JUDGMENT Hon’ble V.K. Shukla, J.—Present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing of order dated 30.10.1995 passed by S.D.M. Bansi, awarding punishment of cancellation of two increments and reverting the petitioner on the pay scale of Rs.1190/-. 2. Brief background of the case, as mentioned in the writ petition, is that against the conduct of petitioner, who had been functioning as Lekhpal, complaint had been made, and based on the said complaint, preliminary inquiry was held and report was submitted. Based on the said report, petitioner was placed under suspension on 17.7.1995; charge-sheet was given to the petitioner on same day, to which reply was filed on 31.7.1995. After submission of reply, Naib Tehsildar was appointed as Inquiry Officer and he was required to submit report within 8 days. After submission of report by the Inquiry Officer, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, to which petitioner filed reply on 23.9.1995, and thereafter, impugned order was passed on 30.10.1995. At this juncture, present writ petition has been filed. 3. After pleadings mentioned above have been exchanged inter se parties, present writ petition has been taken up for hearing and disposal with the consent of the parties. 4. Sri Ajay Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended with vehemence that in the present case at no point of time any inquiry worth the name, had been conducted and at no point of time any date, time or place for inquiry was fixed in the matter, and without holding any departmental inquiry, Inquiry Officer submitted report, and based on the same, order impugned had been passed, as such order impugned is liable to be set aside. 5. Countering the said submission, learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, contended that adequate opportunity had been provided to the petitioner to defend himself, as such the order impugned should not be interfered with. 6. After respective arguments have been advanced, factual position which emerges in the present case is that charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 17.7.1995; reply to which was submitted on 31.7.1995. Inquiry Officer was appointed on 22.8.1995, who submitted report on 30.8.1995. 6. After respective arguments have been advanced, factual position which emerges in the present case is that charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 17.7.1995; reply to which was submitted on 31.7.1995. Inquiry Officer was appointed on 22.8.1995, who submitted report on 30.8.1995. This is admitted fact that Inquiry Officer at no point of time fixed any date, time or place for holding inquiry and report has been submitted taking into consideration the reply submitted by the petitioner on 31.7.1995 to the charge-sheet and opinion has been formed holding petitioner guilty. The Disciplinary Authority has accepted the report submitted by Inquiry Officer, and impugned punishment order has been passed. 7. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. C.S. Sharma, AIR 1968 SC 158 , has taken the view that reasonable opportunity has to be afforded and enquiry should be conducted in a very fair manner by fixing the date, time and place of enquiry. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the said judgment are being extracted below : “6. The first question is whether this inquiry was made under sub-rule (1) or (3) of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. It is an admitted fact that Sharma was a temporary employee and therefore his case would fall to he governed by sub-rule (3) of rule 55 if it could be said that the enquiry which was being made was for a specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for service. Sub. r. (1) of R. 55 is a general rule for enquiries where the conduct of a person is inquired into for misconduct but sub-rule (3) says that sub-rule shall not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer, or to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank a temporary government servant for any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for the service. Sub-rule (3) says that in such cases, the probationer or temporary government servant concerned shall be apprised of the grounds of such proposal, given an opportunity to show cause against the action to be taken against him, and his explanation in this behalf, if any, shall be duly considered before orders are passed by the competent authority. If the third sub-rule applied, it is obvious that the kind of enquiry made complied with its requirements. If the third sub-rule applied, it is obvious that the kind of enquiry made complied with its requirements. The first sub-rule, however, provides for a full-blooded enquiry which is the counter-part of a regular trial : witnesses have to be examined in support of the allegations, opportunity has to be given to the delinquent officer to cross-examine them and to lead evidence in his defence. In our judgment the present case was governed by the first sub-rule and not the third sub-rule. The third sub-rule coals with the unsuitability of an officer for the service or with a charge for any specific fault. This fault means a fault in the execution of his duties and not a misconduct such as taking bribe, etc. which are charges of a more serious nature affecting the character of the individual concerned. The collocation of the words ‘any specific fault’ or ‘on account of unsuitability for service’ give the clue of the distinction between the third sub-rule and the first sub-rule. An