JUDGMENT Hon’ble D.K. Arora, J.—Heard counsel for the parties. 2. By means of present writ petition, the petitioner is seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 16.11.2009 passed by the opposite party No. 2, as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition. 3. The submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that by the impugned order the appointment and posting orders dated 27.10.2006 and 8.11.2006 have been cancelled by the opposite party No. 2 without providing any opportunity of hearing in grass violation of principles of natural justice and fair play. 4. The petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Mines Survey (Trainee) vide order dated 16.2.1991 in Uttar Pradesh State Mineral Development Corporation Ltd., Lucknow, here-in-after referred to as the Corporation, and he was confirmed vide order dated 4.6.1995 in the pay scale of Rs. 2200-4000 on the post of Mines Surveyor. The petitioner was retrenched from the services of the Corporation due to its closure on 31.1.2000. The employees of the Corporation approached this Court by means of Writ Petition No. 338 (s/s) of 1997, Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti and others v. State of U.P. and others with a prayer that a writ of mandamus be issued to the State of U.P. to prepare a list of retrenched employees of various Corporations and to absorb them and also to pay them compensation. The said writ petition was allowed and a writ of mandamus was issued directing the opposite parties to absorb the employees of the petitioner’s association within four months from the date of passing of the order in various organizations of the State Government/ Public Sectors and to pay compensation, in accordance with law. 5. In pursuance of the judgment and order passed by this Court, the petitioner submitted representation on 9.10.2006 before the Survey Commissioner (Waqf), U.P. for his absorption/adjustment in the Waqf department. The application of the petitioner was also forwarded by the State Government to the opposite party No. 2 on 19th October, 2006 and in pursuance of the same, the opposite party No. 2 issued appointment letter on 27.10.2006 thereby appointing the petitioner on the post of Survey Waqf Inspector. The application of the petitioner was also forwarded by the State Government to the opposite party No. 2 on 19th October, 2006 and in pursuance of the same, the opposite party No. 2 issued appointment letter on 27.10.2006 thereby appointing the petitioner on the post of Survey Waqf Inspector. The petitioner in pursuance of the appointment order joined on 30.10.2006 and he was issued posting order on 8.11.2006 thereby posting the petitioner on the post of Survey Waqf Inspector in the office of District Alp Sankhyak Kalyan Adhikari at Agra. The petitioner stood confirmed on the said post after completion of two years probation period in pursuance of appointment order. 6. It appears that the Industrial Development Anubhag-5 wrote a demi official letter to the opposite party No. 2 for cancellation of the appointment of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner was appointed in the Corporation after 1.10.1986, as such, he was not issued a certificate as a retrenched employee and in pursuance of the letter of the Industrial Development Department, the appointment of the petitioner has cancelled by means of impugned order dated 16.11.2009 without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 7. Counsel for the petitioner while assailing the aforesaid order relied upon the unreported judgment passed in Writ Petition No. 872 (S/S) of 1998, Smt. Tulsa Dhir v. State of U.P. and others, in which it has been observed that : “an order passed in violation of principles of natural justice, it is well settled in law, is non est. In the present case admittedly, no opportunity of hearing or to explain her case was afforded to the petitioner before passing the impugned order, by which she was adversely affected. Writ petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed.” 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported in 1980 (4) SCC 379 , S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others observed : “The matter has also been treated as an application of the general principle that justice should not only be done but should be seen to be done. Jackson’s Natural Justice (1980 Edn.) contains a very interesting discussion of the subject. He says : 9. The distinction between justice being done and being seen to be done has been emphasized in many cases. 10. Jackson’s Natural Justice (1980 Edn.) contains a very interesting discussion of the subject. He says : 9. The distinction between justice being done and being seen to be done has been emphasized in many cases. 10. The requirement that justice should be seen to be done may be regarded as a general principle which is some cases can be satisfied only by the observance of the rules of natural justice or as itself forming one of those rules. Both explanations of the significance of the maxim are found in Lord Widgery C. J.’s judgment in R. v. Home Secretary, ex. P. Hosenball, where after saying that “the principles of natural justice are those fundamental rules, the breach of which will prevent justice from being seen to be done” he went on to describe the maxim as “one of the rules generally accepted in the bundle of the rules making up natural justice”. 11. It is the recognition of the importance of the requirement that justice is seen to be done that justifies the giving of a remedy to a litigant even when it may be claimed that a decision alleged to be vitiated by a breach of natural justice would still have been reached had a fair hearing been given by an impartial tribunal. The maxim is applicable precisely when the Court is concerned not with a case of actual injustice but with the appearance of injustice or possible injustice. In Altco Ltd. v. Sudherland Donaldson, J., said that the Court, in deciding whether to interfere where an arbitrator had not given a party a full hearing was not concerned with whether a further hearing would produce a different or the same result. It was important that the parties should not only be given justice, but, as reasonable men, know that they had had justice or “to use the time hallowed phrase” that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done. In R. v. Thames Magistrates’ Court, ex. p. Polemis, the applicant obtained an order of certiorari to quash his conviction by a stipendiary magistrate on the ground that he had not had sufficient time to prepare his defence. The Divisional Court rejected the argument that, in its discretion, it ought to refuse relief because the applicant had no defence to the charge. 