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2009 DIGILAW 356 (AP)

V. Tulasiram v. Government of Andhra Pradesh

2009-06-05

GODA RAGHURAM

body2009
ORDER :-VV:P. No.14038 of 2005: V. Tulasiram and five others have filed this writ petition. Originally, the State of Andhra Pradesh represented by the Secretary, Revenue Department; The District Collector, Ranga Reddy District at Hyderabad; the Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella Division, Ranga Reddy District at Hyderabad and the Mandal Revenue Officer, Shamshabad Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, were impleaded as respondents. Subsequently by the order of this Court dated 10.9.2001 in W.P.M.P. No.19400 of 2006 non-official respondent Nos.5 to 52 were impleaded. 2. A writ of Prohibition restraining the 1st respondent from proceeding further with the enquiry pursuant to the notice in file No.F1/7417/1990 dated 21.6.2005 (issued by the Joint Collector-I, Ranga Reddy District); and a consequent direction to the official respondents not to interfere with the petitioners' possession and enjoyment over the lands in Survey Nos.122 to 126, 143 to 150, 152/A, l52/B, 153 and 154 of Sultanaplli Village, Shamshabad Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, is sought. 3. The case of the petitioners in brief : (a) The petitioners under registered sale deeds in 1982 had purchased from the original pattadars - Syed Shabuddin and Syed Karar Hyder Hussain and thus own all the lands in the Survey Numbers aforementioned. They are in possession and enjoyment of the lands since then and are recorded as owners in possession as per the relevant entries in the revenue records. The petitioners were also issued pattedar passbooks and title deeds in respect of the lands. (b) The 3rd respondent asserted the lands to be Jagir lands and thus vested in the State under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (T.A.) Abolition of Jagir Regulation 1358 Fasli (for short 'Regulation 1358-F'). He issued a memo dated 21.6.1993 to the said effect. The petitioners filed W.P. No.12631 of 1993 questioning the memo. By the judgment dated 24.3.2000, the writ petition was allowed. The 3rd respondent appealed in W.A. No.732 of 2000. W.A. No.732 of 2000 was dismissed by the judgment dated 11.11.2002. He issued a memo dated 21.6.1993 to the said effect. The petitioners filed W.P. No.12631 of 1993 questioning the memo. By the judgment dated 24.3.2000, the writ petition was allowed. The 3rd respondent appealed in W.A. No.732 of 2000. W.A. No.732 of 2000 was dismissed by the judgment dated 11.11.2002. The Division Bench however directed that the factual findings recorded by the learned Single Judge (in W.P. No.12631 of 1993) would not in any way influence or bind the Civil Court or any statutory forum or authority which may be called upon to decide the basic issue whether the subject lands constitute 'jagir' within the meaning of that term as defined in Section 2(f) of the Regulation 1358-F and that such issue should be resolved solely on the evidence that may be led before such Court, forum or authority, as the case may be. (c) The 1st respondent thereafter filed a petition before the Commissioner and Director of Settlement and Jagir Administrator, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad for an enquiry to declare the lands as vested with the Government, since the appropriate authority to decide whether the lands are jagir or otherwise is the Jagir Administrator under Regulation 24(i) of the Regulation 1358-F. By the order dated 31.3.2005, the claim of the 1st respondent 'was dismissed by the Commissioner and Director of Settlement and the Jagir Administrator. The 1st respondent did not challenge this order and this order has thus become final. (d) Learning that the State through the 3rd respondent is out to interfere with the petitioners' possession and enjoyment of the lands and 3rd respondent was proceeding to assign the lands to third parties, the petitioners filed W.P. No.11064 of 2005. This writ petition was disposed of by the order dated 10.5.2005 directing the respondents not to dispossess the petitioners except by following the due process of law. The petitioners were also granted liberty to seek appropriate remedy for establishing their title over the lands. (e) While so, the petitioners received the impugned notice dated 21.6.2005 issued in purported exercise of the power under Section 166-B of the Andhra Pradesh (T.A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317-Fasli (for short 'the Land Revenue Act') and Section 9 of the Andhra Pradesh Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (for short the 'Pattadar Passbooks Act'). (e) While so, the petitioners received the impugned notice dated 21.6.2005 issued in purported exercise of the power under Section 166-B of the Andhra Pradesh (T.A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317-Fasli (for short 'the Land Revenue Act') and Section 9 of the Andhra Pradesh Record of Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (for short the 'Pattadar Passbooks Act'). The impugned notice apart from the lands claimed by the petitioners included certain lands in other survey numbers as well, the relevance of which is not apparent to the petitioners. 4. The Basis for seeking the Writ of Prohibition: The 1st respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision against the order dated 31.3 .2005 of the Commissioner and Director of Settlement and the Jagir Administrator, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, passed under the provisions of the Regulation l358-F. The impugned notice fails to indicate which proceedings are sought to be revised or reviewed by the 1st respondent; and Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act or Section 9 of the Pattadar Passbooks Act are inapplicable and do not authorize any enquiry into the matter. There is an inherent want of jurisdiction and the respondents have no authority under the provisions of the Regulation 1358-F; and the reference (in the impugned notice) to the provisions of Section 9 of the Pattadar Passbooks Act is equally misconceived - hence the Writ of Prohibition. 5. Counter: The 2nd respondent has filed a counter affidavit and on behalf of the other official respondents as well, stating: (a) Sultanpalli village is an ex-jagir village of late Mohd. Taher Ali Khan Amee - Rul - Mulk. Later by succession the Jagir devolved on Syed Shahabuddin Hussaini, Syed Karra Hyder Hussaini and Frakrunnissa Begum. (b) The Wasool Baqi Register of the village sets out the name of the Jagirdar as Kathedar in respect of the lands covered by certain survey numbers mentioned in the Wasool Baqi Register, but in the remarks column it is mentioned 'pattadar is Jagirdar of the village, but actual cultivators are others'. It is further noted that as per the new rules, patta should be transferred in the name of cultivators. It is further noted that as per the new rules, patta should be transferred in the name of cultivators. Circular No.12 dated 3.11.1949 clearly stipulates that no jagirdar or hissadar or his relation can enter his name as pattedar, unless the land was personally cultivated by him and that any such entry shall be carefully investigated; that any (grant of) patta for a land, in contravention of Rule 4 of the Rules regarding grant of pattedar rights in non-Khasla village shall be cancelled; and record must show the name of the person who is in actual cultivation. Contrary to the Rules however, the name of the Jagirdar is continued in the revenue records, as pattedar. (c) Historically the Jagirdar was a mere administrator for the purpose of collecting the revenues and to manage the day-to-day affairs. Where the administration of the land revenue and its collection was not directly administered by the erstwhile Government it was administered through intermediaries. The lands directly administered by the Government were termed as Khalsa lands while those administered through intermediaries were termed as non-khalsa lands. The intermediaries included the Jagirdar (and Deshmuk), who used to collect revenue from the area or village within his authority or jurisdiction, retain his commission and remit the balance to the credit of the Government. The lands within the authority of a Jagirdar are Jagir lands and comprise patta lands of cultivators and communal lands. If there is personal cultivation by the Jagirdar, he could be registered as a pattedar. Thus Jagir lands do not per se and in all events belong either to the Jagirdar or to the State. (d) By