JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—These writ petitions (except Civil Misc. Writ Petition (PIL) No. 8968 of 2008) have been filed by the farmers of district Ghaziabad, State of Uttar Pradesh challenging the acquisition of their good agricultural land by the State of Uttar Pradesh for a Company (respondent No. 2). By two successive acquisition proceedings, first by issuing notification dated 11th February, 2004 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and second by issuing notification dated 29th August, 2006 under Section 4 of the Act, huge area of agricultural land measuring about 2500 acres was sought to be acquired for a power project to be established by the Company (respondent No. 2). 2. The above writ petitions can be categorises in four groups. The first group of writ petitions are Writ Petition No. 55578 of 2008 (Pooran and others v. State of U.P. and others) and other connected writ petitions which challenge both the acquisition proceedings, i.e., acquisition proceeding initiated by issuing notification dated 11th February, 2004 under Section 4 of the Act and the acquisition proceeding initiated by issuing notification dated 29th August, 2006 under Section 4 of the Act. The second group of writ petitions are Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14254 of 2008 (Kanti v. State of U.P. and others) and other connected writ petitions, which challenge the land acquisition proceeding initiated by issuing notification dated 11th February, 2004 under Section 4 of the Act. The third group of writ petitions are Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12014 of 2008 (Babu Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others) and other connected writ petitions which challenge the acquisition proceeding initiated by issuing notification dated 29th August, 2006 under Section 4 of the Act and the declaration dated 20th February, 2007 issued under Section 6 of the Act. The fourth group of writ petition is Civil Misc. Writ Petition (PIL) No. 55548 of 2008 (Vishwanath Pratap Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others), which is a public interest litigation challenging both the land acquisition proceedings initiated by issuing notifications under Section 4 of the Act dated 11th February, 2004 and 29th August, 2006. 3. The fourth group of writ petition is Civil Misc. Writ Petition (PIL) No. 55548 of 2008 (Vishwanath Pratap Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others), which is a public interest litigation challenging both the land acquisition proceedings initiated by issuing notifications under Section 4 of the Act dated 11th February, 2004 and 29th August, 2006. 3. The background facts giving rise to these writ petitions, briefly noted, are; Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited, a private registered company within the meaning of Companies Act, 1956 made an application on on 19th January, 2004 to the Chief Secretary of the State of U.P. expressing its interest in setting up of 3000-3500 MW Gas Based Thermal Power Station in Tahsil Hapur, District Ghaziabad. On the same day another letter dated 19th January, 2004 was submitted before the Collector by the Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited praying acquisition of 2500 acres of land in villages Baharmandpur, Jadonpur, Nand Lal Pur, Bajhera Khurd, Kakarana, Dhaulana and Dehra, Pargana Dasna, Tahsil Hapur, District Ghaziabad. The application was appended with relevant certificates and declarations for acquisition. The Additional District Magistrate submitted a report before the Collector, Ghaziabad for forwarding proposal of acquisition to the Director, Land Acquisition. The report noted that the Company has also deposited 10% acquisition charges and 10% estimated compensation. The Collector on 24th January, 2004 forwarded the acquisition proposal received from the Company to the Director, Land Acquisition, Board of Revenue, Lucknow. The Director after examining the proposal received from the Collector wrote a letter to the Principal Secretary (Energy) on 28th January, 2004 for taking steps for issuance of notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17 of the Act according to the procedure prescribed in Part-VII and VIII (Sections 38 to 55) of the Act. The letter of the Director, Land Acquisition was examined by the Energy Department of the State and a note was submitted that approval of Bhumi Upyog Parishad be obtained. The Principal Secretary, Niyojan Vibhag submitted a proposal that Reliance Delhi Power Limited being a private company, the proceedings of land acquisition be taken in accordance of Part VII (Sections 38 to 44B) of the Act for acquisition of 903.568 hectares of land, which was approved by the Chief Minister on 31st January, 2004. The Principal Secretary, Niyojan Vibhag submitted a proposal that Reliance Delhi Power Limited being a private company, the proceedings of land acquisition be taken in accordance of Part VII (Sections 38 to 44B) of the Act for acquisition of 903.568 hectares of land, which was approved by the Chief Minister on 31st January, 2004. After getting the approval of the Revenue Department, the notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act dated 11th February, 2004 for acquisition of 903.449 hectares of land for a public purpose, namely, for setting up Gas Based Thermal Power Station and Energy Research and Development Institution was issued. Section 17(4) was invoked for dispensing inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. A draft agreement under Section 41 of the Act was submitted by the Reliance Delhi Power Limited, which after the approval by the Hon’ble the Chief Minister, was executed on 19th February, 2004 between the Governor of U.P. and Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited. On 3rd March, 2004 an application by the Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited for additional land of 2500 acres for increasing the capacity of plant from 3000 MW to 7000-8000 MW was moved, however, subsequently the request for additional acquisition of 2500 acres of land was given up. A draft State Support Agreement was submitted by the Company to the Government in which several concessions and demands were made by the Company from the State Government. The request made in draft State Support Agreement was examined. A letter dated 2nd April, 2004 was written by the Collector, Ghaziabad stating that the acquisition proposal was sent to him on the request of the Company who had also deposited 20% of compensation but the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act by mistake does not mention the name of the Company, which may be examined. The Special Secretary (Energy) wrote that for acceding the demands made by the Company the Power Policy of the State needs to be amended. The amended Power Policy was approved by the Cabinet on 8th June, 2004 which provided several further benefits to the Company including that the State shall bear 60% of cost of acquisition. The State Support Agreement was executed on 16th June, 2004 incorporating several clauses beneficial to the Company including new concessions and benefits and sharing of the cost to the extent of 60% by the Government. The State Support Agreement was executed on 16th June, 2004 incorporating several clauses beneficial to the Company including new concessions and benefits and sharing of the cost to the extent of 60% by the Government. After execution of the State Support Agreement the declaration under Section 6 was issued on 25th June, 2004. In November, 2004 the State Government claimed to have taken possession of the land. The farmers were asked to enter into an agreement under the U.P. Land Acquisition (Determination of Compensation and Declaration of Award by Agreement) Rules, 1997 and receive compensation. Large number of farmers signed the agreement and received compensation. The compensation was offered at the rate of Rs. 150/- per square yard. 4. The State executed a conveyance deed on 23rd November, 2005 transferring the acquired land in favour of the Company. In May, 2006 an agitation was started by the farmers against the acquisition of the land. The farmers united under the leadership of late Vishwanath Pratap Singh, Ex-Prime Minister of India raising protest and demonstrations. On 17th August, 2006 a big rally was proposed in district Ghazaibad under the leadership of Ex-Prime Minister. The police administration issued order under Section 144 of Cr.P.C. for preventing any rally or demonstration. In August, 2006 in demonstrations and rallies several farmers were injured and first information reports were lodged. On 29th August, 2006 another notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of 53.236 hectares of land in the aforesaid villages. Section 17(4) of the Act was also invoked dispensing with the inquiry. The declaration under Section 6 with regard to the aforesaid land was issued on 20th February, 2007. On 20th December, 2007 the Additional District Magistrate, Land Acquisition wrote a letter to the Company that several farmers have neither executed the agreement nor accepted compensation and the same may be completed within three days. 5. A writ petition being Writ Petition (Civil) No. 680 of 2007 (Sahyog Samiti v. State of U.P. and others) was filed in Supreme Court in October, 2007 under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the vires of Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Act and further praying to quash notification dated 11th February, 2004 issued under Section 4 of the Act of the above mentioned seven villages. The writ petition was taken up by the Supreme Court on 8th February, 2008, which issued notices confining prayer (a) praying for declaration of Sections 3, 4 and 5 as ultra vires. Prayer (b) and (c) challenging the notification under Section 4 of the Act were permitted to be deleted. The respondent No. 2 (Company), which was also one of the parties in the writ petition was deleted. A writ petition being Writ Petition (Civil) No. 12 of 2008 was filed in the Supreme Court by Ranbir Singh and others challenging the acquisition proceeding initiated by notification dated 11th February, 2004 in which an order was passed by the Supreme Court on 11th January, 2008 permitting withdrawal of the writ petition with liberty to approach the High Court. On 30th January, 2008 Writ Petition No. 4992 of 2008 was filed by one Somvir Singh in the High Court in which a limited interim order was granted on 27th February, 2008. The most of the writ petitions, which are up for consideration were filed in February/March, 2008. The last writ petition filed is Writ Petition No. 55578 of 2008 in October, 2008. 6. As noted above, in some of the writ petitions both the notifications issued in the year 2004 and 2006 under Section 4 of the Act were challenged, in some of the writ petitions notification under Section 4 issued in the year 2004 has been challenged and in some of the writ petitions notification under Section 4 issued in the year 2006 has been challenged. A comprehensive relief has been claimed in Writ Petition No. 55578 of 2008 challenging both the acquisition proceedings of the year 2004 and 2006. It is useful to reproduce the reliefs as claimed in Writ Petition No. 55578 of 2008, which are as under : “(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction thereby quashing the Notification bearing No. 406 P-3-24-2004-4 (Land Acquisition) 2004 dt. 11.2.2004 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (Annexure 3) and the consequent proceedings arising thereform; (ii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction thereby quashing the Notification bearing No. 1582-P-3-24-2004-4 (Land Acquisition) 2004 dt. 25.6.2004 under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (Annexure 7) and the consequent proceedings arising therefrom; (iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction thereby quashing the Notification bearing No. 2770/24-P-3-2006-4 (Land Acquisition) 2004 dt. 25.6.2004 under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (Annexure 7) and the consequent proceedings arising therefrom; (iii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction thereby quashing the Notification bearing No. 2770/24-P-3-2006-4 (Land Acquisition) 2004 dt. 29.8.2006 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (Annexure 9) and the consequent proceedings arising thereform; (iv) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction thereby quashing the Notification under Section 6 bearing No. 509/P-3-24-2007-4 (Land Acquisition) 2004 dt. 20.2.2007 (Annexure 10) and the consequent proceedings arising thereform; (v) Quash the Amendments made in the Power Policy on 8.6.2004 (Annexure 5) and declare the same as null and void; (vi) Quash the State Support Agreement dated 16.6.2004 executed between respondent No. 2 and respondent State (Annexure 6) and the Conveyance Deed dt. 23.11.2005 between the respondents No. 1 and 2 (Annexure__); (vii) Issue any other or further writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case; (viii) Award the costs of the petition to the petitioner.” 7. The petitioners in all the above writ petitions have pleaded and claimed that they are still in possession of their agricultural land and are continuing with their agriculture. The respondent No. 2 has not started any construction of the project, building or any other work except construction of boundary wall in some areas with a site office. At the time of entertainment of the writ petition following was the interim order passed by this Court in most of the writ petitions : “Till the next date of listing, the petitioners shall not be dispossessed from the land in question. However, this order will not give any right to re-enter if they have already been dispossessed.” 8. The interim order granted was extended from time to time. 9. We have heard Sri Shashi Nandan, Sri V.K. Singh learned Senior Advocates assisted by Sri Hari Pillai, Sri Ashish Pratap Singh, Sri Vinay Singh and, Advocates for the petitioners, Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri W.H. Khan, Senior Advocate, Sri M.K. Gupta, Sri Gaurav Bhatia, Sri Manish Tandon, Sri Shantanu Krishna and Sri Prateek Dwivedi, Advocates for respondent No. 2 and Sri Jafar Naiyer, Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri M.C. Tripathi and Sri P.K. Pandey for the State. 10. 10. By an earlier order dated 16th September, 2008 the Additional Advocate General was directed to produce the entire original record relating to acquisition in question for perusal of the Court. The record pertaining to Power Policy of 2003 and 2004 were also directed to be produced. The learned Additional Advocate General has produced the original record in the Court, which were also perused by the counsel for both the parties. Learned counsels for both the parties have made their submissions on the basis of pleadings on the record as well as on the basis of original record pertaining to land acquisition as produced by the learned Additional Advocate General under the orders of the Court. 11. Challenging the land acquisition proceedings, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that huge chunk of valuable agricultural land has been handed over by the State on a platter to respondent No. 2. The submission of the petitioners’ counsel is that proceedings for acquisition were started on an application dated 19th January, 2004 of Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited, a private company registered under the Companies Act. The Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited requested acquisition for the Company after depositing 10% estimated compensation and 10% acquisition charges. It is submitted that the Collector after receipt of the application dated 19th January, 2004 forwarded the proposal to the Director, Land Acquisition vide his letter dated 24th January, 2004 for issuing notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act as acquisition “for a company”. The Director, Land Acquisition also recommended acquisition “for a company” after compliance of Part-VII (Sections 39 to 44B) of the Act. The approval was also granted on the said recommendation by Hon’ble the Chief Minister on 31st January, 2004. However, notification under Section 4 was illegally issued without mentioning that the acquisition is “for a company”, rather the notification mentioned the acquisition “for public purpose”. Even after the notification under Section 4 of the Act, the agreement under Section 41 of the Act between the Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited and the Governor of U.P. was executed in which the company had undertaken to bear all cost of acquisition without there being any financial burden on the State. In the agreement executed under Section 41 of the Act there is no clause that the State shall contribute any part towards expenses for acquisition. In the agreement executed under Section 41 of the Act there is no clause that the State shall contribute any part towards expenses for acquisition. After execution of the agreement a request was received from the Company for granting several undue benefits including bearing of substantial part of cost of land acquisition by the State. It is contended that respondent No. 2 being in good terms with the then Chief Minister, all the request made on behalf of the Company, which burdened the State with huge financial liability and other liabilities was acceded. The Power Policy 2003, which do not contain any condition for bearing of expenses by the State, was amended at the instance of respondent No. 2 and State Support Agreement was executed on 16th June, 2004 containing the terms and conditions, which were highly beneficial to the Company and unreasonably disregarding the views expressed by the Revenue Department of the State and other Departments that such conditions will not be in the interest of the State and the State shall be burdened with unnecessary liability of more than Rs. 800 crores. The State illegally invoked the power under Section 17 of the Act while issuing notification under Section 4 of the Act, which power was not available as the acquisition was for a company. The agricultural land of the petitioners are good land on which the petitioners and their family depend for their livelihood. The petitioners have been deprived from their agricultural land in breach of the provisions of the Act. The acquisition being really an acquisition for a company, the procedure prescribed under the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (Hereinafter referred to as 1963 Rules) was required to be followed. The provisions of 1963 Rules mandates fulfilment of various conditions precedent for acquisition for a company including hearing to the land owners. The provisions of the 1963 Rules require that where the land proposed to be acquired is a good agricultural land, the acquisition of such land should be avoided. The provisions of Part-VII of the Act are mandatory to be complied with before acquisition for a company. The submission is that neither the provisions of Part VII of the Act nor the provisions of the 1963 Rules have been followed by the State while proceeding with the acquisition in favour of respondent No. 2 only with intent to give undue benefit to respondent No. 2. The submission is that neither the provisions of Part VII of the Act nor the provisions of the 1963 Rules have been followed by the State while proceeding with the acquisition in favour of respondent No. 2 only with intent to give undue benefit to respondent No. 2. It is submitted that petitioners being illiterate agriculturists were no match to stand up against the might of the State and might of respondent No. 2 and were forced to accept the meagre compensation offered by the Collector. It is submitted that camps were held in all villages and petitioners were asked to sign and receive compensation. The submission is that petitioners did not accept the compensation of their own freewill but forced to accept the same under the circumstances. It is submitted that petitioners have started uniting and raising their voice against the acquisition of good agricultural land since May, 2006 and subsequently their agitation was led by former Prime Minister late Sri Vishwanath Pratap Singh. The petitioners were neither negligent nor they have given up their rights although agitation against the first acquisition initiated by notification dated 11th February, 2004 was still going on when fresh notification was issued on 29th August, 2006 for acquiring 53.236 hectares of land, which was agitated too. It is submitted that the farmers whose land was covered by second notification neither entered into any agreement nor accepted any compensation and continued their protest against the acquisition of land. It is submitted that the acquisition was for a company, which is apparent from various correspondences and reports on the original records including the agreement under Section 41 of the Act. The State Support Agreement was subsequently executed at the instance of respondent No. 2 by getting the power policy amended, which cannot change the nature of acquisition. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Devindra Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 2008 SC 261 : 2008(1) SCC 728 , it is contended that infusion of the State fund cannot be made after execution of the agreement under Section 41 of the Act. It is contended that after the amendment of the Act by Act No. 68 of 1984, the legislative scheme of the acquisition has gone sea change and acquisition for a company cannot be made in any other manner except after compliance of Part VII of the Act. It is contended that after the amendment of the Act by Act No. 68 of 1984, the legislative scheme of the acquisition has gone sea change and acquisition for a company cannot be made in any other manner except after compliance of Part VII of the Act. The amendments made in Sections 3(f), 4, 6, 17 and 39 of the Act have been relied by counsel for the petitioners. It is further submitted that there was no material for invoking Section 17 of the Act. Further there was no application of mind nor any basis for dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. The acquisition in question is by way of colourable exercise of power, which vitiate the entire proceeding. The entire acquisition proceedings are tainted with fraud and collusion by the State Government and the respondent No. 2, which makes the entire proceedings non-est and void. It is further submitted that Delhi Power Private Limited being a private company, the acquisition at its instance could be made only for the purposes mentioned in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 40, hence the entire proceeding is without jurisdiction. The respondent No. 2 was a private company, which continued to be as such till 31st March, 2004 when incorporation was made certifying change of the company from being a private limited company to a public limited company, which was intimated to the Government on 10th April, 2004. The land acquired is much in excess and there has been no appropriate inquiry regarding requirement of the land. It is submitted that in the original records there is noting by the Principal Secretary (Energy) that TATA’s have requested for only 120 acres of land for establishment of 1000 MW power project. The petitioners have been throughout in the possession of the agricultural land and carrying on their agricultural activities. The project of respondent No. 2 has not even started in all these period and according to the respondents themselves only thing, which has been constructed, is a boundary wall and site office. The acquisition proceeding in favour of respondent No. 2 (Company) ought not to have been continued when they resiled from their commitment that entire cost of acquisition shall be borne by them. The agreement under Section 41 of the Act was also published in U.P. Gazette in September, 2004, which indicates that agreement under Section 41 subsisted. The acquisition proceeding in favour of respondent No. 2 (Company) ought not to have been continued when they resiled from their commitment that entire cost of acquisition shall be borne by them. The agreement under Section 41 of the Act was also published in U.P. Gazette in September, 2004, which indicates that agreement under Section 41 subsisted. It is also submitted that for acquisition for a company, compliance of Part VII of the Act is mandatory and even if the State decided to contribute amount towards payment of compensation, they cannot change the nature and procedure of acquisition for a company. The entire proceeding for acquisition being tainted by fraud and being colourable exercise of power by the State to unduly benefit respondent No. 2, is liable to be struck down by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The facts and events as took place after the acquisition proceeding clearly indicate that petitioners were neither negligent nor at any point of time have acquiesced to the illegal proceedings. The delay in filing the writ petition deserves to be ignored in the interest of justice. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on various judgments of the Apex Court and different High Courts, which shall be referred to hereinafter while considering the submissions in detail. 13. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for respondent No. 2 refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners contends that petitioners are not entitled for any relief in the writ petition. Sri Dwivedi contends that writ petitions have been filed after long delay of more than four years that too after majority of farmers including the petitioners have accepted the amount of compensation after entering into agreement under the 1997 Rules. It is submitted that the ground of laches and delay is not a technical ground, rather is a substantive ground for dismissal of the writ petition. It is submitted that petitioners having acquiesced to the proceedings by not challenging the notification within reasonable time, they are now estopped from challenging the land acquisition proceedings. It is submitted that in all 5827 farmers were affected by acquisition proceedings, majority of the farmers have accepted compensation and only 513 farmers are remaining, who have not accepted compensation. It is submitted that the petitioners have no right to challenge the land acquisition proceeding after accepting the compensation. It is submitted that in all 5827 farmers were affected by acquisition proceedings, majority of the farmers have accepted compensation and only 513 farmers are remaining, who have not accepted compensation. It is submitted that the petitioners have no right to challenge the land acquisition proceeding after accepting the compensation. It is also submitted that in certain writ petitions facts have been suppressed that compensation were accepted by the petitioners. It is submitted that Chandrapal Singh had filed Writ Petition No. 6471 of 2006 in which notification dated 11th February, 2006 was not challenged and only challenge was made that State be restrained from taking forceful possession of their land without any proceeding. It is submitted that in Writ Petition No. 6471 of 2006 no challenge was made of acquisition proceeding initiated by notification dated 11th February, 2004, which indicated that petitioner of that case was not aggrieved by 2004 acquisition. The writ petitions filed by the petitioners and its prosecution by a battery of lawyers indicates that petitions are proxy petitions on behalf of the business rivals of respondent No. 2 and are not bona fide writ petitions. In support of his submission that all the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, Sri Dwivedi has placed reliance on number of judgments of the Apex Court, which shall be hereinafter referred to while considering the said submission in detail. 