JUDGMENT Appellant in WA No. 840 of 2007 was the petitioner in W.P. No. 16305 of 2005. Respondents 1 to 4 were the original respondents. Respondents 5 and 6 are the impleaded respondents. Writ petition tiled by the appellant having been dismissed by the learned Single Judge by an order dated 18-4-2007, writ appeal has been filed to set aside the said order and to grant the relief prayed in the writ petition. Appellant in W.A. No. 851 of 2007 was the petitioner in W.P. No. 18637 of 2005. Questioning the order dated 18-4-2007 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition, by following the order passed in W.P. No. 16305 of 2005, writ appeal has been filed to set aside the 'said order and to grant the relief prayed in the writ petition. 2. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the records. As the question of law sought to be raised is common in both the appeals, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. The facts of the case in W.A. No. 840 of 2007 are sufficient to dispose of both the writ appeals. 3. Facts in a nutshell are: One P.M. Ibrahim was the holder of intra-State stage carriage permit No. 21/STA/92 between Ballur to Talapady via Kykamba and Uppala in Kerala State. The said intra-State permit was varied by an extension from Talapady to Mangalore in Karnataka State and back, by the Kerala State Transport Authority (for short, 'STA, Kerala, with effect from 17-8-1992, subject to counter-signature by the State Transport Authority in Karnataka (for short, 'STA, Karnataka. The said permit which was counter-signed by the STA, Karnataka, expired on 3-3-1995 and was also counter-signed by the STA, Ka1l1ataka. Appellant filed an application between the primary authority for renewal of the- permit, for a further period of five years and the STA, Kerala. by its proceedings dated 7-12-2004, renewed the permit upto 2-3-2010 and the same was also counter-signed by the STA, Karnataka. Appellant filed an application between the primary authority for renewal of the- permit, for a further period of five years and the STA, Kerala. by its proceedings dated 7-12-2004, renewed the permit upto 2-3-2010 and the same was also counter-signed by the STA, Karnataka. Respondents 2 and 3 preferred revision petitions before the Ka1l1ataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore (for short, 'the Tribunal') contending that, the renewal of counter-signature by the STA, Karnataka is contrary to the provisions of the Act and also the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ashwani Kumar and Another "Regional Transport Authority, Bikaner and Another' and A. Venkatakrishnan " Stote Transport Authority, Kerala'. The said petitions were contested by the appellant, principally on the ground that, the permit granted under the Indian Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short, "the old Act'" are saved under Section 217-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act') and the two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said cases, are in relation to grant of fresh permits and have no application to the renewal of the counter-signature of the permit of the appellant and that the revision petition is also not maintainable on the ground that, the renewals made on 17-8-1992 and counter-signed thereafter from time to time, were not challenged. 4. After considering the record and the rival contentions, the Tribunal allowed both the revision petitions and set aside the renewals of the counter-signatures of the permits of the appellants, being aggrieved by which, the appellants filed \V.P. Nos. 16,305 of 2005 and 18637 of 2005 respectively, which were contested by respondents 2 and 3 Considering the record and the rival contentions, learned Single, Judge found the writ petitions to be devoid of merit and dismissed the same. 5. Sri K. Hadhakrishnan, learned Senior Counsel appalling for the appellants along with Sri B.RS. 16,305 of 2005 and 18637 of 2005 respectively, which were contested by respondents 2 and 3 Considering the record and the rival contentions, learned Single, Judge found the writ petitions to be devoid of merit and dismissed the same. 5. Sri K. Hadhakrishnan, learned Senior Counsel appalling for the appellants along with Sri B.RS. Gupta, learned Advocate, firstly contended that, the Tribunal has failed to note that the validity of original permit right upto 2005 was not questioned by respondents 2 and 3 and consequently, the renewal of Permit granted between 2005 to 2010 by the P1imalY Authority being not a subject-matter in the State of Kerala, they could nut have maintained the revision petitions as against the renewal of the counter-signatureh made by the STA, Karnataka, in the light of the provisions of Section 81 of the Act and consequently the orders passed by the Tribunal setting aside the renewal of countersignature is illegal and its upholding by the learned Singh' Judge is totally erroneous. Secondly, it was contended that, the Tribunal failed to note that the decisions rendered In the cases of Ashwani Kumar and A Venkatakrishnan are only with reference to the grant of fresh inter State stage carriage permits and not in relation to the renewal of existing permits granted earlier, which are saved under Section 217-A of the Act and there is a distinction in the matter of grant of permit and the renewal of permit, under the scheme of new Act, compared to the provisions which were available in the old Act and the non-consideration of the distinction and setting aside of the renewals of the counter-signatures is erroneous. Dismissal of the writ petitions, without deciding the said aspect by the learned Single Judge, is highly erroneous, is the further contention. Thirdly, it was contended that, both the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge, failed to note that, the routes held by the appellants are purely a non-monopoly routes and the permits granted under the non-monopoly routes are governed under Chapter V of the Act and hence, the decisions rendered with regard to the monopoly routes under Chapter VI, stand on an entirely different footing, in view of the overriding effect and the other laws. Lastly, it was contended that, the considerations for grant and renewal of the permit being different, the same awe not been kept in view and considered, along with the other contentions raised for consideration and consequently, the impugned order has resulted in prejudice being caused to the appellants, resulting in miscarriage of justice. 