a notification dated 14.9.1949 by the Military Governor, the Jagirs in Telangana area were abolished and the administration of Jagirs was transferred to the Government of Hyderabad with effect from 28.9.1949. A Provisional Commutation A ward was passed by the Jagir Administrator in proceedings dated 7.8.1952 provisionally determining the commutation sum in respect of Sultanpalli Village at Rs.60,000-00. On 21.1.1957 the Final Commutation Award was passed and the payment was received by the beneficiaries, by 31.3.1965. The payment of Commutation to the Jagirdars was intended to compensate for the loss of income on the abolition of Jagirs. The Jagir lands thus stood converted into Ryotwari settlement under the direct administration of the Government. (e) On the abolition of Jagirs all communal lands vested absolutely in the State. The payment of Commutation to the Jagirdars was intended to compensate for the loss of income on the abolition of Jagirs. The Jagir lands thus stood converted into Ryotwari settlement under the direct administration of the Government. (e) On the abolition of Jagirs all communal lands vested absolutely in the State. The lands involved in the present writ petition are kancha lands (grazing grass) and are thus vested in the Government. This is evident from the fact that the Tahasildar had auctioned the lands for grass during 1950-51. Aggrieved by the auction, the Jagirdar filed an appeal before the Additional Collector claiming that the Kancha lands were recorded as patta in his name. However, the entries in the Wasool Bakhi clearly indicate that the pattedar is the Jagirdar of the village but the actual cultivators are others. Under the Rules, the patta should be transferred in the names of the cultivators. On the basis of such remarks (in the Wasool Bakhi Register), necessary corrections in the final entries in the revenue records should have been made deleting of the name of Jagirdar from the pattedar column. This was however not done. The Additional Collector ignoring the remarks recorded in the Wasool Bakhi Register erroneously, by an order dated 12.8.1950 (on the appeal filed by the Jagirdar) set aside the auction and held that Kancha lands were recorded as patta lands of the Jagirdar. (f) Aggrieved by the order of the Additional Collector, the then lessee one Mr. Prabhu Lingam filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue. The Board by the order dated 20.7.1951 observed that as the income of the entire Kancha lands was included in the ten years income statement for commuting, a de novo enquiry should be held by the Additional Collector and only lands under the personal cultivation of the Jagirdar should be allowed as patta in his name and the patta of other land should be cancelled as per the Standing Orders. Aggrieved, the Jagirdar preferred a revision before the Government. The Hon'ble Minister for Revenue by the order dated 18.11.1952 upheld the Board's finding and dismissed the revision. Even the Jagirdar admitted this factual and legal position in his deposition before the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer, Land Reforms Tribunal, Hyderabad West in C.C. No.29411 CH/75, under the provisions of the Agricultural Land Ceilings Act. The Jagirdar however clandestinely sold the lands to various persons. Even the Jagirdar admitted this factual and legal position in his deposition before the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer, Land Reforms Tribunal, Hyderabad West in C.C. No.29411 CH/75, under the provisions of the Agricultural Land Ceilings Act. The Jagirdar however clandestinely sold the lands to various persons. (g) The cultivators of the lands in Sultanpalli Village filed O.S. No.123 of 1981 before the Munsif Magistrate, Chevella, Ranga Reddy District against the Jagirdar for a pern1anent injunction contending that the Jagirdar was interfering with their possession over land of an extent of Acs.190-02 guntas of the village, in Survey Nos.122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 143 to 150 and 150-A. In the suit, the plaintiffs filed I.A. No.38 of 2001 and therein obtained are interim injunction. This was made absolute on 24.2.1982. The Jagirdar preferred an appeal in C.M.A. No.35 of 1982 to District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, against the injunction. This appeal was dismissed by the order dated' 27.11.1982 of the District Judge, Ranga Reddy District. The Jagirdar however continued to sell the lands in question. Consequently there was a conflict between the cultivators and the purchasers. This led to initiating of proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in 1983. The Revenue Divisional Officer by an order dated 17.3.1986 ruled in favour of the purchasers despite being informed of the orders of the Civil Court and the injunction orders granted. The order of the Revenue Divisional Officer was challenged before the Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District in Crl. R.P. No.5 of 1986 by the cultivators. The Sessions Judge, by the order dated 27.8.1987 confirmed the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer. The order of the Board of Revenue dated 20.7.1951 was however not implemented i.e., by deleting the name of the Jagirdar under the pattedar column. (h) Pursuant to a debate in the Legislative Assembly, a House Committee was constituted in 1987 to enquire into the transfer of lands in Sulthanpalli Village. The House Committee submitted its report on 29.8.1988 wherein it is concluded that as the final decision of the Board of Revenue was upheld by the Government in the revision preferred by the Jagirdar, the lands should be treated as Government lands. The House Committee report found a clear lapse on the part of the officers in failing to implement the orders of the Board of revenue. The report concluded that the lands in Survey Nos. The House Committee report found a clear lapse on the part of the officers in failing to implement the orders of the Board of revenue. The report concluded that the lands in Survey Nos. 122, 126, 143, 150, 152/A, 152/B, 153 and 154 of Sulthanpalli Village belong to the Government and recommended that the Government should take appropriate action. (i) The petitioners filed W.P. No.14257 of 1989 seeking invalidation of the report of the House Committee of the Legislative Assembly. This writ petition was however withdrawn on 4.12.1989. G) The State Government by a memo dated 21.6.1993 directed the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District to adjudicate, as directed by the order of the Board of Revenue dated 20.7.1951 and having due regard to the report of the House Committee, on the following points: (i) Whether the Jagir is entitled to ryotwari patta with reference to the land as per the Regulation Act, 1358-F; and (ii) Whether the ryots acquired occupancy rights in respect of lands in their possession. (k) The Joint Collector then issued a notice dated 1.8.1993 to the Jagirdar as well as the purchasers for an enquiry scheduled on 7.9.1993. The petitioners challenged the Joint Collector's memo in W.P.No.12631 of 1993. The High Court by the order dated 24.3.2000 allowed the writ petition and declared the memo as without jurisdiction. The Government preferred W.A. No.732 of 2000. The Division Bench disposed of W.A. No.732 of 2000 on 11.11.2002, declaring that the factual findings recorded by the learned Single Judge would not bind either the civil Court, the Statutory Forum or other Authority, which may be called upon to decide the issue whether the lands are Jagir and that issue should be decided on the evidence on record before such Court, Forum or Authority. L) As the issue relating to the character and nature of the lands was left open and undetermined, the State Government directed the 2nd respondent by the proceedings dated 14.10.2004 to file an• application before the Commissioner, Survey, Settlements, Land Records and the Jagir Administrator, for a determination of the character and nature of Sultanpalli lands. The Mandal Revenue Officer filed an appropriate application before the Jagir Administrator on 3.11.2004. This was dismissed by the Jagir Administrator, by the order dated 31.3.2005. The Mandal Revenue Officer filed an appropriate application before the Jagir Administrator on 3.11.2004. This was dismissed by the Jagir Administrator, by the order dated 31.3.2005. The filing of W.P. No.11 064 of 2005 by the writ petitioners, the order of this Court dated 10.5.2005 in the said writ petition and the issuance of the impugned notice dated 