Judgment : 1. Prayer in these Applications are to grant interim injunction restraining the first respondent, their agents, servants or men from cancelling the Contract dated 28. 2006 with all its amendments, pending the arbitration and to restrain the first respondent by an order of injunction from invoking the bank guarantee executed by the respondents 2 to 5 in respect of the supply of Vessel Hull Nos.117, 118 and 119, morefully described in the schedule to the Judges Summons of the respective applications, pending arbitration. 2. Since identical prayers are made in all these applications, i.e., for the grant of interim injunction restraining the first respondent, their men and agents from cancelling the contract dated 28. 2006 with all its amendments pending arbitration and to restrain the respondents by an order of injunction from invoking bank guarantee executed by the respondents 2 and 3 in supply of respective Vessels as mentioned in the schedule to the Judges Summon, these Applications are dealt with commonly and the following common order is passed. 3. The case of the applicant as per the averments made in the Affidavit in support of O.A. No.734 of 2009 are that the applicant is a public limited Company, incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, and is carrying on the business in building Ocean going Vessels among other incidental activities. According to the applicant, it has earned good reputation in the market, not only in India but also internationally and undertakes to build Vessels on the basis of agreements with persons, carrying on business outside India also. The vessels are built up as per the specifications to be given by the person, who would ultimately buy the Vessel and consequently, the Vessel built, or in the process of being built as per the specifications of a particular buyer, cannot normally be sold to another buyer, except by changing those specifications to suit any other buyer, for which one has to meet substantial expenditure. 4. In the year 2006, M/s. J. Hagenaes Shipping AS, the Company incorporated in Norway, approached the applicant for building of Vessels on their specifications. The applicant Company executed eight ship building contracts with the first respondent, to whom these contracts stood assigned from the original buyer viz., M/s. J. Hagenaes Shipping AS. Out of these eight shipping contracts, the applicant Company delivered one Vessel bearing Hull No.116. The applicant Company executed eight ship building contracts with the first respondent, to whom these contracts stood assigned from the original buyer viz., M/s. J. Hagenaes Shipping AS. Out of these eight shipping contracts, the applicant Company delivered one Vessel bearing Hull No.116. In respect of vessels bearing Hull Nos.117, 118 and 119, which are the subject matter of the present dispute, after negotiations, agreement was entered into on 28. 2006 between the said Norwagean Company and the applicant with respect to Vessels bearing Hull Nos.117, 118 and 119 for designing, building, launch, equip, complete, sell and deliver to the first respondent at the applicants shipyard one vessel VS470 MPSV type bearing the above Hull numbers. The agreement consists of 20 Articles, each being sub-divided into clauses. Appendix-1 deals with refund guarantee format and Appendix-2 deals with specifications and G.A drawings. 5. The agreement was prepared by M/s. J. Hagenaes Shipping AS. It is defined in the agreement, "delivery date" as ‘contract delivery date as adjusted for permissible delay. "Permissible delay" is also defined as ‘all delays, inclusive of Force Majeure delay, causing delay in delivery of Vessel, which according to the terms of the contract permit postponement of the delivery date. The agreement was accepted by the applicant in its registered office at Egmore, Chennai, and it came to existence. The agreement also contains a clause that the Norwagean Company could nominate any other Company as a buyer and in the event of such nomination, all the rights and obligations would stand transferred to the nominee Company. 6. As the vessels contracted for construction are of custom built Vessels based on the specifications of the buyer, they are to be tailor-made to Suit the requirements of the buyer. The plan and specifications are submitted to the builder by a Company called Vik Sandvik, who is responsible for the Vessel design and drawings and the buyer shall order for the drawings and designs from the Company. 7. Article IX deals with Force Majeure, which illustrates few acts of delay and the delivery date shall be postponed by the brief number of days corresponding to the net delay in delivery. 7. Article IX deals with Force Majeure, which illustrates few acts of delay and the delivery date shall be postponed by the brief number of days corresponding to the net delay in delivery. Apart from the said delay, if there is delay of delivery and acceptance of the Vessel due to extraordinary circumstances or events beyond the control of the builder, such as acts of God, requirements of Government Authorities, war or warlike conditions, civil commotion or riots, strike or lock out are also described as some of the facts that would attract Force Majeure clause. 8. The first respondent recommended the applicant to enter into a contract with Vik Sandvik for the purpose of supply and drawing plans, etc., pursuant to which agreement was also signed on 28. 2006. The first respondent did not stick to the original specification and opted to change the same from time to time. The first change to the order was issued by the first respondent on 11. 2006. According to the applicant in or around November/December, 2006, M/s. J. Hagenaes Shipping AS, by invoking the relevant provision under the contract, nominated Active Subsea AS as the buyer. By letter dated 12. 2006 the applicant accepted the change in the name of the buyer. Thus, new buyer came into existence though rights and obligations between the parties continued and bind the applicant and the substituted buyer. The said Active Subsea AS introduced further changes. The second and third changes came into existence on 25. 2007 for additional strengthening for installation of 60 Tonnes crane and installation of Chiller plants. The revised design and specifications were agreed in the meeting held on 23. 2008. The 4th and 5th changes came on 4. 2008. 9. It is the case of the applicant that due to enormous delay in getting the drawings as stated supra, the applicant Company could not proceed with the work of fabricating the Vessels i.e., Hull numbers 117, 118 and 119. 10. As per Article XVI of the agreement, if the buyer fails to deliver any of the buyers supply within the time designated, the delivery time shall be automatically extended. The first respondent introduced sixth change on 210. 2008. The said changes are substantial changes including change in dimension of the Vessel by increasing the width from 16.8 meters to 19.2 meters. The first respondent introduced sixth change on 210. 2008. The said changes are substantial changes including change in dimension of the Vessel by increasing the width from 16.8 meters to 19.2 meters. The earlier date fixed for delivery of the Vessels on or before 37. 2008 could not be adhered to and the last change of specification was made on 210. 2008. The first respondent was conscious of the fact that the changes introduced by them in the design and the delay in furnishing of drawings by Vik Sandvik were the reasons for the delay in completion of the Vessels. The first respondent also through Vik Sandvik sent E-Mails between 20th January, 2009 and 18th February, 2009 and requested further changes in the design by increasing the number of persons to be accommodated in the Vessel. The first respondent on 16. 