ORDER 1. Appellants have filed this appeal against the order dated 17.11.2008 passed by Sixth Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Suit No.21-A/2006. By the impugned order the trial Court allowed the application for injunction under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 CPC. 2. The present case has a long history. Initially, in the year 1982 Haridas filed a suit for declaration, possession and mesne profits against the appellants-defendants. He pleaded that he is the owner of a house, situated at Sarafa Bazar, Lashkar. As per the plaintiff, he purchased the suit house on 7.4.1964 in an auction proceedings conducted by the Court in pursuance to the execution of a decree in Execution Case No.29/56/1963. The sale was confirmed on 16.8.1973 and a sale certificate was also issued in favour of the plaintiff on 30.8.1973. Because, at that time, the house was in possession of tenants, hence, the plaintiff had been given symbolic possession of the house. In the year 1979 the defendants have taken possession of two rooms on ground floor forcibly, hence, the plaintiff prayed a decree for possession, mesne profits and declaration. 3. The defendants denied the claim of the plaintiff. They pleaded that they had been in possession over the suit house. They further pleaded that earlier Bulakhidas filed a suit with regard to possession of the house. The aforesaid suit was registered as Civil Suit No.3 of Samvat 91. When Bulakhidas died, Pattobai, his widow, contested the suit. At that time, forefathers of the defendants had been in possession of the house. Since then they had been in possession of the suit house. The father of defendant Gulabchand had cordial relations with the family of plaintiff, hence, the plaintiff participated in the auction proceedings on behalf of the defendants and the money was paid by the defendants. Thereafter, vide an agreement dated 28.2.1983 the plaintiff and defendants appointed Arbitrators, Balkishan, Namonarayan, Phoolchand and Mahavir Prasad for deciding the dispute. The Arbitrators handed over their award on 15.9.1983. 4. It is an admitted fact that during pendency of the aforesaid suit proceedings the plaintiff and defendants agreed to hand over the dispute with regard to suit house to the Arbitrators. The Arbitrators vide award pronounced on 15.9.1983 have held that both the parties withdrew the pending civil proceedings and Mr. Haridas would execute registry of the house in favour of defendants. The Arbitrators vide award pronounced on 15.9.1983 have held that both the parties withdrew the pending civil proceedings and Mr. Haridas would execute registry of the house in favour of defendants. The defendant, Padamchand, would be entitled to receive rent from the tenants of the house. Defendant No.2, Haridas, shall pay an amount of Rs.2,75,000/- to the plaintiff in a consideration of execution of sale-deed. 5. Defendants filed an application under section 14 read with section 18 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 before the District Judge for passing a judgment in terms of the award. On the aforesaid application a case was registered as Civil Suit No.43-A of 1984. The plaintiff filed objections before the District Judge under section 47 of the Arbitration Act. The objections were rejected by the Court vide order dated 19.2.1990. Against the aforesaid order the respondents filed a Civil Revision before this Court, which was registered as Civil Revision No.34/91. This Court disposed of the aforesaid revision vide order dated 24.2.1992 with the following directions : "(1) In the aforesaid suit application was filed on 21.12.1983 by the non-petitioners for making the award dated 15.9.1983, rule of the Court. It is submitted that in the application which was filed u/s 47 proviso of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in regard to that award, it has been contended that the arbitration agreement was void, being procured through coercion. Accordingly, that objection shall be decided by the trial Court in terms of the provisions of S.30(c) of the Act. It shall be open to the parties to adduce evidence and indeed, it shall be competent for the trial Court to frame specific issues for deciding finally the application of the non-petitioners dated 21.12.1983 in terms of the order to be passed u/s 30(c) of the Act, within six months, the final order of the Court shall be passed in terms of S.30(c) in Civil Suit No.430-A/1984. (2) Between the same parties, in the same Court, is pending trial Civil Suit No.3-A/1982. It is submitted that evidence is being recorded in that suit. (2) Between the same parties, in the same Court, is pending trial Civil Suit No.3-A/1982. It is submitted that evidence is being recorded in that suit. However, trial of that suit shall be kept in abeyance for a period of six months and in the event of the decision made u/s 30(c), aforesaid, going in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners, the proceedings for trial of the suit would continue from the stage left and the suit shall be decided in accordance with law without taking into consideration anything that transpired in the proceedings in Civil Suit