21.6.2005 are admitted. (m) The impugned notice (dated 21.6.2005) is valid. It is issued exercising powers under Rule 4 of the Rules regarding grant of pattadari rights in non-khalsa villages issued under sub-section (2) of Section 172 of the Land Revenue Act. These rules deal with recognition of pattadars in Jagir tracts. Rule 4 contemplates that the name of the Jagirdar, his hissadar or relation shall not be recorded in the concerned village records as pattedar of any jagir land except in respect of land personally cultivated by him. Any pattas existing in the concerned village records in contravention of these rules shall be cancelled and the name of the person who has actually held the land must be recorded. In this position of the rules, the name of the Jagirdar can be entered in the revenue records as pattedar only when he personally cultivates the lands. In view of the Jagirdar's admission before the Land Reforms Tribunal, Hyderabad in C.C.No.29411Ch/75 (that he is not in possession of the lands); the orders of the Board of Revenue dated 20.7.1951 declaring that land not in the actual cultivation of the Jagirdar should not be allowed to continue as patta and pattas of other lands should be cancelled, the Jagirdar or his successors have no right as the lands are already vested with the Government. Further, the Board of Revenue had categorically declared these lands as Kancha lands. Also Kancha lands being communal lands always vest with the Government and neither the Jagirdar nor the subsequent purchasers from the Jagirdar can claim any title over them. C.C. Sr. No. 6052 of 2005: 6. This contempt case is filed by V. Tulsiram (1st petitioner in W.P. No.14038 of 2005) to punish the respondents for committing contempt of the order of this Court dated 4.10.2005 in Crl. M.P. No.2128 of 2005 in Crl. R.C. No.1651 of 2005. According to the contempt petitioner, despite the interim order of this Court dated 4.10.2005 in Crl. This contempt case is filed by V. Tulsiram (1st petitioner in W.P. No.14038 of 2005) to punish the respondents for committing contempt of the order of this Court dated 4.10.2005 in Crl. M.P. No.2128 of 2005 in Crl. R.C. No.1651 of 2005. According to the contempt petitioner, despite the interim order of this Court dated 4.10.2005 in Crl. R.C No.1651 of 2005 (staying the operation of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate-cum-Special Grade Deputy Collector and Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella Division, Ranga Reddy District dated 22.9.2005 ordering attachment and appointing a receiver to the lands); though the petitioner appeared before the respondent on 29.10.2005 and sought release of his property from attachment, the respondent did not handover the possession and on the other hand some unknown persons were permitted to interfere with the boundary stones and the existing crop over the land. The contempt case was filed along with an application – C.A.No. 1085 of 2005 - seeking leave to file the contempt case against the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District and the Principal Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh (arrayed as respondent Nos.3 and 4 in the contempt case - but who are not respondents in Cr1.R.C.No.1651 of 2005). In paragraph No.4 of the affidavit filed in support of Contempt Application No.1085 of 2005, the contempt petitioner pleads that at the behest of respondent Nos.3 and 4, the Ist respondent initiated proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C and it is these respondents (respondent Nos.3 and 4) who are responsible for failing to restore possession of the lands to the petitioner. 7. The petitioners in W.P.No.14038 of 2005 have filed this criminal revision against the order dated 22.9.2005 of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate-cum-Special Grade Deputy Collector and Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella Division, Ranga Reddy District (the 3rd respondent in the writ petition). The order dated 22.9.2005 initiated under Section 145 Cr.P.C this is an order of attachment of the lands and was passed under Section 146(1) Cr.P.C., appointing the Mandal Revenue Officer as the receiver. The order dated 22.9.2005 initiated under Section 145 Cr.P.C this is an order of attachment of the lands and was passed under Section 146(1) Cr.P.C., appointing the Mandal Revenue Officer as the receiver. In view of the several proceedings referred to by the petitioners in the writ petition (W.P. No.14038 of 2005), the petitioners assert to be the owners and to be in lawful possession of the lands; that in W.P. No.14038 of 2005 this Court granted an interim stay of enquiry pursuant 10 the notice of the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District dated 21.6.2005; and therefore the initiation of proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and the orders of attachment and appointment of a receiver are arbitrary, incompetent and without jurisdiction. 8. By an interim order dated 4.10.2005 (in Cr1.R.C.M.P.No.2128 of 2005), this Court stayed the impugned proceedings dated 22.9.2005 while directing the parties to appear and participate in the enquiry before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. C.C. No.557 of 2006: 9. The respondent Nos.1 to 4 in W.P.No.14038 of 2005 (the official respondents) filed this contempt case. It is alleged herein that the writ petitioners violated the order dated 23.8.2005 passed in W.P.M.P.No.17819 of 2005 in the writ petition. By the order dated 23.8.2005 while granting interim stay of the enquiry pursuant to the (impugned) Joint Collector's memo dated 21.6.2005 this Court directed the writ petitioners not to change the use of the land or create any third party interest therein till the disposal of the writ petition. 10. In paragraph No.3 of the affidavit filed in support of the contempt case, the State and other petitioners assert that the respondents (writ petitioners in W.P. No.14038 of 2005) had sold specified extents of lands (covered by the interim order of this Court) to several persons in violation of the interim order (specifically directing the writ petitioners not to change the use of the lands or create third party's interest therein till the disposal of the writ petition). Counter of the respondents in the contempt case (writ petitioners): 11. V. Tulasiram filed a counter affidavit and on behalf of respondent Nos.2, 3, 4 and 6 as well. Counter of the respondents in the contempt case (writ petitioners): 11. V. Tulasiram filed a counter affidavit and on behalf of respondent Nos.2, 3, 4 and 6 as well. In paragraph No.4 of this counter it is stated that on account of the pressure exerted by M/s. Prudential Cooperative Bank Limited from which these respondents had availed certain credit facilities and to clear certain private loans obtained by them, they executed sale deeds on 18.3.2006 for generating funds to liquidate their loans. It is also pleaded that they had informed the purchasers about the interim order of this Court and the purchasers agreed to restore the original situation in the event of these respondents loosing title to the land. The respondents also assert to have infom1ed the purchasers not to change the use of the land. It is further stated that there was no wholesale alienation and only for generating funds to liquidate their loans, the respondents borrowed some money (from the purchasers) and as a security for the loans so availed have registered the documents. No wholesale third party interest was however created, is the assertion. In case the respondents conduct is found contumacious the respondents' tender unconditional apology. Analysis of the relevant facts, law and issues arising in WP. No. 14038 of 2005: 12. The petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain further proceedings pursuant to the notice (bearing reference File No.F1/7417/1990, dated 21.6.2005), issued by the Joint Collector-1, R.R. District (the impugned notice). The impugned notice sets out the 4th respondent as the appellant and the petitioner as the respondent. Being relevant the contents of notice are extracted: In order to implementation of the order passed by the then Board of Revenue, Hyderabad in File No.313/87/1950, appeals Hyderabad, dated 20.7.1951 and the orders passed by the Hon. Minister for Revenue, Government of Hyderabad in File No.A-1/148/1951, No. (54) dated 18.11.1952 read with under Rule 4 of the Rules regarding grant of pattadari rights in non-Khalsa villages published in Gazette No.32 dated 19thir 1356 F. circular No.2 Revenue Department dated 18.10.1949 and circular No.12 Jagir Administration dated 3.11.1949 in respect of the land bearing Sy.Nos.9/2, 26, 33, 44, 42, 46, 47, 78 and 79 admeasuring Ac. 307-35 gts, new Sy.Nos.210, 1,4, 118, 119, 120, 121, 66, 122, 123, 124, 154,42, 51, 152, 153, 125, 126, 127, 128, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148 and 149 admeasuring Acs.307 - 35 situated Sultanpalli Village, Shamshabad Mandal. Therefore the case is taken up for hearing under Section 166-B of AP. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act 1317 F and Section 9 of Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act 1971 and posted for hearing on 1.7.2005 at 3 p.m, before Joint Collector-1, Ranga Reddy District at O/o Collectorate, RR District at Lakadi-ka-pool, Hyderabad. Therefore you are required to be present before this Court either in person or through an advocate on the said date and time along with supporting documents in their favour, failing which the matter will be decided on the material available on record: 13. As is apparent from the pleadings by the petitioner, the counter-affidavit by the 2nd respondent, the several earlier proceedings including the judgment dated 24.3.2000 in W.P. No.12631/93 and the judgment dated 11.11.2002 in W.A. No.732 of 2000, the impugned notice proceeds on the assumption that the lands (in Sy.Nos.122 to 126, 143 to 150, 152/A, 152/B, 153 and 154 of Sultanpalli Village, Shamshabad Mandal, RR District), belong to the State in view of the order of the Board of Revenue, Hyderabad, dated 20.7.1951 in File No.313/ 87/1950 and of the Government (by the Hon. Minister for Revenue) dated 18.11.1952 in File No.A-1/1481/1951. The impugned notice purports to be a revision initiated in exercise of the powers under Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act and Section 9 of the Pattadar Pass Books Act. 14. As the statement of objects and reasons underlying the enactment of the Pattadar Pass Book Act discloses, the enactment is intended to be a fresh legislation applicable through out the State for preparation and maintenance of record of rights, repealing the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Record of Rights in Land Regulation 1358-F. Section 12 of this Act states: Nothing in this Act shall apply to the lands belonging to the State Government or the Central Government. The learned Advocate General appearing for the official respondents has also conceded the legal position that the impugned notice is not traceable to powers under any of the provisions of the Pattadar Pass Books Act. The learned Advocate General appearing for the official respondents has also conceded the legal position that the impugned notice is not traceable to powers under any of the provisions of the Pattadar Pass Books Act. In the circumstances, the impugned notice and any further proceedings thereunder by the Joint Collector-I, RR District are not and cannot be justified as emanating from any authority, power or jurisdiction under the provisions of the Pattadar Pass Books Act. 15. The underlying assumption in the impugned notice is that the lands in question (claimed per contra as belonging to the petitioners on valid and bona fide purchase from the jagirdars from out of their private patta lands and from others who were conferred occupancy rights), belong to the State having vested in it on the abolition of jagirs under the Regulation 1358-F. 16. Whether the above factual assumption by the State is on the basis of conclusions recorded in proceedings by a duly empowered authority, forum or a Court and if so whether jurisdiction is available under the provisions of Section 166-B of the Land Revenue Act, is the issue that falls for determination in this writ petition. 17. The core facts regarding the competing claims of the petitioners on the one hand and the State on the other have been set out in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 11.11.2002 in W.A. No.732 of 2000. The rival claims and the several proceedings leading to this writ petition may, be set out in brief: 1. According to the petitioners, Sultanpalli village was a jagir village and Syd. Shabuddin Hussain and Syd. Karar Hyder Hussain were the jagirdars. The State admits these facts. 2. According to the petitioners the above jagirdars owned private lands apart from the jagir, which were subsequently given Survey Numbers 122 to 126, 143 to 150, 152A, 152B, 153 and 154. After the abolition of the jagir by the Regulation 1358-F and the merger of the jagir with the revenue administration of the State, (qua Section 5 of this Regulation), the private lands of the jagirdar were recorded as their patta lands in the revenue records. Out of the lands in the above Sy. After the abolition of the jagir by the Regulation 1358-F and the merger of the jagir with the revenue administration of the State, (qua Section 5 of this Regulation), the private lands of the jagirdar were recorded as their patta lands in the revenue records. Out of the lands in the above Sy. Nos., lands comprised in Sy.Nos.152, 153 and 154 admeasuring Acs.43.00 were held by protected tenants who were granted occupancy rights certificates thereby conferring on them rights of ownership under Section 38E of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1950 (the Tenancy Act, 1950). 3. The petitioners purchased lands in several Sy.Nos. from out of the private jagirdars as well as from one Mr. Seetal Singh (a protected tenant who was conferred ownership rights under Section 38E of the Tenancy Act, 1950), during the years 1978 to 1982. The petitioners since the purchases are in continuous possession and enjoyment of the lands. The revenue records testify this position. The petitioners were also issued pattedar pass books and title deeds in respect of these lands, under the provisions of the Pattadar Pass Books Act by the competent authority. 4. The 1st respondent herein by a memo dated 21.6.1993, [on reference to an order of the Board of revenue dated 20.7.1951 and the appellate order of the State Government dated 18.11.1952 and an order of this Court in W.P. No.2027/87 (dated 3.7.1987)] had asserted that the lands in question had vested in the Government free from all encumbrances after abolition of the jagir in 1950; the rights of the respective parties must be adjudicated in accordance with the provision of the Regulation 1358-F which was not done; if the jagirdars were not entitled to any rights their alienees would not also acquire any rights and therefore it requires to be adjudicated: (i) whether the jagirdar is entitled to ryotwari patta for the lands under the provisions of the Regulation 1358F; and (ii) whether the ryots had acquired occupancy rights in respect of lands in their possession. The State Government by the memo directed the Collector, RR District to enquire into the matter. 5. Aggrieved by the above direction of the State Government the petitioners filed W.P. No.12631/93. This writ petition was allowed by the judgment dated 24.3.2000 and the memo dated 21.6.1993 was quashed. Thereagainst the State and other official respondents preferred W.A. No.732 of 2000. The State Government by the memo directed the Collector, RR District to enquire into the matter. 5. Aggrieved by the above direction of the State Government the petitioners filed W.P. No.12631/93. This writ petition was allowed by the judgment dated 24.3.2000 and the memo dated 21.6.1993 was quashed. Thereagainst the State and other official respondents preferred W.A. No.732 of 2000. This appeal was disposed of by the judgment dated 11.11.2002. The learned Division Bench while directing that the factual findings recorded by the learned Single Judge on the merits of the matter would not in any way influence or bind either the civil Court or any other statutory forum or authority which may be called up to decide the basic issue whether• the subject lands constitute 'jagir" within the meaning of that teffi1 as defined in Clause 2(t) of the Regulation 1358-F, observed that such issue must be resolved solely on the basis of evidence that may be led before such Court, forum or authority as the case may be. The Learned Division Bench however sustained the judgment of the learned Single Judge as regards the quashing of the Government's memo dated 21.6.1993, as patently incompetent and without jurisdiction. There are certain observations recorded by the learned Division Bench as part of the analysis leading to its conclusion, which are re1evant and material for the determination of this lis. These are extracted: "Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, it needs to be emphasized that if the petition scheduled lands are the very same lands covered by the decision of the Board of Revenue, it is trite, the petitioners cannot be permitted to reagitate their claim that the subject lands are patta lands and not 'jagir' lands because the order of the Board of Revenue as upheld by the Government in the revision was allowed to become final. Perhaps, realizing this position, the learned Government Pleader for Revenue as well as Sri V. Ravinder Rao would strenuously contend that though there is no specific reference to Sy.Nos.122, 126, 143, 150, 132/A, 152/B, 153 and 154 in the order of the Board of Revenue, as a matter of fact, the same lands were subject-matter of the proceedings before the Board of Revenue. Sri Ravinder Rao, would point out that by the time the Board of Revenue decided the appeal, survey settlement was not completed, and, therefore those lands were not given Sy.Nos. Therefore, it becomes necessary for us, in the first instance, to resolve the question whether the lands covered by the order of the Board of Revenue are the same petition schedule lands or not. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perusing the pleadings as well as the documents placed before us, we do not find any evidence to satisfy ourselves that the lands which were subject-matter of appeal before the Board of Revenue and the lands which are the subject-matter of the present proceedings are one and the same. The question whether they are one and the same, it is trite, is a pure question of fact. Unless it is shown that the competent Court of law or an adjudicatory statutory authority or a quasi judicial forum has recorded a finding on this factual question, it is not appropriate for this Court in exercising judicial review power under Article 226 to take up resolution of such disputed fact. Such a question, we are of the considered opinion, cannot be resolved conclusively and finally only on the basis of affidavits and counter-affidavits. It requires tendering of witnesses for examination and cross-examination. The petitioners in the writ affidavit filed in support of the writ petition in unmistakable terms have stated: "The petitioners in this case are not concerned with either the other patta lands of jagirdar or the jagir lands as such for the purpose of the present writ petition." Further, the petitioners have contended thus: "All the petitioners before purchasing the lands have verified with the revenue records; and found that the lands proposed to be purchased by them were patta lands of their vendors. Only after satisfying this that their vendors have got full rights to sell the lands under law, the petitioners have purchased the lands from them for a valuable consideration." In the context of the above specific pleading and in the absence of any satisfactory materials placed by the State Government and its authorities or the impleaded respondents to show that the subject land is the same in both the proceedings, it is not safe for the Court to assume that they are one and the same. Secondly, we also find considerable force in the contention of the writ petitioners that the State Government acted ultra vires the Regulation and without jurisdiction in passing the impugned proceedings declaring that the subject lands are 'jagir' lands and they stood vested in the State Government after the abolition of the 'jagirs' and in directing the Collector, Ranga Reddy District to determine the two issues set out by it in para (3) of the impugned proceedings. It needs to be emphasized that a statutory authority or an administrative authority should function within the parameters of the authority granted to it by law. It is true that the executive authority of the State Government is co-extensive with the legislative authority of the concerned State. Abolition of 'jagir' and taking over the management and administration of 'jagir' in favour of the Government is a field fully occupied by the Regulation. It is well settled that if the field is occupied by the statute, it is not permissible for the executive Government to meddle with the statutory provision or to do anything, contrary to the statutory provision in the purported exercise of executive powers and if it does so, such action would be condemned as ultra vires the statute concerned. The Regulation is a Code in itself as regards abolition and taking over the management of the 'jagir' in favour of the Government. Section 3 of the Regulation deals with the power of the Government to appoint 'jagir' Administrator and Assistant Jagir Administrator for the due administration of the Regulation. Section 5 reads as under: "5. Appointment of dates for transfer of administration:-(1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Regulation, the Government shall appoint a date for the transfer to the Government of the administration of jagirs and may appoint different dates for different jagirsk. (2) On the date so appointed any 'jagir' (hereinafter referred to as the appointed day) the Jagirdar shall make over the management of the 'jagir' to the Jagir Administrator and shall furnish him with an account of the revenue received and expenditure incurred on account of the 'jagir' in the current or, if Jagir Administrator so requires, in the immediately preceding year of account, insofar as such revenue and expenditure are attributable to that year. (3) If the Jagirdar fails to comply with the provisions of sub-section (2) to the satisfaction of the Jagir Administrator, or obstructs the access of the Jagir Administrator to any land or building belonging to the 'jagir', or fails to furnish the Jagir Administrator with any document relating to the administration of the 'jagir', the Jagir Administrator may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for the purpose of entering upon any such lands or buildings of or securing possession of any such document. (4) If in any 'jagir', a jagirdar is not in existence on the appointed day, the Jagir Administrator shall require the duties imposed upon the jagirdar by sub-section (2) to be discharged by such one of the Hissedars as he may designate for the purpose and references in sub-sections (2) and (3) of this Section and in sub-section (4) of Section 13 to the jagirdar shall be read as referring to the Hissedar so designated" On issuance of a notification envisaged under sub-section (1) by the Government, by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (2) every jagirdiu is obligated to make over the management of the 'jagir' to the Jagir Administrator and if a jagirdar fails to carry out the obligation, then, sub-section (3) provides that the Jagir Administrator could pursue coercive steps to take over the management of the 'jagir'. Thus, it could be seen that in a case, where steps envisaged under sub-section (1) of Section 5 have been taken against a person and that person who is considered to be a 'jagirdar' by the Government comes before the Jagir Administrator and contends that the lands in respect of which the Government has issued the notification is not a 'jagir', but a private patta land of the 'jagirdar', the Jagir Administrator may be required to decide such incidental issue in order to effectuate the provisions of the Regulation. Be that as it may, the learned Government Pleader as well as Mr. V. Ravinder Rao were not in a position to refer to any of the provisions of the Regulation or the Rules framed thereunder, to show that the Government have the power to decide the question whether a land is 'jagir' or patta land in case of a dispute. V. Ravinder Rao were not in a position to refer to any of the provisions of the Regulation or the Rules framed thereunder, to show that the Government have the power to decide the question whether a land is 'jagir' or patta land in case of a dispute. It is well settled that when the law maker designate an authority and confers certain statutory power to do certain thing, that authority can alone exercise the power and not any other authority, whether superior or inferior, and if any external authority exercises the powers vested in a statutory authority, the action would be condemned as ultra vires the statute. Therefore, it is not permissible for the State Government to determine the rights of the parties. Realizing the difficulty to sustain the impugned action of the Government, the learned Government Pleader as well as Mr. V. Ravinder Rao would maintain that the impugned action is not an action taken under the Regulation, but it is an administrative