2009 again requested for the increase of number of persons to be accommodated from 65 to 118, which was earlier requested to be increased from 48 to 65. However, the said drawing is not given in respect of Hull No.119. According to the applicant, change of design was made on 19 times and the last change was made on 17. 2009. All the above facts are the reasons for the delay in execution of the contracts. 11. Applicant states that first respondent sent a congratulatory E-mail to the applicant upon the delivery of the first Vessel Hull No.116, which clearly establishes the satisfaction recorded by the first respondent with regard to the performance of the work by the applicant. However, by notice dated 27. 2009, the first respondent intend to cancel the contract/agreement with effect from 30.7.2009, pursuant to which a meeting was convened in Oslo on 17. 2009 and 17. 2009 and various issues were discussed. It was stated in the said meetings by the applicant that the Vessels could be supplied on a date to be agreed subject to the condition that all approved drawings are furnished forthwith and all change of requests are confirmed in writing and an assurance would be given that no further changes would be made thereafter. The first respondent did not commit anything on these aspects. The matter was further discussed and the Trico Marine sent a draft agreement with a covering letter dated 27. 2009 and called upon the applicant to execute the same. The first respondent did not commit anything on these aspects. The matter was further discussed and the Trico Marine sent a draft agreement with a covering letter dated 27. 2009 and called upon the applicant to execute the same. The said draft agreement contained onerous and inequitable clauses and therefore the same is not agreeable to the applicant. Consequently, on the threat of cancellation and as the contracts contain an Arbitration clause, the applicant intend to raise dispute and prior to the Arbitration proceedings, these applications are filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with the above said prayers. 12. The first respondent in these Applications filed counter affidavit by contending that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and/or dispose of the present proceedings on the ground that Article XIX of the Contract provides for arbitration in Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration (SCMA) in accordance with the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration Rules, which rules are deemed to be incorporated by reference to the said clause. The terms of the contracts are governed and interpreted in accordance with the Laws of England. It is also the case of the first respondent that the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts in respect of Part-I of the Act having been excluded, the appropriate forum for the applicant to file application for interim reliefs are the competent courts of Singapore and not the Indian Courts. It is also stated therein that the respondents 2 to 5 are not party to the Arbitration agreement and therefore their impleadment will not give any right to invoke Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the applicant also has no intention to invoke arbitration. The other contentions raised with regard to merits canvassed in these Applications are also denied, though not specifically by a brief reply by reserving its rights to file further and more detailed affidavit/counter, if required at a later date. 13. Mr. D.D. Madan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent at the time of arguments submitted that the said counter affidavit/affidavit dated 18. 2009 filed in these Applications may be treated as counter affidavit for the purpose of disposal of these Applications. The said submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent is recorded. 14. 13. Mr. D.D. Madan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent at the time of arguments submitted that the said counter affidavit/affidavit dated 18. 2009 filed in these Applications may be treated as counter affidavit for the purpose of disposal of these Applications. The said submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent is recorded. 14. The applicants filed reply/rejoinder and reiterated that the agreement between the applicant and the first respondent does not exclude any provision of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, though the contract shall be governed by the laws of England and the seat of arbitration is in Singapore. The English Arbitration Act, 1976, enable the English Courts to grant interim orders, even if the seat of arbitration is outside England, as per Section 2(3) of the English Arbitration Act, 1976. Thus, the object of the arbitration law is to grant powers to the Courts to grant interim relief, even if the International Commercial Arbitration were to be held outside India. The UNCITRAL Model Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 1985, also provides that it would not be incompatible with an Arbitration agreement for any party to request before or during Arbitration proceeding for interim measure of protection and for a Court to grant such protection. It is further stated that the respondents 2 to 5 have been impleaded for the limited purpose of their obedience to the orders of this Court. The applicant has already invoked the Arbitration clause and necessary communication was sent to the first respondent and the first respondent failed to take any action in response to the said notice till date. The injunction sought for in these Applications are for an interim measure on establishing the prima facie case subject to the matter to be agitated before the arbitral panel. If the intention to cancel the contract as in the communication dated 27. 2009 is implemented, the first respondent will prematurely invoke the bank guarantee, which would cause irreparable loss and hardships to the applicant and the interim injunction granted by this Court on 27. 2009 is after making out prima facie case and if the first respondent is allowed to cancel the contract and encash the bank guarantee, the money will flow to foreign country and the applicant may not be in a position to get back the same, if the Arbitration proceeding ends in its favour. 2009 is after making out prima facie case and if the first respondent is allowed to cancel the contract and encash the bank guarantee, the money will flow to foreign country and the applicant may not be in a position to get back the same, if the Arbitration proceeding ends in its favour. The Vessels which are being constructed cannot be used by any other person except the first respondent, which would cause irretrievable loss to the applicant. 15. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicant argued that Article XIX of the agreement, though states that laws of England shall govern the contract for its interpretation and the arbitration shall be referred to the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration, there is no exclusion of jurisdiction of the Indian Courts in the said Article and therefore the jurisdiction issue raised by the first respondent is unsustainable. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the Honourable Supreme Court in the decisions reported in Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd., 2008 (1) CTC 348 (SC): 2008 (4) SCC 190 , and Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., 2002 (4) SCC 105 , considered similar issue and held that unless the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts are specifically excluded in the Article/clause in the agreement, Courts in India can exercise its jurisdiction to pass interim orders under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned Senior Counsel also argued on the merits of the matter by contending that the delay incompletion of the construction of the Vessels are due to the delay on the part of the first respondent or its agent for not submitting the designs and change of design several times and therefore the delay in completion of the construction of the Vessels cannot be attributed against the applicant. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that if the contract is cancelled, particularly Vessels constructed according to the design and drawings submitted by the first respondent, the same cannot be sold to any other person as they are tailor-made and in such circumstances under Sections 41(e) and 10 (b)(2)(a) of the Specific Reliefs Act, 1963, the contract can be specifically enforced and therefore the applicant has rightly filed injunction petition before this Court, prior to Arbitration proceedings. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that if the contract is allowed to be cancelled, the first respondent will encash the bank guarantee and money will go out of India and thereafter it will be very difficult to get it back, if Arbitral award is passed in favour of the applicant. 16. Mr. D.D. Madan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent on the other hand submitted that Article XIX of the agreement specifically oust the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts and the laws applicable for the interpretation of the contract is agreed to be of English Law and therefore the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts to entertain the Applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is excluded. If at all the applicant has got any right, it can only move the Courts at Singapore for getting appropriate relief. Insofar as the prayer for injunction is concerned, the injunction not to terminate the contract is not maintainable, and the delay in completion of the construction of the Vessels has happened as to whose fault, can be raised only before the Arbitrator, and that the contract provides for an option to cancel the contract. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that Section 14(1)(a) of the Specific Reliefs Act, is a clear bar to file the Injunction Application. The applicant has also neither pleaded nor established fraud to prevent the encashment of the bank guarantee. The bank guarantee given by the applicant are for the money already paid by the first respondent for the construction of the Vessels and therefore once the contract is cancelled, the first respondent is entitled to get back the money by encashing the bank guarantees. The terms of the agreement between the parties are binding and therefore the first respondent is entitled to cancel the contract and it is open to the applicant to go for arbitration as per Article XIX of the agreement for claiming damages and no case is made out to pass an interim order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned Senior Counsel also cited the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court reported in Max India Limited v. General Binding Corporation, Manu/DE/1212/2009, to substantiate his contention that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 17. The learned Senior Counsel also cited the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court reported in Max India Limited v. General Binding Corporation, Manu/DE/1212/2009, to substantiate his contention that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 17. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Senior Counsels appearing for the applicant as well as the first respondent. 18. After going. through the above pleading and on hearing the arguments of either side, two issues arise for consideration in these applications : (1) Whether this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the Application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for granting interim relief? (2) If this Court has got jurisdiction, what could be the order to be passed pending invocation of the arbitration by the applicant in these cases under Article XIX the agreement? 19. Admittedly the applicant and the first respondent entered into an agreement on 28. 2006 and there is a clause for extension of time on certain contingencies. Insofar as the jurisdiction issue with regard to disputes to be settled, the same is mentioned in Article XIX of the agreement dated 28. 2006, which reads as follows: "1. Governing Law: The parties hereto agree that the validity and interpretation of the Contract and of each Article and part thereof shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of England. 2. Arbitration: All and any dispute arising out of or in connection with the Contract, including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved by Arbitration in Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration ("SCMA") in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of SCMA ("SCMA Rules") for the time being in force at the commencement of the arbitration, which rules are deemed to be incorporated by reference in this clause. The contract with its Appendices and Exhibits has been drawn up in two identical originals, one for each party." The above said Article states that the parties agree that validity and interpretation of the contract and of each article and part thereof governed by and interpreted in accordance with the Laws of England and all and any dispute including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration in Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration for the time being in force at the commencement of the arbitration. 20. The Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration Rules defines the Act under Rule 1 (2) as the Act means the International Arbitration Act (Chapter 143-A) and any statutory re-enactment thereof. Rule 22 deals with jurisdictional seat of arbitration, which reads as follows: "Rule 22. Juridical Seat of Arbitration. 22.1 Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the juridical seat of arbitration shall be Singapore. Where the seat of the arbitration is Singapore, the law of the arbitration under these Rules shall be the Act. 22.2 An award made under these Rules shall be deemed to be made in the juridical seat of arbitration. 22.3 Regardless of the seat of the arbitration, all physical hearings and meetings of the arbitration shall be held in Singapore save where parties agree otherwise." The applicability of law is also stated in Rule 21, which reads as follows: "Rule 21. Applicable law. The Tribunal shall apply the law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties, the Tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable." 21. From the above referred Article XIX and the definition of the Act as well as the applicability of the Law as per Rule 21 and juridical seat of arbitration under Rule 22, it is evident that there is no express exclusion clause of any other Law including Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, especially Part-I, i.e., from Sections 2 to 43. If there is no express exclusion, the Courts in India are having jurisdiction to entertain Application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. If there is no express exclusion, the Courts in India are having jurisdiction to entertain Application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The International Arbitration Act (Chapter 143-A) which is the Law governing the arbitration, defines the powers of the Arbitral Tribunal in Section 12, which reads as follows: "12. Powers of Arbitral Tribunal. (1) Without prejudice to the powers set out in any other provision of this Act and in the Model Law, an arbitral tribunal shall have powers to make orders or give directions to any party for (a) security