JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amar Saran, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. This writ petition has been filed against an order passed by the Commissioner Lucknow Division, Lucknow dated 16.9.2009 dismissing the petitioner’s appeal under Section 6 of the U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (hereafter the Goondas Act) against the order of the A.D.M. Administration, Rae Bareilly dated 7.8.2009 under Section 3 of the Goondas Act externing the petitioner out side the jurisdiction of Rae Bareilly for a period of six months. 3. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner could not be described as a ‘Goonda’ as defined under Section 2 (b) of the U.P. Control of Goondas Act because there was no evidence that he habitually committed the offences of the Indian Penal Code mentioned under Section 2 (b) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the Goondas Act. 4. It may be noted that the other ingredients for describing a person as a Goonda have been mentioned in the different clauses under Section 2(b). 5. The material against the petitioner mentioned in the impugned orders was that a case at Crime No. 1449/08 under Sections 363/366, IPC and 3 (1) 10 S.C.S.T. Act and a beat information nakal report No. 40 dated 11.10.2008 were present on the record. It is also mentioned in the impugned orders that the petitioner was generally reputed to a Goonda. Under Section 2 (b) (iv), it may be noted that a ‘Goonda’ means a person who is generally reputed to be a person who is desperate and dangerous to the community. From these circumstances, it was observed in the impugned orders that by the actions of the petitioner fear and terror had been generated amidst the public and that the appellant was habituated to committing offences under chapters Sections 16, 17 and 18, of the Indian Penal Code. 6. From these circumstances, it was observed in the impugned orders that by the actions of the petitioner fear and terror had been generated amidst the public and that the appellant was habituated to committing offences under chapters Sections 16, 17 and 18, of the Indian Penal Code. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that under Section 3 (1) of the Act, it is provided that for externing a Goonda, it is not only necessary that the person is a Goonda as defined under Section 3 (1)(a) but it is further necessary that his movements or acts are causing or are calculated to cause alarm or harm to persons or property and that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is engaged or is about to engage in the commission or abetment of offences referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of Section 2 of the Goondas Act, i.e. the offences mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of Section 2, which are offences under Section 153, Section 153b and Section 294 or chapters XV, XVI, XVII or XXII IPC or offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 or under the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 and Public Gambling Act, 1867 or Section 25, 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. 7. 7. It would be useful to quote to Section 3 (1) of the U.P. Control of Goondas Act, 1970 insofar as it is relevant here : “Where it appears to the District Magistrate : (a) that any person is a goonda; and (b) (i) that his movements or acts in the district or any part thereof are causing, or are calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to persons or property; or (ii) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is engaged, or about to engage, in the district or any part thereof, in the commission of an offence referred to in subclauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of Section 2, or in the abetment of any such offence; and (c) That witnesses not willing to come forward to give evidence against him by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person or property.” (Underlining added) A perusal of of this section shows that whereas for externing a Goonda, it is necessary to show that a person is a Goonda (i.e. he falls in the any of the categories mentioned in Section 2(b) which define a goonda), and that his movements in the district or any part of it are likely to cause alarm or danger to the general public or property, because between clauses 3(1)(a) and 3(1)b), the conjunctive “and” has been used. But significantly between clauses 3(b) (i) and 3 (b)(ii) the disjunctive “or” has been used, i.e. it is not necessary to show that the ingredients of both the clauses, that the movements of the petitioner are likely to cause alarm or harm to persons or property and also that he is likely to engage in commission of offences mentioned Section 2(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) are present. However so far as the requirement of Section 3(1) (c) that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence against him, this also relates to the earlier clause [Section 3(1)(b)(ii)] that he is engaging or is likely to engage in commission of offences referred to in Section 2(b)(i), (ii) and (iii), which as I have mentioned above was not the clause on which action appears to have been taken against the petitioner, but rather he appears to have been treated as a ‘goonda’ because of Section 2(b)(iv), as from the fact that some case against him under Section 363/366, IPC and 3 (1) 10 S.C.S.T. Act and a beat information nakal report No. 40 dated 11.10.2008 it could at least be inferred that he was generally reputed to be a person who was desperate and dangerous to the community. Furthermore, in the present case it is mentioned by the petitioner himself in paragraph 12 of the writ petition that the prosecutrix has withdrawn her complaint against the petitioner by filing an affidavit. But this itself goes to suggest that the witness is not likely to come forward to give evidence against him, which is an important reason for externing a person outside the district for being a goonda. 8. For all these reasons, I see no illegality in the impugned order. 9. Moreover, as the order of the A.D.M. (Admn) was passed on 7.8.2009 and no stay was granted when the appeal was filed before the Commissioner, the petition has become virtually infructuous as the period of externment is about to expire. No ground therefore exists for interfering with the impugned order. The petition is accordingly dismissed. ————