6. Refuting the said contentions, Sri K.V. Prabhakaran, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that, the appellants' permits were intra-State services in the State of Kerala, when originally issued. Thereafter, by obtaining curtailment of the route and on account of the variation of the route, the permits became inter-State permits. Thus, the new permits for the routes, which are inter-State routes came into force, which was subsequent development after the 1988 Act came into force. It was pointed out that, under Section 88 of the Act, it in mandatory that, there should be an inter-State reciprocal agreement for grant of an inter-State route and in these cases, there is no inter-State reciprocal agreement for the routes in question and hence, the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ashwani Kumar and A. Venkatakrishnan became applicable, which were rightly applied, both by the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge. He contended that, the new additional trip granted to the appellants exceeded 24 kms., which is against Section 80(3) of the Act, which was rightly noticed by the learned Single Judge. He contended that, the permits in question are legally defective and the first respondent while exercising its power under Section 88 of the Act, was required to consider all aspects of the matter in a quasi-judicial manner and the grant of counter-signature is not a mere formality nor a ministerial Act. Further, the power to consider an application for grant of counter-signature, is equivalent to the power to consider an application for renewal of permit and that the renewal of the counter-signature also stands in the same footing. Learned Counsel contended that, the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ashwani Kumar and A. Venkatakrishnan are applicable to both the fresh grant and renewal of permits. According to the learned Counsel, Section 217-A of the Act is not relevant, since the said section provides for renewal of permits granted under the old Act i.e., 1939 Act. According to the learned Counsel, Section 217-A of the Act is not relevant, since the said section provides for renewal of permits granted under the old Act i.e., 1939 Act. He contended that, even otherwise, the provision of Section 217-A does not cure the legal infirmities found in the appellants' permits. According to the learned Counsel, non-filing of revision petitions against the earlier counter-signatures or the renewals, is not a bar for challenging the fresh renewal of counter-signatures made by the first respondent, as each order of grant or renewal gives rise to a fresh cause of action. Learned Counsel contended that, different yardsticks have been provided for the intra-region, inter-region and inter-State permit under the Act and imposition of limit for grant of inter-State pursuit is permissible under Section 88(5) of the Act and hence, the three categories of permits cannot be considered to be belonging to the same class. Learned Counsel by referring to the records, made submissions in support of the findings recorded in the impugned orders, both by the Tribunal and the learned Single, Judge and contended that, the impugned orders are in conformity with the relevant statutory provisions and the ratio of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and consequently, no interference is called. Sri M.C. Narasimhan. learned Senior Counsel for the Employees' Association contended that, the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in the cases of Ashwani Kumar and A. Venkatakrishnan, are squarely applicable to the matter and the same are retrospective in operation, inasmuch as the law as it existed at the time of coming into force of the Act has only been explained therein. Learned Counsel contended that, both the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge, have correctly considered the material aspects of the matter and having found that and renewal of counter-signature of the permits in question in favour of the appellant being contrary to law, the interference by the Tribunal, was upheld by the learned Single. Judge, which is justified and no interference in these appeals is called for. Sri C.S. Patil, learned Additional Government Advocate, contended that, the appellants' permits earlier were in intra-State service and the appellants obtained curtailment and variation on double point tax basis. The permits were counter-signed by the STA, Karnataka on double point tax basis, which were renewed in 1995, 2000 and 2005. Sri C.S. Patil, learned Additional Government Advocate, contended that, the appellants' permits earlier were in intra-State service and the appellants obtained curtailment and variation on double point tax basis. The permits were counter-signed by the STA, Karnataka on double point tax basis, which were renewed in 1995, 2000 and 2005. Learned Counsel pointed out that, instead of taking action against the renewal of permits by the primary authority, filing of revision petitions against the grant of ren8\val of counter-signatures by the STA, Karnataka is untenable. Learned Counsel contended that, the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ashwani Kumar and A. Venkatakrishnan, have only prospective effect. According to the learned Counsel, the permits granted and renewed, are saved under Section 217-A of the Act. He finally submitted that. keeping in view the record of the case. appropriate order may be passed. Sri C.v. Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the private respondent contended that, the provisions under Section 217-A of the Act will not cure the initial defect, that Section 217-A has no application and the matter in question is a case of one of want of jurisdiction on the part of the first respondent, which not only committed an error and irregularity, but also total illegality. Learned Counsel contended that, the revision petitions filed before the Tribunal, were maintainable and the petitioner had the locus standi to question the counter-signatures made by the first respondent. According to the learned Counsel, there is no difference between grant and renewal of permits and what applies to grant equally applies to the case of renewal. Learned Counsel strongly relied upon the aforesaid two decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and contended that, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the revision petitions and the learned Single .Judge was justified in dismissing the writ petitions on the ground that the Tribunal had not committed any jurisdictional error or illegality. Learned Counsel pointed out that the ground raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant that, the revision petition was not maintainable for not impleading the Kerala and Karnataka State Governments does not survive for consideration, in view of the order dated 13-11-2007 allowing of I.A. No. II of 2007 and the two State Governments have been impleaded as respondents 5 and G and granting opportunity of hearing to them. Learned Counsel contended that, none of the grounds raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants have merit. Learned Counsel made submissions in support of the impugned orders, passed by the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge and contended that they are justified. Sri B. V. Shankara Narayana Rao, learned Counsel, who has filed LA. No. 1 of 2008 for impleading the KSRTC as an additional respondent, made similar submissions, as was made by Sri K V. Prabhakaran, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 6 and contended that, the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal and upheld by the learned Single Judge, being in conformity with the record of the case and the law applicable to the matter, the writ appeals may be dismissed. Learned Counsel contended that, because of the counter-signature and renewal made in favour of the appellants by the STA, Karnataka, the interest of KSRTC is also affected. He contended that, to avoid multiplicity of litigation, since the matter is pending in these appeals, the applicant is supporting the order passed by the Tribunal and learned Single Judge. 7. Sri S. Vijay Shankar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicants/intervenors - Sri Satish Peragade and three others, contended that, the applicants have been operating on the routes under permit No. 88/1992-93 for the route Kasargod to Mangalore and back: permit No. 67/92-93 for the route Kollur to Guruvayur and back: permit No. 72/92-93 for the route Mangalore to Mithanadaka and back and permit No. 74/92-93 for the route Nithilapadavu to Mangalore bus stand to Kasargod etc., respectively, with the counter-signature from the STA, Kerala which services are operated from 1992 with continuous renewals and also the renewals of counter-signatures and such being the case, the Secretary, STA, Karnataka did not receive the renewal applications on the ground that the decision in W.P. No. 18637 of 2005, dated 18-4-2005, which is the subject-matter of the present appeal declares the law that, there was no reciprocal agreement between the two States in respect of the route which was the subject-matter of the writ petition and it is only after the interim order is passed in these appeals, the applicants' permits were renewed subject to the condition that, the renewals are subject to final decision of these writ appeals. Learned Counsel pointed out that, the routes operated by the applicants are not the same routes dealt with in the order and hence, the impleading applicants'/intervenors' application may be disposed of, with a clarification that, the renewal of the applicants' permits is not subject to result of the present writ appeals. It is to be noted at this stage itself that, there is no need for any clarification being made by this Court in these appeals. If the Secretary, STA, Karnataka has imposed any condition, while renewing the stage carriage permits of the applicants, which are unnecessary or illegal, it is open for the applicants to challenge the same, by taking such course of action, as may be available to them under law. The condition imposed while renewing the stage carriage permits of the applicants and the consequential endorsements made thereon, which have not been challenged and are also not under consideration in these appeals, cannot be the subject-matter of consideration and no clarification as sought for by the applicants/intervenors can be made. The application for impleading and the memo dated 24-3-2008 filed by them, shall stand disposed off accordingly. 8. Having perused the record after hearing the learned Counsel on both sides, for the reasons mentioned below, in our view, the Tribunal has not committed any error or illegality, in allowing the revision petitions and setting aside the impugned renewals of counter-signatures made by the STA, Karnataka and the upholding of the said orders, by the learned Single Judge. 9. Indisputably, appellants' permits were intra-State services, in the State of Kerala. On account of the curtailment of the routes and thereafter the variation of the routes upto Mangalore in the Karnataka State, inter-State route permits, came into force during 1992 i.e., after coming into force of the Act. Provisions contained under Section 88 of the Act are mandatory. In terms thereof, there should be an inter-State reciprocal agreement for grant of an inter-State route permit. There is no inter-State reciprocal agreement between the two States for the routes in question. 10. Keeping in view the above facts, records and the rival contentions, the following points arise for our consideration: 1. Whether the revision petitions filed before the Tribunal against the appellants, challenging the grant of renewal of counter-signature of the permits were maintainable? 2. There is no inter-State reciprocal agreement between the two States for the routes in question. 10. Keeping in view the above facts, records and the rival contentions, the following points arise for our consideration: 1. Whether the revision petitions filed before the Tribunal against the appellants, challenging the grant of renewal of counter-signature of the permits were maintainable? 2. Whether the grant of renewals of counter-signature by the STA, Karnataka in the absence of any inter-State agreement between the two States for the routes in question, was illegal? 