officer who is, for example, habitually lazy or makes mistakes frequently or is not polite or decorous may be considered unsuitable for the service. Another officer who makes a grievous default in the execution of his work may be charged for the specific individual fault, that is a dereliction or defect in the execution of that duty. Where there is an allegation that an officer is guilty of a misconduct such as accepting bribe or showing favours, the matter is not one of specific fault in the execution of his work but something more. That matter will fall to be governed by the first sub-rule because you cannot charge a man with criminal conduct without affording him adequate opportunity to clear his character. Mr. Aggarwal fairly pointed out that the Government had appointed the enquiring officer to take action under Rule 55 (1) and it is thus quite clear that Government viewed the matter also in this light. 7. It, therefore, follows that if the procedure under the first sub-rule had to be followed, adequate opportunity had to be given to Sharma to lead evidence on his own behalf to clear himself of serious charges which were levelled against him and give evidence on his own behalf. It is obvious that he has not been able to lead his defence or to give evidence on his own behalf. It is obvious that he has not been able to lead his defence or to give evidence on his own behalf. The question is whether he has to thank himself or the omission proceeded because of some action on the part of the enquiring officer. Considering the whole matter we are satisfied that the enquiring officer was to blame and we shall now show why we think so. 8. Throughout the enquiry, as late as February 24, 1954 Sharma had again and again given indication that he would lead evidence in his defence. At first he had given a list or’ three witnesses which he later amplified to four leaving out one from the original list and adding two new names. He had also stated that he wanted to examine himself in his defence.” The reamed Commissioner who was holding the enquiry on more than one occasion stated that he would be afforded this opportunity and also that a date would be fixed for the examination of the defence witnesses. It is true that Sharma was playing for time and on the 2nd of February (before the date of hearing came) he put in an application that he would like an adjournment of 20 days before he submitted a final list of witnesses with their addresses. This application was rejected on February 6, but between February 6 and April 8, when the report was made, two long months passed and it was possible for the Commissioner to have fixed a date, on which if he was so minded, Sharma could bring his witnesses in support of his case or tender himself for examination. No action was taken between February 6, 1954 and April 8, 1954 to enable Sharma to lead his defence, if any, in support of his part of the case. This omission in our judgment was sufficient to vitiate the whole proceeding because no enquiry of this type in which there are charges of a criminal nature, can be said to be properly conducted when the defence of the officer is either frustrated or ruled out. 9. It was submitted by Mr. Agarwal that the witnesses were being summoned by him to clear himself of the charge of owning a car without having the visible means to afford it and this charge was not accepted by the State Government. 9. It was submitted by Mr. Agarwal that the witnesses were being summoned by him to clear himself of the charge of owning a car without having the visible means to afford it and this charge was not accepted by the State Government. This is true enough but the State Government came on the scene much later. In so far as the enquiring officer was concerned, he had accepted the allegation against Sharma and even if the original list be considered, Sharma was entitled to lead evidence with regard to the car itself. It is possible that ‘ if a date had been fixed, he would, not only have led evidence with regard to the car, but would have brought witnesses to clear himself of other charges, but no such opportunity was clearly afforded to him. Further, before the case closed, the Commissioner had before him a list of four witnesses and fair play demanded that he should have fixed a date and left it to Sharma to procure attendance of his witnesses on that date, but if no date was fixed Sharma was not expected to bring his witnesses day after day in the hope that the Commissioner would examine them any day. The enquiry cannot be said to comply with the elementary principles of natural justice and therefore we have no hesitation in accepting the decision of the High Court that the enquiry was vitiated. 10. We may not omit to state that there was an allegation against the Commissioner that he was biased against Sharma. It does -appear that the Commissioner, in one of his letters, stated that he had heard witnesses and satisfied himself that Sharma was definitely corrupt. This statement of the Commissioner showed that he approached the case with a feeling that Sharma was guilty although the State Government cannot be said to share this bias of the Commissioner. It does -appear that the Commissioner, in one of his letters, stated that he had heard witnesses and satisfied himself that Sharma was definitely corrupt. This statement of the Commissioner showed that he approached the case with a feeling that Sharma was guilty although the State Government cannot be said to share this bias of the Commissioner. We would have said something more about this, if the occasion had demanded this, but as we are upholding the order of the High Court on the ground that no reasonable opportunity was afforded to Sharma to lead his evidence, it is not necessary to say whether an officer in the position of the Commissioner, who on the basis of secret enquiries behind the back of delinquent officer has reached the conclusion that there are good grounds for holding that the officer is corrupt, should himself conduct the enquiry. That matter may be left for consideration in another case.” 8. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Ravindra Nath Chaturvedi and another, 1995 SCC (Labour and Service) 1426, has set aside the order of punishment, where reasonable opportunity was not provided. Relevant extract of the judgment is being quoted below : “1. Leave granted. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The High Court has set aside the imposition of the penalty on the respondents on the ground that no reasonable opportunity was given to the respondents during the inquiry by the Inquiry Officer. It is also found that no one was examined to prove the case of the State. It would be desirable that an officer who is acquainted with the records may also be examined to prove the documentary evidence and opportunity may be given to the respondents to cross-examine the witnesses or produce any evidence in rebuttal. Thereafter, inquiry will be conducted, the report will be given and copy thereof will be supplied to the respondents. 3. The order of the High Court is accordingly set aside. The Inquiry Officer, if he is still in service, is directed to conduct and complete the enquiry within a period four months from the date of receipt of this order, if he is not in service, the State is directed to appoint another Inquiry Officer afresh who would do the needful within the said period. 4. The Inquiry Officer, if he is still in service, is directed to conduct and complete the enquiry within a period four months from the date of receipt of this order, if he is not in service, the State is directed to appoint another Inquiry Officer afresh who would do the needful within the said period. 4. In case of fresh appointment of Inquiry Officer, the State Government is directed to appoint an Inquiry Officer within one month from the date of receipt of this order. After submission of the report by the Inquiry Officer, the State Government is further directed to consider the enquiry report and take appropriate decision within three months thereafter. 5. The appeal is accordingly, allowed with the above directions. No costs.” 9. Division Bench of this Court in the case of Subhash Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director, U.P. Co-operative Spinning Mills Federation Ltd. Kanur, 1999 AWC 3227 , has taken the view that for enquiry, date, time and place has to be fixed. Relevant paragraph 4 of the said judgment is being quoted below : “4. Several p0ints have been raised in the petition, but this petition deserves to be allowed on one ground alone, and it is not necessary to go into the other grounds. In paragraph 5 of the petition, it has been stated that no enquiry was held nor any date for holding the enquiry was intimated to the petitioner nor was any evidence led in the said enquiry. The reply to paragraph 5 of the petition is contained in paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit. There is no denial in paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit to the allegation in paragraph 5 of the writ petition that no date for enquiry was fixed nor any evidence led in the said enquiry. All that has been said in paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit is that in the charge-sheet fifteen days’ time was given to the petitioner to submit his reply, and thus the date in the enquiry was fixed. In our opinion, this does not mean that the date for the enquiry was fixed. The charge-sheet is Annexure-3 to the writ petition and a perusal of the same shows that no date was fixed for the enquiry in the same nor was any date fixed in the supplementary charge-sheet. In our opinion, this does not mean that the date for the enquiry was fixed. The charge-sheet is Annexure-3 to the writ petition and a perusal of the same shows that no date was fixed for the enquiry in the same nor was any date fixed in the supplementary charge-sheet. Thus, the allegation in paragraph 5 of the writ petition that neither the date for the enquiry was fixed nor evidence led in the same stands unrebutted. In paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit, it has been alleged that petitioner had asked for some documents, but he was only allowed to see the documents. We are of the opinion this again does not mean that any date for the enquiry was fixed nor was any oral evidence led in the enquiry. In fact it has been admitted in paragraph 5 of the petition that no oral evidence was produced by the management.” 10. Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sharad Kumar Verma v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(7) ADJ 165 (DB)(LB) : 2006(4) ESC 2534 (DB)(LB), has taken the view that even if it is accepted that petitioner was given adequate opportunity to inspect record, the present inquiry proceeding cannot be sustained as admittedly after submission of reply to the charge-sheet, Inquiry Officer did not give any opportunity to the petitioner to participate in the inquiry nor fixed any date. Further it has been held that charges unless proved, cannot form basis of any punishment, and in this background, disciplinary proceedings are vitiated. Paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the judgment being relevant are being quoted below : “9. Even if it is accepted that the petitioner was given adequate opportunity to inspect record, the present enquiry proceeding cannot be sustained, as, admittedly after submission of reply to the charge-sheet, the enquiry officer did not give any opportunity to the petitioner to participate in the inquiry nor fixed any date for leading evidence either to the department or to the delinquent officer. In fact, the requests dated 12.10.1998 and 26.10.1998 (annexures-5 and 6) have not at all been considered and the representation dated 6.6.2000 (Annexure-7) has been taken as reply to the charge-sheet by the enquiry officer. This fact is evident from the averments made in para 19 of the counter-affidavit. In fact, the requests dated 12.10.1998 and 26.10.1998 (annexures-5 and 6) have not at all been considered and the representation dated 6.6.2000 (Annexure-7) has been taken as reply to the charge-sheet by the enquiry officer. This fact is evident from the averments made in para 19 of the counter-affidavit. The State admits that the enquiry officer did not fix any date, time or place for holding the enquiry or for adducing evidence and the petitioner was also not called by him to participate in the enquiry after submission of reply to the charge-sheet but defends the order by emphatically asserting that since the charges were based on documents, no oral enquiry was needed. The argument is that charges stood roved by documentary evidence, which were available with the enquiry officer and, therefor,e no illegality has been committed, if the petitioner was not called for any oral hearing and no oral evidence was led. In support of the submission, it has also been argued that the petitioner 9n his reply dated 6.6.2000 has only prayed that an impartial enquiry report be submitted and had not asked for any personal hearing or opportunity to adduce evidence. 10. This question has come up before this Court very often and the Court had been explaining in all the cases of departmental proceeding s that if the delinquent denies the charges then whether he asks for personal hearing or opportunity to participate in the proceedings or not, it is the bounden duty of the enquiry officer to afford such an opportunity. The enquiry officer requires that the charges levelled against the delinquent officer should stand proved on the basis of the material on record and the necessary evidence, which may be oral or documentary or both. The delinquent has not participated in the enquiry despite the opportunity being given is a separate issue but where no opportunity is afforded, the enquiry stands vitiated. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 12.10.1998 and 21.10.1998 and in both the replies, he did not accept the charges but expressed his inability to give complete answer in t he absence of the documents being supplied. In the representation dated 6.6.2000 again the petitioner raised the same plea and prayed that impartial enquiry report be submitted. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 12.10.1998 and 21.10.1998 and in both the replies, he did not accept the charges but expressed his inability to give complete answer in t he absence of the documents being supplied. In the representation dated 6.6.2000 again the petitioner raised the same plea and prayed that impartial enquiry report be submitted. The aforesaid request including the representation of the petitioner by no stretch of imagination can constitute an admission on his part to the charges levelled nor would mean that he has agreed for submitting of the enquiry report without associating the petitioner and without giving opportunity to lead evidence. 11. In departmental proceedings, the charges unless proved cannot from the basis of any punishment. The standard of proof is different as against the required standard in the case of a criminal trial but the charges levelled must stand proved on the basis of the relevant material. The moment charge is required to be proved, the necessity would arise for adducing evidence, which may be documentary or oral or both. The burden to prove charges lies upon the departmental, therefore, the department owes its liability first to adduce evidence and take steps for proving the charge. It is after this stage that the delinquent would be required to rebut the evidence adduced an also to cross-examine the witnesses produced or to nullify the documentary evidence by adducing such evidence, as may be necessary and may be available or to show the unworthiness of the documents which are sought to be relied upon but this can only be done if the enquiry officer does not fixes a date for adducing evidence and not otherwise. Merely because the delinquent did not say so in so many words about his participation in the enquiry despite the charges not being admitted to him and they having been denied, the enquiry officer does not stand absolve of his legal obligation of holding enquiry in the manner prescribed. It is to be kept in mind that denial of charges and admission of the charges cannot be taken on the same footing. It is to be kept in mind that denial of charges and admission of the charges cannot be taken on the same footing. There may be a case where the delinquent denies the charges specifically and there may be a case where the delinquent does not refer to the charge but does not admit the charge and in such a case also the enquiry officer would be under legal obligation to hold the enquiry to see that the charges are proved or not. It is only where in a case the delinquent admits the charge, the department may not lead any evidence before the enquiry officer and the charge can be taken to be proved, as the facts admitted need not be proved. 