for costs; (b) discovery of documents and interrogatories; (c) giving of evidence by Affidavit; (d) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any property which is the subject matter of the dispute; (e) securing the amount in dispute; (f) ensuring that any award which may be made in the arbitral proceedings is not rendered ineffectual by the dissipation of assets by a party; and (g) an interim injunction or any other interim measure. (2) An Arbitral Tribunal shall, unless the parties to an Arbitration agreement have (whether in the Arbitration agreement or in any other document in writing) agreed to the contrary, have power to administer oaths to or take affirmations of the parties and witnesses. (3) An Arbitral Tribunal shall, unless the parties to an Arbitration agreement have (whether in the Arbitration agreement or in any other document in writing) agreed to the contrary, have power to adopt if it thinks fit inquisitorial processes. (4) Without prejudice to the Application of Article 28 of the Model Law, an Arbitral Tribunal, in deciding the dispute that is the subject of the Arbitral proceedings (a) may award any remedy or relief that could have been ordered by the High Court if the dispute had been the subject of Civil proceedings in that Court; (b) may award interest (including interest on a compound basis) on the whole or any part of any sum which (i) is awarded to any party, for the whole or any part of the period up to the date of the award; or (ii) is in issue in the Arbitral proceedings but is paid before the date of the award, for the whole or any part of the period up to the date of payment. (5) All orders or directions made or given by an Arbitral Tribunal in the course of an arbitration shall, by leave of the High Court or a Judge thereof, be enforceable in the same manner as if they were orders made by a court and, where leave is so given, judgment may be entered in terms of the order or direction. (6) The High Court or a Judge thereof shall have, for the purpose of and in relation to an arbitration to which this Part applies, the same power of making orders in respect of any of the matters set out in subsection (1) as it has for the purpose of and in relation to an action or matter in the court." (Emphasis Supplied) From the perusal of the above, particularly Section 12(6) of the International Arbitration Act, the High Court or a Judge thereof has got powers of making orders in respect of the matters set out in sub-section (1) as it has for the purpose of and in relation to an action or matter in the Court. Thus, the International Arbitration Act provides for getting interim orders from the High Court. 22.(a) The issue as to whether unless there is specific exclusion, Courts in India have got jurisdiction to entertain Application under Section 9 of the Act, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA, 2002 (4) SCC 105 . The contentions raised, arguments made and the findings given in the said judgment from paragraphs 16 to 32 are extracted hereunder: "16. A reading of the provisions shows that the said Act applies to arbitrations which are held in India between Indian nationals and to International Commercial Arbitrations whether held in India or out of India. Section 2(1)(J) defines an International Commercial Arbitration. The definition makes no distinction between international commercial arbitrations held in India or outside India. An International Commercial Arbitration may be held in a country which is a signatory to either the New York Convention or the Geneva Convention (hereinafter called "the convention country"). An International Commercial Arbitration may be held in a non-convention country. The said Act nowhere provides that its provisions are not to apply to International Commercial Arbitrations which take place in a non-convention country. Admittedly, Part II only applies to arbitrations which take place in a convention country. Mr. An International Commercial Arbitration may be held in a non-convention country. The said Act nowhere provides that its provisions are not to apply to International Commercial Arbitrations which take place in a non-convention country. Admittedly, Part II only applies to arbitrations which take place in a convention country. Mr. Sen fairly admitted that Part II would not apply to an International Commercial Arbitration which takes place in a non-convention country. He also fairly admitted that there would be countries which are not signatories either to the New York Convention or to the Geneva Convention. It is not possible to accept the submission that the said Act makes no provision for International Commercial Arbitrations which take place in a non-convention country. 17. Section 1 of the said Act reads as follows: "1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(I) This Act may be called the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. (2) It extends to the whole of India: Provided that Parts I, III and IV shall extend to the State of Jammu and Kashmir only insofar as they relate to International Commercial Arbitration or, as the case may be, International Commercial Conciliation." The words "this Act" mean the entire Act. This shows that the entire Act, including Part I, applies to the whole of India. The fact that all Parts apply to the whole of India is clear from the Proviso which provides that Parts I, III and IV will apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir only so far as International Commercial Arbitrations/Conciliations are concerned. Significantly, the Proviso does not state that Part I would apply to Jammu and Kashmir only if the place of the International Commercial Arbitration is in Jammu and Kashmir. Thus if sub-section (2) of Section 2 is read in the manner suggested by Mr. Sen there would be a conflict between Section 1 and Section 2(2). There would also be an anomaly inasmuch as even if an International Commercial Arbitration takes place outside India, Part I would continue to apply in Jammu and Kashmir, but it would not apply to the rest of India. The legislature could not have so intended. 18. Section 2(l)(a) defines "arbitration" as meaning any arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral institution. Thus, this definition recognises that the arbitration could be under a body like the Indian Chamber of Commerce or the International Chamber of Commerce. The legislature could not have so intended. 18. Section 2(l)(a) defines "arbitration" as meaning any arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral institution. Thus, this definition recognises that the arbitration could be under a body like the Indian Chamber of Commerce or the International Chamber of Commerce. Arbitrations under the International Chamber of Commerce would be held, in most cases, out of India. Section 2(1)(c) provides that the term "arbitral award" would include an interim award. 19. Section 2(1)(f) of the said Act defines an International Commercial Arbitration. It reads as follows: "2. (1)(f) `International Commercial Arbitration means an arbitration relating to disputes arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, considered as commercial under the law in force in India and where at least one of the parties is (i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any country other than India; or (ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any country other than India; or (iii) a company or an association or a body of individuals whose central management and control is exercised in any country other than India; or (iv) the government of a foreign country." As stated above, the definition of "International Commercial Arbitration" makes no distinction between International Commercial Arbitrations which take place in India or Internal Commercial Arbitrations which take place outside India. 