Judgment :- Naresh H. Patil, J. 1) The appellants filed return under section 12 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act 1961, as amended upto 1975, (for short, hereinafter referred to as "the Ceiling Act"). According to the appellants, they possess six agricultural lands i.e. Survey Nos.163,149,147,17,5 and 164 at village Mangrool, Taluka Pathri, District Parbhani comprising of 161 acres 6 Gunthas. During enquiry conducted by the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal (for short, "SLDT"), under the old Ceiling Act, out of total area of 65 acres 9 gunthas from Survey Nos.5,164 and 163 was already declared as surplus. After deduction of 65 acres and 9 gunthas, the holding of the appellants was of 95 acres 37 gunthas. Out of the said lands an area of 9 acres 39 gunthas was acquired for Jayakwadi project. 2 acres of land from land Survey No.5 was acquired for Road and an area of 17 gunthas was Pot-Kharaba. Four acres of land vested in Nala. The appellants, therefore, submit that holding of the land holder comes to 79 acres 21 gunthas and after deducting the share to the extent of 26 acres 20 gunthas of adopted son Sundar the holding would come to 53 acres and one guntha which is less than the ceiling limit of 54 acres and accordingly the appellants furnished their return not being surplus land holders. 2) The Surplus Land Determination Tribunal, Taluka Pathri by an order dated 11-10-1979 accepted the exclusion of 65 acres and 9 gunthas declared as surplus under the old Ceiling Act, excluded 16 acres 16 gunthas acquired land for Jayakwadi Project, road, Nala and also accepted exclusion of 26 acres 20 gunthas as share of the major adopted son. The SLDT reached conclusion that the appellants were not surplus land holders. 3) The Additional Commissioner, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad, in exercise of his suo moto powers conferred under section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act, called for record by an order dated 9-8-1982. The Additional Commissioner decided the matter finally by an order dated 31st March 1986. The Additional Commissioner confirmed the order of the SLDT except to the extent of 26 acres and 20 gunthas which was shown to be the share of adopted major son. The Additional Commissioner decided the matter finally by an order dated 31st March 1986. The Additional Commissioner confirmed the order of the SLDT except to the extent of 26 acres and 20 gunthas which was shown to be the share of adopted major son. Accordingly under the orders of the Additional Commissioner the appellants were surplus land holders to the extent of 25 acres 21 gunthas and accordingly directions were issued to delimit the land of 25 acres 21 gunthas after allowing the land holders to exercise their right of choice. 4) The order passed by the Additional Commissioner was challenged in Writ Petition No.370 of 1986 filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition was admitted on 24-4-1986 and interim relief in terms of Prayer Clause "C" was granted staying the execution and operation of the order passed by the Additional Commissioner during pendency and final disposal of the writ petition. 5) By judgment and order dated 4-8-2000 the learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition. It was submitted that a Special Leave Petition was preferred to the Apex Court against the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. A copy of the order dated 8-1-2001 passed by the Apex Court in the S.L.P. is annexed at Exhibit "B" in the paper book of this Letters Patent Appeal. The Apex Court passed following order. "Learned counsel submits that petitioner would be advised to move the Division Bench in LPA. To facilitate his request the SLP is dismissed as withdrawn." 6) The Letters Patent Appeal was preferred on 16th March 2001. The LPA came to be admitted by Division Bench on 6th January 2003. Interim protection was granted in favour of the appellants during pendency of the LPA. It is submitted that under the orders of this Court the appellants’ possession of the said land was protected. 7) Learned counsel Shri. V.D. Salunke appearing for the appellants submitted that the notice of the reopening of the proceedings was issued by the Additional Commissioner on 19-12-1985 which was beyond the period of 3 years from the date of passing of the order by the SLDT i.e. on 11-10-1979. It was necessary for the Additional Commissioner to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 45 (2) for issuing notice within a period of three years. It was necessary for the Additional Commissioner to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 45 (2) for issuing notice within a period of three years. In the submission of the counsel, passing of the order for calling of record of the SLDT is mechanical compliance of law. On the issue of calling record it was submitted that there is total non application of mind by the Additional Commissioner. A printed / cyclostyled proforma having blank places was used by the Additional Commissioner and names of the parties were filled in which itself demonstrates total non application of mind exhibiting mechanical and casual approach to the facts of the case by the Additional Commissioner. The learned counsel further submitted that the SLDT had passed order in the year 1979 which was disturbed by the Additional Commissioner in the year 1985. The period lost in between was unreasonable and was not explained. 