3. Whether the Tribunal has committed any error and illegality in allowing the revision petitions and in setting aside the renewals of the counter-signatures made by the STA, Karnataka impugned before it'? 4. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified In dismissing the writ petitions? 11. Re: Point No. (l).-It was contended before the Tribunal on behalf of the appellants herein that, the revision petitioners having kept quiet for more than a decade, have no locus standi to maintain the revision petitions, in that, having' acquiesced by not challenging the renewals made earlier, cannot challenge the same, when the further renewals were sought and made. The said contention was not accepted by the Tribunal by placing reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal1 When the contention was reiterated before the learned Single Judge, taking note of the provisions contained in Section 88 of the Act, which contemplated that, an inter-State route as agreed upon by the two States is mandatory and the countersignature in respect of the inter-State permit came to be granted by the authorities of Karnataka in the year 1992 and that, in the absence of an agreement between the two States, no counter-signature could have been granted, though was granted and renewed periodically, it was held that, the challenge to the renewal cannot be rejected on the mere ground that, the counter-signature had been renewed on more than a couple of occasions in the past. It was further held that, the grant of counter-signature to the inter-State permit or its renewal depends on the powers, duties and functions of the State Transport Authorities, as envisaged under the provisions of the Act. It was further held that, the grant of counter-signature to the inter-State permit or its renewal depends on the powers, duties and functions of the State Transport Authorities, as envisaged under the provisions of the Act. In view of the decision in the case of KSRTC, it was held that, acquiescence in the matter of renewal over a long period, cannot create estoppel from objecting thereto. In the background of the said reasoning, we have considered the contention. 11.1 In Gajraj Singh v State Transport Appellate Tribunal and 2 Others, the consequences that would flow from the meaning of the word 'renewal' has been held as follows.- "35. This may be angulated from yet another legal perspective, namely, consequences that would flow from the meaning of the word 'renewal' of a permit under Section 81 of the Act. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, defines the word 'renewal' at p. 1296 thus: "The Act of renewing or reviving. A revival or rehabilitation of an expiring subject; that which is made a new or re-established. The substitution of a new right or obligation for another of the same nature. A change of something old to something new. To grant or obtain extension of'. 36. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's "The Law Lexicon" (Reprint Edn. 1987), the word 'renewal' is defined at p. 1107 to mean "a change of something old for something new". The renewal of a 'licence' means "a new licence granted by way of renewal". The renewal of a negotiable bill or note is regarded simply as a prolongation of the original contract. The office of a 'renewal', as it is termed, of a life policy, is to prevent discontinuance or forfeiture. 37. In Provash Chandra Dalui v Biswanath Banerjee. 1989 Supp. (j) SCC 487. (SCC at p. 496), in para 14, this Court drew the distinction between the meaning of the words extension and renewal It was held that: a distinction between 'extension' and 'renewal' is chiefly that in the case of renewal, a new lease is required while in the case of extension the same lease continues in force during additional period by the performance of the stipulated act. In other words, the word 'extension' when used in its proper and usual sense in connection with a lease, means prolongation of the lease", 38. In other words, the word 'extension' when used in its proper and usual sense in connection with a lease, means prolongation of the lease", 38. It is settled law that grant of renewal is a fresh grant though it breathes life into the operation of the previsions lease or licence granted as per existing appropriate provisions of the Act, rules or orders or acts intra vires or as per the law in operation as on the date of renewal” (emphasis supplied) 11.2 It is not in dispute that, the intra-State route granted by the Kerala State Authorities came to be extended to Mangalorc in Karnataka, converting it into an inter-State route, subject to the condition that the STA, Karnataka shall grant counter-signature. It is also not in dispute that, the said permits were counter-signed by the STA, Karnataka and were also renewed, from time to time. It is also not in dispute that, there is no agreement between the two States of Kerala and Karnataka, with regard to the routes in question, in the manner contemplated under Section 88151 and 161 of the Act. A careful reading of the said section shows that, the existence of an agreement between the two States is a condition precedent, for the exercise of the powers under Section 88(5) of the Act. An inter-State agreement cannot be unilaterally created by one State or its authorities. The procedure for such agreement to come into being, has been enumerated in sub-section (5) of Section 88 and the steps to be taken after the agreement was reached, is in terms of sub-section 16) of Section 88 of the Act. As the mandatory requirement stipulated under Section 88 of the Act became applicable immediately with the coming into force of the Act and since there is no agreement between the two States, no counter-signature or a renewal could have been granted. 11.3 In Writ Appeal No. 382 of 2007 and cognate matters decided by us on 14-12-2007, the facts were that, the appellants were stage carriage holders, who had secured renewal of their permits from the STA, Karnataka. 