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2009 DIGILAW 3620 (ALL)

Brig. M. A. KHAN v. UNION OF INDIA

2009-11-30

ANIL KUMAR, DEVI PRASAD SINGH

body2009
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—Heard Sri Safiq Mirza, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Dinesh Kumar Pandey, Central Government Standing Counsel on behalf of respondents. 2. The factual matrix of the present case as submitted by Sri Safiq Mirza, learned counsel for the petitioner in brief are that the petitioner was Commissioned in Army Education Corps of the Indian Army on 2.7.1949 and thereafter promoted to different ranks. 3. On 20.10.1979 when the petitioner was posted as Colonel in the Headquarters Central Command, Lucknow, a Selection Board was constituted in October, 1980 at the Army Headquarters by the Chief of the Army Staff in accordance with the Regulations which governs the service condition of the Army person for the assessment of officers for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonels and above, the petitioner was approved for promotion to the rank of Brigadier by the aforesaid Selection Committee and in this regard he was informed by order dated 08.12.1980 (Annexure1 to the writ petition). 4. It was further pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Government of India Ministry of Defence had taken a decision in the month of February, 1980 for up-gradation of certain post under the Improvement in career prospects scheme of Army Officers upto the rank of Brigadier and as per the said decision the up-gradation had to be done within a span of period of three years commencing w.e.f. 1980, accordingly on 3.3.1981, an order was issued by the competent authority by which 19 posts in the rank of Colonel were upgraded to the rank of Brigadier, out of 19 up-graded posts to the rank of Brigadier two were earmarked for the Army Education Corps, one Commandant, Army Education Corps (A.E.C.) Training College and Centre, second Brigadier Education Eastern Command both at Calcutta. However, thereafter the up-graded posts of Brigadier were filled-up by promoting the Officers to the said rank by March/April, 1981 vide order of Army Head Quarter Signal No. 380109/M.S.(X)/15 and only the petitioner, who was otherwise eligible approved officers to be promoted to the rank of Brigadier without any reason whatsoever was not promoted. 5. Aggrieved by the said action the petitioner submitted a representation for redressal of his grievance to the Headquarter Central Command, Lucknow in the month of April, 1981. 5. Aggrieved by the said action the petitioner submitted a representation for redressal of his grievance to the Headquarter Central Command, Lucknow in the month of April, 1981. The said representation of the petitioner was forwarded to the Army Headquarter, New Delhi vide letter dated 11.4.1981 by the competent authority but no heed whatsoever had been paid in the matter in question by the competent authority and the petitioner was not granted the rank of Brigadier. 6. However, on 14.5.1981 orders was issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Defence by which amendments was made in upgradation order No. 449/1/B(MS/IS) dated 3.3.1981 and the petitioner was granted acting rank of Brigadier and accordingly the petitioner was given the acting rank of Brigadier w.e.f. 19.5.1981 in Education Head Quarter Central Command, Lucknow, from the said post the petitioner superannuated on 31.5.1981 and consequently he had relinquish the rank of Brigadier on the same day. 7. Further after the retirement Last Pay Certificate which was issued on 8.7.1981 by C.D.A.(O) to the petitioner was for the rank of Colonel (Annexure7 to the writ petition) as the army authorities had not recognized the status of Brigadier to him on the ground that he was granted acting rank of Brigadier. 8. Being aggrieved by the said action and denial the rank of Brigadier w.e.f. 1.11.1980 the petitioner submitted a Statutory Complaint to the competent authority under provision of Section 27 of the Army Act 1950 (hereinafter referred as Act) the said complaint was rejected by means of order dated 19.1.1982. 9. Aggrieved by the order dated 19.1.1982 by which the petitioner statutory complaint was rejected and the order dated 8.7.1981 by which Last Pay Certificate had been given to him for the rank of Colonel, the pension had been fixed accordingly, the petitioner had challenged said orders by means of present writ petition praying therein that he may be granted the rank of Brigadier w.e.f. 1.11.1980 and other consequential benefits. 10. 10. The main thrust of the arguments advance by the learned counsel for the petitioner are to the effect that the petitioner was only eligible person working on the post of Colonel in Army Education Corps and approved for promotion to the rank of Brigadier by the Selection Committee held on October, 1980 as such he ought to have been promoted to the post of Brigadier Education Eastern Command w.e.f. 1.11.1980 and he was entitled for the benefits whatsoever, for the said post w.e.f. 1.11.1980. 