20. Section 2(1)(e) defines "Court" as follows: "2. (1)(e) ‘Court’ means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a Suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;" A Court is one which would otherwise have jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter. The definition does not provide that the Courts in India will not have jurisdiction if an International Commercial Arbitration takes place outside India. Courts in India would have jurisdiction even in respect of an International Commercial Arbitration. As stated above, an ouster of jurisdiction cannot be implied. An ouster of jurisdiction has to be express. 21. Now let us look at sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 2. Courts in India would have jurisdiction even in respect of an International Commercial Arbitration. As stated above, an ouster of jurisdiction cannot be implied. An ouster of jurisdiction has to be express. 21. Now let us look at sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 2. Sub-section (2) of Section 2 provides that Part I would apply where the place of arbitration is in India. To be immediately noted, that it is not providing that Part I shall not apply where the place of arbitration is not in India. It is also not providing that Part I will "only" apply where the place of arbitration is in India (emphasis supplied). Thus, the legislature has not provided that Part I is not to apply to arbitrations which take place outside India. The use of the language is significant and important. The legislature is emphasising that the provisions of Part I would apply to arbitrations which take place in India, but not providing that the provisions of Part I will not apply to arbitrations which take place out of India. The wording of sub-section (2) of Section 2 suggests that the intention of the legislature was to make provisions of Part I compulsorily applicable to an arbitration, including an International Commercial Arbitration, which takes place in India. Parties cannot, by agreement, override or exclude the non-derogable provisions of Part I in such arbitrations. By omitting to provide that Part I will not apply to International Commercial Arbitrations which take place outside India the effect would be that Part I would also apply to International Commercial Arbitrations held out of India. But by not specifically providing that the provisions of Part I apply to International Commercial Arbitrations held out of India, the intention of the legislature appears to be to ally (sic allow) parties to provide by agreement that Part I or any provision therein will not apply. Thus in respect of arbitrations which take place outside India even the non-derogable provisions of Part I can be excluded. Such an agreement may be express or implied. 22. If read in this manner there would be no conflict between Section 1 and Section 2 (2). The words "every arbitration" in sub-section (4) of Section 2 and the words "all arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto" in sub-section (5) of Section 2 are wide. Such an agreement may be express or implied. 22. If read in this manner there would be no conflict between Section 1 and Section 2 (2). The words "every arbitration" in sub-section (4) of Section 2 and the words "all arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto" in sub-section (5) of Section 2 are wide. Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 2 are not made subject to sub-section (2) of Section 2. It is significant that sub-section (5) is made subject to sub-section (4) but not to sub-section (2). To accept Mr. Sens submission would necessitate adding words in sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 2, which the legislature has purposely omitted to add viz. "subject to provision of sub-section (2)". However read in the manner set out hereinabove there would also be no conflict between sub-section (2) of Section 2 and sub-sections (4) and/or (5) of Section 2. 23. That the legislature did not intend to exclude the applicability of Part I to arbitrations, which take place outside India, is further clear from certain other provisions of the said Act. Sub-section (7) of Section 2 reads as follows: "2. (7) An arbitral award made under this Part shall be considered as a domestic award." As is set out hereinabove the said Act applies to (a) arbitrations held in India between Indians, and (b) International Commercial Arbitrations. As set out hereinabove International Commercial Arbitrations may take place in India or outside India. Outside India, an International Commercial Arbitration may be held in a convention country or in a non-convention country. The said Act however only classifies awards as "domestic awards" or "foreign awards". Mr. Sen admits that provisions of Part II make it clear that "foreign awards" are only those where the arbitration takes place in a convention country. Awards in arbitration proceedings which take place in a non-convention country are not considered to be "foreign awards" under the said Act. They would thus not be covered by Part II. An award passed in an arbitration which takes place in India would be a "domestic award". There would thus be no need to define an award as a "domestic award" unless the intention was to cover awards which would otherwise not be covered by this definition. Strictly speaking, an award passed in an arbitration which takes place in a non-convention country would not be a "domestic award". There would thus be no need to define an award as a "domestic award" unless the intention was to cover awards which would otherwise not be covered by this definition. Strictly speaking, an award passed in an arbitration which takes place in a non-convention country would not be a "domestic award". Thus the necessity is to define a "domestic award" as including all awards made under Part I. The definition indicates that an award made in an International Commercial Arbitration held in a non-convention country is also considered to be a "domestic award". 24. Section 5 provides that a judicial authority shall not intervene except where so provided in Part I. Section 8 of the said Act permits a judicial authority before whom an action is brought in a matter to refer parties to arbitration. If the matters were to be taken before a judicial authority in India it would be a court as defined in Section 2(1)(e). Thus if Part I was to only apply to arbitrations which take place in India the term "court" would have been used in Sections 5 and 8 of the said Act. The legislature was aware that, in International Commercial Arbitrations, a matter may be taken before a judicial authority outside India. As Part I was also to apply to International Commercial Arbitrations held outside India the term "judicial authority" has been used in Sections 5 and 8. 25. The beginning part of Section 28 reads as follows: "28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.—(l) Where the place of arbitration is situate in India, __ … … …” Section 28 is in Part I. If Part I was not to apply to an arbitration which takes place outside India there would be no necessity to specify that the rules are to apply "where the place of arbitration is situate in India". It has been held in the case of National Thermal Power Corpn. v. Singer Co. that in International Commercial Arbitrations parties are at liberty to choose, expressly or by necessary implication, the law and the procedure to be made applicable. The procedure or the rules governing such arbitration may be of the country where the arbitration is being held or the body under whose aegis the arbitration is being held — all bodies which conduct arbitrations and all countries which have rules and laws governing arbitrations. The procedure or the rules governing such arbitration may be of the country where the arbitration is being held or the body under whose aegis the arbitration is being held — all bodies which conduct arbitrations and all countries which have rules and laws governing arbitrations. Thus Section 28 does not provide for rules where the place of arbitration is out of India. 