11.3 In Writ Appeal No. 382 of 2007 and cognate matters decided by us on 14-12-2007, the facts were that, the appellants were stage carriage holders, who had secured renewal of their permits from the STA, Karnataka. The renewal of permits in their favour was called in question by the KSRTC and other Road Transport Corporations, by filing revision petitions before the Tribunal, which after hearing the parties, had allowed the revision petitions and set aside the impugned orders before it and remanded the matters to the authority for fresh consideration. The said order of the Tribunal was questioned by the operators by filing the writ petitions, which were dismissed by the learned Single Judge, against which, the aforesaid writ appeals had been filed, wherein, one of the contentions urged for consideration was that, the original orders granting permits having not been questioned before the Tribunal, questioning of renewal of permits by the Corporations was untenable and the revision petitions were not maintainable. The said contention was not accepted, relying upon the decision in the case of KSRTC. 11.4 In the case of KSRTC, the facts were that, KSRTC, the appellant, had challenged the order passed by the Tribunal, affirming the order passed by the Road Transport Authority, granting renewal of the stage carriage permit in respect of a certain route, which overlapped the notified route under the Bangalore scheme and as such, the renewal was illegal. The authorities and the learned Single Judge had rejected the contention on the ground that, since the contesting respondent has been operating the route for the past 29 years under the original permit and the renewal thereof from time to time and no attempt having been made by the appellant to question such renewal, is a conduct which would disentitle the appellant, to object the renewal at that stage. Noticing the fact that, a portion of the route constitutes part of the notified route and that the operator has been operating on the route through the renewed permit and that the renewed permit insofar an it overlaps the portion of the nationalized route, is prima facie irregular and cannot be sustained, it was held by the Division Bench as follows.- “.. The conduct of the appellant in acquiescing in the renewal of the permits over a long period, as observed by the authorities and the learned Single Judge, cannot create or constitution an estoppels from enforcing his lights under the scheme and from objecting against the renewal of the permit in view of the subsistence of a valid scheme. In fact, the object of the process., of renewal inter alia, appears to be for the authority to consider whether in the circumstances existing as on the date of the application such renewal can be validly granted to the operator. In that view of the matter, the view taken by the learned Single Judge appears to be erroneous". (emphasis supplied) 11.5 In view of the undisputed fact that, the intra-State route was converted into a inter-State route by the permits granted by the authorities in the State of Kerala and was later on counter-signed by the authorities of State of Karnataka, without there being any reciprocal agreement between the two States with regard to routes in question, in the manner contemplated under Section 88151 and 161 of the Act, the action of STA, Karnataka was wholly illegal. In the absence of an inter-State agreement. the grant and the renewal, accorded earlier being illegal, the same cannot be continued, by perpetuating the illegality, Mere acquiescence of the grant or renewal of permits earlier, cannot create a right in favour of the appellants nor constitute an estoppel against the revision petitioners from enforcing their rights and questioning the renewals of permits, which had been granted de hors the relevant provisions of the Statute. As held by the Apex Court, grant of renewal is a fresh grant, though it breathes life into the previous grant, as per existing provisions of the Act. Consequently, we hold that the revision petitions filed before the Tribunal questioning the renewal of counter-signature by the STA, Karnataka were maintainable and the Tribunal has not committed any illegality in overruling the objection raised by the appellants, so far as the question of maintainability is concerned. In the circumstances, no exception can be taken to the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, on the point of maintainability. 12. In the circumstances, no exception can be taken to the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, on the point of maintainability. 12. Re: Point No. (2).-It is an undisputed fact that, the intra-State route permits within the State of Kerala, came to be extended to Mangalore, in the State of Karnataka, converting them into inter-State route permits after the new Act came into force, subject to the condition that the STA, Karnataka, shall grant the counter-signature, as contemplated under Section 88 of the Act. It is undisputed that, there is no agreement as contemplated under Section 88(6) of the Act, between the two States of Kerala and Karnataka, in respect of the routes in question. Appellants contend that, in view of Section 217-A of the Act, the requirement of an agreement under Section 88161 of the Act is not mandatory in the case of renewals of counter-signature. The said contention is refuted by the respondents, lather than State of Karnataka according to whom, Section 217-A applies only to those permits which were granted under the provisions of the old Act, which is not the case herein and according to them, the issue is squarely covered by the two decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of Ashwani Kumar and A. Venkatakrishnan. 12.1 The question, whether the holder of a stage carriage permit under the repealed Act, is required to obtain a fresh permit or a of the permit as per the provisions of the Act, was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gajraj Singh and it was held as follows.