14. Sri Dwivedi submits that in the facts of the present case, it is not necessary to consider various submissions raised by the petitioners challenging the land acquisition proceeding. Sri Dwivedi, however, has made his submissions replying various arguments of the petitioners. Sri Dwivedi contends that even on merits the submissions of the petitioners have no legs to stand. Sri Dwivedi submitted that after the enforcement of the the Electricity Act, 2003 generation companies have to be given a boost to generate more and more power for serving the common good. He submits that on generation companies the State can exercise statutory control. The Electricity Act, 2003 itself encourage private sector to come up in generation of power. He submits that there is acute shortage of power generation in the State of U.P. and in view of the Power Policy 2003 an application was submitted by respondent No. 2 for establishing a mega power project. The Electricity Act, 2003 itself encourage private sector to come up in generation of power. He submits that there is acute shortage of power generation in the State of U.P. and in view of the Power Policy 2003 an application was submitted by respondent No. 2 for establishing a mega power project. The submission is that respondent No. 2 has taken several power projects in different parts of the country and at present there are thirteen power projects, which are being established in different parts of the country by respondent No. 2. It is submitted that Power Policy 2003 of the Government is a open ended policy. The issuance of notification under Section 4 dated 11th February, 2004 referring the purpose of acquisition as public purpose was fully justified. It cannot be denied that generation of power is in public interest and establishment of a power project shall serve maximum public good. Even though application was given by respondent No. 2 for acquisition, the State was fully justified in issuing notification under Section 4 notifying the purpose as a public purpose. The State was required to provide land under the Power Policy 2003 for a project. The project of respondent No. 2 was a public purpose project and the State was within its right to issue notification under Section 4 of the Act notifying it as public purpose. The Part VII of the Act and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 are not applicable in the acquisition in question. The Power Policy having been amended on 8th June, 2004 and the State Support Agreement having been executed on 16th June, 2004 infusing substantial fund by the State Government up to the extent of 60% of acquisition cost, the acquisition was under Part-II of the Act and declaration made under Section 6 on 26th June, 2004 that land is needed for public purpose is fully in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the law as laid down by the Apex Court. It is contended that execution of the agreement under Section 41 of the Act was erroneous exercise, which does not affect in any manner the acquisition proceeding. Clause 3k of the State Support Agreement dated 16th June, 2004 has been referred to which provided that suitable amendment in agreement under Section 41 of the Act be made to give effect the State Support Agreement. Clause 3k of the State Support Agreement dated 16th June, 2004 has been referred to which provided that suitable amendment in agreement under Section 41 of the Act be made to give effect the State Support Agreement. The acquisition being an acquisition for public purpose, the provisions of Section 17(1) and 17(4) were available and were rightly invoked by the State. It is submitted that State Support Agreement stipulates that 40% of the generated power shall be given to the State of U.P. It is stated that there was sufficient materials for invoking power under Section 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, the implementation of power project being an urgent need. No kind of fraud was practised on the petitioners in entering into the agreement under the 1997 Rules for accepting the compensation. There are no sufficient pleadings in the writ petition with regard to any particulars of fraud played on the petitioners. The allegations of fraud have to be specifically pleaded and proved in which the petitioners have utterly failed. It is not pleaded as to who put force on the petitioners to accept the compensation at which place. 15. Sri Dwivedi, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, contends that basic test for determining as to whether acquisition was for public purpose or not even though it was initiated at the instance of respondent No. 2 is the factum of infusion of fund by the State. In the present case decision having been taken by the State for infusion of fund to the extent of 60% of the acquisition cost, the acquisition is an acquisition for public purpose. It is submitted that it is open for the State to infuse the fund before declaration under Section 6 of the Act is issued and in the present case the declaration under Section 6 having been issued on 25th June, 2004, the fact that it is a public purpose acquisition was fully justified and in accordance with law. The submission is that the petitioners were well aware of Section 4 and Section 6 notifications and they having also accepted the compensation, they cannot be heard in challenging the acquisition. The possession was taken by the State after issuance of notice under Section 9 of the Act. The submission is that the petitioners were well aware of Section 4 and Section 6 notifications and they having also accepted the compensation, they cannot be heard in challenging the acquisition. The possession was taken by the State after issuance of notice under Section 9 of the Act. The conveyance deed has also been executed in favour of respondent No. 2 on 23rd November, 2005 and the name of respondent No. 2 has already been entered into the revenue records. The case of the petitioners that they still continue in possession of the agricultural land cannot be accepted. The respondent No. 2 has constructed eight kilometres boundary wall for enclosing the acquired land and the site office has also been constructed. Under the 1997 Rules under which the petitioners entered into the agreement and accepted the compensation, no applications have been given by the petitioners to cancel the agreement, which clearly shows that petitioners have no genuine grievance against the acquisition. In fact the petitioners’’ grievance was with regard to amount of compensation since they had claimed before the Collector payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 300 per square yard. There is no colourable exercise of power by the State and there are no allegation in the writ petitions that any force was used in payment of compensation to the farmers. The petitioners voluntarily accepted the compensation and there being voluntariness the estopple, acquiescence shall automatically be applicable. None of the petitioners have filed any document to show that market value of the land is considerably higher than Rs. 150 per square yard. Sri Dwivedi replying the submissions of petitioners’ counsel regarding amendment brought in the Act by Act No. 68 of 1984, contended that amended provisions have to be harmoniously construed. In case of acquisition for company Part VII shall be applicable only when the acquisition is an acquisition simplicitor, i.e., when there is no infusion of fund by the State but after infusion of fund by the State Part VII shall not be applicable. The exclusion as contained in Section 3(f) will cover those cases where company wants land for its own purpose irrespective of any Government policy. Replying the submission raised by counsel for the petitioners regarding Section 44-B of the Act, it is submitted that Company was a public limited company by purchase of share by another company, namely, Patal Ganga Public Limited. Replying the submission raised by counsel for the petitioners regarding Section 44-B of the Act, it is submitted that Company was a public limited company by purchase of share by another company, namely, Patal Ganga Public Limited. However, if the respondent No. 2 is treated as private company, no acquisition can be made in its favour under Part VII, which shall make Part VII inapplicable and only course open is to take recourse for acquisition under Part II of the Act. 16. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 supported his various submissions by referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts, which shall be referred to while considering the submissions in detail. 17. Sri Jafar Naiyer, learned Additional Advocate General made his submissions on behalf of the State. Sri Jafar Naiyer referring to the counter-affidavit of the State submitted that Government at that time proceeded on the request of respondent No. 2. It was further submitted that amendments in the Power Policy were made solely at the behest of respondent No. 2. He submits that it is difficult to deny that in the agreement, which was entered into on 19th February, 2004, the entire cost of acquisition was to be borne by the Company. However, subsequently by amending Power Policy a major chunk of the cost bearing fell on the State. The Additional Advocate General submits that it is difficult to deny that State Support Agreement is prima facie beneficial to the Company and the State was burdened with various obligations. Referring to the original records, the Additional Advocate General submitted that while processing the request of respondent No. 2 for acquisition of the land at various stages deviations were allowed from the prescribed procedure and need for the strict compliance of the procedure of the Land Acquisition Act/Rules were unfortunately given a go-bye. Learned Additional Advocate General submits that original records pertaining to entire process of land acquisition have been placed before the Court for its perusal, which may be looked into. 18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the pleadings of the parties in the writ petition as well as the original records pertaining to both the land acquisition proceedings. 19. 18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the pleadings of the parties in the writ petition as well as the original records pertaining to both the land acquisition proceedings. 19. From the submissions of learned counsel for the parties following issues arise for consideration in this writ petition : (i) Whether the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches? (ii) Whether the land acquisition proceedings for acquiring 2500 acres of land at Tahsil Dasna, District Ghaziabad were initiated at the instance of respondent No. 2 as an acquisition ‘’for a company’ or acquisition proceedings were initiated by the State ‘’for a public purpose’? (iii) Whether the notification issued under Section 4 dated 11th February, 2004 and declaration issued under Section 6 dated 25th June, 2004 declaring the land acquisition for public purpose is valid? (iv) If the application given by respondent No. 2 was for acquisition ‘’for a company’, whether Section 17 of the Act was available for such acquisition? (v) What is the effect and consequence on the acquisition for a company after amendment made in the Land Acquisition Act by Act No. 68 of 1984 in different sections of the Act? (vi) What is the stage up to which the State can infuse fund on an acquisition proceeding initiated by a company to make the acquisition as a public purpose acquisition? (vii) Whether in facts and circumstances of the present case in impugned acquisition proceedings initiated by notification dated 11th February, 2004 compliance of Part VII of the Act was mandatory? (viii) Whether for the acquisition in question, it was mandatory to comply with the provisions of Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963? (ix) Whether for the 2006 acquisition initiated by notification dated 29.8.2006 there was sufficient material and justification for invoking Section 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act? (x) To what relief/benefit the petitioners are entitled in the present writ petitions? 20. Before we proceed to examine various submissions raised by learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to look into necessary facts, which led to the impugned acquisition proceedings. (x) To what relief/benefit the petitioners are entitled in the present writ petitions? 20. Before we proceed to examine various submissions raised by learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to look into necessary facts, which led to the impugned acquisition proceedings. One of the issues in the writ petitions being as to whether the impugned acquisition proceedings are acquisition proceedings for a company or for public purpose, attending facts and circumstances and various decisions taken by the competent authority at the relevant time is to be ascertained. For appreciating the issues between the parties the facts which led to the impugned acquisition have to be noted in detail. 21. On 15th January, 2004 one Sri Satish Seth, Executive Vice Chairman of B.S.E.S. Limited, a member of reliance group, wrote a letter to Hon’ble the Chief Minister, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow expressing its interest to set-up a Gas Based Power Project of the capacity of 3000 MW by investing Rs. 10,000 crores. The letter further stated that applicants are exploring suitable location in the State for locating their investment and have short listed few sites near Kanpur, Gautam Budh Nagar and Dadri. It is stated that the project neither requires any power purchase agreement nor payment security mechanism nor State Government’s guarantee and thus the same would not cause any burden on the financial position of the State. After four days another letter dated 19th January, 2004 was submitted by the Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited, a private limited company, to the Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh expressing interest regarding setting up of 3000-3500 MW Gas Based Thermal Power Plant and Energy Research Institute in Uttar Pradesh. The copy of the memorandum, article of association and relevant Board resolutions were submitted along with the application. On the same day, i.e., 19th January, 2004 the Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited submitted an application to the Collector Ghaziabad praying for acquisition of 2500 acres of land for setting up a 3000 MW Combined Cycle Gas Based Thermal Power Station and Energy Research and Development Institute. The letter further stated that the applicants have identified an area ad-measuring 2500 acres in village Baharmandpur, Jadonpur, Nand Lal Pur, Bajhera Khurd, Kakarana, Dhaulana and Dehra, Pargana Dasna, Tahsil Hapur, District Ghaziabad. The letter further stated that the applicants have identified an area ad-measuring 2500 acres in village Baharmandpur, Jadonpur, Nand Lal Pur, Bajhera Khurd, Kakarana, Dhaulana and Dehra, Pargana Dasna, Tahsil Hapur, District Ghaziabad. Along with the application article of association of the Company, Board resolutions and various declarations given on behalf of the Company for acquisition of the required land was submitted. On the application dated 19th January, 2004 submitted by Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited a report dated 24th January, 2004 was submitted by the Additional District Magistrate, Land Acquisition stating that Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited has submitted a proposal for acquisition of the land proposed to be acquired with statement that a draft of 10% land acquisition expenses and 10% of the estimated compensation has also been submitted. The request of the Company has been noticed that Company has prayed for invoking Section 17 of the Act. The report stated that preliminary inquiry and spot inspection have been made and the report has been obtained from Incharge Officer (Ceiling). The report further stated that proposal for acquisition and for issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Government is to be made available through Director, Land Acquisition, Board of Revenue, U.P. The Collector on the same day, i.e., 24th January, 2004 wrote a letter to the Director, Land Acquisition with regard to above mentioned villages separately requesting for taking appropriate steps for issuing notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act. The Director, Land Acquisition after receipt of the proposal of acquisition from Collector sent the proposal to the Principal Secretary (Energy), Government of U.P., Lucknow stating that since Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited is a private company keeping in view the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963, on the proposal proceeding be undertaken in accordance with Part VII and VIII (Sections 38 to 55) of the Act and the notification under Section 4(1)/17 can be issued only thereafter. The letter dated 28th January, 2004 sent by the Director, Land Acquisition was examined and a note was put up on 30th January, 2004 that before issuance of notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act an agreement is to be executed under Section 41 of the Act as the Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited is a private company. The letter dated 28th January, 2004 sent by the Director, Land Acquisition was examined and a note was put up on 30th January, 2004 that before issuance of notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act an agreement is to be executed under Section 41 of the Act as the Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited is a private company. It was further recommended that before taking permission of the Revenue Department for invoking Section 17 of the Act, the proposal be got examined by the Bhumi Upyog Parishad. The note was forwarded on the same day by the Principal Secretary to the Bhumi Upyog Parishad. The Kshetra Adhikari, Bhumi Upyog Parishad submitted a note that Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited being a private company Part VII and VIII of the Act are to be taken into consideration. The Additional Director, Land Acquisition put up a note on 31st January, 2004, which was forwarded by the Principal Secretary, Niyojan Vibhag and also signed by the Chief Minister on the same day. The Secretary (Revenue) submitted a similar note on 3rd February, 2004 recommending that before issuance of notification under Section 4(1)/17 agreement meant for private company is to be executed. Certain queries were made by the Secretary (Energy) from the Collector, which was replied by the Collector vide his letter dated 6th February, 2004. The Special Secretary (Energy) thereafter submitted his note dated 6th February, 2004 proposing issuance of notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act. The notification under Section 4(1)/17 was forwarded to the Collector Ghaziabad for publication in the newspaper and for submitting proposal for notification under Section 6. The proforma of the agreement was prepared, which was required to be executed in accordance with Section 41 of the Act (in accordance with Form 14 of the Land Acquisition (Manual). A note was put up by Principal Secretary (Energy) to Hon’ble the Chief Minister for approval. The approval was granted on 19th February, 2004 by Hon’ble the Chief Minister and an agreement under Section 41 was executed on 19th February, 2004. As noted above, the format of the agreement to be executed under Section 41 was examined by the Principal Secretary (Energy) and the Principal Secretary, Law Department, which were also approved by Hon’ble the Chief Minister on 19th February, 2004, which is revealed from the original record of the State Government. As noted above, the format of the agreement to be executed under Section 41 was examined by the Principal Secretary (Energy) and the Principal Secretary, Law Department, which were also approved by Hon’ble the Chief Minister on 19th February, 2004, which is revealed from the original record of the State Government. The agreement was entered into between the Governor of the Uttar Pradesh (first party) and Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited (second party). It is necessary to look into certain clauses of the agreement, which was entered between the parties. The relevant portion of the agreement is extracted below : “AN AGREEMENT made the 19th day of February, 2004 BETWEEN the Governor of Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter called ‘’the First Party’) of the one part AND— “Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited a Company Incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and having its registered office at BSES House; Santacruz (East), Mumbai-400 055 (herein called ‘’the Second Party’) of the other part; WHEREAS the Second Party has made an application to the Government of Uttar Pradesh (hereinafter called the State Government) to acquire for the purposes of the Second Party under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the land described in Schedule I hereto (and delineated on the plan hereto annexed); AND WHEREAS the State Government is satisfied that the Second Party is a company within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the said Land Acquisition Act; AND WHEREAS under Section 41 of the said Land Acquisition Act, it is necessary that the Second Party should enter into an agreement with the First Party regarding matters specified in the section read with the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963; NOW THAT it is hereby agreed declared as follows : 1. That the second party will pay to the State Government or such person or persons as the State Government may appoint in this behalf all such sums of money as shall be awarded by the Collector under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or by Court to which a reference under Part III of the said Act may be made, or by the Court or Courts including the High Court or the Supreme Court to which an appeal from the award of the Court may be preferred, as compensation to any person or persons who may be found on inquiry held under the provisions thereof to be interested in the said land. 2. That the second party will pay to the State Government from its fund all costs, charges and expenses of proceedings in the Courts or otherwise incidental to the proposed acquisition or payable in interest thereof under the provisions of the said Act and in particular, upon a reference being made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the second party shall, within seven days of receiving the demand, deposit with the Collector all estimated costs, charges and expenses computed on the differential in the compensation claims made by persons interested (including the counsel’s fee and other expenses incidental to the reference or payable in respect thereof), failing which the first party may, without prejudice, to any other remedy, recover the amount spent or the expenses incurred from the second party as arrears of land revenue and may also rescind or withdraw from the proceedings in acquisition and all loss resulting therefrom shall be borne by and be to the account of the second party : Provided however that the second party may at its option, instead of making the aforesaid deposit in cash furnish in whole or in part Bank Guarantee in like amount to the satisfaction of the Collector but this shall be subject always to the second party getting the guarantee extended from time to time till the proceedings including appeal under reference have been finally disposed of, failing which the same consequences shall be ensue as are provided hereinbefore in respect of default in deposit of the amounts mentioned hereinabove. 3. .................................... 4. 3. .................................... 4. That upon the second party having made all payments incidental to the acquisition of such land as mentioned in clauses 1, 2 and 3 hereof the first party will forthwith but without prejudice to his rights to recover from the second party enhanced compensation, if any, awarded by any Court in respect of the said land, convey and grant to the second party the said land described in Schedule I hereto TO HOLD the same unto the second party for every subject to the conditions hereinafter setforth, namely : (1) that the second party, its successors, and assignees, will use the said land for the aforesaid purpose and for no other purpose without the previous sanction in writing of the State Government; (2) that the Second Party shall within three years of being put in possession of the said land erect and complete all work in accordance with the particulars specified in Schedule II hereto under supervision of the District Officer or an office authorized by him in this behalf. The District Officer shall make half-yearly report to the State Government and the Land Acquisition Committee indicating the conditions, which have been or have not been complied with as well as on the progress of the work and on the amount of money spent progressively on the work. If the State Government is satisfied after such inquiry as it may deem necessary that the second party was prevented by reasons beyond its control from erecting, providing, constructing or executing the said work within the said period of three years, the State Government may extend the time for that purpose by a period not exceeding one year at a time so however that the total period of extension shall not exceed three years and upon extension being granted, the second Party shall erect, provide, construct or execute the said work within the extended period; (3) .................................... (4) .................................... (5) .................................... (4) .................................... (5) .................................... (6) that in case of a breach by the Second Party of any of the terms and conditions of this agreement, the First Party shall be entitled to declare the transfer of the land to the Second Party as null and void whereupon the land shall revert back to the State Government and an amount equal to one-forth of the amount paid by the Second Party to the State Government as the cost of acquisition under clauses 1, 2 and 3 hereinbefore shall be forfeited to the State Government as damages and the balance shall be refunded to the Second Party, and the order so made by the State Government shall be final and binding on the Second Party PROVIDED THAT the State Government shall not make an order under this sub-clause unless the Second Party has been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter.” 22. The Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited sent a letter dated 27th February, 2004 to the Chief Secretary forwarding a draft of State Support Agreement. On 3rd March, 2004 a communication was addressed by Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited to the Government requesting for acquisition of additional land of 2500 acres stating that capacity of the project is proposed to be enhanced from 3000 MW to 7000-8000 MW. Hon’ble the Chief Minister ordered that Energy Department may act as Nodal Agency for additional acquisition of 2500 acres of land. A letter dated 2nd April, 2004 was sent by the Collector that notification dated 11th February, 2004 has omitted to mention the name of the Company for which the land is being proposed to be acquired, which may be considered. On the request made by the Company for additional land, a note was submitted by the Principal Secretary (Energy) to the Chief Secretary of the State recommending that justification for minimum requirement of land be got technically examined by Central Regulatory Electricity Authority especially when the State is extending various concessions. On 11th May, 2004 the Chief Secretary approved the proposal for technical evaluation of minimum requirement of the land. Thereafter discussion was made with officials of the Company in which discussion they did not press for additional acquisition. Thus the request of additional acquisition of 2500 acres of land was given up when Chief Secretary wrote for getting the minimum requirement technically examined. 