action taken in exercise of the executive power of the State and, therefore, no exception could be taken to the impugned action. This contention of the learned Counsel should be noticed only to be rejected, because it is well settled, as stated above it is not permissible for the executive Government to meddle with the statutory power vested in a statutory authority or to do any thing contrary to the statutory provision in the purported exercise of the executive power. The executive Government by exercising executive power can only supplement and it cannot supplant the statutory provisions. It is not the case where the statute is silent and the executive Government has stepped in and issued administrative instructions or guidelines to fill in the gap in the statute. In conclusion we cannot find any substantive or weighty reasons to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge. However, we find some force in the grievance of the learned Government Pleader and Sri V. Ravinder Rao that certain findings recorded and observations made by the learned Single Judge in the course of the order relating to the merits of the matter were unwarranted and unjustified. However, we find some force in the grievance of the learned Government Pleader and Sri V. Ravinder Rao that certain findings recorded and observations made by the learned Single Judge in the course of the order relating to the merits of the matter were unwarranted and unjustified. According to the learned Counsel the learned Judge having held that the impugned proceedings could not be sustained for want of power in the State Government ought to have quashed the impugned proceedings only on that ground, reserving liberty to the parties to work out their remedies before the appropriate Court or the forum and ought not to have recorded findings on merits of the case. It is true that the learned Single Judge in the course of the order has held that having regard to the earlier proceedings taken under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and the source between the parties etc, the subject lands could not be regarded as 'jagir'. We think that there was no necessity for this Court to foreclose the issue by recording findings on merits. The factual questions should not and could not have been decided only on the basis of the affidavits and counter-affidavits in a summary proceedings under Article 226. Further we do not find any clinching proof to sustain the factual findings." 6. Almost two years after the judgment in W.A. No.732 of 2000, the 4th respondent filed a petition before the Commissioner and Director of Settlement and the Jagir Administrator, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, on 3.11.2004. The 4th respondent sought a declaration that the lands in Sy.Nos.122 to 126 and 143 to 150 and 152/B had vested in the Government and the respondents (the writ petitioners herein) have no right, title or interest in the land. The Jagir Administrator by the order dated 31.3.2005 dismissed the 4th respondent's petition holding that the petition (by the 4th respondent) is frivolous and ill-prepared; that Section 24(1) of the Regulation 1358F (under which the petition was claimed to have been filed) deals with the rule making powers of the Government and confers no power on the Jagir Administrator to decide such issues; and that if the lands referred to in the 4th respondent's petition are the same as covered by the order of the Board of Revenue (dated 20.7.1951), since the matter is already conclusively settled there is nothing to adjudicate. It was also observed that if the records are not in conformity with the orders of the Board of Revenue, the 4th respondent ought to take proper action to correct them rather than filing such frivolous petition. 7. Apprehending dispossession by the respondents from the lands, the petitioners filed W.P. No.11064/05. This writ petition was disposed of at the admission stage by the order dated 10.5.2005 directing the respondents 1 to 4 (respondents 1 to 4 herein) not to dispossess the petitioners if they are in possession and enjoyment of lands in Sy.Nos.122 to 126, 143 to 150, 152/A, 152/B, 153 and 154 of Su1tanpalli Village, except by following the due process of law. Thereafter the impugned memo (dated 21.6.2005) was issued. 18. The judgment in W.A. No.732/ 2000, on an analysis of the facts on record and the contentions advanced, clearly concluded that there was no evidence that the lands (the ownership and possession of which is claimed by the petitioners) are the same as those which were the subjectmatter of the proceedings before the Board of Revenue vide the order of the Board dated 20.7.1951. The Jagir Administrator while dismissing the 4th respondent's petition by the order dated 31.3 .2005 recorded a complementary observation viz., that if the lands claimed by the petitioners are covered by the orders of the Board of Revenue dated 20.7.1951, there was nothing for the Jagir Administrator to adjudicate. 19. The counter-affidavit on behalf of the official respondents, filed by the 2nd respondent (in Para-4) admits the possibility of lands within the authority or jurisdiction of a Jagirdar comprising also patta lands of cultivators, communal lands as well as lands under the personal cultivation of the Jagirdar. 20. Section 18 of the Regulation 1358 F enacts that the provisions of this Regulation would not effect the personal property of the Jagirdar, Hissedar or any property other than the jagir held by a Jagirdar on behalf of the Hissedar. Section 21 (2) of this Regulation enacts that all claims relating to a jagir ...... whether arising under this Regulation or otherwise, shall subject to this Regulation but notwithstanding any existing law, be filed in and decided by the appropriate civil Court. There is no provision in this Regulation which consecrates power, authority and jurisdiction in the Jagir Administrator to determine whether a particular land is a personal property of the Jagirdar or otherwise. whether arising under this Regulation or otherwise, shall subject to this Regulation but notwithstanding any existing law, be filed in and decided by the appropriate civil Court. There is no provision in this Regulation which consecrates power, authority and jurisdiction in the Jagir Administrator to determine whether a particular land is a personal property of the Jagirdar or otherwise. In view of• the provisions of Section 21 (2) of the Regulation 1358 F any dispute relating to a jagir must be filed in and decided by the appropriate civil Court. Even a dispute as to whether a particular property is the personal property of the Jagirdar or otherwise could be presented for determination before the civil Court of competent jurisdiction, even if such a dispute does not classically fall within the contours of a claim referred to in Section 21(2) of this Regulation. This is so since the general legal presumption as to existence of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not excluded by the provisions of the Regulation 1358- F. 21. An integral aspect falling for determination in the writ petition is whether exercise of revisional power under Section 166B of the Land Revenue Act is legitimate. 22. The Land Revenue Act is an amending and consolidating legislation to bring under a common fasciculus, the several orders and regulations relating to land revenue. Chapter-I deals with preliminary matters including the short title, commencement of the legislation and definitions; Chapter-II comprising Sections 3 to 16 sets out provisions relating to appointment and powers of revenue officers; Chapter-ill (Sections 17 to 23) was omitted by Act XLIV of 1952; Chapter-IV sets out provisions relating to land and land revenue and contains Sections 24 to 53; Section 24 enacts: "All public roads, lanes, paths, bridges, ditches, dikes, rivers, streams, tanks, ponds, canals, lakes, and flowing water and all land, wherever situated, together with all rights appertaining thereto are the property of the Government excepting:- (a) those belonging to persons or class legally capable of holding property and to the extent so far as their such rights are established; (b) those in respect of which any other order under any law may have been given. It shall be lawful for the Collector or other officer appointed by the Government for this purpose subject to rules sanctioned by the Government and contained in notification and the order of the Board of Revenue, to dispose of them in his discretion; but the right of way or other rights legally vesting in any person