- "We, therefore, hold that grant of renewal of the stage carriage permit should necessarily be preceded by a grant of a permit to stage carriage under Section 72, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Sections 70 and 71. This should be made before the expiry of the period prescribed in the permit granted under the Repealed Act. Therefore, for stage carriage permits granted under Chapter IV of the Repealed Act, if they stand to expire or expired after 1-7-1989. without any pending application for renewal having been made under Section 58 as on 1-7-1989. fresh applications under Section 70 should be filed and after consideration under Section 71, permits be obtained as per law under Section 72. Therefore, for stage carriage permits granted under Chapter IV of the Repealed Act, if they stand to expire or expired after 1-7-1989. without any pending application for renewal having been made under Section 58 as on 1-7-1989. fresh applications under Section 70 should be filed and after consideration under Section 71, permits be obtained as per law under Section 72. If there is any delay to obtain permits pending consideration, by operation of Section 76, to avoid hiatus in continued operation of providing stage carriage service, Section 87 gives power to grant temporary permits without following the procedure laid down in Section 70. In Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India., (1992)1 SCC 168 . this Court had laid down different criteria for grant of inter-region, intra-region and inter-State permits under the Act under Sections 88 and 80 of the Act which did not find place in the Repealed Act. It was held that such distinction was neither discriminatory nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus considered, the argument of arbitrariness, discrimination or avoidable inconvenience to the holders of permits etc., under the Repealed Act and to the traveling public would be hypothetical and without force". 12.2 Section 217-A of the Act, inserted by Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2000. reads as follows.- "217-A Renewal of permits, driving licences and registration granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Notwithstanding the repeal by sub-section (11 of the Section 217 of the enactments referred to in that sub-section, any certificate of fitness or registration or licence or permit issued or granted under the said enactments may be renewed under this Act". 12.3 In the case of H. Devadas Hegde v Regional Transport Authority, a Division Bench of this Court, while considering the question - "Whether the permits regarding which the validity period expired before the enactment of Section 217-A. could be renewed under the newly introduced provision"" held as under: "7. It is not necessary to multiply citations. Let us further analyse the section. The power of renewal conferred by Section 217-A is made expressly applicable to the permits granted under the repealed Act. The renewal is a future act though the renewal is in respect of past permits i.e., permits issued under the old Act before the introduction of Section 217-A. The newly introduced provision provided for renewal of such permits. The power of renewal conferred by Section 217-A is made expressly applicable to the permits granted under the repealed Act. The renewal is a future act though the renewal is in respect of past permits i.e., permits issued under the old Act before the introduction of Section 217-A. The newly introduced provision provided for renewal of such permits. In the very nature of things, such power cannot be said to be retrospective in effect. It is not reasonably possible to place the interpretation that Section 217-A operates prospectively insofar as the old permits which were in force on the date of anlended provision and it becomes retrospective in relation to the old permits which lost their validity before the amended provision came into force. In any case, having regard to the express language employed in the section conferring the enabling power of renewal in relation to the old permits granted under the repealed Act, it would be immaterial to dilate on the question whether the provision is prospective or retrospective and whether the provision IS procedural or substantive. 8 ..... With the advent of Section 2l7-A on the statute book, the legal position as regards the renewal of permits granted under the old Act was fundamentally altered. The effect of the decision of Supreme Court in Gajraj Singh v State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Others, AIR 1997 SC 412 was neutralised by bringing about this new provision". Even though this Court has held as above, with reference to the effect of insertion of Section 217-A in the Act, the appellants case being not that, they had a valid inter-State permit, which expired and is required to be renewed, they are not entitled to the relief, in view of the fact that, there is no reciprocal agreement between the two States for the routes in question in terms of Section 88(6) of the Act. In our considered view, unless the original grant and its counter-signature is legal, being preceded by an inter-State reciprocal agreement for the routes in question, there cannot be any grant or renewal of counter-signature. Then the permit granted/renewed or counter-signature made/renewed is found to be without jurisdiction and illegal, the Tribunal was justified in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 90 of the Act, in interfering with the impugned action of the first respondent. Then the permit granted/renewed or counter-signature made/renewed is found to be without jurisdiction and illegal, the Tribunal was justified in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 90 of the Act, in interfering with the impugned action of the first respondent. It is in this context, a reference to the said two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, requires to be made. The basic facts in the case of Ashwani Kumar were that: "The Regional Transport Authority granted stage carnage permit for operating a route Bhadra-Delhi, which was an inter-State route lying within the jurisdiction of the States of Rajasthan. Haryana and the Union Territory of Delhi. Three operators had applied out of whom permit was granted in favour of one person by name Abhey Singh for providing daily one return trip. The applications of the appellant before the Apex Court and as also another person were rejected. They filed appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan. The Tribunal allowed both the appeals directing the Regional Transport Authority, Bikaner to grant stage carriage permit to the appellants on condition that the permit would be valid on obtaining counter-signature from the