No.43-A/1984. However, should the plaintiff-petitioner fail in the other proceedings, in Civil Suit No.43-A/1984, it would be open to him to press the objection made under the proviso to S.47 that the compromise which had been entered could be considered only in terms of Order 23 rule 1 CPC. Evidently, therefore, the order passed in Civil Suit No.43-A/1984 u/s 30(c) of the Act would be subject finally to the order to be passed on the pending application preferred u/s 47 proviso disposed of by the impugned order which shall be dealt with afresh in the pending suit. (3) A few words I must say now to give reasons for the directions made. What I find, after hearing the learned counsel on the grievance made on both sides, that there is hardly any objection on any side to be taken in regard to the proposed order to be passed in this matter, Care is taken to ensure disposal of at the threshold of the objections which could be raised in two parallel proceedings so that proceedings are not protracted; to permit multiplicity, parties are not to be afforded opportunity to impeach the orders passed in two different proceedings in interlocutory matters, in higher Courts, in regard to the objections which are therefore, not to be left undecided. Shri N.K. Mody, who appears for non-petitioners, has fairly submitted that to the order in terms of the directions made aforesaid, he has no objection. Shri H.D. Gupta also submitted that all his grievances having taken care of, he has nothing to object to the directions made. The only thing which had to be considered is whether it was proper to consolidate different types of two proceedings, it was found unadvisable to do so, as such a course is not even contemplated under the law. Shri H.D. Gupta also submitted that all his grievances having taken care of, he has nothing to object to the directions made. The only thing which had to be considered is whether it was proper to consolidate different types of two proceedings, it was found unadvisable to do so, as such a course is not even contemplated under the law. In any case, care is taken otherwise to achieve the same purpose following a procedure which is not averse to one contemplated." 6. Thereafter, the trial Court vide order dated 2.8.2000 allowed the application filed by defendants-appellants under section 14(2) read with section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and directed for making the award as a rule of Court and also passed the judgment and decree in terms of the Arbitration award dated 15.9.1983. Against the aforesaid order appellants preferred a miscellaneous appeal before this Court. It was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No.674/2000. This Court dismissed the appeal vide order dated 5.4.2006 with the following observations : "10. This Court with the consent of the parties modified the order dated 19.12.1990 passed in Civil Suit No.43-A/84. From the perusal of para 2 of the order dated 24.2.1992, it is very clear and specific that the appellants never raised any objection at the time of passing of the order dated 24.2.1992 nor the appellants challenged the order passed by this Court on 24.2.1992. This Court in this order dated 24.2.1992 very specifically directed that if appellants, who were plaintiffs in Civil Suit No.3-A/82, fall in the proceedings in Civil Suit No.43-A/84, it would be open to them to press the objection made under the Proviso to section 47 of the Act that the compromise which had been entered could be considered only in terms of the Order 23 rule 1, CPC. All the orders passed in Civil Suit No.43-A/84 would be subject to finality to the order to be passed on the pending application preferred under section 47 Proviso disposed of by the impugned order which shall be dealt with afresh in the pending suit. Thus, from the aforesaid finding of this Court, it is clear that after the order dated 24.2.1992, the pending application under section 47 shall be dealt with afresh in the pending suit, i.e., in Civil Suit No.3-A/92. Thus, from the aforesaid finding of this Court, it is clear that after the order dated 24.2.1992, the pending application under section 47 shall be dealt with afresh in the pending suit, i.e., in Civil Suit No.3-A/92. Thus, if the petitioner has any grievance in respect of the impugned order, the said grievance in respect of the impugned order, the said grievance of the petitioner can be decided afresh in the pending suit. Now the petitioner is free to raise the objection made under the Proviso to section 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, afresh in the pending Civil Suit No.3-A/82. Now at this stage, he cannot raise objection under section 47 of the Arbitration Act by filing this appeal under section 39 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily it is not open to the appellate Court to substitute its own opinion unless it is shown that the Court below has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has not adopted the general approach in the matter. Learned counsel for the appellants has failed to show any material for coming to a different conclusion, he also could not make out a case for interference and could not show that how the judgment of the Court below making the judgment as a rule of the Court is unjustifiable. Thus, I do not find any merit or substance in the appeal filed by the appellants and no case is made out by the appellants for interference by this Court in this appeal in the reasonings adopted by the Court below in making the award a rule of the Court." 