23. Thereafter discussion was made with officials of the Company in which discussion they did not press for additional acquisition. Thus the request of additional acquisition of 2500 acres of land was given up when Chief Secretary wrote for getting the minimum requirement technically examined. 23. As noticed above, the draft State Support Agreement was submitted by the Company and thereafter the same was sent to the Revenue Department of the State for its evaluation. At the level of Principal Secretary (Energy) and the Chief Secretary of the State of U.P. several meetings were held in which it was realised that in case the Company is extended any benefit other than those, which are permissible under the Power Policy 2003, the Power Policy 2003 needs to be amended. A detail note was submitted by the Special Secretary (Energy) dated 31st May, 2004 in this regard. It was decided to place the matter before the Cabinet for amendment of Power Policy 2003 to enable more benefits to be given to the Company. The Cabinet approved the amendments in the Power Policy in its meeting dated 8th June, 2004. The amended Power Policy provided for cost sharing in the acquisition to the following extent : “B. GOUP would acquire the required land for the project and transfer the same to the project. Land for the project would include land required for setting up the power plant and other associated facilities. GOUP would subsidise the cost of land and the cost of resettlement of project affected families as follows. Capital cost between Rs. 1000-2500 cr : 20% of the cost of land and 20% of the cost of resettlement of project affected families would be borne by GOUP. For coal thermal plants where land requirements are higher 10% of the cost of land and 10% of the cost of resettlement of project affected families would be borne by GOUP. Capital cost between Rs. 2500-5000 cr : 40% of the cost of land and 40% of the cost of resettlement of project affected families would be borne by GOUP. For coal thermal plants where land requirements are higher 20% of the cost of land and 20% of the cost of resettlement of project affected families would be borne by GOUP. Capital cost greater than Rs. For coal thermal plants where land requirements are higher 20% of the cost of land and 20% of the cost of resettlement of project affected families would be borne by GOUP. Capital cost greater than Rs. 5000 cr : 60% of the cost of land and 60% of the cost of resettlement of project affected families would be borne by GOUP. For coal thermal plants where land requirements are higher 30% of the cost of land and 30% of the cost of resettlement of project affected families would be borne by GOUP. The cost of land for the above computation will include acquisition price, administrative cost of acquisition, stamp duty and registration expenses. Cost of resettlement of project affected families will include resettlement and rehabilitation expenses incurred as provided in GOUP guidelines.” 24. The amended Power Policy also contained several other benefits and concessions including trade tax benefits. 25. The State Support Agreement was executed on 16th June, 2004 providing for various benefits and concessions in favour of the Company and obligation on the State to share 60% of the land acquisition cost as per amended Power Policy. Although the agreement under Section 41 of the Act provided for erection and completion of all project within three years from giving of the possession of the land with extension of one year at a time not exceeding three years, the State Support Agreement contained a clause “the Company agrees to make best efforts to commence commercial operation within seven years of signing this agreement”. The State Support Agreement contained in Clause 3 obligations of the parties. Clause 3.1 deals with obligations of the Government of Uttar Pradesh and Clause 3.2 deals with obligations of the Company. Clauses 3.1(ii), 3.1(ix), 3.2(ii) and 3.2(iii), which are relevant for the purpose, are quoted below : “3. OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES 3.1 Obligations of GoUP .................................... 3.1(ii) GoUP shall, within four weeks, appoint a high ranking Government official, who shall co-ordinate, facilitate, assist and oversee the approval process, and shall act as GoUP’s representative for implementing the obligations of GoUP under this Agreement and shall act as “GoUP’s single window agency” for all interactions between Company and Government Instrumentalities. .................................... .................................... 3.1(ii) GoUP shall, within four weeks, appoint a high ranking Government official, who shall co-ordinate, facilitate, assist and oversee the approval process, and shall act as GoUP’s representative for implementing the obligations of GoUP under this Agreement and shall act as “GoUP’s single window agency” for all interactions between Company and Government Instrumentalities. .................................... .................................... 3.1(ix) GoUP shall grant all the fiscal benefits envisaged under the Power Policy and Industrial Policy including the exemption and/or deferment of Entry tax, State trade taxes etc., exemption/remission of stamp duty and registration charges on the grant/transfer of land by GoUP to the Company or on the mortgages, charges and encumbrances as may have to be created on the Project assets for procuring debt finance for construction, maintenance and operation of the Project. In addition to the benefits provided for in the Power Policy and the Industrial Policy, GoUP shall grant to the Project any tax, regulatory or other benefits which are normally extended in relation to any other project in the energy/gas sector or based on energy/gas excluding small capacity non-conventional energy projects; established in the State of Uttar Pradesh to the extent that such benefits are more favourable than similar benefits granted, if any, pursuant to the Power Policy or the Industrial Policy. .................................... .................................... 3.2 Obligations of the Company .................................... 3.2(ii) The land acquired under Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 pursuant to the agreement entered into between the Company and GoUP on 19th February, 2004 shall be used for the purposes of Project only. 3.2(iii) The Company shall, (a) in response to competitive bids invited in line with Electricity Act, 2003 and rules, regulations, guidelines & policies, framed and to be framed, thereunder for long term supply of Base Load Power by the Government instrumentalities engaged in the distribution of electricity in U.P. for .............................. the State of U.P. or (b) under any other provision of the Electricity Act offer to make available from the Project in aggregate 40% of the total net available site capacity of the Project then existing, in the line with the terms and conditions of the respective power purchase agreements to be mutually discussed and entered into and subject to extension of suitable Payment Security Mechanism. The Company agrees that the levelized fixed cost component of the bid-tariff for sale of power shall not exceed one rupee twenty-five paisa (Rs. The Company agrees that the levelized fixed cost component of the bid-tariff for sale of power shall not exceed one rupee twenty-five paisa (Rs. 1.25) per kilo-watt hour (kwh) (“Ceiling Fixed Cost”) of power delivered at the bus-bars of the Power Station. Such Ceiling Fixed Cost shall be appropriately revised to reflect any changes, subsequent to signing of this Agreement, in the fiscal, financial and other policies as deemed relevant for its computation. In such an event, the Company would provide relevant information to GoUP in support of such revision and shall mutually discuss GoUP’s comments.” 26. After execution of the State Support Agreement notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 25th June, 2004. 27. The issue which needs to be considered first is, whether the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 28. The submission of learned Counsel for the respondent is that writ petitions have been filed with delay of about four years. After issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 25.6.2004, the steps were taken by the Collector for taking possession. The Additional Collector (Land Acquisition) Ghaziabad is said to have taken possession of the land on 18.11.2004. The conveyance deed was executed on 23.11.2005 in favour of respondent No. 2 transferring the land. On 4.1.2006 the name of the respondent No. 2 was entered into revenue records. From September 4, 2004 payment of compensation to the farmers started after they signed the agreement in accordance with U.P. Land Acquisition (Determination of Compensation and Declaration of Award by Agreement) Rules, 1997 . In writ petition No. 8968 of 2008, Vishwanath Pratap Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, various details of protests and agitations undertaken by the farmers against the acquisition proceedings have been referred to and relied, which have been brought on record. A memorandum was given by the farmers stating that compensation be awarded at the rate of Rs. 300/- per square yard and atleast one member of the family be also given employment. It was stated in the memorandum that district administration had announced compensation at the rate of Rs. 150/- per square yard and pressures were put on the peasants. The peasants started demonstration raising their protest since May, 2006. The newspaper report dated 4.5.2006 has been relied and referred to. It was stated in the memorandum that district administration had announced compensation at the rate of Rs. 150/- per square yard and pressures were put on the peasants. The peasants started demonstration raising their protest since May, 2006. The newspaper report dated 4.5.2006 has been relied and referred to. In July, 2006, agitation turned violent and local police had lathicharged the peasants and first information reports were also lodged against the peasants. Late Vishwanath Pratap Singh, ex-Prime Minister took a lead in registering the protest. The administration had to issue order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. A rally was organised on 17.8.2006 under the leadership of ex-Prime Minister. Several peasants were arrested. Police had to use mild force to disburse the agitating peasants. The agitation was under way when second notification dated 29.8.2006 under Section 4 of the Act was issued for acquiring further 53.236 hectares of land in the above mentioned villages. Declaration under Section 6 in continuation of Section 4 notification dated 29.8.2006 was issued on 20.2.2007. A letter was written by the Collector to the respondent No. 2 on 20.12.2007 that the farmers, whose names were mentioned in the letter in different villages along with their Khata numbers, have not yet taken compensation nor have entered into agreement and steps be taken for getting Panchnama executed . On 15.12.2007 one Mohammad Arif of Village Masauri district Ghaziabad made an application under Right to Information Act to the Collector, Ghaziabad as to whether in the acquisition, the procedure as prescribed under the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules 1963 was followed or not. In October, 2007, the writ petition (Civil) No. 680 of 2007 was filed in the Apex Court by one Sahyog Samiti, praying that; (A) Section 34 and 6 be declared as ultravires to the Constitution of India (B) the notification dated 11.2.2004 and consequent acquisition proceedings be quashed (C) further acquisition proceedings consequent to the notification dated 11.2.2004 be stayed. 29. Hon’ble Supreme Court on 8.1.2008 issued notice confining to prayer “(A)”. The Company respondent No. 2 in the writ petition before us, was also arrayed as respondent No. 2 before the Apex Court. The Apex Court deleted the respondent No. 2 from the array of the parties. Following was the order passed by the Apex Court on 8.1.2008 : “Application for exemption from filing C.T. Is granted. Issue notice confining to prayer A of the writ petition. The Apex Court deleted the respondent No. 2 from the array of the parties. Following was the order passed by the Apex Court on 8.1.2008 : “Application for exemption from filing C.T. Is granted. Issue notice confining to prayer A of the writ petition. Respondent No. 2 is deleted from the array of parties and consequently prayers B and C are deleted. Tag with W.P.(c) No. 224 of 2007 entitled Karnataka Landless Farmers Ass. and others v. Union of India.” 30. Writ petition (Civil) No. 12 of 2008 was filed by Ranbir Singh and others before the Supreme Court challenging the land acquisition proceedings initiated by notification dated 11.2.2004. The writ petition was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to approach the High Court. Following was the order passed by the Apex Court on 11.1.2008 : “Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to approach the High Court. The permission is granted for doing so. The writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn” 31. In January, 2008 writ petition No. 4992 of 2008, Sombir Singh and others was filed in the High Court challenging the acquisition proceedings in which a limited interim order was granted by this Court to the effect that till the next date of listing the petitioners shall not be dispossessed from the land in question. However, the order will not give any right of re-entry, if they have already been dispossessed. Several writ petitions were filed with similar prayers in February, and March, 2008 challenging the acquisition. The writ petition of Puran Singh was filed with 389 petitioners challenging the acquisition in October, 2008 in which writ petition also similar interim order was passed. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the first writ petition which was filed in this Court challenging the land acquisition proceedings was in January, 2008 i.e. after three and half years from publication of notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 25.6.2004. After January, other writ petitions were filed as noted above. 32. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 2 vehemently submitted that the delay in approaching the Court is fatal specially when the petitioners accepted the compensation. He contended that had the farmers had any genuine grievance against the land acquisition, they ought to have challenged acquisition within a reasonable time. 32. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 2 vehemently submitted that the delay in approaching the Court is fatal specially when the petitioners accepted the compensation. He contended that had the farmers had any genuine grievance against the land acquisition, they ought to have challenged acquisition within a reasonable time. He further contended that infact protest and agitation which were undertaken by the farmers after declaration made by the administration that compensation shall be paid at the rate of Rs. 150/- per square yard was confined to enhancement of the compensation only. The farmers were not aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings but wanted only enhancement of the compensation. 33. The submission of the petitioners on the other hand is that all the farmers were very much aggrieved by the acquisition, they being illiterate farmers did not know what were the appropriate proceedings which should be taken by them. It is submitted that right of objection under Section 5A was taken away by invoking Section 17(4) of the Act hence, they had no opportunity to raise their objections. There was pressure from the administration to accept the compensation and Panchnama as declared by the administration. The farmers had no option except to sign the Panchnama and accept whatever amount was offered to them but the petitioners being aggrieved by the acquisition had organized themselves which took time and thereafter raised their protest. Some of them had approached the Apex Court in the first week of January, 2008 which writ petition was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to approach the High Court on 11.1.2008. 34. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the entire land acquisition proceedings were initiated by the State to give undue benefit to the respondent No. 2 disregarding the mandatory procedure as provided under Part VII of the Act. Although it was the respondent No. 2 which prayed for acquisition of the land itself for establishing a power project, the acquisition was given a colour as acquisition for public purpose by dispensing with the right of objections under Section 5-A of the Act. The submission is that the acquisition was in colourable exercise of power and the entire proceedings were void and tainted by fraud, which has now become apparent after inspection of the original records pertaining to the land acquisition proceedings produced by the State. The submission is that the acquisition was in colourable exercise of power and the entire proceedings were void and tainted by fraud, which has now become apparent after inspection of the original records pertaining to the land acquisition proceedings produced by the State. It is submitted that in view of the petitioner’s case to above effect, the writ petitions be not thrown out on the ground of delay and laches but the vital issues raised in the writ petition needs to be adjudicated in the cause of justice. 35. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has further pleaded that more than 90% farmers have taken compensation and out of 5827 farmers only 513 farmers have not taken compensation. It is further submitted that the land which is subject matter in these writ petitions is about 550 acres. 36. Learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on following judgments of the Apex Court for the proposition that writ shall not be issued if there is negligence and omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right. AIR 1967 SC 1450 , Moon Mills Ltd. v. R. Meher; AIR 1969 SC 329 , Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Services and others; (1975) 4 SCC 285 , Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others; (1975) 4 SCC 296 , Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and others; (1980) 2 SCC 83 , Pt. Girdharan Prasad Missir and another v. State of Bihar; (1984) 2 SCC 624 , Hari Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others; (1986) 4 SCC 566 , State of M.P. and others v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others; 1993 Supp (2) SCC 20, Ramjas Foundation and others v. Union of India and others; (1994) 5 SCC 486 , P. Chinnanna and others v. State of A.P. and others; (1996) 11 SCC 698 , Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana; 1996 (4) SCC 579 , Reliance Petroleum Ltd. v. Zaver Chand Popatlal Sumaria and others; (1996) 6 SCC 445 , State of Rajasthan and others v. D.R. Laxmi; (1996) 1 SCC 501, Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investments Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others; (1998) 4 SCC 387 , Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujrat and others; (2000) 8 SCC 262 , Netai Bag and others v. State of West Bengal and others; (2002) 7 SCC 712 , Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur v. Bheru Lal and others; (2003) 4 SCC 485 , Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab and others; (2003) 1 SCC 335 , Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and others; (2005) 6 SCC 493 , Govt. of A.P. and others v. Kollutla Obi Reddy and others; (2006) 11 SCC 464 , U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh and another; (2003) 5 SCC 1 , M.T.W. Tenzing Namgyal and others v. Motilal Lakotia and others; (2008) 4 SCC 695 , Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. and another v. State of Rajasthan and others. The Apex Court in AIR 1967 SC 1450 , Moon Mills Ltd. v. R. Meher had occasion to consider the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court quoted with approval the principles as stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd. It is useful to quote the observations of the Apex Court as laid down in paragraph 6: "In the circumstances of this case, we do not consider that there is such acquiescence on the part of the appellant as to disentitle it to a grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the issue of a writ of certiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion. It is also true that the writ will not be granted if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. The principle is to a great extent, though not identical with, similar to the exercise of discretion in the Court of Chancery. The principle has been clearly stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (1874) 5 PC 221 at p. 239, as follows : “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. The principle has been clearly stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (1874) 5 PC 221 at p. 239, as follows : “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as related to the remedy.” In the present case, we are of opinion that there is no such negligence or laches or acquiescence on the part of the appellant as may disentitle it to the grant of a writ.” 38. In the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Services and others (supra), the above proposition was reiterated. The reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others (supra) . In the said case notification was issued in the year 1959 for acquisition of the land for planned development of Delhi. Declaration under Section 6 was issued in March, 1966. Notice under Section 9 (1) was issued in 1970. Writ petitions were filed in the year 1972, challenging the acquisition proceedings. Governor of Delhi and others (supra) . In the said case notification was issued in the year 1959 for acquisition of the land for planned development of Delhi. Declaration under Section 6 was issued in March, 1966. Notice under Section 9 (1) was issued in 1970. Writ petitions were filed in the year 1972, challenging the acquisition proceedings. One of the grounds of challenge was that public purpose was not sufficiently specified in the notification and the petitioners were prejudiced in effectively exercising their right under Section 5-A. Following was laid down in paragraphs 10 and 11 : “10. That apart, the appellants did not contend before the High Court that as the particulars of the public purpose were not specified in the notification issued under S.4, they were prejudiced in that they could not effectively exercise their right under S.5A. As the plea was not raised by the appellants in the writ petitions filed before the High Court, we do not think that the appellants are entitled to have the plea considered in these appeal. 11. Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the validity of the notification even after the publication of the declaration under Section 6 in 1966. Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one of the appellants. There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the public purpose were not specified. A valid notification under S.4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners (see Tilockchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 2 SCR 824 : AIR 1970 SC 898 and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of india, (1970) 2 SCR 697 : AIR 1970 SC 470 : 1970 Lab IC 402).” 39. In the above case challenge was that particulars of the public purpose was not specified in notification under Section 4 and further the said submission was not raised in the High Court. No reason was given as to why the writ petitioners waited till 1972 when the notification was issued in the year 1959. The delay in the said case was more than 12 years. 40. In Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and others (supra) again the delay was of nine years in challenging the declaration under Section 6. Following was laid down in paragraph 12 : “12. Land Acquisition proceedings commence with the notification under Section 4 of the Act. Objections are invited under Section 5A of the Act. Therefore a declaration under Section 6 of the Act is made. Any challenge to a notification under Section 4 and a declaration under Section 6 of the Act should be made within a reasonable time thereafter. The length of the delay is an important circumstance because of the nature of the acts done during the interval on the basis of the notification and the declaration.” 41. In Pt. Girdharan Prasad Missir and another v. State of Bihar, (1980) 2 SCC 83 , Section 4 notification was issued on 22nd May, 1956 and Section 6 was issued in December, 1958, the writ petition was filed in March, 1964 i.e. after about more than five and half years of Section 6 notification. In Hari Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, (1984) 2 SCC 624 , the delay was of two and half years. The plea was taken that the petitioners were not aware of the notification for acquisition. The Apex Court did not accept the plea that they were not aware of the acquisition proceedings and dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of laches. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, Apex Court also observed that some photographs of the land were produced before the Court which showed that work of construction had already been commenced. The Apex Court did not accept the plea that they were not aware of the acquisition proceedings and dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of laches. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, Apex Court also observed that some photographs of the land were produced before the Court which showed that work of construction had already been commenced. In State of M.P. and others v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others, (1986) 4 SCC 566 , the Apex Court laid down that issue of appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. The Court held that rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a straitjacket formula. Following observations made in paragraph 24 being relevant is to be noticed : “24. ...... Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a straitjacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court; ex hypothesis every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it.” 42. Ramjas Foundation and others v. Union of India and others, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 20 was a case where Section 4 notification was issued in the year 1959. Section 6 notification was issued in the year 1968-69. Writ petition was filed in the year 1973. The objections were filed under Section 5-A by thousands of persons. The writ petitions were filed in the year 1970, when notice under Section 9 was issued which writ petitions were dismissed. The appellants before the Apex Court had initially filed a writ petition in the year 1973 which was permitted to be withdrawn and thereafter fresh writ petitions were filed in the year 1978 on identical grounds. The writ petitions were filed in the year 1970, when notice under Section 9 was issued which writ petitions were dismissed. The appellants before the Apex Court had initially filed a writ petition in the year 1973 which was permitted to be withdrawn and thereafter fresh writ petitions were filed in the year 1978 on identical grounds. In the above facts, the Court held that there is no explanation for the delay and the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of laches. P. Chinnanna and others v. State of A.P. and others, (1994) 5 SCC 486 was a case where writ petition was filed after seven years. Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 698 was a case where Section 4 notification was issued in the year 1976. Section 6 was issued in the year 1977 award was made in the year 1981 and writ petition was filed in the year 1994. Writ petitioners were subsequent purchasers after issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act. In the above fact, the Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that petitioners approached belatedly and their title was a void title. 43. Much reliance has been placed by the petitioners on the judgment of the Apex Court in Reliance Petroleum Ltd. v. Zaver Chand Popatlal Sumaria and others, 1996 (4) SCC 579 . In the said case, the notification under Section 4 was issued in 1993. Declaration was made in the year 1994 and the award was also made in December, 1994. In the said case when the matter was pending before the Land Acquisition Officer before an award was passed, the respondents for themselves and on behalf of others addressed a letter dated 25.10.1994 stating that they have no objection to the acquisition of the land but they wanted only compensation as demanded therein. The Court held that petitioners could have immediately filed the writ petition when the notification under Section 6 was issued. They took their chance in the award proceedings and only when award was not in their favour, they filed the writ petition. The Court took the view that only object of the writ petitioner was to get the maximum price for the land acquired. They took their chance in the award proceedings and only when award was not in their favour, they filed the writ petition. The Court took the view that only object of the writ petitioner was to get the maximum price for the land acquired. In the aforesaid facts, the Apex Court took the view that High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petition and exercising the discretionary jurisdiction to quash the Section 4 and Section 6 notification and award. The Apex Court did not set aside the order of the High Court on the ground that there was unexplained laches. In the cases of State of Rajasthan and others v. D.R. Laxmi (supra), Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investments Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others (supra) and Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujrat and others (supra), same proposition has been laid down by the Apex Court. 44. In (2000) 8 SCC 262 , Netai Bag and others v. State of West Bengal and others, challenge was after three years of the lease. The Apex Court held that huge project had actually come into existence. The challenge was negatived. The judgment of the Apex Court in Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur v. Bheru Lal and others, (2002) 7 SCC 712 and Tej Kaur v. State of Punjab and others, (2003) 4 SCC 485 , laid down similar propositions. In Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and others, (2003) 1 SCC 335 , the writ petition was filed after 17 years of award. In the said case, the petitioners had sought for enhancement of compensation without challenging the notification under Sections 4 and 6. Having sought for enhancement of compensation, they filed writ petition even three years after the appeal was disposed of by the High Court. Following was laid down in paragraph 9 : “ 9. Looking to the facts of the present case and conduct of the respondents 1-5, the High Court was not at all justified in ignoring the delay and laches and granting relief to them. As already noticed, the respondents 1-5 approached the High Court by filing writ petition almost after a period of 17 years after finalization of the acquisition proceedings. They accepted the compensation amount as per the award and sought for enhancement of the compensation amount without challenging the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6. As already noticed, the respondents 1-5 approached the High Court by filing writ petition almost after a period of 17 years after finalization of the acquisition proceedings. They accepted the compensation amount as per the award and sought for enhancement of the compensation amount without challenging the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6. Having sought for enhancement of compensation only, they filed writ petition even three years after the appeals were disposed of by the High Court in the matter of enhancement of compensation. There is no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions. Merely because full enhanced compensation amount was not paid to the respondents, that itself was not a ground to condone the delay and laches in filing the writ petition. In our view, the High Court was also not right in ordering restoration of land to the respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used for which it had been acquired. It is well-settled position in law that after passing the award and taking possession under Section 16 of the Act, the acquired land vests with the Government free from all encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which it is acquired, the land owner does not get any right to ask for revesting the land in him and to ask for restitution of the possession. This Court as early as in 1976 in Gulam Mustafa and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others, (1976) 1 SCC 800 in para 5 has stated thus: AIR 1977 SC 448 " 45. U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh and another, (2006) 11 SC.C. 464 was a case where an employee accepted the retirel benefit and thereafter sought to challenge the retirement, in such circumstance, the challenge was not accepted. M.T.W. Tenzing Namgyal and others v. Motilal Lakotia and others, (2003) 5 SCC 1 was a case where owner of the land accepted the compensation without any dimmer. It was held that in such circumstances, the owner as well as the successor in interest held stopped and precluded from denying the vesting of the said land in Sikkim Darbar. The said case was on its own facts. Last case relied by the counsel for the petitioner is Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. and another v. State of Rajasthan and others, (2008) 4 SCC 695 . The said case was on its own facts. Last case relied by the counsel for the petitioner is Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. and another v. State of Rajasthan and others, (2008) 4 SCC 695 . In the above case, notice under Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 for acquisition was issued on 25.6.1975. Objection was filed which was rejected in the year 1984 and declaration was issued after issuance of notice. A writ petition was filed by the appellant before the Calcutta High Court. Calcutta High Court granted an interim order which was set aside by the Apex Court vide its order dated 8.4.1985 holding that Calcutta High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In 1987, the writ petition was filed in the Rajasthan High Court which was withdrawn on 10.3.1989, praying for quashing of the notification dated 8.2.1984. Following was laid down in paragraph 14 “14. We do not find any substance in the submissions of the counsel for the appellants. No doubt, the appellants had filed a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court challenging the acquisition proceedings, but the said writ petition was dismissed by this Court on 8th April, 1985 holding that the Calcutta High Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Thereafter, till 1987 the appellants did not challenge the acquisition proceedings and the writ petition was filed by it before the Rajasthan High Court which had the territorial jurisdiction in the matter and the same was withdrawn which was again filed within the next four months thereof, meaning thereby, during the interregnum the appellants slept over the matter. However, the appellants have not been able to give any explanation for the same.” 46. Now the cases relied by counsel for the petitioners need to be considered. Reliance has been placed on AIR 1987 SC 1353 , Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others. The Apex Court was considering ambit and scope of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Apex Court held that expression sufficient cause is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Following principles were laid down in paragraph 3 of the judgment : “3. The Apex Court held that expression sufficient cause is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Following principles were laid down in paragraph 3 of the judgment : “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters, instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that : 1 “Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of 0. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay. every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 47. The principles which have been ennunciated by the Apex Court for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act can very well be utilized to decide as to whether a writ petition be thrown out on the ground of delay and laches or entertained in exercise of its sound jurisdiction. Much reliance has been placed by the petitioners’ counsel on the judgment of the Apex Court in (2007) 9 SCC 304 , VyaliKaval Housebuilding Coop. Society v. V. Chandrappa. In the said case, notification under Section 4 was issued on 22.12.1984, declaration under Section 6 was issued on 21.2.1986 and award was passed on 16.11.1987. The possession of land was taken on different dates up to the year 1992. The writ petitions were filed in the year 1998 challenging the land acquisition proceedings. An objection was taken by the society in whose favour the land was acquired contending that writ petition was hopelessly barred by time being delayed by 14 years from the date of the issue of the notification under Section 4. It was further contended that petitioners have participated in the inquiry under Section 5-A and have received substantial amount from the appellant society pursuant to the agreement executed in their favour. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and on the ground that the petitioners have participated in the proceedings and they shall be treated to have acquiesced. Appeal was filed by the respondents which was allowed by the Division Bench. The Court held that acquisition was colourable exercise of the power therefore, the delay cannot be a good ground to dismiss the writ petition. Appeal was filed by the respondents which was allowed by the Division Bench. The Court held that acquisition was colourable exercise of the power therefore, the delay cannot be a good ground to dismiss the writ petition. Against the Division Bench judgment, the society filed Civil Appeals challenging the Division Bench judgment. The Apex Court upheld the judgment of the Karnataka High Court and dismissed the appeal. The Apex Court laid down that when the acquisition was totally malafide and not for bonafide purpose, the ground of delay and acquiescence had no substance. It is useful to quote the relevant observations of the Apex Court made in paragraphs 3, 4 and 9 : “3. This writ petition was contested by the appellant-society as respondent and it was alleged that it was hopelessly barred by time being delayed by 14 years and it was also submitted that the writ petitioners had participated in the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act and have also received substantial amount from the appellant-society pursuant to the agreement executed in their favour. Learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of being hopelessly barred by time and the writ petitioners participated in the proceedings therefore they have acquiesced in the matter. Aggrieved against this order passed by learned Single Judge, a writ appeal was filed by the respondents which came to be allowed by the Division Bench for the reasons mentioned in another writ appeal decided by the same Division Bench headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court on 17.1.2000. In that writ appeal the Division Bench held that the entire acquisition on behalf of the appellant-society was actuated with fraud as held in Narayana Reddy v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1991 Kar 2248. In that case it was held as follows : “As seen from the findings of G.V.K. Rao Inquiry Report, in respect of five respondent societies and the report of the Joint Registrar in respect of Vualikaval House Building Co-operative Society, these Societies had indulged in enrolling large number of members illegally inclusive of ineligible members and had also indulged in enrolling large number of bogus members. The only inference that is possible from this is that the office bearers of the societies had entered into unholy alliance with the respective agents for the purpose of making money, as submitted for the petitioners otherwise, there is no reason as to why such an Agreement should have been brought about by the office bearers of the Society and the agents. Unless these persons had the intention of making huge profits as alleged by the petitioners, they would not have indulged in enrolment of ineligible and bogus members. The circumstance that without considering all these relevant materials the Government had accorded its approval, is sufficient to hold that the agents had prevailed upon the Government to take a decision to acquire the lands without going into all those relevant facts. The irresistible inference flowing from the facts and circumstances of these cases is, whereas the poser conferred under the Land Acquisition Act is for acquiring lands for carrying out housing scheme by a housing society, in each of the cases the acquisition of lands is not for a bona fide housing scheme but is substantially for the purpose of enabling the concerned office bearers of respondent- societies and their agents to indulge in sale of sites in the guise of allotment of sites to the Members/ Associate members of the society to make money as alleged by the petitioners and therefore it is a clear case of colourable exercise of power. Thus the decision of the Government to acquire the lands suffers from legal mala fides and therefore the impugned Notifications are liable to be struck down.” 4. In view of aforesaid observation, their Lordships of Division Bench held that since the acquisition was colourable exercise of the power, therefore, delay cannot be a good ground to dismiss the writ petition. The said judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka was affirmed by this Court in Special Leave Petition Nos. (c)..CC 525-532 of 1999 and Special Leave Petition Nos. (c) ..CC 504-522 of 1999 decided on 14.7.1999 and it was held that the appellant-society is a bogus house building society and accordingly, the order passed by the learned Single Judge was set aside by Division Bench. Against the order of the Division Bench passed in Writ Appeal No. 2294 of 1999 a review petition was filed which was dismissed on 22.3.2002. Hence both these appeals. Against the order of the Division Bench passed in Writ Appeal No. 2294 of 1999 a review petition was filed which was dismissed on 22.3.2002. Hence both these appeals. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents has also invited our attention that same notification was set aside by the High Court and the said order of the High Court was also upheld by this Court by dismissing the S.L.P.(C) No. 6196 of 1998 on 7.4.1998 and S.L.P.(c) ..CC 495-a498 of 1999 on 14.7.1999 concerning the very same appellant society. In this background, when the acquisition has been found to be totally mala fide and not for bona fide purpose, the ground of delay and acquiescence in the present case has no substance. Learned counsel for the appellant tried to persuade us that as the amount in question has been accepted by the respondents, it is not open for them now to wriggle out from that agreement. It may be that the appellant might have tried to settle out the acquisition but when the whole acquisition emanates from the aforesaid tainted notification any settlement on the basis of that notification cannot be validated. The fact remains that when the basic notification under which the present land is sought to be acquired stood vitiated then whatever money that the appellant has paid, is at its own risk. Once the notification goes, no benefit could be derived by the appellant. We are satisfied that issue of notification was mala fide and it was not for public purpose, as has been observed by this Court, nothing turns on the question of delay and acquiescence. Learned Counsel for respondents raised other pleas like decree for partition was granted among brothers and they were not made parties, we are not going into those questions when we are satisfied that when acquisition stand vitiated on account of mala fide, nothing remains further.” In the above case the challenge to acquisition proceedings was contested firstly on the ground that there is great delay in challenging the acquisition proceedings and secondly that the compensation has already been accepted by the land owners, hence the challenge is unsustainable. The Apex Court repelled both the objections and has laid down following in paragraphs 9, “(i) ..... The Apex Court repelled both the objections and has laid down following in paragraphs 9, “(i) ..... when the acquisition has been found to be totally malafide and not for bona fide purpose, the ground of delay and acquiescence in the present case has no substance.... and (ii) ..... learned counsel for the appellant tried to persuade us that as the amount in question has been accepted by the respondents, it is not open for them now to wriggle out from that agreement. It may be that the appellant might have tried to settle out the acquisition but when the whole acquisition emanates from the aforesaid tainted notification any settlement on the basis of that notification cannot be validated. The fact remains that when the basic notification under which the present land is sought to be acquired stood vitiated then whatever money that the appellant has paid, is at its own risk. Once the notification goes, no benefit could be derived by the appellant”. The Apex Court in the above case (Vyalikaval Housebuilding Coop. Soceity v. V. Chandrappa) approved the view of the Division Bench of the High Court that since the acquisition was in colourable exercise of the power, delay cannot be a good ground to dismiss the writ petition. 49. To recapitulate, the submissions of the petitioners in these writ petitions are that land acquisition by the State in the present case was in a colourable exercise of power. The application was made by the company after depositing part of the compensation and no part of the compensation was to be paid by the State Government when the application had been moved by the company or till the agreement was executed by the Company and State under Section 41 of the Act. Acquisition by the State as an acquisition for public purpose by invoking Section 17 was a colourable exercise of power. The acquisition being acquisition for a company, part VII of the Act and Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 were required to be adhered to. The State with an intention to byepass the statutory provisions and to unduly help the respondent No. 2 had proceeded to acquire the land as acquisition for public purposes. 50. Thus, in the present case also, the challenge to the acquisition is on the ground of colourable exercise of power. The State with an intention to byepass the statutory provisions and to unduly help the respondent No. 2 had proceeded to acquire the land as acquisition for public purposes. 50. Thus, in the present case also, the challenge to the acquisition is on the ground of colourable exercise of power. The petitioners further submission in all the writ petitions is that petitioners are in possession of their agricultural land inspite of the State having taken symbolic possession in the year 2005, the petitioners are carrying out their agricultural activities throughout. It has been specifically pleaded that no project construction has at all taken on the spot nor any Step towards construction of the project has been taken as yet although the time which was allowed in the agreement under Section 41 has long lapsed. In this context, the submissions made by counsel for the respondent No. 2 are relevant to be noticed. The case of the respondent No. 2 is that possession has been handed over to the State and conveyance deed has already been executed in favour of the company on 23.11.2005 and the allegation that farmers are still in possession is denied. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 in writ petition No. 55578 of 2008 following has been stated in paragraph 27: “The company had set up a barbed fencing which was broken later by farmers upon instigation by political leaders. Thereafter the company had constructed a wall extending to 8 Kms. The wall is stil there on the spot. The site office of the company also exists on the land. However, even if some farmers unlawfully encroached the land that will not indicate that possession was taken on paper only. In the instant case, the land had duly vested in the State Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act and, thereafter, the same has been legally and duly transferred to the company.” 51. From the own pleading of the respondent No. 2, it is clear that company had initially set up a barbed fencing and thereafter constructed a wall extending to 8 Kms. It is further claimed that site office also exists on the land. It is further alleged that even some farmers unlawfully encroached the land that will not indicate that possession was taken on papers only. It is further claimed that site office also exists on the land. It is further alleged that even some farmers unlawfully encroached the land that will not indicate that possession was taken on papers only. Thus, on own showing of the respondent No. 2 no project work has yet started, no construction is even claimed apart from site office and boundary wall. 52. The acquisition in question was acquisition proceedings initiated by State by dispensing inquiry under Section 5-A denying opportunity of filing objections. It is true that petitioners have signed Kararnama and taken whatever compensation was given by the respondents but it is clear that petitioners have been raising their protests and continued their agitations. Agitation was started being noticed since May, 2006. The compulsory acquisition of land is a serious matter and the persons, who were pitted against the petitioners were the mighty State and respondent No. 2 company, the petitioners being thousands in number, took time in approaching the Court raising their grievance specially when the farmers had no opportunity and the inquiry under Section 5-A had been dispensed with. It is relevant to quote the observations of the Apex Court in (1980) 2 SCC 471 , State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh and others following was laid down in paragraph 16 : “.....It is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man’s property is serious matter and the smaller the man the more the serious matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness and denial of this administration fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons. ........” 53. As noted above, when the second notification under Section 4 was published on 29.8.2006 for acquisition of further land, full-fledged agitation was already going on protesting the acquisition. The farmers neither accepted compensation nor executed any Kararnama with regard to the land which is subject matter of 2006 notification. 54. Scattered number of farmers out of huge number of farmers could start knocking the doors of the Court, challenging the acquisition apart from a Public Interest Litigation which was filed in the Apex Court in October, 2007 in which acquisition notification dated 11.2.2004 was also challenged. A writ petition by individual farmer was also filed in the Apex Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 11.1.2008 with liberty to approach the High Court. A writ petition by individual farmer was also filed in the Apex Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 11.1.2008 with liberty to approach the High Court. Most of the writ petitions in the High Court were filed in January, 2008, February, 2008 and March, 2008, last having been filed in October, 2008. It is admitted case of the respondents that no inquiry under the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 has been taken in the impugned acquisition proceedings nor part VII of the Act has been complied. Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963, provides a mandatory inquiry with regard to several subjects including as to whether any alternative suitable site can be found, if the acquisition is for the good agricultural land. Rule 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 is quoted as below : “Appropriate Government to be satisfied with regard to certain matters before initiating acquisition proceedings. 4. (1) Whenever a company makes an application to the appropriate Government for acquisition of any land, that Government shall direct the Collector to submit a report to it on the following matters, namely— (i) that the company has made its best endeavour to find out lands in the locality suitable for the purpose of the acquisition; (ii) that the company has made all reasonable efforts to get such lands by negotiation with the person interested therein on payment of reasonable price and such efforts have failed; (iii) that the land proposed to be acquired is suitable for the purpose; (iv) that the area of land proposed to be acquired is not excessive; (v) that the company is in a position to utilise the land expeditiously; and (vi) where the land proposed to be acquired is good agricultural land, that no alternative suitable site can be found so as to avoid acquisition of that land.” 55. There is no denial that 2500 acres of land which is sought to be acquired is good agricultural land. 56. Taking into consideration over all facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to throw the writ petitions on the ground of delay and laches. The writ petitioners have made out a case for consideration of various issues by this Court which have arisen in these writ petitions. 56. Taking into consideration over all facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to throw the writ petitions on the ground of delay and laches. The writ petitioners have made out a case for consideration of various issues by this Court which have arisen in these writ petitions. Thus, the submissions of learned counsel for the respondents that writ petitions be thrown out on the ground of delay and laches and other submissions need not be considered, does not merit acceptance. 