts below or even before this Court. 9. The petitioners have failed to bring on record any evidence to dislodge that respondent No. 3 was not given in adoption. This fact has not even been denied in the pleadings either before the Courts below or even before this Court. 9. The petitioners throughout have been harping upon that they were given shares by the Consolidation Officer on the basis of compromise between the parties and subsequently also another compromise was filed in revision proceedings before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and also upon the alleged admission said to have been made by respondent No. 3 in proceedings of Civil Suit No. 1027 of 1994 with respect to compromise. 10. In the backdrop of the above facts of the case set up by the petitioners, the question for consideration is whether they could get share in the property inherited by respondent No. 3 as adopted son of Pran Nath, who admittedly, does not belong to the family of the petitioners, on the basis of alleged compromise. 11. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sahu Madho Das and others v. Mukand Ram and another, AIR 1955 SC 481 has observed as under : “It is well settled that a compromise or family arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary.” 12. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary.” 12. In the celebrated case of Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, AIR 1976 SC 807 , the Hon’ble Apex Court while reaffirming the view taken in the case of Sahu Madho Das (supra) has reiterated that members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent, title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property, which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed that even one of the parties to the settlement has no title, but under the arrangement, the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the Courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same. 13. In Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, AIR 1918 PC 196, it has been held as under : “It is not necessary that every party taking the benefit under the family settlement must necessarily be bound to have, under the law, a claim to a share in the property. All that is necessary is that party must be related to each other in some way and have a possible claim to the property or even a semblance of a claim on some other grounds.” 14. In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioners had no antecedent title whatsoever of their own in the properties inherited by respondent No. 3 as adopted son and whatever title they claim was acquired under the alleged compromise. Since the petitioners failed to show that they had any competing title of their own in respect of properties in dispute, the alleged compromise would not fall within the ambit of a family settlement. 15. Since the petitioners failed to show that they had any competing title of their own in respect of properties in dispute, the alleged compromise would not fall within the ambit of a family settlement. 15. In view of the above facts and law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the alleged compromise which forms the basis of the claim of the petitioners cannot be said to be the family arrangement, and on the said basis, the petitioners cannot be held entitled to any share in the said property. 16. In so far as other argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is concerned, there can be no doubt that a compromise can be entered with a stranger. However, the question that would arise is whether such a decree requires to be registered under the provisions of Registration Act. Shri S.K. Verma, learned Senior Counsel vehemently contended that since property in dispute was subject matter of suit/proceedings, as such the decree would not require any registration in view of the provisions of Section 17 (2)(vi) of the Registration Act. 17. Section 17 (1) of the Act mandates, the instruments enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) require to be compulsorily registered, if the property to which they relate is immoveable property, value of which is Rs. 100/- or upwards. Sub-section (2) of Section engrafts exceptions to the instruments covered only by clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (i). Clause (vi) of Section 17 (2) with which, we are concerned reads as under : “(vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immoveable property other than that which is the subject matter of suit or proceeding; as” 18. The consequences of non-registration of a document requiring registration is contained in Section 49 of the Registration Act which reads as under. “49. The consequences of non-registration of a document requiring registration is contained in Section 49 of the Registration Act which reads as under. “49. No document required by Section 17 [or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882)] to be registered shall— (a) affect any immoveable property comprised therein, or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered : [Provided that an unregistered document affecting immoveable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (1 of 1877), or as evidence of part-performance of a contract for the purposes of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.] 19. The word ‘affect’ used in sub-section (a) of Section 49 in relation to immoveable property, if read in the light of Section 17 can only be said to be a compendious term for expressing the phrase of purporting or operating to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future any right, title or interest. 20. The above interpretation to the word ‘affect’ used in Section 49 also finds support from a decision of Madras High Court in the case of Saraswatamma v. Paddayya and others, AIR 1923 Mad 297. Reading the two sections together the irresistible conclusion is that no right, title would pass in case a document which requires to be compulsorily registered is not registered. 21. Further in the case of Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major and others, AIR 1996 SC 196 , while considering the provisions of Section 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraphs 16 and 17 has observed as under : “16. We have to view the reach of Clause (vi), which is an exception to sub-section (1), bearing all the aforesaid in mind. We have to view the reach of Clause (vi), which is an exception to sub-section (1), bearing all the aforesaid in mind. We would think that the exception engrafted is meant to cover that decree or order of a Court, including a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which declares the pre-existing right and does not by itself create new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- or upwards. Any other view would find the mischief of avoidance of registration, which requires payment of stamp duty, embeded in the decree or order.” “17. It would, therefore, be the duty of the Court to examine in each case whether the parties have pre-existing right to the immovable property, or whether under the order or decree of the Court one party having right, title or interest therein agreed or suffered to extinguish the same and created right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- or upwards in favour of other party for the first time, either by compromise or pretended consent. If latter be the position, the document is compulsorily registerable. 22. In view of the law laid by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhoop Singh (supra), the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is not liable to be accepted. The petitioners having failed to establish that they had any pre-existing rights in the property in dispute and since the alleged compromise purports to create new rights, the order passed on the basis of compromise required registration and would not confer any right. For the same reason, the alleged subsequent compromise said to have been filed before Deputy Director of Consolidation, would also confer no right on the petitioners. 23. In view of the aforesaid facts and discussions, no illegality appears to have been committed either by the Settlement Officer Consolidation or Deputy Director of Consolidation which may warrant any interference in the orders passed by them. 24. The writ petition accordingly fails and stands dismissed in limine. ————