7. After dismissing the appeal of the respondents by this Court the appellants filed an execution proceeding before the Additional District Judge, Gwalior and the Court registered a Case No.43-A/84/2001. Before the Executing Court the respondents filed an application for granting stay of the award and the judgment and decree passed by the Court in Civil Suit No.43-A/84. The Executing Court rejected that application vide order dated 11.1.2008. Against the aforesaid order the respondents filed a writ petition before this Court, which was registered as Writ Petition No.1518/08. This Court dismissed the writ petition with the following observation with cost vide order dated 12.8.2008 : "12. It is well settled that the executing Court is bound by the terms of decree. Against the aforesaid order the respondents filed a writ petition before this Court, which was registered as Writ Petition No.1518/08. This Court dismissed the writ petition with the following observation with cost vide order dated 12.8.2008 : "12. It is well settled that the executing Court is bound by the terms of decree. Sections 35 and 46 of the Act will not be made applicable and the executing Court has not committed any error in rejecting the stay application. The reasons assigned by the executing Court is based on appreciation of the order passed by this Court in Civil Revision No.34/91 on 28.2.1992 and the order dated 5.4.2006 passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No.674/2000. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India this Court under its power of superintendence can interfere in the order passed by the Court, if illegalities are found in such order. Herein the present case, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, material on record and approach of the executing Court, it cannot be said that the grounds have been made out by the petitioners warranting interference by this Court. The being so, I am not inclined to interfere in the impugned order passed by the executing Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction because no case is made out by the petitioners for quashing the impugned order. The writ petition filed by the petitioners has no merit is accordingly dismissed with cost. Counsel fee Rs.2,500/-." 8. Thereafter, respondents filed an application under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 CPC before the trial Court for grant of temporary injunction with regard to staying the decree passed in Civil Suit No.21-A/06. Vide impugned order the trial Court granted injunction in favour of the respondents. 9. Learned senior counsel appearing for appellants has submitted that the trial Court has committed an error of law in granting injunction in favour of the respondents. Virtually, the order of injunction passed by the trial Court amounts to contempt of this Court because in earlier proceedings this Court has rejected the objections of the respondents with regard to refusal to grant stay by the executing Court. Virtually, the order of injunction passed by the trial Court amounts to contempt of this Court because in earlier proceedings this Court has rejected the objections of the respondents with regard to refusal to grant stay by the executing Court. Contrary to this, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No.1 to 4, has submitted that the plaintiffs raised a legal issue with regard to maintainability of the award in accordance with section 47 of the Arbitration Act and this Court has granted liberty to respondents to raise the issue in civil suit in deciding finally the Miscellaneous Appeal No.674/2000 and after considering the legal position the trial Court has granted stay, which is as per law. In support of his contentions learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in the case of Naraindas v. Ballabhdas and others, reported in 1972 JLJ 978 and Bisnath v. Bastimal, reported in 1968 JLJ 841 . 10. From the facts of the case it is clear that in pursuance to the arbitration agreement the Arbitrators pronounced their award. Thereafter the appellants filed an application before the District Court under the provisions of the Arbitration Act for making the award as rule of the Court. In the aforesaid pr6ceedings the respondents filed objections. Their objections were rejected by the trial Court vide order dated 19.12.1990 passed in Civil Suit No.43-A/84. Thereafter, a revision was filed before this Court by the respondents challenging the aforesaid order. It was registered as Civil Revision No.34/91 and decided by this Court vide order dated 24.2.1992. Thereafter, vide order dated 2.8.2000 the Additional District Judge ordered making the award as a rule of the Court and passed the judgment and decree in accordance with the Arbitration award dated 15.9.1983. The aforesaid order dated 2.8.2002 was challenged