or the public shall subsist." The other Sections in Chapter IV deal with the assignment of lands, right of pattedar to certain trees within the lands held by him; planted on occupied lands prior to his occupation; proprietary rights of Government over toddy, sendhi trees etc. and connected matters; Chapter sets out provisions relating to occupation of Khalsa land and the rights of occupants; Chapter-VI (comprising Sections 56 to 76) sets out the rights and liabilities of superior holder and shikmi holder including as regards payment of land revenue; Chapter-VII includes provisions relating to revenue survey and settlement of records and partition of areas, in Sections 77 to 89B; Chapter-VIII sets out the powers and procedure regarding disputes relating to boundaries and installation and maintenance of boundary marks; Chapter-IX (comprising Sections 103 to 144) incorporates provisions for realization of land revenue and other Government taxes including powers of attachment, restraint for recovery of arrears of land revenue, arrest and imprisonment, forfeiture and sale of the attached property; Chapter-X lays down the procedure to be followed by the revenue officials regarding exercising of jurisdiction conferred by the provisions of the Act including the mode of enquiry and writing of decisions; Chapter-XI sets out provisions for appeal, review and revision, in Sections 158 to 166B; and Chapter-XII contains miscellaneous provisions including Section 172 which deals with the power to make rules. 23. Section 166B of the Land Revenue Act confers power on the Government or any Revenue Officer not lower in rank to a Collector, to call for the record of a case or proceeding from a subordinate department and inspect it in order to satisfy himself that the order or decision passed or the proceedings taken is regular, legal and proper and to make a suitable order in that behalf. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 166B enjoins providing an opportunity to an affected ryot before passing any order effecting his rights. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 166B enjoins providing an opportunity to an affected ryot before passing any order effecting his rights. Sub-section (2) of Section 166B enables a Revenue Officer lower in rank to a Collector or a Settlement Commissioner to call for the records of the case or proceedings from a subordinate department for satisfying himself that the order or decision or other proceedings is regular, legal and proper and if of opinion that such order, decision or proceedings should be modified or annulled, to put up the file with his opinion to the Collector or Settlement Commissioner, as the case may be. Thereupon the Collector or the Settlement Commissioner may pass suitable orders under the provisions of sub-section (1). 24. There is nothing in the scheme of the Land Revenue Act in general, or in Section 166B thereof in particular, which expressly or by compelling implication inheres a revisional jurisdiction in the Government, the Collector, the Settlement Commissioner or any other Revenue Officer to adjudicate and resolve rival claims by the State on the one hand and a citizen on the other as to the character and ownership of property, as in this case. There are other circumstances which negate the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction in this case. Among the lands purchased by the petitioners in the several Sy.Nos., in Sultanaplli Village, are lands claimed to have been purchased from the protected tenant, one Seetal Singh. The petitioners also assert that even the lands purchased by them from the Jagirdars are the personal lands of the erstwhile Jagirdars and not jagir lands and that they had verified these facts before they had purchased. It is also the clear assertion of the petitioners that the names of their vendors (the Jagirdars) were recorded in the revenue records as patta lands belonging to them; that after they purchased these lands their names have been mutated in the revenue records; and they were also issued pattadar pass books and title deeds for these lands. These assertions are not disputed. 25. In the light of the fact that there exist and operate several knotty, complex, interrelated and interactive factual and legal positions which have to be analysed as a prelude to determination of the nature and character of the lands in the several Sy.Nos. These assertions are not disputed. 25. In the light of the fact that there exist and operate several knotty, complex, interrelated and interactive factual and legal positions which have to be analysed as a prelude to determination of the nature and character of the lands in the several Sy.Nos. in Sultanpalli Village including (a) whether these lands are comprised within the jagir or are the personal property of the Jagirdar; (b) whether the commutation award passed by the Jagir Administrator on 7.8.1952 covered the lands in these Sy.Nos. of the village as well; (c) the fact that the order of the Board of Revenue dated 20.7.1951 does not pertain to and indicate any specific land by reference to any specific Sy.No; (d) as also the potential defence by the petitioners as to having perfected their titles to the lands by adverse possession, including through their predecessors-in-interest, the protected tenants or the Jagirdars, as the case may be, such complex factual and legal positions cannot be determined in exercise of the revisional power under Section 166B and determination of rival and competing claims to title is patently beyond the province of provisions of the Land Revenue Act. 26. There is also the aspect of the exercise of revisional power being barred on account of inordinate delay. The Regulation 1358-F was issued by the Militmy Governor by virtue of the power conferred on him by a Farman of the Nizam, dated 20.9.1948. This Regulation came into force on 15.8.1949. More than four decades thereafter by a Government Memo dated 21.6.1993 an administrative enquiry was initiated on the assumption that the lands .in Sultanpally Village had vested in the State under the Regulation 1358-F. This enquiry was set aside in W.P. No.1261/93. Five and half decades after the coming into force of the Regulation 1358-F the impugned notice is issued by the Joint Collector-I, RR District, asserting revisional power under two (2) enactments viz., the Land Revenue Act and the Pattadar Pass Books Act. The position is clear and the State also concedes this position as presented by the learned Advocate-General that assertion of the revisional power under the Pattadar Pass Books Act is wholly misconceived. Our analysis supra clearly indicates that revisional power under the Land Revenue Act is in the facts and circumstances of the case, not available. The position is clear and the State also concedes this position as presented by the learned Advocate-General that assertion of the revisional power under the Pattadar Pass Books Act is wholly misconceived. Our analysis supra clearly indicates that revisional power under the Land Revenue Act is in the facts and circumstances of the case, not available. Alternatively the exercise of the revisional power under Section 166B of the Land Revenue Act (even suo motu and though no specific limitation period is prescribed therein), is in the considered view of this court wholly unjustified and arbitrary. There is a long and venerated catena of presidential authority for the proposition that even exercise of suo motu power whether administrative or quasi judicial including revisional, must be within a reasonable time. The precedents are clear that the exercise of an administrative or quasi judicial power is necessarily linked to the concept of rule of law and the exercise of such power after a long lapse of time is prima facie arbitrary - vide Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak, AIR 1983 SC 1239 , P. Mangamma v. Workmen Co-operative Housing Society Ltd, 1995 (3) ALD 594 = 1995 (3) ALT 330 (DB), Gudepu Sailoo and others v. Government of AP, 1998 (3) ALD 652 = 1997 (5) ALT 598, Hindustan Times v. Union of India, (1998) 2 SCC 242 = 1998 (2) ALD (SCSN) 6, Laxminarayana and others v. Joint Collector, Khammam, 1998 (3) ALD 107 = 1998 (2) ALT 258, M Narasayya and others v. P. Ranga Reddy and others, 2001 (2) ALT 269 , Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Kooli Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy and others, (2003) 7 SCC 667 , Vallabhadas Pallod v. The Municipal Council, Zaheerabad and others, W.A. No.674/04 and Batch, dated 13.4.2005 reported in 2009 (4) ALD 129 (DB), S. Santhanam v. State of A.P., Revenue Department and others, 2006 (2) ALD 566 = 2006 (2) ALT 341 and Pratap Janglel Resorts Pvt. Ltd v. Joint Collector, RR District, 2009 (1) ALD 401 = 2008 (4) ALT 794 . 