8) The learned Assistant Government Pleader Shri. P.M. Shinde appearing for the respondents raised objection to maintainability of the LPA. In the submission of Shri. Shinde, the learned Single Judge exercised supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, in the facts of the case, the LPA itself was not maintainable. On merits it was submitted by the A.G.P. that in exercise of powers under Section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act, the Additional Commissioner had called for record within a period of three years from the date of passing of the order by the SLDT which was necessary and sufficient compliance of the provisions of law. It was not necessary that the notice ought to have been issued within a period of three years. According to the learned A.G.P., the time consumed by the Additional Commissioner in passing final orders was not unreasonable. The learned A.G.P. has placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his submission that the LPA was not maintainable. (1) In Kondiba Dhondiba Dalvi vs. Narayan Namdeo Nanware, ( 2001 (2) Mh.L.J. 820 ) it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court that, whether a petition is filed either under Article 226 or Article 227 or under both the Articles has to be found out on the basis of the pleadings, points raised and prayers made in the writ petition. (2) Surya Dev Rai v. Ramchandra Rai, ( 2004 (1) Mh.L.J. 633 ). (2) Surya Dev Rai v. Ramchandra Rai, ( 2004 (1) Mh.L.J. 633 ). The Apex Court held that the proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. (3) Kanhaiyyalal Fattelalji Upadhyaya vs. Mahavir Tea Company, (2007 (4) Mh.L.J. 360). In this case a Division Bench at Nagpur held that mere mention of Article 226 of the Constitution will not make an appeal maintainable under Clause 15 of the letters patent, if in substance the jurisdiction exercised by the Single Judge was the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. (1) Madhukar Chandrabhan Mohite v. Balkrishna Govind 824 Sulakhe, (1999 Vol.101(3) Bom. L.R. 824). In this case tests to be applied for deciding nature of petition filed under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India are explained. (2) Jagdish Balwantrao Abhaynkar vs. State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1994 Bom. 141 ). In this case it is held that if a writ petition is filed under Article 226 against order of Court, Tribunal or Authority the Court cannot treat it to be one under Article 227 merely because Court, Tribunal or Authority whose order is assailed is subject to its power of superintendence. Right of writ appeal cannot be denied by taking such approach. (3) Midnapore Peoples’ Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda, ( AIR 2006 SC 2190 ). In this case, appeal filed against an order passed under Contempt of Courts Act was held to be maintainable. (4) Sambhaji Ramji Patil Umrekar vs. District Supply Officer, Nanded, ( 1997 (3) Mh.L.J. 309 ). In this case the learned Single Judge admitted the petition but refused to grant stay. Letters Patent Appeal against such interlocutory order was held to be maintainable. (5) Priyadarshini Education Trust vs. Ratis (Rafia) Bano d/o. Abdul Rasheed, (2007 (6) ALL MR 238). In this case, a LPA was filed against the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge arising out of an appeal passed by the School Tribunal. Letters Patent Appeal against such interlocutory order was held to be maintainable. (5) Priyadarshini Education Trust vs. Ratis (Rafia) Bano d/o. Abdul Rasheed, (2007 (6) ALL MR 238). In this case, a LPA was filed against the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge arising out of an appeal passed by the School Tribunal. 9) The learned counsel Shri. V.D. Salunke has placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his contentions that the LPA is maintainable: 10) Considering the view adopted by the Courts in the judgments cited supra and the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the LPA is maintainable against the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 11) The provision of Section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act reads thus: "45.(2) The State Government may, suo motu or on an application made to it by the aggrieved person, at any time, call for the record of any inquiry or proceedings under sections 17 to 21 (both inclusive) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any inquiry or proceedings (or any part thereof) under those sections and may pass such order thereon as it deems fit, after giving the party a reasonable opportunity of being heard: Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall entitle the State Government to call for the record of any inquiry or proceedings of a declaration or part thereof under section 21 in relation to any land, unless an appeal against any such declaration or part thereof has not been filed within the period provided for it and a period of three years from the date of such declaration or part thereof has not elapsed: Provided further that, no order shall be passed under this section so as to affect any land which is already declared surplus and distributed according to the provisions of this Act: Provided also that, the revisional jurisdiction under this section shall be exercised only where it is alleged that the land declared surplus is less than the actual land which could be declared surplus." 