12. In the instant case, admittedly the aforesaid procedure was not followed an d that at no point of time the petitioner was associated with the enquiry and, therefore, he could not get any opportunity to rebut the documentary evidence, which was relied upon nor was in a position to adduce any evidence in rebuttal. The entire proceedings was thus conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. The charges thus cannot be said to be proved against the petitioner and the enquiry stands vitiated on this ground alone.” 11. Division Bench of this Court in writ petition No. 154 (MB) of 2000, Chhail Behari v. State Public Servbices Tribunal and others, decided on 13.5.2002 has deprecated the submission of enquiry report by mentioning that in case delinquent does not choose to submit his reply or to participate in the enquiry despite reasonable opportunity being given, charge has to be proved on the strength of material on record by the enquiry officer. 12. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal v. Kharak Singh, 2008 (118) FLR 1112, as to in what way and manner domestic enquiry is to be concluded, has given guidelines. Relevant portion of the said judgment contained in paragraphs 5 to 11 of the said judgment is being quoted below : “5. Before analyzing the correctness of the above submissions, it is useful to refer various principles laid down by this Court as to how enquiry is to be conducted and which procedures are to be followed. 6. The following observations and principles laid down by this Court in Associated Cement Co. Before analyzing the correctness of the above submissions, it is useful to refer various principles laid down by this Court as to how enquiry is to be conducted and which procedures are to be followed. 6. The following observations and principles laid down by this Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. The workmen and another, 1963 (7) FLR 269 (SC), are relevant : “.............In the present case, the first serious infirmity from which the enquiry suffers proceeds from the fact that the three enquiry officers claimed that they themselves had witnessed the alleged misconduct of Malak Ram. Mr. Kolah contends that if the Manager and the other officers saw Malak Ram committing the act of misconduct, that itself would not disqualify them from holding the domestic enquiry. We are not prepared to accept this argument. If an officer himself sees the misconduct of a workman, it is desirable that the enquiry should be left to be held by some other person who does not claim to be an eye-witness of the impugned incident. As we have repeatedly emphasized, domestic enquiries must be conducted honestly and bona fide with a view to determine whether the charge framed against a particular employee is proved or not, and so, care must be taken to see that these enquiries do not become empty formalities. If an officer claims that he had himself seen the misconduct alleged against an employee, in fairness steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. How the knowledge claimed by an enquiry officer can vitiate the entire proceedings of the enquiry is illustrated by the present enquiry itself..........” .............It is necessary to emphasise that in the domestic enquiries, the employer should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman charged, give an opportunity to the workman to cross-examine the said evidence and then should the workman be asked whether he wants to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. It seems to us that it is not fair in domestic enquiries against industrial employees that at the very commencement of the enquiry, the employee should be closely cross-examined even before any other evidence is led against him. It seems to us that it is not fair in domestic enquiries against industrial employees that at the very commencement of the enquiry, the employee should be closely cross-examined even before any other evidence is led against him. In dealing with domestic enquiries held in such industrial matters, we cannot overlook the fact that in a large majority of cases, employees are likely to be ignorant, and so, it is necessary not to expose them to the risk of cross-examination in the manner adopted in the present enquiry proceedings. Therefore, we are satisfied that Mr. Sule is right in contending that the course adopted in the present enquiry proceedings by which Malak Ram was elaborately cross-examined at the outset constitutes another infirmity in this enquiry.” 