11. But the said benefits were denied to the petitioner in view of the provisions as contained in Special Army Instruction 1.5.1974 to the effect that the “acting rank” will not confirm on an officer unless he had not held the said rank continuously for 21 consecutive days which are arbitrary in nature and further on the basis of the same the petitioner can not denied the benefits for the rank of Brigadier and other consequential retirement benefits of the said post. 12. Further it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was subject to hostile discrimination as he had been denied the opportunity, the opportunity of completing the remaining period on the rank of Brigadier in order to enable him to earn salary and other consequential retirement benefits on one hand and on the other hand Major General Y.R. Dani, V.S.M. Of Army Medical Corps was retained in service after the date of superannuation to complete the pensionable service and to avail other terminal benefits and similarly K.B. Nayar (Retd.) former Judge Advocate General (Army) was granted acting rank of Brigadier with retrospective effect to enable him to complete pensionable service in the rank of Brigadier. The said action on the part of the respondents is a violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. More-over the action on the part of the respondent No. 2 thereby rejecting the petitioner statutory complaint under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 by order dated 19.1.1982 was an arbitrary action as no reason whatsoever had been given therein for rejecting the petitioner’s complaint, as such the said action was illegal and arbitrary in nature and in violation of principle of natural justice. 13. 13. Sri Dinesh Kumar Pandey, learned Central Government Standing Counsel on the other hand submitted that while the petitioner was working as Colonel, Headquarter Central Command, Lucknow, he was approved for promotion to the rank of Brigadier in December, 1980 and was placed at Serial No. 2 in the select penal for promotion to the post of Brigadier in Army Education Corps of the Indian Army. Thereafter, due to up-gradation of 19 posts of Colonel to the rank of Brigadier by order dated 3.3.1981, two post of Brigadier were upgraded in the Army Education Corps, one at Commandant Army Education Corps Training Centre and College and other at Education Eastern Command both at Calcutta. 14. It was further submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that out of two vacancies of Colonel which were up-graded to the rank of Brigadier in Army Education Corps. The first vacancy of Brigadier in the Army Education Corps, Training Centre and College, Calcutta was filled up by promoting Colonel P.D. Sharma, who was working there at that relevant time in the college and at Serial No. 1 in the select penal. The second vacancy, which was at Eastern Command, Calcutta, as per policy decision/army instruction was not possible to fill-up by promotion of petitioner as he was due to retire from the army service w.e.f. 31.5.1981 afternoon and thus he was left less than three months service before retirement on the date of issue of Government sanction (3.3.1981) by which post of Colonel were up-graded to the rank of Brigadier so it was administratively not possible to shift him from Headquarter Central Command, Lucknow to Headquarter Central Command, Calcutta in view of the policy provided in Army Headquarter letter No. 30399/P/MS/X dated 10.4.1974 (Annexure CA-1) by which an Officer cannot be promoted to higher rank, if he is not enable to render effective service for a minimum period of four months in their new appointments, if promoted. In view of the above said facts the petitioner was not promoted to the rank of Brigadier although he was in select list for promotion to higher rank. 15. In view of the above said facts the petitioner was not promoted to the rank of Brigadier although he was in select list for promotion to higher rank. 15. Thereafter, the petitioner had made representation for considering his case for promotion to the rank of Brigadier as well as on the recommendation made by the Headquarter Central Command to upgraded the post of Colonel Headquarter Central Command, Lucknow where he was serving as Colonel to the rank of Brigadie the Government of India and Ministry of defence had issued a letter on 14.5.1981 by which an amendment was made in the ministry letter No. 449/1/D/M.S./I.S. dated 3.3.1981 (in regard to the improvement in career prospects of Army Officers upto the rank of Brigadier), and the post at serial No. 17 i.e. Brigadier Education Eastern Command, Calcutta in the said letter was changed as Brigadier Education Central Command. 