57. From the pleadings of the parties and examination of the original records, following facts emerged with regard to impugned acquisition proceedings : (1) an application dated 19.1.2004 was submitted by Reliance Delhi Power Private Ltd. to the Collector Ghaziabad as well as to the Chief Secretary of the State of U.P. The Collector proceeded to inquire the proposal submitted by the respondent No. 2. The proposal was submitted by the respondent No. 2 with deposit of 10% of the acquisition costs and 10% of the estimated compensation (amount of Rs. 16 Crores). Acquisition proceedings were not initiated pursuant to any decision of the State Government or its any of the Departments. (2) the land measuring 2500 acres was identified and selected by Reliance Delhi Power Pvt. Ltd. and in the application submitted to the Collector, Ghaziabad, the name of seven villages were mentioned by company. The site was neither selected by the State Government or its any of the Departments or by Collector, Ghaziabad for acquisition. (3) the Collector Ghaziabad after conducting the necessary inquiry sent the proposal for acquisition to the Director Land Acquisition Directorate Board of Revenue U.P. Lucknow. In the letter dated 24.1.2004 it was stated that the proposal for land acquisition has been received from Reliance Delhi Power Pvt. Ltd. for acquisition of land with regard to 735.45 acres of land of village Kakarma Pargana Dasna, Tahsil Hapur. It was further stated that Reliance Delhi Power Pvt Ltd deposited the required 10% acquisition cost and 10% of estimated compensation in the specified head. The separate letters dated 24.1.2004 were forwarded by the Collector Ghaziabad with regard to seven villages along with plot numbers and area sought to be acquired. A proposed notification under Section 4(1) also invoking the urgency provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 and sub-section (4) of Section 17 was submitted. The separate letters dated 24.1.2004 were forwarded by the Collector Ghaziabad with regard to seven villages along with plot numbers and area sought to be acquired. A proposed notification under Section 4(1) also invoking the urgency provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 and sub-section (4) of Section 17 was submitted. After receipt of the letter by the Collector, Ghaziabad, Director Land Acquisition examined the proposal and forwarded it by letter dated 28.1.2004 to the Principal Secretary, Energy, State of U.P. Lucknow. Separate letters dated 28.1.2004 were issued for different villages in question. In the letter dated 28.1.2004 it was specifically mentioned that Reliance Delhi Power Private Limited is a private Company hence taking into consideration Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 and Part VII and Part III Sections 38 to 55 of the Land Acquisition Act and after getting the agreement executed, notification under Section 4(1)/17 be issued. Collector thus completed the entire proceedings and forwarded the proposal of the company for land acquisition for a company after following parts VII and VIII. (4) the proposal received from the Director Land Acquisition vide letter dated 28.1.2004 was examined by the Department of Energy Government of U.P. and it was decided to obtain recommendation of Bhumi Upyog Parishad. Bhumi Upyog Parishad submitted a note through Principal Secretary, Niyojan on 31.1.2004 that the Reliance Delhi Power Pvt. Ltd. being a priviate company, keeping into consideration part VII of the Land Acquisition Act as amended according to the provisions of Sections 38 to 44-B proceedings be undertaken after taking approval from the Department of Revenue and Law. The recommendations were duly approved by the Chief Minister on 31.1.2004. The Secretary, Revenue submitted a note that before issuance of Section 4(1)/17 notification agreement be executed as required by paragraph 14 of the Land Acquisition Manual and the entire cost of acquisition shall be necessary to be got deposited. Subsequently although it was earlier recommended that notification under Section 4(1)/17 be issued after execution of the agreement as required under Section 41 but it was decided to issue notification under Section 4(1) by invoking Section 17 and agreement be executed thereafter. After publication of the notification under Section 4(1)/17 the draft of the agreement as contemplated under Section 41 of the Act was approved by Hon’ble the Chief Minister on 19.2.2004 and thereafter it was executed. After publication of the notification under Section 4(1)/17 the draft of the agreement as contemplated under Section 41 of the Act was approved by Hon’ble the Chief Minister on 19.2.2004 and thereafter it was executed. Under Section 41, the entire cost of the acquisition was to be born by the company and the State was not to bear any cost of acquisition. (5) the land acquisition proceedings were not initiated under any project/scheme submitted by Energy Department or any other Department of the State nor the acquisition in question was to result into any project of the State rather the agreement stipulated transfer of the land in favour of the respondent No. 2. (6) the decision to bear 60% costs of the acquisition was taken after amendments in power policy was approved on 8.6.2004 and accordingly, the State support agreement was executed on 16.6.2004. 58. From the aforesaid, it is fully established that the proceedings for acquisition were taken on an application of respondent No. 2 on 19.1.2004 as acquisition for a company. When the notification was issued under Section 4, the acquisition of the land was for the company and the acquisition being not acquisition initiated by the State under any of its own projects or scheme, could not be treated as acquisition for public purpose. 59. The above discussion answers the issue No. 2 that the acquisition was for a company. 60. The rest of the issues as noticed above are interconnected and are being taken together. Before we proceed to consider the submissions any further, it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 specially the amendments made in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by Act No. 68 of 1984. 61. Firstly, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as it existed prior to the 1984 amendment need to be noticed. Section 3 of the Act is a definition clause which defines various expressions. Section 3(f) stated that the “public purpose” includes the provisions of village-sites in districts in which the appropriate government shall have declared by notification in the official gazette. Section 4 provided that whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that the land in any locality is needed for any public purpose a notification to that effect shall be published. Section 3(f) stated that the “public purpose” includes the provisions of village-sites in districts in which the appropriate government shall have declared by notification in the official gazette. Section 4 provided that whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that the land in any locality is needed for any public purpose a notification to that effect shall be published. Section 6 provided that subject to provisions of part VII of the Act when appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any made under Section 5-A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for any public purpose or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect. Section 17 provided that in case of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of 15 days, from the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 9 take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a company. Section 39 provided that provisions of Sections 6 to 37 shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any company, unless the previous consent of the appropriate Government has been taken and unless the Company has executed the agreement. 62. The amendment in the Act was necessitated for the object and purpose as specifically stated in the statements of object and reasons of the Amendment Act, 1984. It is useful to quote the relevant portion of the statement of objects and reasons herein below : “Prefatory Note- Statement of Objects and Reasons.- With the enormous expansion of the State’s role in promoting public welfare and economic development since independence, acquisition of land for public purposes, industrialisation, building of institutions, etc., has become far more numerous than ever before. While this is inevitable, promotion of public purpose has to be balanced with the rights of the individual whose land is acquired, thereby often depriving him of his means of livelihood. Again, acquisition of land for private enterprises ought not to be placed on the same footing as acquisition for the State or for an enterprise under it. The individual and institutions who are unavoidably to be deprived of their property rights in land need to be adequately compensated for the loss keeping in view the sacrifice they have to make for the larger interests of the community. The individual and institutions who are unavoidably to be deprived of their property rights in land need to be adequately compensated for the loss keeping in view the sacrifice they have to make for the larger interests of the community. The pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often causes hardships to the affected parties and renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them. 2. It is necessary, therefore, to restructure the legislative framework for acquisition of land so that it is more adequately informed by this objective of serving the interests of the community in harmony with the rights of the individual. Keeping the above objects in view and considering the recommendations of the Law Commission, the Land Acquisition Review Committee as well as the State Governments, institutions and individuals, proposals for amendment to the Land Acquisition Act, were formulated and a Bill for this purpose was introduced in the Lok Sabha on the 30th April, 1982. The same has not been passed by either House of Parliament. Since the introduction of the Bill, various other proposals for amendment of the Act have been received and they have also been considered in consultation with State Governments and other agencies. It is now proposed to include all these proposals in a fresh Bill after withdrawing the pending Bill. The main proposals for amendment are as follows : (i) The definition of “public purpose” as contained in the Act is proposed to be so amended as to include a longer illustrative list retaining, at the same time, the inclusive character of the definition. (ii) Acquisition of land for non-Government companies under the Act will henceforth be made in pursuance of Part VII of the Act in all cases. (iii) ...........” The Legislature noticed that with the enormous expansion of the State’s role in promoting public welfare and economic development acquisition of land for public purpose has become far more numerous than ever before, which is inevitable but the same is to be balanced with the rights of the individual whose land is acquired, thereby often depriving him of his means of livelihood. It was further stated that acquisition of land for private enterprises ought not to be placed on the same footing as acquisition for the State or for an enterprise under it. It was further stated that acquisition of land for private enterprises ought not to be placed on the same footing as acquisition for the State or for an enterprise under it. One of the main proposals for amendment as noticed in the statement of objects and reasons was “.. acquisition of land for non- Government companies under the Act will henceforth be made in pursuance of Part VII of the Act in all cases”. 63. Consequently, the amendments were made in Sections 3(f), 4, 6, 17 and 39. Following is the tabular chart of unamended and amended provisions of the above sections : 64. Section 3(f) is a definition clause defining “public purpose”. Definition of “public purpose” is an inclusive definition, which is expansive definition. However, an exclusionary definition have been added in Section 3(f) by amendment “excluding acquisition of land for Companies”. 65. The acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act is contemplated for public purpose and for companies. For companies also the acquisition is permissible in public good on the grounds which are also for the public benefit as mentioned in Section 40 of the Act. Amendment in Section 4 of the Act has been made by adding after the words “ any public purpose, the words “ or for a company”. Section 4 prior to the amendment, had only used the expression “for any public purpose”. There was reason and rational for only using expression “for any public purpose”. The rational was that all acquisitions were contemplated to be made for public purpose and acquisition for company was also for the purposes which were limited public purposes permitted for acquisition for company. The Apex Court had laid down, while interpreting the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act prior to the Amendment Act 1984, that acquisition for a company is also an acquisition for a limited public purpose in (1993) 4 SCC 255 , Shyam Nandan Prasad and others v. State of Bihar and others following was laid down in paragraph 21 : “21. Now here the distinction is made between a public purpose and a purpose for the company. The acquisition of land for a company is in substance for a public purpose as all those activities mentioned in Section 40 such as constructing dwelling houses and providing amenities for the benefits of workmen employed by it and construction of some work for public utility etc. The acquisition of land for a company is in substance for a public purpose as all those activities mentioned in Section 40 such as constructing dwelling houses and providing amenities for the benefits of workmen employed by it and construction of some work for public utility etc. serve the public purpose. The acquisition for the company and the purpose for it, can well be investigated under Section 5-A or Section 40, necessarily after the notification under Section 4. Reference may usefully be made to Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (now Maharashtra), AIR 1960 SC 1203 . It was the conceded case before the High Court that there could be no acquisition for the respondent-Society without provisions of Section 40 of the Act being involved and complied with. In Babu Barkya’s case supra too, this Court has taken the view that as provided in Section 39, the machinery of the Land Acquisition Act beginning with Section 6 and ending with Section 37 shall not be put into operation unless two conditions precedent are fulfilled, namely, (i) the previous consent of the appropriate Government has been obtained and (ii) an agreement in terms of Section 41 has been executed by the Company. Such consent could be given if it was satisfied on the report of the enquiry envisaged by Section 5-A(2) or enquiry held under Section 40 itself that the purpose of the acquisition is for purposes as envisaged in Section 40. In this state of law, the plea set up on behalf of the appellants that when their Society could not be treated either as a private or a Government company, was no company at all so as to remain bound to comply with Chapter VII of the Act, is of no substance. The Society as a company is bound to satisfy the requirements of Section 40 before taking aid of Sections 6 to 37 of the Act to promote its needed acquisition.” Thus, Section 4 before amendment used only expression “for any public purpose” whereas in Section 6 both the expressions “for public purpose” or “for company” were used. The amendments made by 1984 Amendment Act clearly separated the acquisition “for public purpose” and acquisition “for company” from the stage of issuance of notification under Section 4 itself. The amendments made by 1984 Amendment Act clearly separated the acquisition “for public purpose” and acquisition “for company” from the stage of issuance of notification under Section 4 itself. For acquisition for a company compliance of part VII as well as compliance of Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 was made necessary. The purpose of inquiry under the Land Acquisition Rules, 1963 and part VII has to be examined. The State having itself undertaken numerous welfare activities, acquisitions for public purpose by State are increasing day by day. The land which is available specially the agricultural land is limited, more strict inquiry and rigorous procedure has been envisaged and contemplated by 1984 Amendment. At this juncture, it is necessary to refer to Rules 4 and 5 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. Various requirements of Rule 4 indicate that normally the request of the company for acquisition is not to be accepted unless it has made best endeavour to find out the land made all reasonable efforts to get such lands by negotiation on payment of reasonable price. The area of land proposed to be acquired is not excessive and if the land proposed to be acquired is a good agricultural land , no alternative suitable site is to be found. The inquiry under Rule 4 is envisaged with the object that no agricultural land be acquired if any suitable site can be found. The obligation to find suitable site has been placed on the Government which shall obtain a report from the Collector on the above mentioned issues. 66. Another noticeable change which has been brought by 1984 amendment is the amendment in Section 17. In unamended Section 17 in cases of urgency whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector could have taken possession of any land needed for public purpose or for a company. After amendment, in Section 17, the words “or for a Company” have been deleted. Thus, for an acquisition for a company, Section 17 is no more available. The Legislative intent is that for acquisition for company urgency clause is not to be invoked. The Legislature thus, does not treat the acquisition for a company as an urgent acquisition. The statement of objects and reasons give clear Legislative intendment for interpreting the amendments brought in Section 3(f), 4, 6 and 17. The Legislative intent is that for acquisition for company urgency clause is not to be invoked. The Legislature thus, does not treat the acquisition for a company as an urgent acquisition. The statement of objects and reasons give clear Legislative intendment for interpreting the amendments brought in Section 3(f), 4, 6 and 17. The amendments in Section 39 also re-enforces the Legislative intendment that in an acquisition for a company Section 17 is not available. Earlier Section 39 provided that provisions of Sections 6 to 37 shall not be put in force in order to acquire the land for any company unless the previous consent of the appropriate Government is obtained and an agreement is executed. Section 17 was included in Section 39. Thus, before amendment Section 17 was permissible to be used after previous consent of the Government is obtained and an agreement is executed but, deletion of Section 17 from Section 39 makes the intention clear that Section 17 is not available for acquisition for a company. The Apex Court in 1973 AIR SC 1016, Commissioner of Income Tax Gujrat v. Vadilal Lallubhai etc. etc. laid down that in order to find out the legislative intent, it has to be find out what was the mischief that the legislature wanted to remedy. Following was laid down in paragraph 15 : “15. In order to find out the legislative intent, we have to find out what was the mischief that the legislature wanted to remedy. The Act was extensively amended in the year 1939, Section 44-F was not in the draft bill. That section was recommended by the Select Committee consisting of very eminent lawyers. It will not be inappropriate to find out the reasons which persuaded the Select Committee to recommend the inclusion of Section 44-F, if the section is considered as ambiguous - See Commr. of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, 32 ITR 615 at p. 627 : AIR 1957 SC 832 . It will not be inappropriate to find out the reasons which persuaded the Select Committee to recommend the inclusion of Section 44-F, if the section is considered as ambiguous - See Commr. of Income-tax, Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, 32 ITR 615 at p. 627 : AIR 1957 SC 832 . In recommending the inclusion of Section 44-F, this is what the Select Committee observed : “The new Sections 44-E and 44-F are designed to prevent avoidance of tax by what are known as “bond-washing” transactions, involving the manipulation of securities so that the securities will pass temporarily in the legal ownership of some second person who is either not liable at all or liable in a lesser degree to tax, under such conditions that the interest on the securities is the income of this second person. A common form of the process is the sale of securities cum interest with a simultaneous contract to purchase them ex-interest. Where foreign securities are concerned this second person may be a foreigner resident abroad entitled to claim exemption from the tax on the interest. More often a financial concern in India is utilised whose computation of profits includes the results of realising securities, so that the concern can profitably offer “bond-washing” facilities to the owner of securities bearing fixed interest where the owner himself is not liable to taxation on the realisation of the securities.” 67. From the statement of object of the Act No. 68 of 1984 and the amendment brought in the Act, it is apparent that legislature intended that acquisition for a company be no longer treated as acquisition for public purpose. For acquisition for a company more strict scrutiny and compliance of the 1963 Rules and Part VII of the Act was made mandatory with clear intendment that acquisition for a company be not treated as acquisition for public purpose and land be acquired for company only when mandatory requirement of Part VII of the Act and the 1963 Rules are complied with. Due to above reason, Section 17 of the Act was made inapplicable for acquisition for companies as noted above. 68. Section 3(f) uses exclusionary clause in negative words. Negative words used in Section 3(f) are clearly prohibitory and in no case the acquisition for a company has to be treated as an acquisition for public propose for purpose of Sections, 4,6 and 17. 68. Section 3(f) uses exclusionary clause in negative words. Negative words used in Section 3(f) are clearly prohibitory and in no case the acquisition for a company has to be treated as an acquisition for public propose for purpose of Sections, 4,6 and 17. The Apex Court in (1997) 2 SCC 424, Mannalal Khetan and others v. Kedar Nath Khetan laid down that when Statute prohibites acquisition for company to be treated as acquisition for public purpose, the same cannot be done indirectly. 69. Another judgment which is relevant to be noticed interpreting the exclusionary clause is (2006) 6 SCC 530 , M/s. Falcon Tyres Ltd. v. State of Karnatka. In the above case agricultural produce was defined in Section 2A(1) of Entry Tax Act. There was exclusionary definition in the definition clause. In second schedule sub-section (3) of Section 6 provided that no tax shall be levied under the Act on the goods specified in second Schedule or its entry into a local area. Serial No. 2 of the second schedule specifies Agriculture produce including tea, coffee and cotton (whether ginned or unginned) as exempt from the entry tax. The arguments was raised that tea and coffee is to be included in the agricultural produce by virtue of second schedule. Rejecting the submissions following was laid down in paragraphs 10 and 13 : “10. We do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the semicolon after the word cotton does not mean that the first part of the Section is disjunctive from ‘such produce’ as has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process. Section 2 (A) (1) is in two parts, it excludes two types of food from agricultural produce. Section 2 (A) (1) is in two parts, it excludes two types of food from agricultural produce. According to us, the definition of the agriculture and horticulture produce does not say as to what would be included in the agriculture or horticulture produce, in substance it includes all agriculture or horticulture produce but excludes, (1) tea, coffee, rubber, cashew, cardamom, pepper and cotton from the definition of the agriculture or horticulture produce though all these products as per dictionary meaning or in common parlance would be understood as agricultural produce and (2) “such produce as has been subject to any physical, chemical or other process for being made fit for consumption”, meaning thereby that the agricultural produce other than what has been excluded, which has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process for making it fit for consumption would also be excluded from the definition of the agriculture or horticulture produce except where such agricultural produce is merely cleaned, graded, sorted or dried. For example, if the potatoes are cleaned, graded, sorted or dried, they will remain agricultural produce but in case raw potato is subjected to a process and converted into chips for human consumption it would cease to be agricultural produce for the purposes of the Entry Tax Act. The words “such produce” in the second part does not refer to the produce which has already been excluded from the agricultural or horticulture produce but refers to such other agricultural produce which has been subjected to any physical, chemical or other process for being made fit for human consumption. 13. In the definition clause of Section 2(A)(1) rubber is excluded from the agricultural produce, sub-section (6) of Section 3 provides for exemption in respect of goods specified in the Second Schedule. At Sl. No. 2 of the Second Schedule, only tea, coffee and cotton (whether ginned or un-ginned) have been given exemption from payment of Entry Tax and not other items such as rubber, cashew, cardamom and pepper and such other agricultural produce which has been subjected to any process for making it fit for human consumption. Intention of the legislature is that though tea, coffee and cotton have been excluded in the definition clause from the agricultural produce but for the purposes of the Entry Tax Act tea, coffee and cotton are exempted from payment of Entry Tax. Intention of the legislature is that though tea, coffee and cotton have been excluded in the definition clause from the agricultural produce but for the purposes of the Entry Tax Act tea, coffee and cotton are exempted from payment of Entry Tax. This is an exception created by the legislature. If the legislature intended to create exception for rubber also it could have done it but it chose not to do it. Simply because the legislature has included tea, coffee and cotton in the Second Schedule exempting it from payment of Entry Tax does not mean that all other agricultural produce items which have been excluded from the definition of the agricultural produce would stand included in the Second Schedule to the Act exempting them from payment of Entry Tax. This would be doing violation to the Act as well as acting contrary to the intent of the legislature.“ 70. The above view of ours finds full support from the Division Bench judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Chaitram Verma and others v. Land Acquisition Officer, Raipur and others, AIR 1994 M.P. 74 . In the above case Section 4 notification was issued for acquisition of land for “public purpose”. The respondent No. 4 in the above case, which was a company, made an application for making available the land for construction of railway siding. The application of Section 17(1) was approved by the Commissioner. The submission before the High Court by the land owners was to the effect that acquisition of their land is in colourable exercise of power under the Act inasmuch as though the land is needed for respondent No. 4 (a public limited company), the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act mention the acquisition for public purpose with a view to avoid application of Chapter VII of the Act and to deny statutory benefits to the petitioners. The Division Bench noticed the amendments made by Act No. 68 of 1984 in Section 3 and laid down following in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment : 11. ........... The Division Bench noticed the amendments made by Act No. 68 of 1984 in Section 3 and laid down following in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment : 11. ........... The last part of the definition i.e. “it does not include acquisition of land for Companies” is important and brings out the obvious fact that even though a “public purpose” may be served by acquiring land for companies, the expression “public purpose” as used in the Act does not include such acquisition. It is true that the definition is inclusive and therefore, it is possible to hold that it includes many other purposes, which would otherwise not be included within it. But the use of exclusionary sentence as the end would make the difference and indicate that except for acquisitions for companies which cannot be treated as acquisition for public purpose, all other purposes are included within it. It is, therefore, a case where the definition is both inclusive and exclusive, the exclusion being of a limited nature suggesting that other categories of acquisitions which are not excluded fall within the inclusive definition. This method in relation to a definition clause is not natural and had received attention of the Supreme Court in Purshottam H. Judye v. V.B. Potdar, AIR 1966 SC 856 and Commr. of Income-tax, Gujarat v. Vidilal Lallubhai, AIR 1973 SC 1016 . Under the circumstances whatever may be extent of purpose included within the definition of “public purpose”, acquisition for company is excluded from it. Clearly therefore, an acquisition for a company is to be distinguished from acquisition for a public purpose, and an acquisition for a company even though serving public purpose, cannot, in the context of Section 3(i) of the Act, be accepted as an application for a public purpose. 