12) We will first deal with the contentions raised by the counsel for the appellants that it is not only necessary to call record within three years from the date of order passed by the SLDT but the Additional Commissioner ought to have even issued notice to the appellants within a period of three years. 13) The learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the Full Bench judgment in the case of Manohar Ramchandra Manapure vs. State of Maharashtra, (1989 Mh.L.J. 1011). The learned counsel has referred to the observations made by the Full Bench in para 6 of the judgment which read thus: "6. . . . If this is the meaning of the word "call", then it contemplates some action or application of mind on the part of the State Government or its delegate before calling for the record. The learned counsel has referred to the observations made by the Full Bench in para 6 of the judgment which read thus: "6. . . . If this is the meaning of the word "call", then it contemplates some action or application of mind on the part of the State Government or its delegate before calling for the record. It cannot be equated with a mechanical, clerical or ministerial act of calling for the records of all the proceedings irrespective of the fact whether they are required or not for the purpose specified in the section. We are informed that general instructions have been issued to all the Collectors and Sub-Divisional Officers to send all the records of the proceedings to the Commissioner. Thus in substance all the records relating to the proceedings resulting in the declaration under section 21 of the Act are practically stored in the office of the Commissioner. Such a storing of the records or sending of the records by the respective Collectors or Sub-Divisional Officers cannot be equated with the summoning of the records or calling for the records for the purposes specified in section 45(2) of the Act. It requires a conscious application of mind on the part of the competent authority qua – particular proceedings. The word "any" as used in sub-section (2) of section 45 is indicative of this intention. Section 45(2) contemplates different stages, namely, calling for the records, giving opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned and ultimate decision. However, record is not to be called for merely satisfying the curiosity or for storing. It has a purpose behind it. The State Government is not appointed as roving Commission; but is expected to exercise judicial or quasi judicial powers. . . . . . . . Though this calling for the record, will require some positive act on the part of the authority, it must ultimately depend upon the facts of each case; as to when record was actually called by the concerned authority. . . . ." 14) The learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on a judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Champabai w/o Shankarrao Patwari vs. The State of Maharashtra, (2004 MCR 480). The learned Single Judge referred to the Full Bench judgment in the case of Manohar Manapure (cited supra) along with other cases. The learned Single Judge referred to the Full Bench judgment in the case of Manohar Manapure (cited supra) along with other cases. In the facts of the said case, it was observed that the decision to initiate proceedings was taken within three years’ time but the same was without application of mind and hence bad in law. 15) In the case of Shalikram Dagduba Solunke vs State of 310 Maharashtra, (2004 (1) Mah L R 310), learned Single Judge of this Court, in the facts of the said case, held that the order to call record or the decision to initiate the proceedings was illegal for non application of mind, as the same was passed in mechanical manner as if the Commissioner was exercising ministerial act. The learned Single Judge had placed reliance on the case of Manohar (cited supra). 16) Arun Nagorao Vyas and others vs. The State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition No.1166 of 1990) was decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 6-6-2008 referring to the case of Champabai (supra). The cases of Champabai and Shalikram (supra), were considered by the learned Single Judge and it was noticed that in view of belated exercise of powers under section 45(2) by the Additional Commissioner, which was after expiry of about 8 years, the impugned order therein got vitiated. 17) The learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance in the case of Lotan Fakira Patil vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002 MCR 311). In the facts of the case the learned Single Judge of this Court held that there was non application of mind by the Additional Commissioner when exercising powers under Section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act and, therefore, the impugned order therein was held to be bad in law and was set aside. 