16. Immediately, thereafter, within two days a promotion order was issued vide Army Headquarter Signal No. 380264/MS(X)/94 dated 16th May, 1981 and the petitioner was given acting rank of Brigadier Education Command, Headquarter Central Command 19.5.1981 and he joined the said post on the said date and thereafter retired on 31.5.1981 further as the petitioner had worked less then 21 days on the post of Brigadier so in view of the Special Army Instruction SAI/1/S/74 dated 10.4.1974 he was not entitled for salary and other retiral benefit for the post of Brigadier but for the post of Colonel as such the petitioner was paid the post retiral benefit (i.e. pension etc.) for the post of Colonel, by means of Last Pay Certificate issued by C.D.A. (O) dated 8.7.1981, accordingly the petitioner was rightly given the post retiral benefit for the rank of Colonel. 17. 17. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that as per the procedure when the statutory complaint of the petitioner was considered and decided by the Competent Authority relevant material were placed before him and on the basis of the same the competent authority had taken a decision to reject the statutory complaint of the petitioner, the said fact was informed to the petitioner vide order dated 19.1.1982 and further all the material which was considered by the competent authority while rejecting the petitioner’s statutory complaint was also given to him, which is evident from the order dated 19.3.1982 in which it is specially mentioned that : “The Chief of the Army Staff (in quadruplicate) for communication to the officer through the staff channels with the necessary administrative instructions and for further action in accordance with the existing procedure.” 18. In these circumstances the allegation as made by the petitioner that his Statutory Complaint was rejected by a non-speaking order is totally incorrect rather the same is in accordance with law. Learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the argument raised on behalf of the petitioner that he was subject to the hostile discrimination at the hands of the concerned respondents, as similar situated persons were given benefit, which were not given to him were totally incorrect and wrong in view of the fact that no such extension of service was granted to Brigadier A.V. Nayar Ex-Judge Advocate General and he had retired with effect from 31st December, 1979 (afternoon) after attaining the compulsory retirement age of 55 years. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that it was totally incorrect on the part of the petitioner to submit that Major General Y.R. Dani, V.S.M. Army Medical Corps was granted extension of service mainly to give him the pensionary benefits are totally incorrect and contrary to the rules as the rules governing the retirement age of Army Medical Corps Officers, who are all Doctors by profession are not at par with the retirement rules of Officers belonging to the other Army Services of the Army. Major General Y.R. Dani was promoted to the acting post of Major General on 1st November, 1979 against substantive vacancy. Major General Y.R. Dani was promoted to the acting post of Major General on 1st November, 1979 against substantive vacancy. Major General in Army Medical Corps, on grant of substantive rank can be given extension beyond minimum retirement age for a period as approved by the Government upto a maximum age of 59 years. Major General Dani was accordingly granted extension of service from February 7, 1980 to 30 November, 1980 keeping in view service requirements thus he was not granted extension merely to give him retirement benefits as alleged by the petitioners so the alleged plea of discrimination taken by the petitioner that action on the part of the respondents was discriminatory in nature, thus Article 14 an 16 of the Constitution of India is wholly incorrect and wrong. Accordingly, it was submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that the present writ petition filed by the petitioner is misconceived and is liable to be dismissed. 19. Before we proceed to adjudicate the rival contentions and submission made by the learned counsels for the parties in the present case we feel that it is appropriate to state the relevant provisions of Army Acts and Rules which are involved in the present case the same are as under : Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 : 27. Remedy of aggrieved officer.—Any officer who deems himself wronged by his commanding officer or any superior officer and who on due application made to his commanding officer does not receive the redress to which he considers himself entitled, may complain to the Central Government in such manner as may from time to time be specified by the proper authority.” Section 192 : Power to make regulation.—The Central Government may make regulations for all or any of the purposes of this Act other than those specified in Section 191. 20. In exercise of power conferred under Section 192 Act, the regulations were framed by the Ministry of Defence, Central Government has framed regulation known as Defence Service Regulation and Clause 4 of the prefix the said regulation provides as under : “Departmental orders and instructions are based on, and take their authority from, these regulations. Who any variance arise between such orders and instructions and these regulations for the army at the latter shall prevail.” 21. Who any variance arise between such orders and instructions and these regulations for the army at the latter shall prevail.” 21. In view of the above said facts, the Army Instructions and Special Army Instructions were issued by the competent authority in order to regulate the service condition, which governs the persons, who were working in the army on different posts/ranks. So far as the present case is concerned, the army instructions which governs the field in the present case are as under : (a) Special Army Instruction No. 30399/P/MS(X) dated 10.4.1974 (b) Special Army Instructions issued and the relevant portion of the above said Special Army Instructions are quoted hereinbelow : Special Army Instruction No. 30399/P/MS(X) dated 10.4.1974 Promotion to Higher Ranks of Officers on the Verge of retirement 1. ............................. 2. ............................. 3. ............................. 4. It has further been decided, in pursuance of the above policy, that officers, who come up for promotion to a higher rank when they have 4-10 months left for retirement, will be required to give an undertaking to the effect that they would be willing to forego part or whole of their leave pending retirement as necessary, to enable them to render effective service for a minimum period of four months in their new appointments, if promoted. 22. Special Army Instruction 1/S/74 Acting Promotion Officers : 1. An officer selected to fill an appointment carrying a rank higher than his substantive rank or acting rank (if he is holding such a rank) will be granted acting promotion to the rank carried by the appointment, provided he has completed the following minimum total periods of reckonable service as a commissioned officer (subject to clause (d) below) : (a) For officers of all arms and service except AMC, RVC (Graduate Veternary Officers) and ADC (but including Licentiate officers of these three Corps), PC (SL) MNS and APS— Rank to which Acting Minimum service as remarks promotion is made commissioned officers 1 2 3 Captain.......... 3 years Major............ 6 years Lt. Co.......... 6.5 years With a minimum period of one years’ service in the rank of Major. Broken period will ount towards this limit. Colonel......... 8.5 years With a minimum period of one years service in the rank of Lt. Col. Broken periods will count towards this limit. Brigadier 12 years With a minimum period of three years’ combined service in the ranks of Lt. Col. Broken period will ount towards this limit. Colonel......... 8.5 years With a minimum period of one years service in the rank of Lt. Col. Broken periods will count towards this limit. Brigadier 12 years With a minimum period of three years’ combined service in the ranks of Lt. Col. Broken periods will count towards this limit. Major General 20 years Lt. General 25 years And further appendix ‘A’ to SAI/1/S/74 provides as under : 1. Grant of paid acting rank.—An officer selected for grant of acting promotion under para 1 of this Instruction will be granted the appropriate acting rank from the date he actually assumes and performs the duties of the appointments. Acting rank will become paid after 21 consecutive days of duty in the appointment, though the grant of pay will then be retrospective. Acting rank will not be converted into paid acting rank unless it is held by an officer on the 22nd day. 23. Now coming to the facts of the present case as per the admitted position in the month of February, 1980 the Government of India, Ministry of Defence had taken a decision for up-gradation of certain posts under the Improvement in career prospects scheme of Army Officers upto the rank of Brigadier and as per the said decision the up-gradation was to be done within a span of three years commencing w.e.f. 1980 and the petitioner who was working at that relevant point of time on the post of Colonel in Headquarter Central Command, Lucknow was approved for promotion to the rank of Brigadier and was placed at Serial No. 2 in the select list for promotion to the rank of Brigadier in the Army Education Corps. 24. Thereafter, by order/letter dated 3.3.1981 issued by Government of India, Ministry of Defence 19 posts of Colonel in the Indian Army at various places were up-graded to the rank of Brigadier w.e.f. 1.1.1980 and out of the said 19 posts, two posts belongs to Army Education Corps, which are at serial numbers 16 and 17 in the said order/letter respectively at following place : 16. Commandant Army Education Corps Training College and Centre, Calcutta. 17. Brigadier Education Eastern Commissioned, Calcutta. 25. On the post which was at serial number 16 in the up-gradation order dated 3.3.1981 i.e. Commandant, Army Education Corps (A.E.C.) Training College and Centre, Calcutta was filled up by promoting one Sri. Commandant Army Education Corps Training College and Centre, Calcutta. 17. Brigadier Education Eastern Commissioned, Calcutta. 25. On the post which was at serial number 16 in the up-gradation order dated 3.3.1981 i.e. Commandant, Army Education Corps (A.E.C.) Training College and Centre, Calcutta was filled up by promoting one Sri. P.D. Sharma, who was working their as Colonel and he was at serial number 1 in the selected list. So far as the second post which was up-graded to the rank of Brigadier at Eastern Education Command, Calcutta was not filled up by way of promotion of the petitioner, who was at serial number 2 in the select list. In view of policy decision Special Army Instructions dated 10.4.1974 by which it was provided that an Officer cannot be promoted in higher rank if he is not able to serve the new appointing post for a minimum period of four months accordingly, the petitioner who had less then four months services left before his age of superannuation was not promoted to the rank of Brigadier. 26. However letter on a representation was made by the petitioner for redressal on his grievances in this regard and also recommendation was made by the Headquarter Central Command, Lucknow in the month of April, 1998 taking into consideration the said facts Government of India, Ministry of Defence by means of letter/order dated 14.5.1981 had amended the earlier order dated 3.3.1981 by which the up-gradation of post was done and in view of the said facts the post, which was at Serial No. 17 i.e. Brigadier Eastern Command, Calcutta was transferred to Army Education Corps Central Command, Lucknow. Thereafter, the petitioner was given acting rank of Brigadier w.e.f. 19.5.1981 and he retired on the said post on 31.5.1981 after attaining the age of superannuation and after the Special Army Instruction SA1/1/S/74 the petitioner was given the Last Pay Certificate on 8.7.1981 for the rank of Colonel and accordingly his pension and other post retiral benefit were fixed. 27. Thereafter, the petitioner was given acting rank of Brigadier w.e.f. 19.5.1981 and he retired on the said post on 31.5.1981 after attaining the age of superannuation and after the Special Army Instruction SA1/1/S/74 the petitioner was given the Last Pay Certificate on 8.7.1981 for the rank of Colonel and accordingly his pension and other post retiral benefit were fixed. 27. In view of the above facts, in the present case, the respondents had acted in accordance with the Army Instructions dated 10.4.1974 and Special Army Instruction SA1/1/S/74 as such the said action on the part of the respondents were within the ambit and scope of the Army Instructions which hold the fields so as per the settled proposition of law that this Court while exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not exercise appellate powers. It is not intended to take away from administrative authorities the powers and discretion properly vested in them by law and to substitute Courts as the bodies making the decisions. Judicial review is a protection and not a weapon and cannot substitute its own reasoning without the same has been given. In the case of Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) v Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 AII ER 935, Lord Diplock has observed the scope of judicial review in the following words : “Judicial Review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’ the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety.” 28. Further Judicial review has certain inherent limitation. It is suited more for adjudication of disputes than for performing administrative functions. It is for the executive to administer the law and the function of the judiciary is to ensure that the Government carries out its duty in accordance with the provisions of the rules and statute. 29. Further Judicial review has certain inherent limitation. It is suited more for adjudication of disputes than for performing administrative functions. It is for the executive to administer the law and the function of the judiciary is to ensure that the Government carries out its duty in accordance with the provisions of the rules and statute. 29. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 All ER 141, it was observed by Lord Hailsham as under : “Purpose of Judicial review is to ensure that individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide with its conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court.” 30. In the same case, Lord Brightman observed that Judicial review as the words imply is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which a decision was made and held that : “it would be an error to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making-process but also on the correctness of the decision itself.” 31. The aforesaid observations made by the Lord Hailsham and Lord Brightman were quoted with approval by their Lordships of Supreme Court in State of U.P. v Dharmendar Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1997, and while upholding that the judicial review is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision making process, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “When the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account, relevant factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no resonable authority entrusted with the power in question could reasonable have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision-making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors.” 32. In the case of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that : “The Court is handcuffed in this jurisdiction and cannot raise its hand against what it thinks is a foolish choice. In the case of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that : “The Court is handcuffed in this jurisdiction and cannot raise its hand against what it thinks is a foolish choice. Wisdom in administrative action is the property of the executive and judicial circumspection keeps the Court lock-jawed save where the power has been polluted by oblique ends or is otherwise void on well-established grounds. The constitutional balance cannot be upset.” 33. In the case of Tata Cellular v Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that : “ The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention, the other covers the scope of the Court’s ability to quash an administrative decision on its own merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action.” 34. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that : “Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court.” 35. The same view was further reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bank of India and others v. T. Jogram, (2007) 7 SCC 236 wherein it was held that : “By now it is well-settled principle of law that judicial review is not against the decision. It is against the decision-making process.” 36. In view of above said settled proposition of law in the instant case the decision taken by the respondents thereby not paying the pay and other post retiral benefits to the petitioner for the post of Brigadier but that for the post of Colonel by means of Last Pay Certificate issued by C.D.A. (O) dated 8.7.1981 was an action in accordance with the Special Army Instruction dated 1.5.1974, as such the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard has got no force and accordingly, rejected. 37. 37. The next argument raised on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner that while deciding the statutory complaint of the petitioner under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 the reason should be given is also incorrect and wrong because Section 27 of the Army Act provide a remedy for aggrieved officer in the Army to submit his statutory complaint to the Chief of the Army Staff. 38. In the office of the Chief of the Army Staff these statutory complaints have a specialised procedure for being dealt with. There is a body known as “Complaint Advisory Board” (C.A.B. for short) which investigates every complaint after making such inquiry as may be considered necessary and a very detailed note resulting from such inquiry with the relevant legal provisions referred is given to the Chief of Army Staff, often with suggestions and options. 39. In the event if the Chief of the Army Staff while disposing of the complaint under Section 27 of an Officer agree with the recommendation and the material on record in that circumstances he has not to give a reason for deciding the same, however in case if he does not agree then in that circumstances he has to give a reason for disagreement while disposing of the statutory complaint under Section 27 of the Army Act, this procedure by and large has stood the test of time in respect of the inquiry into the statutory complaints and their fair disposal. 40. It is worthwhile to mention here that if the Court starts issuing direction to the Chief of the Army Staff to decide every statutory complaint of every Jawan and every officer throughout the country by detailed judgments, the Chief of the Army Staff during his entire tenure would be doing nothing except writing judgments in respect of such complaints which are thousands in number. 41. In the case of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1984 the Supreme Court has held that : “Reasons are not required to be recorded for an order passed by the confirming authority confirming the findings and sentence recorded by the Court-material as well as for the order passed by the Central Government dismissing the post-confirmation petition.” 42. Further in the case of Union of India and others v. E.G. Namboodari, AIR 1991 SC 1216 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held that : “If the order as communicated to the Govt. servant rejecting the representation does not contain any reasons, the order cannot be held to be bad in law. If such an order is challenged in a Court of law, it is always open to the competent authority to place the reasons before the Court which may have led to the rejection of the representation. It is always open to an administrative authority to produce evidence allunde before the Court to justify its action.” 43. This Court in the case of Lt. Col. Mahabali Singh v. Union of India and others, 1997(2) LBESR 775 (All) after placing reliance on the case of S.N. Mukherjee (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that : “Where the appellate or revisional authority affirms an order passed by an original authority agreeing with the reasons contained in the original order agreeing. If the order as communicated to the Government Servant rejecting the representation does not contain any reasons, the order cannot be held to be bad in law, for if such an order is challenged in a Court of law it is always open to competent authority to place reasons before the Court,which might have led to the rejection of the representation and it is open to an Administrative Authority to produce evidence aliunde before the Court to justify its action.” 44. In the case of Ltd. Col Ram Avtar Sharma v. Govt. of India and others, (Military Law Journal 1999 KARNT 64) the High Court of Karnataka while interpreting the provision of Section 27 of the Army Act has held that : “The next point the Counsel wanted to be ascertained was whether while dealing with the statutory complaints preferred by the petitioner, the authorities have adverted to all relevant materials. In this behalf there is one aspect to be remembered. The army has a strength of nearly 13 million soldiers. Confidential records would be maintained with respect all these officers/soldiers. If lengthy statutory complaints are submitted by substantial percentage of them and if the judicial bodies call upon the competent authority to write detailed orders, perhaps the Officers will have to spend more time at office desk than at the forward line. Confidential records would be maintained with respect all these officers/soldiers. If lengthy statutory complaints are submitted by substantial percentage of them and if the judicial bodies call upon the competent authority to write detailed orders, perhaps the Officers will have to spend more time at office desk than at the forward line. Therefore necessarily a via media has to be evolved to avoid any miscarriage of justice due to total non application of mind. That perhaps may be, preparation of material notes on the statutory complaint and the competent authority dealing with the same; if the files disclose the materials necessarily to sustain the decision on the statutory complaint then one has to conclude that thee has been a proper disposal of the statutory complaints. The principles of the Mohinder Gill’s case AIR 1978 SC 851 cannot in any way vitiates such orders. Besides, there are no set dogmas to be applied in the matter of forming a decision in relation to awarding of promotions. If so, largely it depends on the satisfaction of the selection committee. If the decision arrived at is plausible to be arrived at and is not a decision that no reasonable man addressed in law and informed of the facts of the case would arrive at, then it has to be accepted as correct even if it be that one is able to point out loopholes and short comings therein.” 45. In the case of Captain C.P. Singh v. Union of India and others (1997) 3 UPLBEC 1702 a division Bench of this Court has held as under : “The next contention is that the statutory complaint of the petitioner under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 has been rejected by cryptic order which cannot be sustained. Section 27 is a remedial provision in that, it provides that any officer, who deems himself wronged by his commanding officer or any superior officer and who, on due application made to his commanding officer, does not receives redress to which he considers himself entitled, may complain to the Central Govt. in such manner as may, from time to time, be specified by the proper authority. It is implicit in Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 that the Central Govt. in such manner as may, from time to time, be specified by the proper authority. It is implicit in Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 that the Central Govt. is under an obligation to address itself to the statutory complaint and dispose it of in accordance with law for making a complaint to the Central Govt. under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950, is not an empty formality. Central Govt. has to address itself to the grievances raised in the complaint and redress the same in accordance with law. This necessarily implies that the Central Govt. while disposing of the representation, shall act in a fair and reasonable manner and not arbitrarily and capriciously and it would be in consonance with the principle of natural justice that reasons in support of order are disclosed therein for that would ensure compliance of rules of natural justice. It would serve yet another purpose. Reasons, if recorded in the order, would serve to reinforce the confidence of the complaint that justice has been done to him and it also enables the higher Courts to see whether decision-making authority has acted on relevant consideration. In S.N. Mukherjee’s case (supra), it has been emphasised that “except in cases, where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function, is required to record the reasons for its decision.” However, it has been held by the Apex Court in the said decision that “reasons are not required to be” recorded for an order passed by the Confirming Authority confirming the findings and sentence recorded by the Court Martial as well as for the orders passed by the Central Govt. dismissing the post-confirmation petition. In the present case, the Central Govt. has rejected the statutory complaint preferred by the petitioner against his non-selection for grant of permanent commission. The Central Govt. by rejecting the representation, has, in fact, confirmed the decision taken by the Selection Board. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the order dated July, 1992, rejecting the petitioner’s statutory complaint under Section 27 merely because, it contains no reason. 46. That apart, in the instant case, on the reasons disclosed in the counter-affidavit, we are satisfied that the selection proceedings were not vitiated by the vice of mala fides or arbitrariness and therefore, the Central Govt. 46. That apart, in the instant case, on the reasons disclosed in the counter-affidavit, we are satisfied that the selection proceedings were not vitiated by the vice of mala fides or arbitrariness and therefore, the Central Govt. cannot be said to have acted illegally in rejecting statutory complaint filed by the petitioner under Section 27 of the Army Act. 47. In the instant case, while disposing of the petitioner’s statutory complaint under Section 27 of the Army Act the relevant materials was before the Chief of the Army Staff, who after considering the same had dispose of statutory complaint and in addition to the said fact the said entire material was also given to the petitioner while communicating him the decision date 19.1.1982 by which his statutory complaint was rejected and further the same was also brought before this Court by way of pleadings in the counter-affidavit so there is no requirement on the part of the appellate authority (the Chief of the Army Staff) to give reason while disposing of the statutory complaint as such the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the statutory complaint had been dismissed by way of non-speaking order, and is in violation of principle of natural justice has got no force, accordingly the same are rejected. 48. The last contention as advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was subject to the hostile discrimination as the similar situated person where granted extension in service beyond the age of superannuation merely to enable them to become entitle for pensionary benefit for higher rank whereas the petitioner had not been given the same is also incorrect and wrong in view of the categorical pleadings made in the counter-affidavit to the effect that extension of service beyond the age of superannuation was not granted to any officers merely to enable them to become entitled to higher pensionary benefits further from the pleadings and submissions as advanced from the side of the respondents it is clearly establish that no such extension of service was granted to Brigadier K.B. Nayar, Ex-Judge Advocate General and he had retired with effect from 31st December, 1979 (AN) on attaining the compulsory retirement age of 55 years. 49. 49. So far the matter relating to Major General Y.R. Dani, VSM, Army Medical Corps is concerned, the rules governing the retirement age of Army Medical Corps Officers, who are all Doctors by profession, are not at par with the retirement rules of officers belonging to the other Arms/services of the Army. Major Generals in Army Medical Corps, on grant of substantive rank can be given extension beyond minimum retirement age for a period as approved by the Government upto a maximum age of 59 years. Major General Y.R. Dani was promoted to the acting rank of Major General on 1st November, 1979 against a substantive vacancy. His date of birth being 7 February, 1923, his date of superannuation as acting Major General/substantive Brigadier was February 6, 1980 accordingly he was granted extension of service from February 7, 1980 to 30 November, 1980 keeping in view service requirements and he was not granted extension merely to give him retirement benefits, as alleged by the petitioner, as such the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner was subjected to hostile discrimination by not giving him extension in service after superannuation in order to enable him to earn the pensionary and other retiral benefits for the rank of Brigadier is wholly misconceived submission accordingly the same are rejected. 50. For the afore-going reasons, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the action on the part of respondent, thereby issuing the Last Pay Certificate dated 8.7.1981 to the petitioner for the rank of Colonel and rejecting the petitioner Statutory Complaint under Section 27 of the Army Act which was communicated to him by order dated 19.1.1981, hence the present writ petition lacks merits and is accordingly dismissed. 51. No order as to cost. ————