12. Legal position was different before the amendment of the definition in 1984 by Act No. 68 of 1984. The definition of “public purpose” in Section 3(f) of the Act before this amendment did not have any exclusionary clause and was inclusive. Similarly, Section 4(1) of the Act permitted issue of notification only for a “public purpose”. It was therefore possible to then submit that if ‘public purpose’ is served by a company, there would be no illegality in the acquisition for a company on the basis of notification, mentioning acquisition for a public purpose. Similarly, Section 4(1) of the Act permitted issue of notification only for a “public purpose”. It was therefore possible to then submit that if ‘public purpose’ is served by a company, there would be no illegality in the acquisition for a company on the basis of notification, mentioning acquisition for a public purpose. In this connection the decision of the Supreme Court in Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 1203 , may be profitably read. The law declared by this decision has, however, become irrelevant because of the amendment not only of the definition of ‘public purpose’ in Section 3(f) but also Section 4(1) of the Act. Under the circumstances, the submission that the public purpose being served by the respondent No. 4, notification mentioning acquisition as for public purpose is legal, cannot be accepted.” 71. The Division Bench further held that provisions of Section 17(1) were not attracted in such acquisition. In the said case an agreement was also entered under Section 41 of the Act even before issuance of notification under Section 4. In the present case although agreement under Section 41 was executed after issuance of notification under Section 4 but in the recommendations made by the Director, Land Acquisition on 28th January, 2004 and the noting of the various Departments it was mentioned that for acquisition in favour of respondent No. 2 agreement is to be executed as required under Section 41 of the Act. The Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that since authorities issuing notification under Section 4 knew about the agreement under Section 41, the acquisition mentioning for public purpose was in colourable exercise of power. Following was laid down in paragraph 14 of the said judgment : “14. ..... It is, therefore, possible to hold that the authority issuing notification under Section 4 of the Act was aware of the agreements under Section 41 of the Act and knowingly issued the notification mentioning acquisition for public purpose. Could the authority getting the agreement under Section 41 of the Act reasonably notify that acquisition was intended to be for a public purpose and not for the company? The answer, in the opinion if this Court, is an emphatic No. It is difficult to believe that the Respondent No. 1 did not know the law on the subject. Could the authority getting the agreement under Section 41 of the Act reasonably notify that acquisition was intended to be for a public purpose and not for the company? The answer, in the opinion if this Court, is an emphatic No. It is difficult to believe that the Respondent No. 1 did not know the law on the subject. Under the circumstances, the only legitimate inference is that the Respondent No. 1 wanted to bye-pass the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act by making the notification for public purpose. It is, therefore, possible to allege lack of bona fide on the part of the respondent No. 1 while issuing the notification. For the same reason, the notification under Section 4 of the Act must be held to have been issued in colourable exercise of power. The notification under Section 4 of the Act (Annexure-A) is thus, vitiated.” 72. The Division Bench further held that Section 17 was inapplicable in such acquisition. It also held that there was no justification for invoking urgency clause under Section 17(1) even if Section 17(1) was applicable. Following was laid down in paragraph 16 of the said judgment : “16. A perusal of the notification under Section 4 of the Act would indicate that the respondent No. 1 has dispensed with enquiry under Section 5A as, according to the said respondent, provisions under Section 17(1) of the Act are applicable in the instant case. Order-sheets (Ann. D, E and F) show that this order was passed by the Commissioner and notified by the respondent No. 1. Order-sheets however, do not indicate any order under Section 17(4) of the Act dispensing with enquiry under Section 5 A of the Act. Section 17(1) as it originally stood, included acquisition for the company but the said provision has been amended by Act No. 68 of 1984 and is no longer applicable to cases of acquisition for a company. If Section 17(1) or 17(2) of the Act be inapplicable, there would be no scope for invoking urgency provision in the case of acquisition for a company. For the same reason, there would be no authority with the respondent No. 1 to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5 A of the Act. If Section 17(1) or 17(2) of the Act be inapplicable, there would be no scope for invoking urgency provision in the case of acquisition for a company. For the same reason, there would be no authority with the respondent No. 1 to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5 A of the Act. Even if Section 17(1) of the Act was applicable, this Court would have found no justification for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5 A of the Act. It has been clearly held in The State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1980 SC 319 that the urgency should be real and not merely a clock for denying benefits of the provision to the claimants. This is also the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 wherein it was clearly specified that not only the urgency within the meaning of Section 17(1) of the Act should be real but the authority must also consider whether the urgency is of a type as to justify dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5 A of the Act. If the facts of the present case are considered in view of the aforesaid law, there would be no justification for invoking the urgency provision under Section 17(1) of the Act. Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 4-7-1991 and published in M.P. Rajpatra, on 19-7-1991. The plant of the respondent No. 4 was to go in production only in October, 1992, as noticed earlier. Apparently, therefore, atleast 16 months were available before starting of production for which the siding was required. It is not the case of the respondents that if immediate acquisition was not made, commissioning of plant and railway siding may not have been done together. If it was to be so, it was the obligation of the respondents to place material on record for appreciation of this Court. In the absence of any such data or material it is not possible to hold that there was any urgency in the matter. Then, the impression gathered by this Court during the hearing of this petition is that the cement plant has not gone into production so far. In the absence of any such data or material it is not possible to hold that there was any urgency in the matter. Then, the impression gathered by this Court during the hearing of this petition is that the cement plant has not gone into production so far. Affidavit of Shri Raj Singh, Resident Manager of the respondent-company indicates that work for establishing the plant had started atleast in 1986 i.e. before the Railway Board was moved for no objection certificate for constructing the railway siding. If the matter could hang on so long for so many formalities, acquisition proceedings could have been arranged in a manner as not to deprive the petitioners of their valuable legal right of participation in the enquiry. These facts would justify the conclusion that there was no justification for invoking urgency clause under Section 17(1) of the Act. The urgency as held earlier must be real and bona fide and not a mere excuse to deny owners of the lands of their right to participate in the enquiry. 73. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondent No. 2 submits that exclusionary clause in Section 3(f) is not absolute. Elaborating his submissions Sri Dwivedi contends that in following three situations exclusionary clause shall not be applicable : (i) A situation where the acquisition for the company comes in the main part of the definition of Section 3(f). (ii) If acquisition comes within a express provision excluding applicability of part VII of the Act. (iii) Acquisition for a company in which public fund is infused by the Government. Reliance has been placed on second proviso to Section 6 of the Act. 74. The first situation where exclusionary clause shall not be applicable as contended by Sri Dwivedi is when purpose of the company is covered in the main definition of public purpose given under Section 3(f). The arguments of the respondent No. 2 is to be tested by referring to various express public purpose mentioned in Section 3(f). 74. The first situation where exclusionary clause shall not be applicable as contended by Sri Dwivedi is when purpose of the company is covered in the main definition of public purpose given under Section 3(f). The arguments of the respondent No. 2 is to be tested by referring to various express public purpose mentioned in Section 3(f). Much emphasis has been laid down by Sri Dwivedi on Section 3(f) (vi), which is being quoted below : “(vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a state, or a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State.” 75. The public purpose as envisaged in clause (vi) is for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government. However, the carrying out above scheme is contemplated only by following. (a) A local Authority (b) A society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (c) A Cooperative Society within the meaning of any law relating to cooperative Society. 76. Confining of carrying out the scheme by above three categories clearly indicates that a company is excluded even for carrying out such a scheme . Company like the respondent No. 2 which is registered under the Companies Act, 1956 is excluded for carrying out such scheme. 76. Confining of carrying out the scheme by above three categories clearly indicates that a company is excluded even for carrying out such a scheme . Company like the respondent No. 2 which is registered under the Companies Act, 1956 is excluded for carrying out such scheme. It is relevant to note the expression ‘companies’ as has been defined in Section 3(e) is to the following effect : “ (e) the expression “Company” means— (i) a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), other than a Government company referred to in clause (cc); (ii) a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, other than a society referred to in clause (cc); (iii) a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State, other than a co-operative society referred to in clause (cc).” 77. The definition clause Section 3 begins with “...unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context ...” Thus, the expression “Company” wherever used in the Act shall have the meaning as given in Section 3(e) unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context. In clause 3(f) (vi) when a registered society and cooperative society has been specifically included for carrying out such scheme, the exclusion of registered company under the Companies Act, 1956 is for purpose and object. Section 3(f) (vi) thus, clearly contemplates that educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme although is a public purpose while carrying out any scheme sponsored by the Government or any authority but the registered company is excluded from said clause which has purpose and object. Another clause, i.e., Clause (vii) of Section 3(f) is to be looked into. Clause (vii) provides that public purpose includes the provisions of land for any other scheme or development sponsored by Government or with the prior approval of the Government by a local authority. The present is not a case where the project has been sponsored by the Government or by any local authority with the prior approval of the Government. In any view of the matter the exclusionary clause shall take out acquisition for a company from a public purpose acquisition. The present is not a case where the project has been sponsored by the Government or by any local authority with the prior approval of the Government. In any view of the matter the exclusionary clause shall take out acquisition for a company from a public purpose acquisition. Thus, the submission of Sri Dwivedi that acquisition for a public purpose, if it is covered by main definition of Section 3(f), the exclusionary clause excluding the acquisition of land for company shall not apply, cannot be accepted. 78. According to Sri Dwivedi, the second category which shall not be covered by exclusionary clause is the category which is expressly excluded from part VII. Learned Counsel has referred to Section 44-B particularly. The submission of the respondent No. 2 is that Reliance Delhi Power Private Ltd. Company is a private company, the said private Company is expressly excluded by virtue of Section 44-B hence acquisition for such company has necessarily to be made under part II. It is relevant to have a look on Section 44-B of the Act, which is quoted as below : “Land not to be acquired under this Part except for certain purpose for private companies other than Government companies. 44B. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no land shall be acquired under this Part, except for the purpose mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 40, for a private company which is not a Government company. Explanation: “Private company” and “Government company” shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).” 79. The submission of the respondent No. 2 is that for an acquisition for a private company for the purpose other than those mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 40 exclusionary clause shall not be applicable. Section 44-B and the exclusionary clause contained in Section 3(f) are fully in consonance with each other. Section 44-B begins with the word “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act”. Thus, Section 44B is couched in a negative prohibitory term. Section 44B provides that “...no land shall be acquired under this Part except for the purpose mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 40, for a private company..” Acquisition for a private company for purposes other than those mentioned in Section 40(1)(a) is impermissible. Section 44B was added by Act No. 31 of 1962. Section 44B provides that “...no land shall be acquired under this Part except for the purpose mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 40, for a private company..” Acquisition for a private company for purposes other than those mentioned in Section 40(1)(a) is impermissible. Section 44B was added by Act No. 31 of 1962. The object clearly was to close the door for private company praying for acquisition of land from the Government exercising its power of eminent domain for any purpose other than acquisition of land for erection of dwelling house for workmen employed by the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith. The object and purpose of Section 44B is clear and loud. The Apex Court had occasion to consider Section 44B in AIR 1964 S.C. 1230 , R.L. Arora v. State of U.P. and others. Before the Supreme Court, the amendments made in Sections 40 and 41 of the Act by Act No. 31 of 1962 was under challenge. In the above context, a submission was made before the Apex Court that there is a discrimination between the public company and private company. It was contended that acquisition for a private company can be made only for purpose as mentioned in Section 40 (1)(a) whereas acquisition can be made for other company for purpose as mentioned in clause (aa) as inserted under Section 40(1) by Amendment Act. Repealling the submissions, the Apex Court held that acquisition between a public company/Government company on one hand and a private company on the other hand has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It was held that intention of the Legislature is clear that private individual and private company could not have advantage of acquiring the land even though they may be intending to engage in some industry or work which may have a public purpose. Following was laid down in paragraph 17. “17. .......It is true that acquisition for the purpose of cl. (aa) can only be made for a Government company or a public company and cannot be made for a private company or an individual; but there is in our opinion a clear classification between a public company and a Government company on the one hand and a private company and an individual on the other, which has reasonable nexus with the objects to be achieved under the law. The intention of the legislature clearly is that private individuals and private companies which really consist of a few private individuals banded together should not have the advantage of acquiring land even though they may be intending to engage in some industry or work which may be for a public purpose inasmuch the enrichment consequent on such work goes to private individuals or to a group of them who have formed themselves into a private company. Public companies on the other hand are broad based and Government companies are really in a sense no different from Government, though for convenience of administration a Government company may be formed, which thus becomes a separate legal entity. Thus in one case the acquisition results in private enrichment while in the other it is the public which gains in every way. Therefore a distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between public companies and Government companies on the one hand and private individuals and private companies on the other is in our opinion justified, considering the object behind cl. (aa) as introduced into the Act. The contention under this head must therefore also fail.” 80. From the above, it is clear that both the submissions of Sri Dwivedi i.e. firstly exclusionary clause in Section 3(f) shall not be attracted for those acquisition which are expressly excluded from part VII and secondly for a private company acquisition can be made for a public purpose disregarding the provisions of part VII, have to be rejected. We are of the clear view that in view of Section 44B, no acquisition for private company can be made for any purpose other than those mentioned in Section 40(1)(a) i.e. for the erection of dwelling house for workmen employed by the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith. We shall further refer to the submissions of the petitioner based on Section 44B a little later. 81. Now the next submission of Sri Dwivedi is that exclusionary clause shall be inapplicable when State infuses public fund for an acquisition for a company as contemplated in second proviso of Section 6 of the Act. We shall further refer to the submissions of the petitioner based on Section 44B a little later. 81. Now the next submission of Sri Dwivedi is that exclusionary clause shall be inapplicable when State infuses public fund for an acquisition for a company as contemplated in second proviso of Section 6 of the Act. The second provision to Section 6 is to the following effect : “Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.” 82. The submission of Sri Dwivedi is that although initially there was no decision of the State Government to infuse public fund for the acquisition in question but after amendment of power policy on 8.6.2004 and after execution of the State support agreement on 16.6.2004, the State was to bear 60% of the costs of the acquisition. The acquisition is to be treated as an execution for public purpose. He contends that by infusion of public fund, the course of acquisition can be changed. Sri Dwivedi in this regard has placed reliance on various judgment of the Supreme Court, which we proceed to consider hereinafter. One more submission connected with this very submission made by Sri Dwivedi is that decision to infuse public fund by Government can be taken by the State at any stage before publication under Section 6 and in the present case since decision to infuse public fund was taken before the declaration under Section 6, the acquisition is to be treated as an acquisition for public purpose. 83. In AIR 1960 S.C.1203, Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, acquisition proceedings were initiated for M/s Mukund Iron and Steel Works Ltd. a registered company for its factory building etc. The Constitutionality of the provisions was challenged before the Apex Court by a writ petition. The challenge was made relying on Article 31(2) of the Constitution of India (as it existed then). It was submitted that since acquisition was for a company it violated Article 31(2). The Constitutionality of the provisions was challenged before the Apex Court by a writ petition. The challenge was made relying on Article 31(2) of the Constitution of India (as it existed then). It was submitted that since acquisition was for a company it violated Article 31(2). Repealling the submissions following was held in paragraph 10 : “ ......These requirements indicate that the acquisition for a Company also is in substance for a public purpose inasmuch as it cannot be seriously contended that constructing dwelling houses, and providing amenities for the benefit of the workmen employed by it and construction of some work of public utility do not serve a public purpose.....” 84. The judgment of the Apex Court in AIR 1961 S.C. 343 , Pandit Jhandu Lal and others v. State of Punjab and another has been relied. In the above case, the acquisition proceedings were initiated for a public purpose namely; for construction of Labour Colony under the Government sponsored housing scheme for industrial workers of Thapar Industries Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. One of the issues before the Apex Court was as to whether acquisition proceedings have been vitiated by reason of the admitted fact that there was no attempt made by the Government to comply with the requirement of part VII of the Act. In the said case, the Apex Court laid down that acquisition for company can be made otherwise than under provisions of part VII, if costs or portion of the costs of the acquisition is to come out from a public fund. Following was laid down in paragraph 8 : “8. ........Section 6 is in terms, made subject to the provisions of Part VII of the Act. The provisions of Part VII, read with Section 6 of the Act, lead to this result that the declaration for the acquisition for a Company shall not be made unless the compensation to be awarded for the property is to be paid by a company. The declaration for the acquisition for a public purpose, similarly, cannot be made unless the compensation, wholly or partly, is to be paid out of public funds. Therefore, in the case of an acquisition for a Company simpliciter, the declaration cannot be made without satisfying the requirements of Part VII. The declaration for the acquisition for a public purpose, similarly, cannot be made unless the compensation, wholly or partly, is to be paid out of public funds. Therefore, in the case of an acquisition for a Company simpliciter, the declaration cannot be made without satisfying the requirements of Part VII. But, that does not necessarily mean that an acquisition for a Company for a public purpose cannot be made otherwise, than under the provisions of Part VII, if the cost or a portion of the cost of the acquisition is to come out of public funds. In other words, the essential condition for acquisition for a public purpose is that the cost of acquisition should be borne, wholly or in part, out of public funds. Hence, an acquisition for a Company may also be made for a public purpose, within the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds. If, on the other hand, the acquisition for a Company is to be made at the cost entirely of the Company itself, such an acquisition comes under the provisions of Part VII.....” 85. Again in AIR 1962 S.C. 764 , R.L. Arora v. State of U.P. and others, the second proviso of Section 6 was considered. Following was laid down in paragraph 5 : “5. .......Though therefore this distinction is there where the acquisition is either for a public purpose or, for a company, there is not a complete dichotomy between acquisitions for the two purposes and it cannot be maintained that where the acquisition is primarily for a company it must always be preceded by action under Part VII and compensation must always be paid wholly by the company. A third class of cases is possible where the acquisition may be primarily for a company but it may also be at the same time or a public purpose and the whole or part of compensation may be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. A third class of cases is possible where the acquisition may be primarily for a company but it may also be at the same time or a public purpose and the whole or part of compensation may be paid out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. In such a case though the acquisition may look as if it is primarily for a company it will be covered by that part of Section 6 which lays down that acquisition may be made for a public purpose if the whole part of the compensation is to be paid out of the public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Such was the case in Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 343 . In that case the acquisition was for the construction of a labour colony under the Government sponsored housing scheme for the industrial workers of the Thapar Industries Co-operative Housing Society Limited and part of the compensation was to be paid out of the public funds. In such a case this Court held that “an acquisition for a company may also be made for a public purpose with in the meaning of the Act, if a part or the whole of the cost of acquisition is met by public funds” and therefore it was not necessary to go through the procedure prescribed by Part VII. It is only where the acquisition is for a company and its cost is to be met entirely by the company itself that the provisions of Part VII apply. In the present case it is not the case of the respondents that any part of the compensation is to be paid out of what may be called public funds. It is not in dispute that the entire compensation is to be paid by the Works and therefore the provisions of Part VII would apply to the present case; and it is in this background that we have to consider the contention raised on behalf of the appellant.” 