by the respondents before this Court in Miscellaneous Appeal No.674/2000. This Court dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, appellants filed execution proceedings for execution of the judgment and decree passed in terms of the award by the Court in Civil Suit No.43-A/84. In the aforesaid proceedings the respondents again filed an application for stay. That application was rejected. Thereafter a writ petition was filed before this Court challenging the order of rejection. It was registered as Writ Petition No.1518/08. This Court dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 12.8.2008 with a cost. In the aforesaid proceedings the respondents again filed an application for stay. That application was rejected. Thereafter a writ petition was filed before this Court challenging the order of rejection. It was registered as Writ Petition No.1518/08. This Court dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 12.8.2008 with a cost. Again, the respondents filed an injunction application before the trial Court. That has been accepted by the trial Court and the trial Court has granted interim injunction by the impugned order to the effect that the defendants shall not execute the sale-deed of the suit house in execution proceedings upto the decision in Civil Suit No.43-A/84. 11. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of M. Gurudas and others v. Rasaranjan and others, reported in (2006)8 SCC 367 , has held as under, with regard to factors which have to be taken into consideration by the Court while considering the application for grant of temporary injunction : "18. While considering an application for injunction, it is well settled, the Courts would pass an order thereupon having regard to : (i) Prima facie case; (ii) Balance of convenience; (iii) irreparable injury. 19. A finding on "prima facie case" would be finding of fact. However, while arriving at such a finding of fact, the Court not only must arrive at a conclusion that a case for trial has been made out but also other factors requisite for grant of injunction exist. There may be a debate as has been sought to be raised by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan that the decision of the house of Lords in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [(1975)1 All ER 504:1975 AC 396:(1975)2 WLR 316 (HL)] would have no application in a case of this nature as was opined by this Court in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. [ (1999)7 SCC 1 ], and S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. [ (2000)5 SCC 573 ], but we are not persuaded to delve thereinto. 20. We may only notice that the decisions of this Court in Colgate Palmolive (supra), and S.M. Dyechem Ltd. (supra), relate to intellectual property rights. The question, however, has been taken into consideration by a Bench of this Court in Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd. [ (2006)1 SCC 540 ], stating (SCC pp.552-53 paras 36-40) : "36. The respondent, therefore, has raised triable issues. The question, however, has been taken into consideration by a Bench of this Court in Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd. [ (2006)1 SCC 540 ], stating (SCC pp.552-53 paras 36-40) : "36. The respondent, therefore, has raised triable issues. What would constitute triable issues has succinctly been dealt with by the house of Lords in its well-known decision in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (supra) holding : (All ER p.510 c-d) 'Your Lordships should in my view take this opportunity of declaring that there is no such rule. The use of such expressions as "a probability", "a prima facie case", or "a strong prima facie case" in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The Court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried.' It was further observed: (All ER pp 511 b-c and 511) 'Where other factors appear to be evenly balanced it is a counsel of prudence to take such measures as are calculated to preserve the status quo if the defendant is enjoined temporarily from doing something that he has not done before, the only effect of the interlocutory injunction in the event of his succeeding at the trial is to postpone the date at which he is able to embark on a course of action which he has not previously found it necessary to undertake; whereas to interrupt him in the conduct of an established enterprise would cause much/greater inconvenience to him since he would have to start again to establish it in the event of his succeeding at the trial. The factors which he took into consideration, and in my view properly, were that Ethicon's sutures XLG were not yet on the market; so that had no business which would be brought to a stop by the injunction; no factories would be closed and no workpeople would be thrown out of work. They held a dominant position in the United Kingdom market for absorbable surgical sutures and adopted an aggressive sales policy.' 37. We are, however, not oblivious of the subsequent development of law both in England as well as in this jurisdiction. They held a dominant position in the United Kingdom market for absorbable surgical sutures and adopted an aggressive sales policy.' 