27. On the aforesaid analysis and in the light of the several precedents referred to supra the impugned memo No.F1/7417/ 1990 dated 21.6.2005 issued on behalf of the State by the Joint Collector-I, Ranga Reddy District is patently without jurisdiction apart from being barred by inordinate and unexplained latches and delay. It cannot be sustained. 27. On the aforesaid analysis and in the light of the several precedents referred to supra the impugned memo No.F1/7417/ 1990 dated 21.6.2005 issued on behalf of the State by the Joint Collector-I, Ranga Reddy District is patently without jurisdiction apart from being barred by inordinate and unexplained latches and delay. It cannot be sustained. Further enquiry pursuant to the impugned notice cannot be sustained either. The impugned memo is accordingly quashed and the official respondents directed to forbear from proceeding further pursuant to the impugned memo. 28. In the considered view of this Court the succession of ill-conceived administrative and quasi judicial measures initiated for determination of the character of the lands in Sulthanpalli Village on an assumption of the State's title to them is on the basis of a misunderstanding that the State must identify and pursue remedies for executive maladministration or revenue mismanagement only within the administrative or statutory machinery, but should not pursue remedies before the judicial branch by way of seeking declaratory or other reliefs, before a civil Court of competent jurisdiction. No conceptual basis whatsoever for this fundamental misconception of the State is presented to this Court either in the pleadings on in the contentions advanced by the learned Advocate General. In the considered view of this Court the remedies available in the judicial branch including before the civil Court of competent jurisdiction are available even to the State and it is open to the State to pursue appropriate remedies such as for declaration of title or other appropriate reliefs, subject, of course, to the operative substantive and procedural law including the law of lin1itation. 29. On the above analysis the writ petition is allowed but with a liberty to the State to pursue if so advised, appropriate remedies before the civil Court of competent jurisdiction with regard to lands in SyNos.122 to 126, 143 to 150, 1521A, 152/B, 153 and 154 of Sultanpalli Village, Shamshabad Mandal, RR District and if any such proceedings are initiated by the State, the appropriate Court shall adjudicate thereupon in accordance with law. 30. 30. This criminal revision is filed by the writ petitioners against the order dated 22.9.2005 of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate cum-Special Grade Deputy Collector and Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella Division, initiating proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. and therein passing an order of attachment of the lands in Sy.Nos.123 to 126, 143 to 150, 152 to 154 of Sultanpalli Village. This Court by an interim order dated 4.10.2005 in Crl. R.C.M.P. No.2128 of 2005 granted stay of operation of the order dated 22.9.2005, while directing the parties to appear before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the enquiry scheduled on 29.10.2005. The order dated 22.9.2005 of the Special Divisional Magistrate was passed on the assumption and on the basis of the report of the M.R.O., Shamshabad that the petitioners are a fencing these lands (asserted to belonging to the State and on the basis that a title dispute regarding these lands is pending before the Collector, RR District). The very basis for initiating proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is in the totality of circumstances misconceived. The learned Counsel for the petitioners also submits that if the validity of the proceedings initiated by the Joint Collector, RR District (the subject-matter of W.P. No.14038/05) is determined in favour of the petitioners, the basis for the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate dated 22.9.2005 would cease to exist. 31. As W.P.No.14038/05 is allowed by this common judgment, the basis for the order dated 22.9.2005 of the Special Divisional Magistrate (impugned in this Crl.R.C.) is obliterated. This revision is accordingly allowed and the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate-cum-Special Grade Deputy Collector and Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella Division, dated 22.9.2005 bearing reference case No.U2940/2005, is quashed. C.C. SR No.6052 of 2005 : 32. This contempt case does not survive in view of the orders passed in this common judgment in respect of W.P.No.14038 of 2005 and Crl.R.C.No.1651 of 2005. C.C. No.557 of 2006 : 33. By an interim order dated 23.8.2005 in WPMP No.17819/05 in W.P. No.14038/ OS, this Court while granting interim stay of the enquiry pursuant to the notice dated 21.6.2005 of the Joint Collector-I, RR District, also directed the writ petitioners not to change the user of the lands or create any third party interests therein till the disposal of the writ petition. 34. 34. Complaining of violation by the writ petitioners of the above interim direction, by the sale of various extents of land (as specified in Para-3 of the Contempt Case), the State of Andhra Pradesh and the other official respondents (in W.P. No.14038/05) have filed this contempt case. On behalf of the respondents (except R-5), by a counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent V. Tulsi Ram, it is admitted that the answering respondents had executed sale deeds on 18.3.2006 with a view to generating funds for liquidating certain loans availed by them from M/s Prudential Co-operative Bank Ltd and from other private persons. Though the counter states that they had informed and requested the purchasers not to change the use of the lands and that the several sale deeds were executed only as security for the loans obtained by the respondents, the fact is clearly established that respondents 1 to 4 and 6 have wilfully violated the interim direction of this Court dated 23.8.2005 directing the respondents not to create any third party interest in the lands or to change the use of the land. 35. Though Mr. N Narsinga Rao s/o N. Rangaiah is arrayed as the 5th respondent in this contempt case, neither the statement of the sale deeds executed by the respondents (as set out in Para-3 of the contempt case) nor the copies of the sale deeds filed along with the contempt case disclose that any sale deed was executed by the 5th respondent. In the circumstances contempt is seen to be committed only by the respondents 1 to 4 and 6. 36. This Court finds no mitigating circumstances whatsoever for this clear defiance by the respondents 1 to 4 and 6, of the interim direction of this Court. Accordingly respondents 1 to 4 and 6 are found guilty of contempt of the interim direction of this Court dated 23.8.2005 in WPMP No.17819/ 05 in WP No.14038/05. As the contumacious conduct of these respondents is grave and constitutes a wilful defiance of the order of this Court, respondents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment of two months each besides a fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two thousand only) each. In default of the payment of fine, the defaulting among respondents 1,2, 3,4 and 6 shall undergo simple imprisonment of a further period of Fifteen days each. In default of the payment of fine, the defaulting among respondents 1,2, 3,4 and 6 shall undergo simple imprisonment of a further period of Fifteen days each. The Contempt Case is accordingly disposed of. 37. In the result, the writ petition is allowed; the Cr1.R.C.No.1651/05 is allowed; CC SR No.6052/05 is dismissed and the CC No.557/06 is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. 38. After the pronouncement of the common judgment including the order in C.C. No.557 of 2006 sentencing the respondents 1 to. 4 and 6 therein, Sri V. Venkataramana, learned Counsel for these respondents stated that these respondents desire to prefer an appeal under Section 19(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and pending institution of the appeal, the sentence may be suspended to preserve their liberty in the interim. 39. The sentence of respondents 1 to 4 and 6 recorded in C.C. No.557 of 2006 is • suspended for a period of (15) days from today.