18) The alternate submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that even if it was held that calling for record within period of 3 years was sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 45(2) still the Additional Commissioner ought to have decided the matter finally within reasonable time. In the facts of this case, in spite of passing of order of calling of the record on 9-8-1982, the notice was issued to the appellants on 19-12-1985 and the matter was decided in the year 1986. Near about 6 years were consumed by the authorities to finally decide the matter. In the facts of this case, in spite of passing of order of calling of the record on 9-8-1982, the notice was issued to the appellants on 19-12-1985 and the matter was decided in the year 1986. Near about 6 years were consumed by the authorities to finally decide the matter. In support of the submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments:-- (1) Gulabrao Bhaurao Kakade vs. Nivrutti Krishna Bhilare, (2001 Vol. 103(2) Bom. L.R. 664). (2) Judgment delivered by a Division Bench at the Principal Seat at Bombay dated 3-10-2006 in Writ Petition No.3135 of 1996 (Shri Dattu Appa Patil v. State of Maharashtra) along with Second Appeal No.88 of 2005 (Rama Yesaba Patil v. Dattu Appa Patil). (3) Judgment delivered a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 12/13/15th June 2007 in Writ Petition No.1919 of 1987 (Radhu Gokul Gawali v. Mohan Kishan Gawali). 19) We have perused all the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the contesting parties. The judgment cited above by the learned counsel on the issue of reasonable period for disposal of the matter cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present appeal. 20) Considering the provisions of Section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act and the judgment of the Full Bench in Manohar (supra) we are of the opinion that for compliance of the provisions of Section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act, the authority is required to call record within a period of three years from the date of passing of the order by the SLDT. The interpretation put up by the learned counsel for the appellants on the word "call" as dealt with by the Full Bench in para 6 of the judgment are not sustainable. Accepting the submission of the learned counsel would go contrary to the express provisions of Section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act. We even do not find that the Full Bench in the case of Manohar indicated that for compliance of Section 45(2), the concerned authority shall issue notice to the parties within a period of three years. In our view three stages in the proceedings initiated under the provisions of Section 45(2) are - (1) calling for the record; (2) giving opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned by issuing notice; and, (3) ultimate decision. In our view three stages in the proceedings initiated under the provisions of Section 45(2) are - (1) calling for the record; (2) giving opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned by issuing notice; and, (3) ultimate decision. The law does not provide for limitation for issuing notice to the parties as it provides in the case of calling for records. The law even does not provide any limitation for final disposal of the matter. But it has now been settled that even in the absence of any period of limitation being provided, the authorities concerned should dispose of such matters within reasonable period. 21) While perusing the original record and proceedings we find that the Deputy Collector, Land Records, Parbhani forwarded 20 cases decided by the SLDT scrutinized for the purpose of suo motu revision under section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act. Under a communication dated 5-6-1982 and scrutiny sheet these cases were forwarded to the Additional Commissioner. We find a detailed note on the scrutiny sheet written by the Deputy Collector Land Records Parbhani stating therein that in these cases no scrutiny was made and it was kept pending since 11-10-1979 and the period for revision would expire on 11-10-1982 hence early action in the matters was required. The last sentence of the note reads that in view of the above facts the case was quite fit for suo motu revision under section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act. At page 13 of the record and proceedings we find another scrutiny sheet for admitting the revision under section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act. One of the columns is about grounds on which the revision was proposed. The grounds shown are that the SLDT had excluded an area of 9 acres 39 guhthas on account of acquisition of land for Jayakwadi project, two acres for road and 4 acres 17 gunthas for pot kharaba and that the SLDT had granted notional share to the adopted son of the land holder. Below this remarks column in green ink there is an endorsement made on dated 9-8-1982 to the effect that "Register as Revision". We are informed by the learned AGP that this remark in green ink was made by the Additional Commissioner. We have perused the order issued on 9-8-1982 under section 45(2) of the Act, calling for the record and proceedings. We are informed by the learned AGP that this remark in green ink was made by the Additional Commissioner. We have perused the order issued on 9-8-1982 under section 45(2) of the Act, calling for the record and proceedings. The said order is in cyclostyled form in prescribed proforma having blank places which were filled in by ink. The Additional Commissioner had signed the notice. We have even perused the notice issued on 19-12-1985 which is a printed prescribed proforma having blank spaces. 