37. We are, however, not oblivious of the subsequent development of law both in England as well as in this jurisdiction. The Chancery Division in Series 5 Software v. Clarke [(1996)1 All ER 853 (Ch D) opined] : (All ER p.864 c-e) 'In many cases before American Cyanamid (supra), the prospect of success was one of the important factors taken into account of assessing the balance of convenience. The Courts would be less willing to subject the plaintiff to the risk of irrecoverable loss which would befall him if an interlocutory injunction was refused in those cases where it thought he was likely to win at the trial than in those cases where it thought he was likely to lose. The assessment of the prospects of success therefore was an important factor in deciding whether the Court should exercise its discretion to grant interlocutory relief. It is this consideration which American Cyanamid (supra), is said to have prohibited in all but the most exceptional case. So it is necessary to consider with some care what was said in the House of Lords on this issue.' 38. In Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (supra), this Court observed that Laddie, J. in Series 5 Software (supra), had been able to resolve the issue without any departure from the true perspective of the judgment in American Cyanamid (supra). In that case, however, this Court was considering a matter under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969. 39. In S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. (supra), Jagannadha Rao, J. in a case arising under Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 reiterated the same principle stating that even the comparative strength and weaknesses of the parties may be a subject-matter of consideration for the purpose of grant of injunction in trade mark matters stating: (SCC p.591, para 21) '21. .... Therefore, in trade mark matters, it is now necessary to go into the question of "comparable strength" of the cases of either party, apart from balance of convenience, point 4 is decided accordingly.' 40. The said decisions were noticed yet again in a case involving infringement of trade mark in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [ (2001)5 SCC 73 ] : 21. The said decisions were noticed yet again in a case involving infringement of trade mark in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [ (2001)5 SCC 73 ] : 21. While considering the question of granting an order of injunction one way or the other, evidently, the Court, apart from finding out a prima facie case, would consider the question in regard to the balance of convenience of parties as also irreparable injury which might be suffered by the plaintiffs if the prayer for injunctions to be refused. The contention of the plaintiffs must be bona fide. The question sought to be tried must be a serious question and not only a mere triable issue {See: Dorab Cazwasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden [ (1990)2 SCC 117 ], Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh [ (1992)1 SCC 719 ], United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India [ (1981)2 SCC 766 ], Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. [(1995)5 SCC 5545], Bina Murlidhar Hemdev v. Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev [ (1999)5 SCC 222 ] and Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. (supra)}. 12. In my opinion, the injunction order granted by the trial Court is clearly in contravention of the orders passed by this Court in Miscellaneous Appeal No.674/2000 and Writ Petition No.1518/2008. The effect of granting injunction passed by the trial Court is that by the aforesaid order the trial Court has nullified the effect of the orders passed by this Court in Miscellaneous Appeal No.674/2000 and Writ Petition No.1518/2008. In my opinion, the trial Court has acted arbitrarily, illegally and against the well settled principle of law in granting the order of injunction. It has not at all considered properly the effect of the orders passed by this Court in Miscellaneous Appeal No.674/2000 and Writ Petition No.1518/2008. There is no prima facie case or balance of convenience lies in favour of the respondents neither there is any irreparable loss. Contrary to this, the order passed by the trial Court is clearly in violation of the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1518/2008. Hence, the impugned order is contrary to law and is liable to be quashed. 13. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellants is hereby allowed. The impugned order of injunction dated 17.11.2008 is hereby quashed. The injunction application filed by the respondents is hereby rejected. Hence, the impugned order is contrary to law and is liable to be quashed. 13. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellants is hereby allowed. The impugned order of injunction dated 17.11.2008 is hereby quashed. The injunction application filed by the respondents is hereby rejected. Looking to the nature of the case, in my opinion, it would be just and proper to impose a cost of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand only) against the respondents.