concerned States. Thereafter, permits came to be issued. Subsequently, based on a decision of the High Court of Rajasthan wherein it was held that the route is question did not exist before the permit came to be granted, the permit granted by the RTA to the appellant before the Apex Court, was cancelled. The matter was taken up before the Apex Court after the appellant was unsuccessful before the High Court of Rajasthan. The Apex Court repelled the contention urged by the appellants therein stating that sub-section (1) of Section 88 has to be construed independently which did not prescribe the existence of a reciprocal arrangement regarding the inter-State route permits and that sub-sections 151 and (61 cannot come in the way of RTA of a State to grant the permit in a State which, when granted, becomes valid in the other State upon its being counter-signed. The Apex Court has further observed that such an argument completely ignores the opening words of the section "except as may be otherwise prescribed". Such prescribing can be by way of the Act itself or by rules framed under it. The Apex Court has further observed that such an argument completely ignores the opening words of the section "except as may be otherwise prescribed". Such prescribing can be by way of the Act itself or by rules framed under it. Sub-section (5) provides that a proposal to enter into an agreement between the States to fix the number of permits which is proposed to be granted or counter-signed in respect of each route or area, shall be published by each of the State Government concerned in their Official Gazette and in anyone or more nev-lspapers in regional language circulating in the area or route proposed to be covered by the agreement. The Apex Court has further observed that the grant of inter-State permits with which the Apex Court was concerned in the said appeals were permissible under Section 88(5) of the Act. The existence of a route was a condition precedent for exercise of the power under sub-section (1) of Section 88 of the Act. The Apex Court has categorically held in paragraph 7 as under: "In the absence of inter-State route, the authorities under the Act were not justified in granting the permits to the appellants. The existence of permit depends upon the reciprocal agreements between the States covered by the roller which, admittedly, did not exist in the instant case. The orders of the authority granting permit in favour of the appellants were thus without jurisdiction"". (emphasis supplied) 12.4 The said decision was referred to a larger Bench in the case of A. Venkatakrishnan, wherein the basic facts were that, the petitioner therein applied before the State Transport Authority, Pondicherry, for grant of permit on the proposed route known as Pandakkal to Palakkad (the proposed inter-State route I. A part of the said route lies in the State of Kerala and the other part lies in the Union Territory of Pondicherry. The State Transport Authority, Pondicherry by an order dated 17-11-2000, granted inter-State permit, as applied for by the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter applied to the STA, Kerala, for grant of counter-signature. The STA, Kerala relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar and rejected the application for grant of counter-signature of permit on the aforesaid inter-State route. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the petition. The petitioner thereafter applied to the STA, Kerala, for grant of counter-signature. The STA, Kerala relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar and rejected the application for grant of counter-signature of permit on the aforesaid inter-State route. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the petition. The main contention urged for consideration was that, the Act does not contemplate a reciprocal agreement between the two States for grant of permit on an inter-State route and the decision in the case of Ashwani Kumar requires reconsideration. Repelling the contention, after making reference to the relevant provisions in the Statute, it has been held as follows.- "12 .... Therefore, before an inter-State route in respect whereof a permit is sought to be granted is determined, the question of filing any application there for by a person before the State Transport Authority of his State would not arise unless an agreement in relation thereto has been entered into by the States concerned and the routes as also the number of trips are fixed thereunder. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the State Transport Authority of one State would have no jurisdiction to entertain an application for grant of an inter-State route, particularly when Section 80 of the Act will have no application in relation thereof unless an agreement is entered into by the State concerned. 13. A purposive and meaningful construction, it is trite, must be given to a statute, so that it is made workable. A statute should to be construed in such a manner, which would create a vacuum. In the absence of any route being fixed in terms of an agreement, in the event it be held that an application for grant of permit for inter-State route can be entertained, the same would lead to a futile exercise. A mutual approval of the States concerned, in the matter, therefore, must be held to be mandatory. In other words, the proviso, appended to sub-section (4) of Section 88 of the Act must be read conjointly with sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 88 thereof and, consequently, it must be held that by necessary implication agreements are contemplated for creation of inter-State routes. 14. We are in agreement with the view taken by this Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar". 14. We are in agreement with the view taken by this Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar". (emphasis supplied I 12.5 Section 63 of the 1939 Act provided that, no vehicle can be allowed to ply on an inter-State route unless the two States providing for number of vehicles and trips to be operated on the inter-State route by two or more States published in the respective Gazettes. As already noticed, there is no such agreement for the routes in question between the two States. Since the existence of a reciprocal agreement for the route IS a condition precedent to grant the permit or the counter-signature and in view of the admitted fact that there is no such agreement for the routes herein between the two States, the grant of inter-State permit or the renewal thereof subject to the condition of the counter-signature by STA, Karnataka and the grant as well as the renewals of counter-signature by the STA, Karnataka are without jurisdiction and thus are highly illegal. Point No. 2 is answered accordingly. 