22) Perusal of the record and proceedings demonstrates that sufficient material was placed before the Additional Commissioner by the Deputy Collector, Land Records, Parbhani for ascertaining as to whether the file is to be reopened by calling records in exercise of powers under section 45(2) of the Ceiling Act. We find that below the scrutiny sheet the endorsement was made by the Additional Commissioner for registering the revision and accordingly on the same day i.e. 9-8-1982 the record was called. Though the order for calling record passed on 9-8-1982 is by way of utilizing cyclostyled form of the order but merely on that basis, in the facts of the case, it would not be proper to observe that the Additional Commissioner did not apply his mind to the facts of the case adopting a mechanical approach in calling the record. Each case will have to be appreciated, decided and judged on its own merits. The Additional Commissioner was expected to take some steps or action towards calling record. 23) In the case of Champabai (cited supra) delivered by the learned Single Judge of this Court certain cyclostyled forms or orders were noticed which were not even properly signed and in the facts of such cases the Court reached conclusion coupled with the fact that there was non application of mind on the part of the Additional Commissioner. If, in the facts of this case, the Additional Commissioner had called record through cyclostyled communication dated 9-8-1982, there was some justification for the appellants to ventilate their grievances that no action or step was taken by the Additional Commissioner for getting himself satisfied that the case is required to be reopened. If, in the facts of this case, the Additional Commissioner had called record through cyclostyled communication dated 9-8-1982, there was some justification for the appellants to ventilate their grievances that no action or step was taken by the Additional Commissioner for getting himself satisfied that the case is required to be reopened. We do have sufficient material before us wherefrom it could be seen that the Additional Commissioner was aware of the facts of the case and grounds to reopen the matter and after perusal of the same made certain endorsements below the order sheet. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was total non application of mind on the part of the Additional Commissioner. 24) Even in accordance with the observations made in the case of Manohar (cited supra) the Court is required to judge each case according to the fact situations emerging therein from the record. 25) There is another important factor in this case which relates to the merits of the matter. The notified date for the purpose of the Ceiling Act is 2-10-1975 and the appellants had taken a stand that Sundar was adopted as son in the year 1979. The date of adoption is beyond the notified date. The SLDT committed a serous error in excluding the share describing it to be the share of the adopted son. The Additional Commissioner was aware of this serious error committed by the SLDT. 26) The learned Single Judge considered this aspect of the matter and was of the opinion that the SLDT committed error and, therefore, the Additional Commissioner’s order of holding the said land to be part of the holdings of the appellants was upheld. The case has to be looked into comprehensively so as to advance the purpose of the legislation. 27) The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the Additional Commissioner committed error in observing that the Tribunal shall make an offer to the holder to exercise his option to retain 54 acres of land. We do not find any error committed by the Additional Commissioner. The Additional Commissioner was right in observing that 79.21 acres of land was in the holding after making all the deduction and the Tribunal should have declared 25.21 acres land as surplus. The SLDT would accordingly complete other legal formalities for getting the surplus land identified in accordance with law. The Additional Commissioner was right in observing that 79.21 acres of land was in the holding after making all the deduction and the Tribunal should have declared 25.21 acres land as surplus. The SLDT would accordingly complete other legal formalities for getting the surplus land identified in accordance with law. 28) In the facts we find that the period consumed for final disposal of the matter by the Additional Commissioner was not highly unreasonable. In law, there is no period prescribed for finally deciding the case by the Additional Commissioner. The only limitation is that records should be called within three years from the date of passing of the order by the SLDT which has been complied with in this case. Considering the merits of the case we do not find that the time consumed by the Additional Commissioner in deciding the matter just after 3 years of the calling record is unreasonable and abnormal period. In hundreds of such cases the Additional Commissioner is required to exercise powers of reopening the matters, consider them on merits and after hearing the parties decide the same. We have considered the reply filed by the respondents -State in the proceedings of the writ petition. We are satisfied with the explanation given by the State to the contentions raised in the writ petition. 29) We, therefore, do not find any merit in the appeal. The view adopted by the learned Single Judge was reasonable and in tune with the provisions of the Ceiling Act which advances the purpose of the legislation. 30) The Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.