7. In Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others, 1993 (67) FLR 1230 (SC), it was held : “Where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer’s report and the delinquent employee’s reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report. the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment. The second stage consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment. The second stage consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the enquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which representation of the employee against the enquiry officer’s report would be considered. Now the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence in respect of the charges. Article 311 (2) says that the employee shall be given “reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him”. The finding on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry officer, particularly, when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. The proviso to Article 311 (2) in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee’s reply to the enquiry officer’s report and conclusion of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. Hence, when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt of innocence of the employee with regard to the charges leveled against him. That right is part of the employee’s right to defend himself against the charges leveled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice. 8. In Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and another, 1999 (81) FLR 475 (SC), it was held : “34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an inquiry and evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature are arrived at behind the back of the Officer and where on the basis of such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be violative of principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of the inquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to punish him and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular departmental inquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. These are obviously not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud against the employees conduct but are cases where the employer has virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings of the Inquiry Officer, which are all arrived at behind the back of the employee - even though such acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order of termination. That is why the misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive, in such cases.” 9. In Syndicate Bank and others v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati, 2006 (108) FLR 1043 (SC), the following conclusion is relevant : “18. In our view, non-supply of documents on which the Enquiry Officer does not rely during the course of enquiry does not create any prejudice to the delinquent. In Syndicate Bank and others v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati, 2006 (108) FLR 1043 (SC), the following conclusion is relevant : “18. In our view, non-supply of documents on which the Enquiry Officer does not rely during the course of enquiry does not create any prejudice to the delinquent. It is only those documents, which are relied upon by the Enquiry Officer to arrive at his conclusion, the non-supply of which would cause prejudice being violative of principles of natural justice. Even then, the non-supply of those documents prejudice the case of delinquent officer must be established by the delinquent officer. It is well settled law that the doctrine of principles of natural justice are not embodied rules. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice.” 10. In regard to the question whether an enquiry officer can indicate the proposed punishment in his report, this Court, in a series of decisions has pointed out that it is for the punishing/disciplinary authority to impose appropriate punishment and enquiry officer has no role in awarding punishment. It is useful to refer to the decision of this Court in A.N.D Silva v. Union of India, 1962 Supp 1 SCR 968, wherein it was held : “In the communication addressed by the Enquiry Officer the punishment proposed to be imposed upon the appellant if he was found guilty of the charges could not properly be set out. The question of imposing punishment can only arise after enquiry is made and the report of the Enquiry Officer is received. It is for the punishing authority to propose the punishment and not for the enquiring Authority.” 11. From the above decisions, the following principles would emerge : (i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities. (ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the Enquiry Officer. (ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the Enquiry Officer. If the said position becomes known after the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. (iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/delinquent charged, give an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and asked to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. (iv) On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/punishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry report and all concerned materials relied on by the enquiry officer to enable him to offer his views, if any.” 13. On the parameters as set out in the aforesaid judgment, in the present case, Inquiry Officer, at no point of time, has taken any lead to lead evidence against the petitioner, to give opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer, no opportunity has been given to lead evidence in rebuttal to the evidence led against him. At no point of time enquiry officer has ever proceeded to fix any date, time and place for enquiry. Thus, this is a case of no inquiry and the same cannot be subscribed. 14. Consequently, present writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed. Impugned order dated 30.10.1995 passed by S.D.M. Bansi is hereby quashed. Passing of this order will not come in the way of respondents to undertake fresh disciplinary proceedings, if any, in accordance with law. No order as to costs. ————