12. p. Polemis, the applicant obtained an order of certiorari to quash his conviction by a stipendiary magistrate on the ground that he had not had sufficient time to prepare his defence. The Divisional Court rejected the argument that, in its discretion, it ought to refuse relief because the applicant had no defence to the charge. 12. It is again absolutely basic to our system that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. If justice was so clearly not seen to be done, as on the afternoon in question here, it seems to me that it is no answer to the applicant to say: ‘Well, even if the case had been properly conducted, the result would have been the same’. That is mixing up doing justice with seeing that justice is done (per Lord Widgery C.J. at page 1375). 13. In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule pendent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice has been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal.” 14. In the case reported in 1991 Supp (1) SCC 330, Shrawan Kumar Jha and others v. State of Bihar and others it has been held : “We are of the view that the appellants should have been given an opportunity of hearing before cancelling their appointments. Admittedly, no such opportunity was afforded to them. It is well settled that no order to the detriment of the appellants could be passed without complying with the rules of natural justice. We set aside the impugned order of cancellation dated November 3, 1988 on this short ground. Admittedly, no such opportunity was afforded to them. It is well settled that no order to the detriment of the appellants could be passed without complying with the rules of natural justice. We set aside the impugned order of cancellation dated November 3, 1988 on this short ground. As suggested by the learned Solicitor General, we direct that the Secretary (Education), Government of Bihar, or to other person nominated by him should give an opportunity of hearing to the appellants, and thereafter give a finding as to whether the appellants were validly appointed as Assistant Teachers. He shall also determine as to whether any of the teachers joined their respective schools and for how much duration. In case some of them joined their schools and worked, they shall be entitled to their salary for such period.” 15. In the case reported in AIR 1998 SC 3261 , Basudeo Tiwari v. Sido Kanhu University and others held : “The said provision provides that an appointment could be terminated at any time without notice if the same had been made contrary to the provisions of the Act, Statutes, Rules or Regulations or in any irregular or unauthorised manner. The condition precedent for exercise of this power is that an appointment had been made contrary to Act, Rules, Statutes and Regulations or otherwise. In order to arrive at a conclusion that an appointment is contrary to the provisions of the Act, Statues, Rules or Regulations etc. a finding has to be recorded and unless such a finding is recorded, the termination cannot be made, but to arrive at such a conclusion necessarily an enquiry will have to be made as to whether such appointment was contrary to the provisions of the Act etc. If in a given case such exercise is absent, the condition precedent stands unfulfilled. To arrive at such a finding necessarily enquiry notice, will have to be held and in holding such an enquiry the person whose appointment is under enquiry will have to be issued to him. If in a given case such exercise is absent, the condition precedent stands unfulfilled. To arrive at such a finding necessarily enquiry notice, will have to be held and in holding such an enquiry the person whose appointment is under enquiry will have to be issued to him. If notice is not given to him then it is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, that is, if the employee concerned whose rights are affected, is not given notice of such a proceeding and a conclusion is drawn in his absence, such a conclusion would not be just, fair or reasonable as noticed by this Court in D.T.C. Mazdoor Sabha’s case ( AIR 1991 SC 101 ). In such an event, we have to hold that in the provision there is an implied requirement of hearing for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion that an appointment had been made contrary to the Act, Statue, Rule or Regulation etc. and it is only on such a conclusion being drawn, the services of the person could be terminated without further notice. That is how S. 35 (3) in this case will have to be read.” 16. The maxim audi alteram partem has many facets. Two of them are : (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule is universally respected. 17. The duty to afford a fair hearing is “a duty lying upon everyone who decides something”, in the exercise of legal power. The rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity; in sum and substance the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.” 18. Learned Standing Counsel points out that in the appointment order dated 27.10.2006 it was specifically provided that if at any point of time any facts come to the light that the petitioner is retrenched employee has been absorbed elsewhere after retrenchment, his services can be terminated without any notice, and therefore, no notice was required to be given to the petitioner. 19. In the present case, it is admitted position that the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing before cancellation of his appointment. 19. In the present case, it is admitted position that the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing before cancellation of his appointment. Since the petitioner was working on the post in question since 2006, therefore, the impugned order violated his right, which cannot be permitted without afforded any opportunity of hearing. At this juncture, the learned Standing Counsel suggests that the impugned order may quash with liberty to pass fresh order after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as per law. 20. In view of the above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the impugned order dated 16.11.2009 has been passed in grass violation of principles of natural justice and the same is liable to be quashed. 21. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 16.11.2009 is hereby quashed. However, it is open for the opposite parties to pass a fresh order after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as per law. 22. There shall be no order as to costs. ————