13. Re: Point No. (3).-Revision petitions were filed by respondents 2 and 3 under Section 90 of the Act, to set aside the endorsement of respondent STA, Karnataka in granting renewals of counter-signature of permits of the appellants in respect of inter-State routes. Considering the contentions of both parties, the Tribunal has examined the point, namely, whether the grant of renewal of counter-signature of permit for the variation of inter-State route lying in the State of Karnataka, by respondent 1 is sustainable in law?' Noticing the fact that, the two variations of conditions of permit of the appellant by the authority exceeded 24 kms. under Section 80(3) of the Act and also the fact that there is no reciprocal agreement between the two States for the routes in question and taking into consideration the law laid down in the two decisions of the Apex Court cited above, it was held that, the renewal of counter-signature by the STA, Karnataka in respect of the variation of the inter-State route lying in the State of Karnataka is bad in law, inasmuch as the action of the STA, Karnataka was without jurisdiction and illegal. In view of our findings supra, it cannot be said that, the Tribunal has committed any illegality in allowing the revision petitions. In view of our findings supra, it cannot be said that, the Tribunal has committed any illegality in allowing the revision petitions. The orders passed by the Tribunal, impugned in the writ petitions, are in accordance with law and we do not find any illegality committed, to interfere with the same. 14. Re: Point No. (4).-Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that, learned Single Judge has erred in not considering several points raised for consideration and hence, the order passed in the writ petitions, impugned herein, calls for interference. The contention was refuted by the learned Counsel for the respondents by contending that, learned Single Judge has considered the core issue which arose for consideration and in view of the fact that, the renewal of counter-signatures were without jurisdiction, the writ petitions having been considered with reference to the central issue and finding the same to be against law, were rightly dismissed. 14.1 The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants though appears to be correct, taking into consideration the statement which we can find at para 10 of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, still the appellants are not entitled to the relief. Learned Single Judge has made it clear that, the whole issue centers around the effect and Purport of Section 88 of the Act, which pertains to the validation of permits for use outside region in which it was granted and having answered the same, appears to have found it inexpedient, to consider and answer other incidental points, which would not have made any difference to the final outcome. 14.2 A careful reading of the provisions contained in Section 88 of the Act, makes it clear that an inter-State route as agreed upon by the two States is mandatory for the purpose of validation of permit for use outside region in which granted. In view of the undisputed fact that, the intra-State permits granted by the authorities of State of Kerala subject to the condition of counter-signature, has been made an inter-State route by the STA, Karnataka without there being in existence an inter-State agreement as provided under Section 88(61 of the Act and thus, the action of the first respondent was without jurisdiction. The STA, Karnataka, has acted illegally and without jurisdiction and hence, the learned Single Judge having properly examined the central issue which arose for consideration with reference to the findings of the Tribunal and the record, was justified in dismissing the writ petitions. Even otherwise, in view of our findings on the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the appellants, we do not find any error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 15. An incidental question raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that, the ratio of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ashwani Kumar and A. Venkatakrishnan is only prospective and did not apply to the cases on hand and consequently, the Tribunal, as well as the learned Single Judge, were not justified in relying upon the same. Normally, the decision of the Supreme Court enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all cases, because it is assumed that what is enunciated by the Supreme Court is in fact, the law from inception. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. V. George and Others v State of Kerala and Others, while considering the application of doctrine of prospective overruling, has held that, the law declared by it will have retrospective effect, if not otherwise stated, to be so specifically. In the case of Sarwan Kumar and Another v Madan Lal Aggarwal", repelling a similar contention, it has been held that it was not for the High Court to say that the law laid down by the Apex Court, would be prospective in operation and if such a view is accepted, then conflicting rules can supposedly be laid down by different High Courts regarding the applicability of the law laid down by the Apex Court and such a situation cannot be permitted to arise. We do not find any declaration made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid two decisions that, the law declared therein will be prospective in operation. In the absence of such a declaration, the contention canvassed by the learned Counsel being against the settled principles of law, cannot be accepted. 16. On overall consideration of the matters, writ appeals are devoid of merit for the reasons aforestated. Consequently, we pass the following: