JUDGMENT :- (This Writ Petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying to quash the impugned order/proceedings dated 14.06.2007, as per Annexure-A.) 1. Heard the Counsel for the parties. 2. The facts of the case are as follows: The petitioner was a member of Parliament when this petition was preferred in the year 2007. The second respondent is the Director, Doordarshan, Bangalore. It is the petitioner's case that he has received several complaints against the second respondent from the general public, as to the manner of his functioning, as well as allegations of corruption, misuse of official power etc. He had, by a letter dated 21.8.2006 addressed the Union Minister for Information and Broadcasting enclosing a detailed representation made against the second respondent. The said enclosure to the letter contained several apparently defamatory and scandalous statements of the higher judiciary and had named several judges of the High Court of Karnataka and a judge of the Supreme Court, who were alleged to be under the influence of the second respondent. It transpires that on account of the letter written by the petitioner - explanations had been called for by the superiors of the second respondent and he was subsequently issued an order of transfer, as had been requested by the petitioner in his letter aforesaid, by an order, dated 2.11.2006. The second respondent had challenged the order of transfer in an application in OA 383/2006 before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner herein was made a respondent to the said application. The second respondent had contended before the Tribunal that the order of transfer was prompted solely by the baseless letter of the petitioner and hence was blatantly mala fide. The petitioner who entered appearance before the Tribunal and by way of a statement of objections had admitted the fact that representations against the second respondent had indeed been forwarded by him to the Ministry and that he believed there was substance in the allegations. The second respondent had hence approached the Advocate General of Karnataka with an application under Section 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity) seeking consent of the Advocate General to initiate action for criminal contempt of Court against the petitioner, before this Court. The second respondent had hence approached the Advocate General of Karnataka with an application under Section 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity) seeking consent of the Advocate General to initiate action for criminal contempt of Court against the petitioner, before this Court. The Advocate General, by an order dated 14.6.2007, has opined that as the petitioner had admitted the contents of the letter which endorsed statements that lend to scandalize the Court and judges - he has no choice but to grant consent. It is this order of the Advocate General that is under challenge. 3. Shri Madhusudhan Naik, Senior Advocate, appearing for the Counsel for the petitioner, contends as follows: a) Though the petitioner may have personally handed over a letter to the then Union Minister of Information and Broadcasting enclosing a representation that had been received by post, that cannot be construed as the publication of any matter or the doing of any act, whatsoever which scandalizes or lowers the authority of any Court or prejudices or interferes with the due course of any judicial proceedings, or the administration of justice. b) It is contended that the Advocate General has erroneously concluded that the petitioner had admitted any scandalous statements made by third-parties. It was not even the case of the second respondent that the petitioner had admitted any such allegations in his pleadings before the Tribunal. c) It is contended that the second respondent seeks to abuse the process of this Court in proposing to bring an action for criminal contempt of Court against the petitioner. And consent having been granted on an erroneous reading of the conduct of the petitioner leads to serious civil and criminal consequences and that the petitioner is hence enabled to seek the intervention of this Court. d) Further it is urged that the petitioner having played an active role in public life for the general public good is in the evening of his life. He has always held the Courts of Law and the judiciary in the highest esteem and is thus extremely pained and deeply anguished at being accused of Contempt of Court. The very thought being abhorrent this fervent plea is made to bring the proceedings to a halt. He has always held the Courts of Law and the judiciary in the highest esteem and is thus extremely pained and deeply anguished at being accused of Contempt of Court. The very thought being abhorrent this fervent plea is made to bring the proceedings to a halt. e) In support of the contention that an order granting consent under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act is justifiable and that the present petition is maintainable, as well as in support of the above contentions, the following authorities are cited: (i) Arther Reginold Perera v. The King (1951) AC 482 The appellant therein was a member of the House of Representatives in Ceylon. When visiting a prison, as part of his public duties, he received a complaint from some of the prisoners to the effect that they had not been present in Court when their appeals against conviction were being heard. A prison jailer present had then inaccurately informed him that only those prisoners who were "undefended" were taken to Court and not all of the prisoners. The appellant had, on the basis of that information, made an entry in the Prison Visitor's Book as follows: "The present practice of appeals of remand prisoners being heard in their absence is unhealthy, when represented by Counsel or otherwise the prisoners should be present at proceedings". The appellant was promptly called upon to show-cause whey he should not be punished for Contempt of Court in making the entry in the Visitors Book as it was an incorrect assumption. He was found to be guilty of contempt of Court. The House of Lords in appeal ruled that appellant was not guilty of contempt of Court and that he had acted in good faith and in discharge of what he believed to be his duty as a member of the legislature; he had made no public use of the inaccurate information; the words made no direct reference to the Court or the judges, or to the cause of justice or to the process of the Courts; his criticism was honest criticism on a matter of public importance. (ii) Conscientious Group v. Mohammed Yunus and Others, (1987) 3 SCC 89 The petition was filed seeking to revive a contempt petition which had been withdrawn earlier. (ii) Conscientious Group v. Mohammed Yunus and Others, (1987) 3 SCC 89 The petition was filed seeking to revive a contempt petition which had been withdrawn earlier. The petitioner therein, an office-bearer of an association called CG had alleged that a respondent had made certain comments about the judges, who had delivered judgment in a review petition in the National Anthem case (1986) 3 SCC 615 before the Supreme Court of India - which according to the petitioner constituted criminal contempt. The contemner having appeared after service of notice of the petition raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner had not obtained consent of the Attorney General, as required under Section 15 of the Act. It transpires that petitioner had approached the Attorney General but was informed that since the Attorney General himself was a party in his capacity as the Attorney General, to the National Anthem Case, it was not appropriate for him to deal with the application of the petitioner and had been returned. This had been brought to the attention of the Court and permission had been sought to withdraw the petition. Permission was accordingly granted. It was later "discovered" by the petitioner that the Solicitor General could grant consent under the Rules if the Attorney General was not in a position to give consent to file a petition. Hence, an application to recall the order of withdrawal had been filed. This had been allowed. However, the Solicitor General had declined his consent on a request made by the petitioner. The refusal having been questioned, the Court found that insofar as the objection regarding the consent of the Solicitor General being necessary could not be disputed. But in the earlier order an observation having been made to the effect that "the petitioner will not be without remedy if the Solicitor General refuses his consent on any irrelevant ground", the Court observed that it was perfectly open to the Court to treat the contempt petition as information furnished to the Court but in view of the Court having opined that the written consent of the Solicitor General was to be obtained -it only remained to be examined whether the reasons assigned for declining to grant consent were valid. The Court found that they were and accordingly dismissed the petition. The Court found that they were and accordingly dismissed the petition. (iii) P.N. Duda v. P.Shiv Shankar, AIR 1988 SC 1208 This case involved the then Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs. He had delivered a speech at a function organised by the Bar Council of Hyderabad. An advocate practising in the Supreme Court had complained that several statements made in the speech delivered by the minister were derogatory to the dignity of the Supreme Court attributing the Court with partiality towards the economically affluent sections of society and these statements had come from a man who had formerly held the office of judge of the High Court before he resigned and took to politics. The bench consisting of two judges examined the statements made in the speech and held that the speech read in its proper perspective, did not bring the administrative of justice into disrepute or impair the administrative of justice. However, on a question of law - namely, whether there was a duty case on the Attorney General or the Solicitor General to consider an application for grant of consent in terms of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? Whether the granting or non-granting of such consent is justifiable by the Court and if so, whether the question of non-granting can be brought up in a rolled application moved by a person to bring it to the notice of the Court to take action suo motu and at the same time to consider whether in the same proceeding the action of the Attorney General or the Solicitor General in granting or not granting consent can be challenged or must it always be by an independent proceeding? The Judges differed in their views on this question. Justice Sabyasachi Mukherji opined that it was not possible to accept the position that under no circumstances the exercise of discretion by the Attorney General or Solicitor General cannot be enquired into. It was held that even though the Attorney General or the Solicitor General may have declined to deal with the matter, the Court could deal with the matter on attention being drawn to the Court. It was held that even though the Attorney General or the Solicitor General may have declined to deal with the matter, the Court could deal with the matter on attention being drawn to the Court. Justice Ranganathan, however, opined that the role of the Attorney General / Solicitor General in the above context was akin to that of an amicus curiae to assist the Court in an administrative matter rather than a quasi-judicial role determining a lis involving rights of a member of the public vis-à-vis an alleged contemner. If the consent is granted no person can approach the Court to contend that the Attorney General / Solicitor General ought not to have given his consent. For it would always be open to the Court if it is found that there is no reason to initiate action, to dismiss the petition. It was opined that it was not a fruitful exercise to review the decision of the Attorney General / Solicitor General and that those officers were improperly joined as parties. It was held that in any event the petitioner is not deprived of his remedy of coming before the Court and requesting the Court to take suo motu action and the petition would be nothing more than information on which the Court may or may not take suo motu action. Shri Naik contends that notwithstanding the divergent views expressed in the above decision as to the justiciability of an order by the Attorney-General / Solicitor General the unanimous decision is Conscientious Group case prevails and hence the writ petition is maintainable. 4. Per contra, the Counsel for respondent No.2 Smt.Anuradha Urs contends as follows:- That the petition is not maintainable as it is shown as to how any legal right of the petitioner is affected. The order under challenge is at best the consequence of the petitioner's own act and he is responsible for the same. The grant of consent by the Advocate General to initiate action for criminal contempt of Court is an administrative act and is not justifiable as held by a division bench of this Court in the case of N. Venkataramanappa v. D.K. Naiker, AIR 1978 Kar. 57 - referred to with approval in P.N. Duda v. P. Shivashankar, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1208 (Per: Justice S. Ranganathan). 57 - referred to with approval in P.N. Duda v. P. Shivashankar, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1208 (Per: Justice S. Ranganathan). The Counsel would take this Court through the sequence of events and the statements of the petitioner to justify the consent granted by the Advocate General. The Counsel places reliance on the following authorities to hold that the petition is not maintainable. (i) N. Venkataramanappa v. D.K. Naikar, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 57: wherein it was held that absolute discretion is vested in the Advocate General in the matter of according consent under Section 15(1) (b) of the Act. Grant or refusal of consent by the Advocate General under Section 15 of the Act, was not justifiable. (ii) Reliance is placed on the opinion of Justice S.Ranganathan in P.N.Duda's case (supra) - whereby the types of action which the Attorney General may take when an application seeking his consent is made: a) Firstly, he may grant permission in which case no further question will arise. It will not be open to any other person to come to the Court with a prayer that such consent ought not to have been given. For it is always open for the Court to dismiss the petition if it does not merit consideration. b) Secondly, it may be possible that the Attorney General may not be able to discharge his statutory function in a particular case for one reason or the other. As was the circumstance in Mohammed Yunus' case ( AIR 1987 SC 1451 ) In cases where the concerned Law Officer is not in a position to take a decision on the application by a third party or where the consent is refused -it was opined that no useful purpose would be served in examining whether the officer should have given a decision one way or the other. For the petitioner could always place the information in his possession before the Court and request the Court to take action. This, according to Justice Ranganathan, was in effect the intention of the observation of Bhagwati CJ in Mohammed Yunus' case on a motion made for recalling the order of withdrawal of the petition, to the following effect: "The petitioner will not be without remedy, if the Solicitor General refuses his consent, on any irrelevant grounds". This, according to Justice Ranganathan, was in effect the intention of the observation of Bhagwati CJ in Mohammed Yunus' case on a motion made for recalling the order of withdrawal of the petition, to the following effect: "The petitioner will not be without remedy, if the Solicitor General refuses his consent, on any irrelevant grounds". (iii) Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary, AIR 1996 SC 186 : The High Court had, at the instance of the respondent, quashed the sanction accorded under Section 6(1-C) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 to initiate proceedings against him. The High Court had opined that the respondent ought to have been given an opportunity of hearing. In appeal, the Supreme Court held that the grant of sanction is only an administrative function though the accused may be saddled with prosecution. On the necessary facts collected during the investigation being placed before the sanctioning authority, he is required to reach an opinion, prime facie, that the relevant facts would constitute an offence and then either grant or refuse to grant sanction. This being an administrative act, the need to provide an opportunity of hearing to the accused before according sanction does not arise. (iv) State of UP v. Johri Mal, 2004 AIR SCW 3888: This decision is relied upon to contend that judicial review can be limited by the subject matter of a particular power. The power exercised by the Attorney General or the Advocate General to decide whether to institute legal proceedings is a non-justifiable power. Reliance is also placed on the following: (v) Bal Thankeray v. Harish Pimpal Khute, AIR 2005 SC 396 (vi) State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo, AIR 2005 SC 2080 (vii) Ektha Shakti Foundation v. Government of NCT Delhi, AIR 2006 SC 2609 The Counsel for the respondent would thus contend that the petition be dismissed with costs. 5. In the above background and in the light of the authorities cited the following questions that arise for consideration are answered as hereunder: a) Whether an order of the Advocate General, in granting or not granting consent under Section 15 (1) (b) of the Act, is justifiable? b) Whether a complainant is precluded from prosecuting or a contemner precluded from defending the allegation of criminal contempt of Court, pursuant to the consent, granted or refused, as the case may be, by the Advocate General? b) Whether a complainant is precluded from prosecuting or a contemner precluded from defending the allegation of criminal contempt of Court, pursuant to the consent, granted or refused, as the case may be, by the Advocate General? c) What order ought to be passed in the present case on hand? In answering the first question it is to be noted that the legal precedent that holds the field is the decision in Conscientious Group v. Mohammed Yunus : AIR 1987 SC 1451 As already noticed the history of that case was that the petitioner therein had filed a contempt petition before the Supreme Court alleging that adverse comments against the Judges who had rendered the judgment in the "National Anthem case" constituted criminal contempt. When the petition came up before the Court on 26.9.1986 -notice was issued to respondent no.1 therein, returnable by 14.10.1986. When the matter subsequently came up before a Bench of three judges, the contemner filed a reply raising an objection that the petitioner was not maintainable without the consent in writing of the Attorney General as required by Section 15 of the Act. By an order dated 3.12.1986, the petitioner was directed to move the Attorney General for his consent. The Attorney General on being moved by the petitioner, opined that he was himself a party, in his capacity as Attorney General, in the 'National Anthem Case' and it was not appropriate for him to deal with the petitioner's application, and the same was returned. On the matter coming up before the three Judge Bench on 12.12.1986, the counsel for the petitioner sought to withdraw the petition in view of the Attorney General's disablement. The Court permitted the withdrawal of the petition with liberty to refile the petition on the National Anthem case reaching a finality. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition to recall the order permitting withdrawal, on the ground that it was not noticed that under rule 3(c) of the Rules framed by the Supreme Court, the contempt petition could be maintained with the consent of the Solicitor General, if the Attorney General was not in a position to give consent for filing the petition. That petition was allowed by the very three Judge Bench which had permitted withdrawal. The Bench observed: "The petition can be revived by the petitioner after obtaining the consent of the Solicitor General. That petition was allowed by the very three Judge Bench which had permitted withdrawal. The Bench observed: "The petition can be revived by the petitioner after obtaining the consent of the Solicitor General. We may point out that the petitioner will not be without remedy, if the Solicitor General refuses his consent on any irrelevant ground." On the petitioner's application - the Solicitor General refused to grant consent. It was this order of the Solicitor General which was called in question in the petitions decided by the above reported decision wherein the two-judge Bench has concluded as follows:- "Thus, as matters now stand, in the light of the events that have transpired and the prior orders aforesaid passed in the matter by the Bench of three Judges, the position is that the prayer for revival will be maintainable only in case the petitioner has obtained the written consent of the Solicitor General or in case he is able to make out that the refusal of consent by the Solicitor General was on any irrelevant ground. As already stated, the Solicitor General by his letter dated February 4, 1987 has declined to grant consent to institution of the contempt proceedings in question. Elaborate reasons have been stated by the learned Solicitor General in support of his conclusion that it would not be in the public interest to give his consent to the initiation of the contempt proceedings. After scrutinising the reasons given by the learned Solicitor General, we are of opinion that the grounds stated by the Solicitor General for declining to grant consent cannot be said to be irrelevant in the eye of law; nor can the view expressed, by the Solicitor General be characterised as arbitrary, illegal or unreasonable. In the circumstances it has to be held that the petitioner is not entitled to succeed his prayer for revival of the contempt petition since neither of the conditions precedent specified in the order dated December 19, 1986 for maintainability of the prayer for revival can be said to be fulfilled. We accordingly dismiss these applications." The effect of the above decision is that the reasons given by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General in giving or not giving his consent were justifiable. This view expressed by Justice Sabyasachi Mukherji J, in P.N.Duda's case supra, is fortified by considering why this practice of the requirement of consent grew up. We accordingly dismiss these applications." The effect of the above decision is that the reasons given by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General in giving or not giving his consent were justifiable. This view expressed by Justice Sabyasachi Mukherji J, in P.N.Duda's case supra, is fortified by considering why this practice of the requirement of consent grew up. Reference is drawn to the observations of Sarkaria J in S.K. Sarkar Vs. V.C. Misra: AIR 1981 SC 723 , to the effect that the whole object of prescribing these procedural modes of taking cognizance under Section 15 of the Act was to safeguard the valuable time of the High Court or the Supreme Court being wasted by frivolous complaints of contempt of Court. Frequent use of this suo motu power on the information furnished by an incompetent petition, may render these procedural safeguards provided in sub-Section (2) otiose. In such cases the Court may be well advised to avail of the advice and assistance of the Advocate General before initiating proceedings. In this connection the Court referred to the observations of the Sanyal Committee appointed to examine this question, where it was observed: "In the case of criminal contempt, not being contempt committed in the face of the Court, we are of the opinion that it would lighten the burden of the Court, without in any way interfering with the sanctity of the administration of justice, if action is taken on a motion by some other agency. Such a course of action would give considerable assurance to the individual charged and the public at large. Indeed some High Courts have already made Rules for the association of the Advocate - General in some categories of cases at least……". Justice Mukherji therefore poses the question: "It was the practice that except where the Court feels inclined to take action suo motu parties were entitled to move only by consent. If no justifiable reason was given in an appropriate case and such consent was refused, can it be said that it would not be proper for the Court to investigate the same?" The question of reviewability, incidentally has been considered and answered in the negative in England in the case of R.V.Solicitor General ex P.Taylor (1995) Times 14 August, DC (See Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) - Reissue) Volume 9 (1) para 434 Note No.8. Page 271). Page 271). But it is to be kept in view that this may not be relevant in the context of the constitutional scheme in India. (See para 44 of Duda's Case). There is ample authority to accept the proposition that unless there is an express or even an implied constitutional bar - there cannot be a situation where the exercise of power by any authority is beyond judicial review. The Reliance placed on the decisions in AIR 1996 SC 186 and AIR 1996 SC 722 by the respondent - related to a right of hearing before granting sanction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and may not be relevant in the present context. On the other hand, in the case of Johri Mal Supra which is relied upon by the respondent. The observations of the Court at Para 28 on the scope and extent of power of judicial review of the High Court may be considered. "The scope and extent of power of Judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities namely, whether the power is statutory, quasi-judicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of the omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law nor do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the Supreme Lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review Court. The limited scope of judicial review succinctly put are: (i) Courts while exercising the power of judicial review, do not sit in appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies, (ii) A petition for a judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds, (iii) An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it, cannot be interfered with in judicial review, unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal… … … … "(emphasis supplied). Hence, it cannot be accepted that an order passed by the Advocate General in granting or not granting consent under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act is not justifiable under any circumstances. On the further question whether a complainant or the contemner are precluded from prosecuting or defending the allegation, as the case may be, depending on the grant or otherwise of the consent by the Advocate General -as there is unanimity of opinion in the above cited cases - that either party would not in any manner be fettered in either furnishing information for the Court to act upon insofar as the complainant is concerned or for the alleged contemner to defend his conduct to demonstrate that there is no cause of action. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, as sought to be urged by the parties, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Advocate General suffers from any perversity or illegality. The petition is therefore dismissed.