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2009 DIGILAW 362 (AP)

Gadiraju Balarama Raju v. D. Sundaraiah (Major)

2009-06-08

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2009
JUDGMENT :- The appellant filed OP No.1477 of 2002 in the Court of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-I Additional District Judge, Khammam against the respondents claiming a sum of Rs.3,00,000/-, as compensation for the injuries and disabilities suffered by him in a motor vehicle accident. 2. It was alleged that when the appellant was proceeding on 27.3.2002 on a bicycle at Budidigadda, an oil tanker bearing No. AIL 5377, owned by the first respondent and insured with the second respondent, came in a rash and negligent manner, dashed against him and ran over his leg. Fracture injuries were said to have been suffered to the right leg leading to amputation, and other multiple injuries to the body. 3. The Tribunal dismissed the O.P., through order, dated 22.12.2008, on the ground that it was dismissed against the first respondent in the year 2004 itself. The said order is challenged in this MACMA. 4. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. The second respondent was served with notice, but it does not enter appearance. Though the notice sent to the first respondent is not yet returned, this Court is of the view that it need not await service of notice, inasmuch as the Tribunal proceeded on the ground that the O.P., was dismissed against the first respondent. 5. On the basis of the pleadings before it, the Tribunal framed two issues, namely. "1. Whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of Tanker bearing No. AIL 5377 ? 2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to any compensation, if so to what amount and from which of the respondents ?" 6. The appellant deposed as PWI and he has examined PW2, the Doctor working in Singareni Collieries Hospital. He has also filed Exs. Al to A40. On behalf of the second respondent, RWs.l and 2 were examined. They did not dispute occurrence of the accident. Their plea, however, was that the driver of the oil tanker did not hold valid driving licence. 7. The Tribunal refused to answer the first point framed by it, on the ground that the driver and owner of the vehicle were not before it. 8. As regards the second issue, it has undertaken extensive discussion running into about eight typed pages. It refused to believe the evidence on record. 7. The Tribunal refused to answer the first point framed by it, on the ground that the driver and owner of the vehicle were not before it. 8. As regards the second issue, it has undertaken extensive discussion running into about eight typed pages. It refused to believe the evidence on record. The finding reads as under : "Thus, even if EX.A3 is taken into account, as far as the accident and sufferance of injuries by the petitioner in the said accident can be accepted, but the contents therein that the petitioner was discharged on 24.5.2002 cannot be accepted. Since there is no mention in Ex.A3 regarding amputation of leg and since the certificate under EX.A3 carries false contents (the date of certificate is dated 10.4.2002. It discloses that patient was discharged on 24.5.2002), the said leg amputation testified by PW2 who is the doctor in the said S.C. Company Hospital which issued the certificate under EX.A3 which contains false averments, cannot be believed. No disability certificate is filed. Therefore, the alleged disability cannot be accepted." 9. Thereafter, it proceeded to examine the claim in terms of money. Here again, it rejected the claim by disbelieving the bills etc. Ultimately, the O.P., was dismissed on the ground that it was dismissed against the first respondent in the year 2004 itself. 10. This Court is rather surprised to note the manner in which the learned Presiding Officer had adjudicated the matter. A totally perverse approach was adopted. Except that the Presiding Officer intended to exhibit his analytical skills by referring to one judgment or the other, he proceeded on a perverse and negative tone and went on searching for grounds, one after the other to reject the O.P. In his anxiety to find as many grounds as possible to reject the O.P., he did not even bother to verify the record of the case. 11. An emphatic reference was made to the dismissal of the O.P., against the first respondent in the year 2004. The relevant observation reads as under : "In the instant case, the petition was got dismissed against the owner of the said vehicle who is respondent No.1 in the year 2002 itself. Insurance company is not liable to pay any compensation directly to the petitioner. It comes into picture only when the owner is held liable to pay compensation. The relevant observation reads as under : "In the instant case, the petition was got dismissed against the owner of the said vehicle who is respondent No.1 in the year 2002 itself. Insurance company is not liable to pay any compensation directly to the petitioner. It comes into picture only when the owner is held liable to pay compensation. When this petition was got dismissed against the owner, it cannot be held that the owner is liable to pay compensation. Therefore, indemnification of the liability of any such owner by respondent No.2 insurance company does not arise." 12. The learned Counsel for the appellant had placed before this Court, the extract of the docket proceedings. The first hearing of the O.P., took place on 19.12.2002 and notices were ordered to both the respondents. Vakalat was filed on behalf of respondent No.2. On 14.2.2003, the office put up a note that the notice sent to respondent No.1 was not returned served. However, the O.P., was dismissed on the ground that there was no representation for the appellant. At a later stage, the O.P., was restored to file. Thereafter, on 15.9.2004, the O.P., was dismissed for default against the first respondent. IA No.793 of 2005 was filed to set aside the order of dismissal of O.P., against the first respondent. That was allowed on 18.8.2005. Subsequently, notice was served upon the first respondent. On the ground that he did not respond even after service of notice, he was set ex-parte on 6.12.2005. This being the record, the Tribunal proceeded on the assumption that the O.P., was dismissed against the first respondent in the year 2004. 13. If really the O.P., was dismissed for default against the first respondent and it was not possible to grant any relief to the appellant on that ground, there was no necessity for the Tribunal to delve into the merits. Curiously, extensive discussion was undertaken and perverse findings were recorded. This only shows lack of regard, to the basic principles of adjudication, on the part of the learned Presiding Officer. The approach adopted by him, which is pointed out in the preceding paragraphs would not only deny justice to the persons who approach the Court but also, in certain cases defeat the rights conferred on them by law. 14. The MACMA is accordingly allowed and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration and disposal. The approach adopted by him, which is pointed out in the preceding paragraphs would not only deny justice to the persons who approach the Court but also, in certain cases defeat the rights conferred on them by law. 14. The MACMA is accordingly allowed and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration and disposal. There shall be no order as to costs.