26. Mr. Sen had also submitted that Part II, which deals with enforcement of foreign awards does not contain any provision similar to Section 9 or Section 17. As indicated earlier, Mr. Sen had submitted that this indicated the intention of the legislature not to apply Sections 9 and 17 to arbitrations, like the present, which are taking place in a foreign country. The said Act is one consolidated and integrated Act. General provisions applicable to all arbitrations will not be repeated in all Chapters or Parts. The general provisions will apply to all Chapters or Parts unless the statute expressly states that they are not to apply or where, in respect of a matter, there is a separate provision in a separate Chapter or Part. Part II deals with enforcement of foreign awards. Thus Section 44 (in Chapter I) and Section 53 (in Chapter II) define foreign awards, as being awards covered by arbitrations under the New York Convention and the Geneva Convention respectively. Part II then contains provisions for enforcement of "foreign awards" which necessarily would be different. For that reason special provisions for enforcement of foreign awards are made in Part II. To the extent that Part II provides a separate definition of an arbitral award and separate provisions for enforcement of foreign awards, the provisions in Part I dealing with these aspects will not apply to such foreign awards. It must immediately be clarified that the arbitration not having taken place in India, all or some of the provisions of Part I may also get excluded by an express or implied agreement of parties. But if not so excluded the provisions of Part I will also apply to "foreign awards". The opening words of Sections 45 and 54, which are in Part II, read "notwithstanding anything contained in Part I". Such a non obstante clause had to be put in because the provisions of Part I apply to Part II. 27. Mr. But if not so excluded the provisions of Part I will also apply to "foreign awards". The opening words of Sections 45 and 54, which are in Part II, read "notwithstanding anything contained in Part I". Such a non obstante clause had to be put in because the provisions of Part I apply to Part II. 27. Mr. Sen had also relied upon Article 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law and had submitted that India has purposely not adopted this article. He had submitted that the fact that India had not provided (like in the UNCITRAL Model Law) that Section 9 would apply to arbitral proceedings which take place out of India, indicated the intention of the legislature not to apply Section 9 to such arbitrations. We are unable to accept this submission. Article 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law reads as follows: "(2) The provisions of this law, except Articles 8, 9, 35 and 36, apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of this State." (emphasis supplied) Thus, Article 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law uses the word "only" to emphasize that the provisions of that law are to apply if the place of arbitration is in the territory of that State. Significantly, in Section 2(2) the word "only" has been omitted. The omission of this word changes the whole complexion of the sentence. The omission of the word "only" in Section 2(2) indicates that this sub-section is only an inclusive and clarificatory provision. As stated above, it is not providing that provisions of Part I do not apply to arbitrations which take place outside India. Thus there was no necessity of separately providing that Section 9 would apply. 28. Now let us consider Section 9. It reads as follows: "9. Interim measures, etc. As stated above, it is not providing that provisions of Part I do not apply to arbitrations which take place outside India. Thus there was no necessity of separately providing that Section 9 would apply. 28. Now let us consider Section 9. It reads as follows: "9. Interim measures, etc. by Court.—A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the Arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to be just and convenient, and the court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it." Thus, under Section 9 a party could apply to the Court (a) before, (b) during Arbitral proceedings, or (c) after the making of the Arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36. The words "in accordance with Section 36" can only go with the words "after the making of the arbitral award". It is clear that the words "in accordance with Section 36" can have no reference to an application made "before" or "during the arbitral proceedings". The words "in accordance with Section 36" can only go with the words "after the making of the arbitral award". It is clear that the words "in accordance with Section 36" can have no reference to an application made "before" or "during the arbitral proceedings". Thus it is clear that an application for interim measure can be made to the Courts in India, whether or not the arbitration takes place in India, before or during Arbitral proceedings. Once an award is passed, then that award itself can be executed. Sections 49 and 58 provide that awards covered by Part II are deemed to be a decree of the Court. Thus "foreign awards" which are enforceable in India are deemed to be decrees. A domestic award has to be enforced under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. All that Section 36 provides is that an enforcement of a domestic award is to take place after the time to make an Application to set aside the award has expired or such an Application has been refused. Section 9 does suggest that once an award is made, an Application for interim measure can only be made if the award is a "domestic award" as defined in Section 2(7) of the said Act. Thus where the legislature wanted to restrict the applicability of Section 9 it has done so specifically. 29. We see no substance in the submission that there would be unnecessary interference by courts in Arbitral proceedings. Section 5 provides that no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided. Section 9 does not permit any or all applications. It only permits Applications for interim measures mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) thereof. Thus there cannot be Applications under Section 9 for stay of Arbitral proceedings or to challenge the existence or validity of the Arbitration agreements or the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal. All such challenges would have to be made before the Arbitral Tribunal under the said Act. 30. Mr. Sen had also submitted that the term "arbitral award" includes an interim award. He had submitted that it would be open for the Arbitral Tribunal to pass interim awards and those interim awards could be enforced in India under Part II. However, there is a difference between an "interim award" and an "interim order". Undoubtedly, the Arbitral Tribunal could pass an interim award. He had submitted that it would be open for the Arbitral Tribunal to pass interim awards and those interim awards could be enforced in India under Part II. However, there is a difference between an "interim award" and an "interim order". Undoubtedly, the Arbitral Tribunal could pass an interim award. But an interim order or directions passed by the Arbitral Tribunal would not be enforceable in India. Thus even in respect of arbitrations covered by Part II a party would be precluded from getting any interim relief. In any event, on Mr. Sens interpretation, an award passed in the Arbitral proceedings held in a non-convention country could not be enforced. Thus such a party would be left completely remediless. 31. If a party cannot secure, before or during the pendency of the Arbitral proceedings, an interim order in respect of items provided in Sections 9(i) and (ii), the result may be that the Arbitration proceedings may themselves get frustrated e.g. by non-appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind or the subject-matter of the Arbitration agreement not being preserved. This could never have been the intention of the legislature. 32. To conclude, we hold that the provisions of Part I would apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto. Where such arbitration is held in India the provisions of Part I would compulsorily apply and parties are free to deviate only to the extent permitted by the derogable provisions of Part I. In cases of International Commercial Arbitrations held out of India provisions of Part I would apply unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that case the laws or rules chosen by the parties would prevail. Any provision, in Part L which is contrary to or excluded by that law or rules will not apply." (Emphasis Supplied) (b) The said judgment was followed subsequently in the decision reported in Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd., 2008 (1) CTC 348 (SC): 2008 (4) SCC 190, and in paragraph 31 it is held thus: "31. Any provision, in Part L which is contrary to or excluded by that law or rules will not apply." (Emphasis Supplied) (b) The said judgment was followed subsequently in the decision reported in Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd., 2008 (1) CTC 348 (SC): 2008 (4) SCC 190, and in paragraph 31 it is held thus: "31. On close scrutiny of the materials and the dictum laid down in the Three-Judge Bench decision in Bhatia International we agree with the contention of Mr K.K. Venugopal and hold that paras 32 and 35 of Bhatia International make it clear that the provisions of Part I of the Act would apply to all arbitrations including International Commercial Arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto. We further hold that where such arbitration is held in India, the provisions of Part I would compulsorily apply and parties are free to deviate to the extent permitted by the provisions of Part I. It is also clear that even in the case of International Commercial Arbitrations held out of India provisions of Part I would apply unless the parties by agreement, express or implied,. exclude all or any of its provisions. We are also of the view that such an interpretation does not lead to any conflict between any of the provisions of the Act and there is no lacuna as such. The matter, therefore, is concluded by the three-Judge Bench decision in Bhatia International." (c) The said view is again reiterated in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in citation Infowares Limited v. Equinox Corporation, 2009 (7) SCC 220 , and in paragraphs 32 to 35 it is held as follows: "32. Shri Venugopal, however, contended that if the parties intended specifically in this case that the law governing the contract was Californian law, as expressed in Bhatia International as well as in Indtel Technical Services case, an implied exclusion of Part I should be presumed. I am afraid it is not possible to read such an implied exclusion. Shri Venugopal, however, contended that if the parties intended specifically in this case that the law governing the contract was Californian law, as expressed in Bhatia International as well as in Indtel Technical Services case, an implied exclusion of Part I should be presumed. I am afraid it is not possible to read such an implied exclusion. Seeing the striking similarity between Clause 10.1 in the instant case and Clauses 13.1 and 13.2 in Indtel case which have been quoted above and further the view expressed by the learned Judge in Indtel Technical Services case regarding the exclusion, it is not possible to even distantly read such an implied exclusion of Part I. It cannot be forgotten that one of the contracting parties is the Indian party. The obligations under the contract were to be completed in India. Further, considering the nature of the contract, it is difficult to read any such implied exclusion of Part I in the language of Clause 1. That argument of learned Senior Counsel for the respondent therefore must be rejected. 33. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent invited attention of this Court to paras 32 and 34 of Bhatia International and again reiterated that the implied exclusion must be read in the language of Clause 1. I have already, however, held that considering the various factors, such exclusion cannot be read and, therefore, Bhatia International will have to be held applicable. 34. Identical view has been taken even in Venture Global Engg. Case where the Court took the view that even the foreign award could be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. This is a judgment by a Two-Judge Bench. The observations made in paras 31, 35 and 37 of that case are extremely apposite and binding. The comments against this judgment that it does not consider the question of implied exclusion would be of no consequence in view of the findings which have earlier been referred to. In the present matter it cannot be said that there was any implied exclusion of the provisions of Part I. The law laid down, therefore, is clearly binding. 35. Similarly the language of Clause 10.1, it is suggested, was expressly agreed between the parties that the procedural law would be that of California. In the present matter it cannot be said that there was any implied exclusion of the provisions of Part I. The law laid down, therefore, is clearly binding. 35. Similarly the language of Clause 10.1, it is suggested, was expressly agreed between the parties that the procedural law would be that of California. The suggestion given by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that since the provision about the arbitration is included in the same sentence the intention must be presumed that the parties intended only the Californian law even to govern the procedure. As I have said, that by itself it cannot be the way to read the said clause as the decision in Bhatia International was available on the date when the agreement was signed." 23. The Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court, cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent reported in Max India Limited v. General Binding Corporation, Manu/DE/1212/2009, is a case where it was specifically agreed that the disputes are to be resolved through arbitration under Singapore International Arbitration Rules and it is the Courts in Singapore, which have the jurisdiction to settle any disputes that may arise out of or in connection with the said agreement. Taking note of the said ouster of jurisdiction of other Courts expressly, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, cannot be invoked as there is express exclusion of the jurisdiction. In the said judgment an unreported decision of this Court made in O.A. Nos.419 and 420 of 2006 dated 22. 2007 by M. Jayachandran, J. is referred to. In the said order this Court has taken a view as there was no express clause in the agreement ousting the jurisdiction of other Courts, there is no bar for the applicant to move this Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for getting interim relief. The said judgment was rendered applying the clause contained in the agreement as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., 2002 (4) SCC 105 . 24. The purpose of enacting Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is to provide interim measure of protection in appropriate cases. The said judgment was rendered applying the clause contained in the agreement as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., 2002 (4) SCC 105 . 24. The purpose of enacting Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is to provide interim measure of protection in appropriate cases. The said section provides a right to a party to apply for interim order before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time, after making of Arbitral award, but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36. As per Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the parties can approach the Arbitral Tribunal to get interim order during the pendency of the proceedings. As per pre and post Arbitral proceedings are concerned, parties are entitled to invoke Section 9 for the purpose of getting interim order. 25. The applicant had already expressed its intention to go for arbitration by letter dated 8. 2009, which is extracted hereunder, "TEEMA SHIPYARDS LTD 7th August, 2009 Trico Subsea AS Tollbugata 6 N-6002 Aalesund Norway. Dear Sirs, SHIP BUILDING CONTRACTS FOR VESSEL Nos.117, 118, 119 We refer to the Shipbuilding Contracts dated August 25, 2006 with respect to the aforesaid Vessels ("the Contracts"). We refer to your letter dated 22nd July, 2009 in which you have stated your intent to cancel the Contracts. It is our position that any purported termination of the Contracts by you as set out in your letter of 22nd July, 2009 would be wrongful, improper and in breach of the Contracts. In view of your letter and the subsequent stay orders dated July, 27, 2009, that we have obtained from the Honourable Madras High Court, inter alia, restraining you from cancelling the Contracts pending arbitration, a dispute has arisen between Trico Subsea AS and Temba Shipyards Limited and we intend to refer the matter to arbitration in accordance of Article XIX of the Contracts. We hereby give you notice that we intend to refer to arbitration the dispute between Trico Subsea AS and Tebma Shipyards Limited pursuant to Article XIX of the Contracts, Article XIX of the Contracts provided that any dispute between the parties is to be resolved by arbitration in Singapore, under the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration ("SCMA") in accordance with arbitration rules as set out in the SCMA Rules. As the Contracts are silent as to the numbers of arbitrators to be appointed, the arbitration may be presided over by one or three arbitrators pursuant to Rule 4.1 of the SCMA Rules. We propose that one arbitrator be appointed for the purpose of these proceedings. We will shortly be notifying the name of our Arbitrator who, if you agree, may act as the sole arbitrator. Failing such agreement, the Arbitrator which we will shortly propose shall be our nominee, in the event that 3 Arbitrators are to be appointed. Please take note of the above and let us have your proposals if any, with respect to the arbitration. Yours faithfully, For TEBMA SHIPYARDS LIMITED Sd/- xxxxxx N. Ramanathan, CFO" For the said letter, the first respondent has given reply which reads thus, "TRICOMARINE GROUP August 14, 2009 Tebma Shipyards Ltd., Rajiv Gandi Salai (OMR), Chennai-600097 Attn. Captain Swaminathan Dear Sir, Re: Agreement dated August 26, 2005 in respect of Yard No.118 & Re: Your letters dated August 7, 2009 and August 12, 2009. We refer to our earlier correspondence in the matter and your letter dated August 7, 2009. Considering that the Parties are currently trying to amicably settle the matter we are not at the current moment dealing with the contents of your letter and shall reply thereto as and when required. Notwithstanding we deny all contents of your letters and reserve all our rights and remedies in the matter. Yours faithfully, Sd/-xxxxxxxxxx Rishi Varna Chief Administrative Officer/General Counsel" From the above referred letter dated 8. 2009 of the applicant it is evident that the applicant had expressed its willingness to resolve the matter through arbitration as provided in Article XIX of the agreement and the first respondent also sent a reply stating that they are currently trying to amicably settle the matter and not giving consent at the current moment and they will send a reply as and when required. 26. The learned Senior Counsel for the applicant as well as the first respondent during the course of the arguments submitted that settlement talks are also going on. From the above referred facts, it is clearly evident that the intention of the applicant is to go for arbitration and there is no lack of bona fide in filing these Applications. 26. The learned Senior Counsel for the applicant as well as the first respondent during the course of the arguments submitted that settlement talks are also going on. From the above referred facts, it is clearly evident that the intention of the applicant is to go for arbitration and there is no lack of bona fide in filing these Applications. Thus, I am of the view that the jurisdictional issue raised by the first respondent is unsustainable and this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain these Applications as the agreement was signed at Egmore, Chennai, and there is no express exclusion of jurisdiction of Indian Courts in Article XIX of the agreement. 27. The second issue as to whether the interim injunction already granted by this Court can be vacated at this stage. Admittedly the applicant on receipt of the intention to cancel the contract with effect from 30.7.2009, through letter dated 27. 2009, approached this Court on 27. 2009 and this Court on prima facie satisfaction, granted interim injunction as prayed, for a period of twelve weeks. The said injunction order is still in force. From the correspondence of the applicant as well as the first respondent, it is evident that if there is no scope for settlement through negotiation, the parties have to resolve their dispute through arbitration under Article XIX of the agreement. As the interim orders are in force for about six weeks, I am of the view that interest of the justice would be met by directing the parties to maintain the present status-quo for a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order and during the said period, it is open to the parties to move the Arbitral Tribunal and obtain appropriate interim order from the Arbitral Tribunal, which is also empowered to pass interim orders as per Section 12 of the International Arbitration Act. 28. Even though merits of the dispute was argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant as well as first respondent, I am not expressing any opinion on the merits as it is up to the Arbitral Tribunal to decide the same and pass appropriate interim order as well as final order. 29. During the pendency of these Applications, the applicant has filed an affidavit stating that the applicant has already addressed letters to the Bank on 18. 29. During the pendency of these Applications, the applicant has filed an affidavit stating that the applicant has already addressed letters to the Bank on 18. 2009 requesting them to extend the bank guarantee and also an undertaking is made in the Affidavit filed on 18. 2009 stating that the applicant undertakes to keep the bank guarantee alive till the disposal of the Injunction Application. It is ordered that the said bank guarantee should be kept alive by the applicant till the disposal of the Arbitral proceedings or till any interim order is passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. 30. All the Applications are disposed of with direction to the parties to maintain status quo as on today for one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order.