86. It is not in dispute that the entire compensation is to be paid by the Works and therefore the provisions of Part VII would apply to the present case; and it is in this background that we have to consider the contention raised on behalf of the appellant.” 86. The judgment of the Constitution Bench in AIR 1963 S.C. 151 , Smt. Somawanti and others v. State of Punjab and others was a case, where Section 4 notification was issued by the Government of Punjab for acquisition on public expenses for public purpose namely; for setting up a factory for manufacturing various ranges of refrigerators , compressors and ancillary equipments. The acquisition was challenged. It was contended that acquisition in question was merely for the benefit of a company and the action of the Government was only a colourable exercise by it. It was contended that before making a declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 6, the Government ought to have taken a decision that it will contribute towards the acquisition. The Government decided to contribute Rs. 100/- only. Financial sanction of Rs. 100/- was accorded by the Finance Department on September 29, 1961 that too after filing of the writ petition in the Apex Court. Rejecting the submission that infusion of fund was a colourable exercise of power following was laid down in paragraph 43 : “43. It is no doubt true that the financial sanction for the contribution of Rs. 100 as part of the expenses for acquisition was accorded by the Finance Department on September 29, 1961. No doubt also that a day prior to the according of sanction this petition had been admitted by this Court and a stay order issued. But from these two circumstances, it would not be reasonable to draw the inference that the declaration made by the Government was a colourable exercise of its power. The provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 6, however, do not require that the notification made thereunder must set out the fact that the Government had decided to pay a part of the expenses of acquisition or even to state the extent to which the Government is prepared to make a part contribution to the cost of acquisition.” 87. The provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 6, however, do not require that the notification made thereunder must set out the fact that the Government had decided to pay a part of the expenses of acquisition or even to state the extent to which the Government is prepared to make a part contribution to the cost of acquisition.” 87. Learned Advocate General had contended before the Apex Court that Scheme of establishment of refrigeration factory at Punjab was examined at various stages and it was then decided to make a part contribution from public fund and as required by Financial Rules, the consent of the Finance Department was to be obtained for this purpose which stage occupied considerable time and that is why delay was there in according sanction. Following was stated in paragraph 44 of the judgment : “44. .....It was stated at the bar by the learned Advocate-General that the entire scheme of establishing a refrigeration factory in Punjab was examined at various stages and at different levels of Government a well as by different ministries and it was then decided to make a part contribution towards the cost of acquisition from public funds. As required by the Financial Rules the consent of the Finance Department had to be obtained for this purpose. This particular stage occupied considerable time and that is why there was a delay in according sanction. The statement of the learned Advocate-General was not challenged on behalf of the petitioner. Moreover the declaration under sub-section (1) 6 is clear on the point that the land is being acquired at public expense, and the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 6 preclude a Court from going behind such a declaration unless it is shown that the Government has in fact decided not to contribute any funds out of the public revenues for that purpose. For, if the Government had in fact taken a decision of that kind then the exercise of the power to make an acquisition would be open to challenge as being colourable.” 88. The statements made by Advocate General as noted above was not contested by the petitioners. Thus, in the above case, decision was taken to contribue fund much earlier, only financial sanction was received with delay. It has not come in the judgment when the decision was taken to contribute fund. The statements made by Advocate General as noted above was not contested by the petitioners. Thus, in the above case, decision was taken to contribue fund much earlier, only financial sanction was received with delay. It has not come in the judgment when the decision was taken to contribute fund. The Apex Court did not lay down any proposition as to when and as to which stage decision should be taken regarding contribution of fund. The Apex Court in the facts of that case held that there was no colourable exercise by the State. It is also relevant to note that even Section 4 notification in the said case mentioned that the land is to be acquired at public expense for a public purpose. 89. Much reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in (2003)10 SCC 626 , Pratibha Nema and others v. State of M.P. and others. The facts in the case of Pratibha Nema are required to be noticed in detail as well as the proposition laid down in the said case. In Pratibha Nema’s case Section 4 notification was issued for the public purpose of “establishment of diamond park”. The inquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with. The notification was issued for acquisition of 73.3 hectare of dry land. Following was noticed in paragraph 1 of the judgment : “1..........The said extent of land was notified for acquisition under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) for the alleged public purpose of ‘establishment of diamond park’. This parcel of land together with an extent of 44.8 hectares of Government land was meant to be placed at the disposal of the Industries Department and/or Madhya Pradesh Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Nigam’) for the purpose of allotting the same to various industrial units - the foremost among them being the 9th respondent-company, for setting up diamond cutting and polishing units with modern technology. The proposal in this regard emanated from the General Manager of District Industries Centre, on the initiative taken by the 9th Respondent. After the land was located by a joint inspection committee of officials, the Government of Madhya Pradesh (Commerce and Industries Department) had given sanction ‘in principle’ for the acquisition. Notification under Section 4 was issued on 30.1.1996 and declaration under Section 6 was issued on 9.2.1996. After the land was located by a joint inspection committee of officials, the Government of Madhya Pradesh (Commerce and Industries Department) had given sanction ‘in principle’ for the acquisition. Notification under Section 4 was issued on 30.1.1996 and declaration under Section 6 was issued on 9.2.1996. The writ petitions were filed challenging the acquisition. The writ petitions and letters patent appeals were dismissed. The matter was taken up to the Apex Court where the State of M.P. made statements that notification under Section 6 shall be withdrawn and procedure under Section 5-A will be followed. The Special Leave Petition was disposed of accordingly. Thereafter notification under Section 6 was withdrawn and an inquiry was held under Section 5-A and the report was submitted overruling the objections and fresh notification was issued under Section 6 on 3.1.1997. Four contentions were urged before the Apex Court which are as follows : “5. Broadly, four contentions have been urged before us. They are : 1. Acquisition is not for a public purpose. The entire acquisition is a subterfuge to hand over the acquired land to the company in the guise of acquisition for a public purpose. Even the amount paid towards compensation was not out of public revenues, but out of the money provided by the Company for the specific purpose of compensation. 2. The public purpose stated in the Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 is vague. 3. The area of the land proposed to be acquired is far in excess of reasonable requirements and. 4. Environmental considerations were not kept in view while taking a decision to acquire the land for industrial purpose.” 90. The Apex Court proceeded to consider the provisions of the Act and had also noticed the definition of public purpose as given in Section 3(f) as amended by Act No. 68 of 1984. Following was observed in paragraphs 6 and 9 : “6. In order to appreciate the contentions set out above in proper perspective, it would be appropriate to advert to certain basic provisions of the Act and recapitulate the well settled principles relating to public purpose and acquisition of land under Part II and Part VII of the Act. Following was observed in paragraphs 6 and 9 : “6. In order to appreciate the contentions set out above in proper perspective, it would be appropriate to advert to certain basic provisions of the Act and recapitulate the well settled principles relating to public purpose and acquisition of land under Part II and Part VII of the Act. Section 4(1) which occurs in Part II of the Act contemplates a notification to be published in the official gazette etc., whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed for any public purpose or for a company. Thereupon, various steps enumerated in sub-section (2) could be undertaken by the authorized officer. There is an inclusive definition of ‘public purpose’ in clause (f) of Section 3. This clause was inserted by Central Act 68 of 1984. Many instances of public purpose specified therein would have perhaps been embraced within the fold of public purpose as generally understood. May be, by way of abundant caution or to give quietus to legal controversies, the inclusive definition has been added. One thing which deserves particular notice is the rider at the end of clause (f) by which the acquisition of land for Companies is excluded from the purview of the expression ‘public purpose’. However, notwithstanding this dichotomy, speaking from the point of view of public purpose, the provisions of Part II and Part VII are not mutually exclusive as elaborated later. 9. We may now advert to Section 6. It provides for a declaration to be made by the Government or its duly authorized officer that a particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a company when the Government is satisfied after considering the report if any made under Section 5-A(2). It is explicitly made clear that such declaration shall be subject to the provisions of Part VII of the Act which bears the chapter heading ‘Acquisition of Land for Companies’. Thus, Section 6 reiterates the apparent distinction between acquisition for a public purpose and acquisition for a company. There is an important and crucial proviso to Section 6 which has a bearing on the question whether the acquisition is for a public purpose or for a Company. Thus, Section 6 reiterates the apparent distinction between acquisition for a public purpose and acquisition for a company. There is an important and crucial proviso to Section 6 which has a bearing on the question whether the acquisition is for a public purpose or for a Company. The second proviso lays down that “no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, wholly or partly, out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority”. Explanation 2 then makes it clear that where the compensation to be awarded is to be paid out of the funds of a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues. Thus, a provision for payment of compensation, wholly or partly, out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority is sine qua non for making a declaration to the effect that a particular land is needed for a public purpose. Even if the public purpose is behind the acquisition for a company, it shall not be deemed to be an acquisition for a public purpose unless at least part of the compensation is payable out of public revenues which includes the fund of a local authority or the funds of a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. However, it was laid down in Somavanti’s case that the notification under Section 6(1) need not explicitly set out the fact that the Government had decided to pay a part of the expenses of the acquisition or even to state that the Government is prepared to make a part of contribution to the cost of acquisition.......” 91. The Apex Court in the said judgment in paragraphs 21 and 22 has laid down that real point of distinction between an acquisition under part II and part VII is a source of fund to cover the costs of acquisition. Following was laid down in paragraphs 21 and 22 : 21. .........Thus, it is seen that even in a case of acquisition for a Company, public purpose is not eschewed. It follows, therefore, that the existence or non-existence of a public purpose is not a primary distinguishing factor between the acquisition under Part II and acquisition under Part VII. Following was laid down in paragraphs 21 and 22 : 21. .........Thus, it is seen that even in a case of acquisition for a Company, public purpose is not eschewed. It follows, therefore, that the existence or non-existence of a public purpose is not a primary distinguishing factor between the acquisition under Part II and acquisition under Part VII. The real point of distinction seems to be the source of funds to cover the cost of acquisition. In other words, the second proviso to Section 6(1) is the main dividing ground for the two types of acquisition. This point has been stressed by this Court in Srinivasa Co-operative House Building Society Limited v. Madam G. Sastry, (1994) 4 SCC page 675 at paragraph 12 : “.....In the case of an acquisition for a company simpliciter, the declaration cannot be made without satisfying the requirements of Part VII. But that does not necessarily mean that an acquisition for a company for a public purpose cannot be made otherwise than under the provisions of Part VII, if the cost or a portion of the cost of the acquisition is to come out of public funds. In other words, the essential condition for acquisition is for a public purpose and that the cost of acquisition should be borne, wholly or in part, out of public funds....” 22. Thus the distinction between public purpose acquisition and Part VII acquisition has got blurred under the impact of judicial interpretation of relevant provisions. The main and perhaps the decisive distinction lies in the fact whether cost of acquisition comes out of public funds wholly or partly. Here again, even a token or nominal contribution by the Government was held to be sufficient compliance with the second proviso to Section 6 as held in a catena of decisions. The net result is that by contributing even a trifling sum, the character and pattern of acquisition could be changed by the Government. In ultimate analysis, what is considered to be an acquisition for facilitating the setting up of an industry in private sector could get imbued with the character of public purpose acquisition if only the Government comes forward to sanction the payment of a nominal sum towards compensation. In the present State of law, that seems to be the real position.” 92. In the present State of law, that seems to be the real position.” 92. As noted above , the Apex Court noticed the amended definition of Section 3 (f) excluding company for public purposes and has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Srinivasa Coop. House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry, (1994) 4 SCC 675 . At this stage, it is relevant to note that in Srinivasa Housing Cooperative v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry, the Apex Court was considering a definition of “public purpose” as it existed before 1984 Amendment and in paragraph 3 of the judgment it was observed : “We are not concerned with the public purpose as amended under 1984 Act”. 93. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that in Pratibha Nema’s case although amended definition of Section 3(f) was noticed but the consequence of amendment specially the amendments made in Sections 4, 6, 17 and 39 have not been considered and the said judgment cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that even after amendment of the definition of “public purpose” by Act No. 68 of 1984, by infusion of public fund in an acquisition for a company, the said acquisition shall become acquisition for public purposes. The Apex Court in Pratibha Nema’s case has noted the amended definition of Section 3(f) in paragraph 6 and has clearly laid down in paragraphs 21 and 22 that real point of distinction seems to be source of fund to cover the cost of acquisition. We feel ourselves bound by the above pronouncement made by the Apex Court. Thus, for the purpose of this case, we proceed on the premise that infusion of public fund by the Government make the acquisition for company as acquisition for public purpose. 94. At this juncture, it is relevant to notice certain distinguishing features of the present case with that of Pratibha Nema’s case. In Pratibha Nema’s case land was meant to be placed at the disposal of Industries Department or M.P. Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam Ltd. for the purpose of allotting the same to various units as noted in paragraph 1 of the judgment itself . The respondent No. 9, the company which wanted to establish diamond industry was one of the companies to whom the land was to be allowed. The respondent No. 9, the company which wanted to establish diamond industry was one of the companies to whom the land was to be allowed. Following are the distinguishing features of the present case with that of Pratibha Nema’s case : Following was laid down in paragraph 31 : “31. .....The State Government by its communication dated 18-1-1996 accorded sanction in principle for acquiring the private land measuring 73 hectares in Rangwasa village ‘for industrial purpose’ in order to set up a diamond park. Thus, the considerations of industrial policy and development weighed prominently with all the concerned authorities while processing the proposals. It is clear from the stand taken by the Nigam in the counter-affidavit and the enquiry report of the Land Acquisition Collector that AKI Ltd. and Rosy Blue of Antwerp are not the only entrepreneurs who would get the land in the proposed diamond park area. In the report of the Land Acquisition Officer, it is specifically mentioned that the land is proposed to be allotted to 12 industrial units after being satisfied about their capacity and bona fides. Our attention has been drawn by the learned Advocate-General to the layout plan in which 12 plots covering an area of 57 hectares are laid out. The remaining area is earmarked for green belt, housing, common facilities and other amenities. Even the MOU entered into between the Nigam and the two Companies do not give us a different picture. It is specifically stated therein that the Commerce and Industries Department will hand over the land to Nigam for the development of diamond park and the Nigam in its turn will allot the land required for setting up the units for cutting and polishing diamonds on leasehold basis to the two Companies as well as other Companies. The site has been selected by a team of Government officials after visiting various places. The fact that AKI Ltd. also requested for allotment of suitable land near Indore and ultimately the land close to Indore was selected, does not necessarily mean that the official team was acting at the dictates of the said Company. Having regard to the strategic location and importance of the Indore city, the choice of site near Indore cannot be said to be vitiated by any extraneous considerations. Having regard to the strategic location and importance of the Indore city, the choice of site near Indore cannot be said to be vitiated by any extraneous considerations. Entering into MOU with the two Companies and thereafter initiating requisite steps for the acquisition of the land does not, in our view, detract from the public purpose character of acquisition, MOU, in ultimate analysis, is in the mutual interest of both the parties and was only directed towards the end of setting up of an industrial complex under the name of ‘diamond park’ which benefits the public at large and incidentally benefits the private entrepreneurs.“ 95. Thus, in the said judgment, the Apex Court took the view that acquisition was not for AKI Ltd. , a company but acquisition was made through M.P. Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam (State Government Corporation), which has submitted the proposal and AKI Ltd. was one of the entrepreneurs who were to be allotted. In Pratibha Nema’s case issue as to at what stage infusion of fund is to take place by the State was not under consideration since the acquisition was routed by the Nigam and all funds were to be born by the Nigam. Amount which was paid by AKI Ltd. by cheque to the Nigam was held to be advance payment towards lease amount as per the terms of MOU. 96. With regard to infusion of fund by the State, submission of Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 is that such infusion of fund can be made by the State at any stage prior to issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Reliance has been placed on the judgments in M. Venkatapathi Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1957 AP 686; Mrs. R.D. Chand and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1963 AP 383 ; Kali Pada Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1966 Cal 480 ; Luxmichand and others v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1983 All 136 and Sree Raja Kandregula Srinivasa Jagannadha Rao Pantulu Bahaddur v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1960 AP 343 . In Venkatpathi Raju’s case, learned Single Judge of Andhra pradesh High Court laid down following : “That although it is not necessary that the deposit of compensation should precede the notification under Section 6 or that the declaration need not ex facie show the intention of the Government as envisaged in the proviso, the declaration of intention of the Government to pay, a part of the compensation out of public funds should precede the notification under Section 6. It is not necessary to repeat the reasoning in support of this conclusion. The Government have not stated anywhere that the intention was made manifest prior to the notification, nor even an attempt made in that behalf.” In Mrs. R.D. Chand and another (supra) the same proposition was repeated that the Government must decide regarding the payment of compensation from public revenue before issuance of notification under Section 6. In Kali Pada Banerji’s case (supra) the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the decision to contribute out of public fund need not be mentioned in the notification. Such a statement however, has to be made in the declaration under Section 6(1). In Luxmichand’s case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court laid down that the second proviso to Section 6 does not require actual deposit of the compensation. In Raja Kandregula Srinivasas case (supra) the same proposition was laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the intention of the Government to pay a part of the compensation out of public revenue must be made manifest before the publication of the declaration under Section 6. However, it is not necessary that such an amount must be paid before the notification. 97. The question as to in what stage decision to contribute public fund is to be taken has been considered and answered in Devinder Singh’s case. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed heavy reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab and others, (2008) 1 SCC 728 . The facts of Devinder Singh’s case and the proposition as laid down by the Apex Court after considering the earlier judgments of this Court needs to be noted in detail. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed heavy reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab and others, (2008) 1 SCC 728 . The facts of Devinder Singh’s case and the proposition as laid down by the Apex Court after considering the earlier judgments of this Court needs to be noted in detail. Section 4 notification issued in the said case provided that the land is likely to be required to be taken by the Government “at the public expense”, for a public purpose, namely for setting up of a Ganesha Project, M/s National traders Ltd at Village Chak Gujran, Tehsil & Distt. Hoshiarpur. Objections were filed under Section 5-A. An agreement under Section 41 of the Act was entered into between the Company and the Sate. Notification under Section 6 was also published on the same date i.e. 27/2/2003. The land owners challenged the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6. During the pendency of the writ petition a sum of Rs. 100/- was deposited by the State as a token amount for acquisition of the said land. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. Following reasons were given by the High Court in dismissing the writ petition : “(i) The acquisition was for a public purpose in view of the report submitted under the Act, relevant portion whereof is as under : In case of M/s. International Tractors Ltd. the company has entered into an agreement with a French company named M/s. Renault Agriculture France for manufacture of latest technology tractors. M/s. Renault Agriculture France holds 20% equity in the company. Production of these latest technology tractors will boost export, which will contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community. Therefore, in view of the facts and the relevant law as mentioned above, it is proved beyond doubt that the profits have actually gone to the general public...... (ii) Acquisition of the lands in question was not a colourable exercise of power. (iii) Acquisition was made in terms of the provisions contained in Part II of the Act and not Part VII thereof, as the State had also contributed a sum of Rs. 100/- for the purpose of acquisition of lands. (ii) Acquisition of the lands in question was not a colourable exercise of power. (iii) Acquisition was made in terms of the provisions contained in Part II of the Act and not Part VII thereof, as the State had also contributed a sum of Rs. 100/- for the purpose of acquisition of lands. (iv) Execution of the agreement with Respondent No. 5-Company and declaration made under Section 6 of the Act although were made on the same day, the same did not suffer from the vice of non-application of mind. (v) Respondent No. 5 being not a private company, statutory limitations contained in Section 44B of the Act are not attracted. (vi) Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 (for short, ‘the Companies Rules’) being directory in nature, it was not necessary to comply with the provisions thereof.” 98. Before the Apex Court the judgment of the High Court was challenged contending that the High Court erred in taking the view that the land can be compulsorily acquired for a company in accordance with the provisions of Part 2. It was further contended that in view of insertion of Clause viii of sub-section (f) in Section 3 by Act 68/84, provisions of part 2 were not available for acquisition of land for companies. The Supreme Court noticed the definition of Corporation owned or controlled by the State under Section 3 (cc), company under Section 3(e) and public purpose under Section 3(f). Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 16 which is quoted below : “16.When a request is made by any wing of the State or a Government company for acquisition of land for a public purpose, different procedures are adopted. Where, however, an application is filed for acquisition of land at the instance of a ‘company’, the procedures to be adopted therefor are laid down in Part VII of the Act. Although it may not be decisive but the conduct of the State as to how it intended to deal with such a requisition, is a relevant factor.” 99. The Apex Court also considered the provisions of Rule 4 of Land Acquisition “Companies Rule 1963” hereinafter called the “Rule 1963”. Although it may not be decisive but the conduct of the State as to how it intended to deal with such a requisition, is a relevant factor.” 99. The Apex Court also considered the provisions of Rule 4 of Land Acquisition “Companies Rule 1963” hereinafter called the “Rule 1963”. Rule 4 sub-rule 1 (vi) as noted above provides that if the land proposed to be acquired is a good agricultural land the acquisition is to be avoided and there has to be inquiry as to whether any alternative suitable site can be found. Rule 4 sub-rule 2(1) further mandates that in case the land is proposed to be acquired is an agricultural land, Senior Agricultural Officer of the District is to be consulted. In para 18 of the judgment the Apex Court has emphasised that the State must form an opinion that the lands which are going to be acquired are not good agricultural land. Following was laid down in para 18 which is quoted below : “18. The State is also enjoined with a duty to make an inquiry wherefor an opportunity of hearing to the company is required to be given. When the State intends to proceed with the acquisition of land it must form an opinion that the lands which are going to be acquired are not good agricultural lands. The rules by and large lay down a statutory policy in that behalf and question of ignoring the same by the State does not arise.” 100. The Apex Court in Devinder Singh’s case also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Pratibha Nema’s case (supra) specially the proposition that in case the acquisition for a public company public purpose is not to be assumed and point of distinction between the acquisition of land in Part II and Part VII would be source of fund to cover the cost of acquisition. In paragraph 3 of the judgment following was laid down : “3. Objections having been called for, the appellants herein filed their objections in terms of Section 5A of the Act, inter alia, stating : “5. That the proposed acquisition by the Punjab Government is unconstitutional, uncalled for and against law and fact of the case, just in order to cause loss to the objectors and to give unlawful gain to other party, i.e., the proposed Ganesha Project M/s. International Tractor Ltd. 7. That the proposed acquisition by the Punjab Government is unconstitutional, uncalled for and against law and fact of the case, just in order to cause loss to the objectors and to give unlawful gain to other party, i.e., the proposed Ganesha Project M/s. International Tractor Ltd. 7. That the acquisition of the proposed land belonging to the objectors is against the interest of the objectors keeping in view the policies of the State. The land in question is cultivable fertile land and the proposed project if any can be shifted some where else at some barren land as well as in the industrial zone according to Industries Master Plan and in this way, it is in the interest of the Pollution Control Department. 9. That the objectors are cultivating the land for the last over 25 years, it is consolidated at one place where in the objector has installed electric motors and planted popular trees around the fields. The objectors do not want that the land in question be acquired since it is against their interest and objectors are dependent on this Acquisition land. The Agriculturist/Farmer is entirely dependent on his land for his livelihood. There are various projects in the name of Escorts Tractors, Mohindra Tractors, Massy Furgon Tractors and so many other tractors companies/industries fulfilling the needs of the public and as such there is no need at all of the proposed industry to be set up in the lands of the objectors. 10. That in any way the proposed acquisition is against the rules of the acquisition and the act itself keeping in view the interest of the objectors thus causing wrongful loss to the objectors and causing wrongful gain to the proposed objectors”. 101. The Supreme Court in Devinder Singh’s case also considered the effect of contribution of sum Rs. 100/- by the State. In paragraph 37, the Apex Court held that ordinarily the Court could not have gone into the question regarding contribution by the State, but the agreement provided for payment of entire compensation by the Company. The Apex Court further held that decision of infusion of fund has to be taken prior to entering into the agreement. Following was laid down in paragraphs 37 and 38 : “37. In this case we may notice that purported contribution had been made only after the writ petitions were filed. The Apex Court further held that decision of infusion of fund has to be taken prior to entering into the agreement. Following was laid down in paragraphs 37 and 38 : “37. In this case we may notice that purported contribution had been made only after the writ petitions were filed. Ordinarily, this Court would not have gone into the said question but the agreement provides for payment of entire compensation by the company. We do not know as to at what stage the State thought it fit to meet a part of the expenses for acquisition of land. Such an opinion on the part of the State having regard to the statutory scheme should have been formed prior to entering into the agreement itself. The agreement does not mention about any payment of a part of compensation by the State. We, in absence of any other material on record, must hold that the State had not formed any opinion in that behalf at least when the agreement was executed. The wisdom in all probabilities dawned on the officers of the State at a later stage. 38. Satisfaction on the part of the State required to be arrived at upon formation of opinion on the basis of materials brought on records for the purpose of Part II of the Act are different from that of Part VII. Once the appropriate Government arrives at a decision that the land sought to be acquired is needed for a public purpose, the Court would not go behind it, as the same may furnish a valid argument for upholding an acquisition under Part II. But when an acquisition is made under Part VII, the conditions precedents therefor as contained in the Companies Rules must be satisfied. On the face of record, if it can be shown that the Government had ignored the mandatory provisions of the Act, the acquisition would have to be struck down. “ 102. In the case in hand also the agreement under Section 41 was executed by the State and the Company which specifically provided that the entire cost has to be borne by the Company. There being agreement between the parties that the entire fund shall be borne by the Company the law as laid down in paragraph 37 as quoted above applies with full force in the facts of the present case. There being agreement between the parties that the entire fund shall be borne by the Company the law as laid down in paragraph 37 as quoted above applies with full force in the facts of the present case. In paragraph 41 of the judgment it was further held as under : “41. A declaration is to be made either for a public purpose or for a company. It cannot be for both.” 103. The Apex Court further proceeded to examine as to whether Rule 4 of the Rule 63 are mandatory or directory. The Apex Court after considering the earlier decisions held that compliance of Rule 4 is mandatory. 104. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 has given much emphasis on paragraph 52 of Devinder Singh’s case (supra). In paragraph 52, the Apex Court observed that the decision of this Court in Somawanti’s case that the stage on which rule 4 is required to be complied with is not the stage prior to issuing notification under Section 4 of the Act, but declaration under Section 6, does not appear to be correct. For taking the above view reliance was placed in paragraph 52 on two judgments of the Apex Court namely State of Gujarat and another v. Patel Chaturbhai Narsibhai and others, AIR, 1974 SC 629, and General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society v. Smt. Wahabuddin and others, 1981 (2) SCC 352 . 105. In the case of State of Gujrat (supra) AIR 1974 SC 629, the three Judges’ Bench of the Apex Court had the occasion to consider Rule 4 of the Rule, 1963. The Apex Court in the said case held that the owners of the land are entitled to opportunity of being heard in an inquiry under Rule 4. The inquiry in the said case was held prior to Section 4 notification which was subsequently cancelled. The second case relied by the Supreme Court was General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society (supra). The said case was also a judgment by three Judges. Rule 4 also came up for consideration in the said judgment. In paragraph 13 of the judgment it was held by the three Judges’ Bench that compliance of Rule 4 precedes the notification under Section 4 as well as compliance of Section 6 of the Act. The said case was also a judgment by three Judges. Rule 4 also came up for consideration in the said judgment. In paragraph 13 of the judgment it was held by the three Judges’ Bench that compliance of Rule 4 precedes the notification under Section 4 as well as compliance of Section 6 of the Act. Paragraph 13 is quoted below : “13.Sub-rule (1) requires the Government to direct the Collector to submit a report to it on the matters enumerated in clauses (i) to (vi) of sub-rule (1) which is for the benefit of the Company. The purpose is to avoid acquisition of land not suitable for a company. Clause (ii) of sub-rule (1) requires that the company has to make all reasonable efforts to get such lands by negotiation with the person interested therein on payment of reasonable prices and that such efforts have failed. The purpose of clause (ii) seems to be to avoid unnecessary land acquisition proceedings and payment of exorbitant prices. The purpose of clauses (iii), (iv) and (v) are obvious. The purpose of clause (vi) is to avoid acquisition of good agricultural land, when other alternative land is available for the purpose. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 requires the Collector to give reasonable opportunity to the company so that the Collector may hold an inquiry into the matters referred to in sub-r. (1). The Collector has to comply with cls. (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-rule (2) during the course of the inquiry under sub-rule (1). The Collector under sub-r. (3) then has to send a copy of his report of the inquiry to the appropriate Government and a copy of the report has to be forwarded by the Government to the Land Acquisition Committee constituted under Rule 3 for the purpose of advising the Government in relation to acquisition of land under Part VII of the Act, the duty of the Committee being to advise the Government on all matters relating to or arising out of acquisition of land under Part VII of the Act (sub-rule (5) of Rule 3). No declaration shall be made by the appropriate Government under Section 6 of the Act unless the Committee has been consulted by the Government and has considered the report submitted by the Collector under Section 5A of the Act. No declaration shall be made by the appropriate Government under Section 6 of the Act unless the Committee has been consulted by the Government and has considered the report submitted by the Collector under Section 5A of the Act. In addition, under clause (ii) of sub-rule (4) of Rule 4, the Company has to execute an agreement under Section 41 of the Act. The above consideration shows that Rule 4 is, mandatory; its compliance is no idle formality, unless the directions enjoined by Rule 4 are complied with, the notification under Section 6 will be invalid. A consideration of Rule 4 also shows that its compliance precedes the notification under Section 4 as well as compliance of Section 6 of the Act.” 106. In paragraph 48 of Devinder Singh’s case the Apex Court has noticed another three Judge judgment in M/s Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. v. Gustavo Ranato Da Cruz Pinto and others, 1985 (2) SCC 152 . In Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. (supra) compliance of Rule 4 of Rule 63 came up for consideration before Three Judges Bench interpreting Rule 4 it laid down that an inquiry under Rule 4 might be made before issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, but it is not a sine-qua non for issuance of notification under Section 4. Following was laid down in paragraph 13 which is quoted below : “13. To complete the acquisition proceedings, notification under Section 6 of the Act is required. Section 6 of the Act enjoins that the government has to be satisfied that the land is needed for public purpose or for a Company and after declaration is made the acquisition is complete after the award is made and possession of the land is taken when the land vests under Section 16 in the government free from encumbrances. Section. 4 does not require as such this satisfaction of the government. The government might initiate acquisition proceedings “if it appears” to the government that land is needed either for public purpose or for a Company. That might appear to the government by enquiry aliunde or on a petition or application made by any Company. Whether the need is proper or genuine that can be found by the government subsequently after notice under Section 4 of the Act. That might appear to the government by enquiry aliunde or on a petition or application made by any Company. Whether the need is proper or genuine that can be found by the government subsequently after notice under Section 4 of the Act. An enquiry under Section 4 might be made before issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act but it is not a sine qua non for the issuance of the notification under Section 4 to have an enquiry under R. 4 of the Rules. The scheme and the language of the Act and the Rules do not indicate that. As noted before, Section 4 does not require government to be satisfied; it is sufficient if it appears to the government that land is needed either for public purpose or for a Company. It may so appear to the government either by independent enquiry or from reports and information received by the government or even from an application by the company concerned.” 107. In the judgment of Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court had noticed its earlier judgment in General Government Servants Co-operative Housing Society the Court made following observations : “24. It appears to us that the reference to R. 4 in the context in which it was made was inadvertent. What perhaps the Court wanted to convey was the need of compliance of entering into agreement under Section 41 before the Issuance of notification under Section 6 of the Act. Otherwise it appears that there was no enquiry under R. 4 of the Rules before issuance of the notification under Section 4 yet the notification under Section 4 was not quashed. The observation then in any event is obiter.” 108. It is to be noticed that in Somawanti’s case Rule 4 of Rule 1963 was neither under consideration nor could have been considered since when Somawanti’s case was decided Rule 1963 had not even been framed. (Judgment of Somawanti’s case is dated 02/5/1962). Thus, the reference of Somawanti’s case in paragraph 52 is a slip of pen and the Apex Court in fact was referring to Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd which was considered in paragraph 48 of the judgment. (Judgment of Somawanti’s case is dated 02/5/1962). Thus, the reference of Somawanti’s case in paragraph 52 is a slip of pen and the Apex Court in fact was referring to Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd which was considered in paragraph 48 of the judgment. In any view of the matter in the present case the question as to when inquiry under Rule 4 of the Rule 63 is to be made is not in issue and nothing turns out on the observations made in paragraph 52. In the present case, inquiry under Rule 4 of the Rule 63 has not been held at any stage. There is on record the letter of the Collector dated 11th January, 2008 that no inquiry under Rule 4 was held. 109. We, again revert to the issue as to at what stage the decision to infuse public fund by the State has been taken in the present case. 110. In the present case, agreement has already been entered between the Company and the State on 17/2/2004 under Section 41 of the Act, 1894, which provided that the entire cost shall be borne by the Company. The law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Devender Singh in paragraph 37 for decision to infuse the fund be taken before entering into the agreement under Section 41 fully covers the issue and in the present case since the agreement was executed on 17/2/2004 and the decision to infuse the fund can be at best said to have taken on 8/6/2004 or 16/6/2004, the course of the acquisition which had actually started as acquisition for a Company could not have been changed and the acquisition proceedings ought to have proceeded with after compliance of Part VII and Rule 1963. Two more judgments relied by Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned counsel for the the respondent No. 2 needs to be mentioned in this context i.e. Sooraram Pratap Reddy and others v. District Collector Ranga Reddy, and others, (2008) 9 SCC 552 and Urmila Roy and others v. M/s Bengal Peerless Housing Development Company Ltd and others, (2009) 5 SCC 242 . Sooraram’s case was a case where Section 4 notification was issued for public purpose for the development of “Financial District and Allied Projects”. Sooraram’s case was a case where Section 4 notification was issued for public purpose for the development of “Financial District and Allied Projects”. In the said case the project was to be implemented by Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd which was the Corporation of the Government. The project was to be implemented by APIIC. It was contended that the acquisition proceedings were taken with malafide to transfer valuable land of small farmers to foreign companies and few selected persons. The Apex Court in the said case held that the entire amount of compensation was to be paid by APIIC which was to work as nodal agency for the execution of the project. It was held that the acquisition was thus for public purpose. Following was laid down in paragraphs 132 and 133. “132. It is clearly established in this case that the infrastructure development project conceived by the State and executed under the auspices of its instrumentality (APIIC) is one covered by the Act. The joint venture mechanism for implementing the policy, executing the project and achieving lawful public purpose for realising the goal of larger public good would neither destroy the object nor vitiate the exercise of power of public purpose for development of infrastructure. The concept of joint venture to tap resources of private sector for infrastructural development for fulfilment of public purpose has been recognised in foreign countries s also in India in several decisions of this Court. 133. The entire amount of compensation is to be paid by State agency (APIIC) which also works as nodal agency for execution of the project. it is primarily for the State to decide whether there exists public purpose or not. Undoubtedly, the decision of the State is not beyond judicial scrutiny. In appropriate cases, where such power is exercised mala fide or for collateral purposes or the purported action is dehors the Act, irrational or otherwise unreasonable or the so-called purpose is “no public purpose” at all and fraud on statute is apparent, a writ Court can undoubtedly interfere. But except in such cases, the declaration of the Government is not subject to judicial review. In other words, a writ Court, while exercising powers under Articles 32, 226 or 136 of the Constitution, cannot substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the as to what constitutes” public purpose.” 111. But except in such cases, the declaration of the Government is not subject to judicial review. In other words, a writ Court, while exercising powers under Articles 32, 226 or 136 of the Constitution, cannot substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the as to what constitutes” public purpose.” 111. The above case is thus clearly distinguishable from the present case. In the above case, the entire fund was to be paid by APIIC and the acquisition was for public purpose. Section 4 notification clearly mentions that the project was to be developed by APIIC and the acquisition was not proposed nor initiated on a request of any Company nor the land was to be transferred to any Company. 112. Urmila Roy’s case (supra) was a case where Section 4 notification was issued for acquisition of land for a Housing Scheme. The argument raised before the Apex Court was that the land had been acquired under the garb of public purpose whereas it was intended to benefit the Bengal Peerless, a private party and an attempt had been made to camouflage the identity of the beneficiary as it has not been specified in the notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The acquisition was alleged to be an acquisition in colourable exercise of power. 113. In Urmila Roy’s case (supra) following was laid down in paragraphs 44 and 57 which is quoted below: “44.In the present case, as already mentioned above, we find that a substantial part of the compensation has, indeed, been paid by the State Government or by the Housing Board which clearly satisfies the test of public purpose. In this background, we endorse the finding of the Division Bench that the procedure envisaged in Part II and not in Part VII of the Act would be applicable. This is precisely what has been done. In this background, we endorse the finding of the Division Bench that the procedure envisaged in Part II and not in Part VII of the Act would be applicable. This is precisely what has been done. 57.In view of what has been observed above, and in the background of the present case, it becomes crystal clear that though the execution of the housing scheme has been entrusted to a joint sector company, the overall control over the project has been retained by the Government-controlled Board of Directors, full details of the scheme have been provided with large provisions for the benefit of the poorer sections of society, with the allotment of tenements either on a subsidised price or on “no-profit-no-loss” basis for the low and middle income groups respectively, allotment by draw of lots to avoid any arbitrariness and a complete freeze on the price of residential accommodation with no escalation whatsoever for whatever reason and the provision of facilities for effective and comfortable living such as schools, roads, sewage, etc. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the housing scheme fully satisfies the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the two cases cited immediately above.” 114. Thus, the judgment in Urmila Roys case is also distinguishable and not applicable in the present case. In Urmila Roy’s case the acquisition was for Housing Scheme which was to be implemented by the Housing Board and the Housing Scheme was entrusted to a joint sector company, but the overall control over the project was of the Government Controlled Board of Directors. 115. We have already noticed the relevant facts pertaining to the acquisition proceedings which emerge from the pleadings of the parties and the original records placed before the Court. We have already held that the entire process for acquisition was initiated on application dated 19/1/2004 submitted by the Reliance Delhi Power Private Ltd before the Collector, Ghaziabad. The Collector examined the proposal which was also supported by the deposit of Rs. 16 crores and wrote to the Director Land Acquisition that the proposal has been received for land acquisition from Reliance Delhi Power Ltd. The Director vide its letter dated 28/1/2004 has recommended for taking steps for notification under Section 4(1)/17 in accordance with Part VII and Part VIII of the Act and after following Sections 38 to 55 thus both the proposal and recommendation was acquisition for Company. The State of its own has never decided to proceed with any acquisition proceedings for public purpose. As noted above, the land was identified by Company itself. The original records produced by the State clearly indicates that the proposal submitted by the Director, Land Acquisition was examined and approved by the Bhoomi Upyog Parishad which recommended for proceedings with the land acquisition with the condition that Part VII of the Act be complied with. The said recommendation dated 31/1/2004 has been approved by the Hon’ble The Chief Minister. In the record, neither there was any recommendation nor any decision to proceed with the acquisition as a public purpose acquisition, but the notification which was issued under Section 4 did not mention acquisition for a Company, but mentions acquisition for public purpose. It is undisputed that till 08/6/2004 there was no decision of the State Government to infuse public fund for acquisition which was initiated by the Company. Thus, on the date when notification under Section 4 was issued, acquisition could not have been said to be acquisition for public purpose. The acquisition was clearly an acquisition for Company in which acquisition Section 17 was not available as has already been observed above. Thus, we are of the opinion that invocation of Sections 17 (1) and 17 (4) were invalid. 116. There is one more reason due to which dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A of the Act by invoking Section 17(4) has to be held unjustified. For invocation of power under Section 17 the principles and grounds are well settled. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others v. Mukesh Hans, (2004)8 S.C.C. 14 had considered the question of dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A by invoking Section 17(4). The Apex Court in the said case has laid down that mere existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency though is a condition precedent for invoking Section 17(4), that by itself is not sufficient to direct the dispensation of the Section 5A inquiry. It has been held that opinion is to be formed by the Government that along with existence of such urgency or unforeseen urgency there is also a need for dispensation of Section 5A inquiry. Following was laid down in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the said judgment : “32. It has been held that opinion is to be formed by the Government that along with existence of such urgency or unforeseen urgency there is also a need for dispensation of Section 5A inquiry. Following was laid down in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the said judgment : “32. A careful perusal of this provision which is an exception to the normal mode of acquisition contemplated under the Act shows mere existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency though is a condition precedent for invoking Section 17(4) that by itself is not sufficient to direct the dispensation of 5A inquiry. It requires an opinion to be formed by the concerned government that along with the existence of such urgency or unforeseen emergency there is also a need for dispensing with 5A inquiry which indicates that the Legislature intended that the appropriate government to apply its mind before dispensing with 5A inquiry. It also indicates the mere existence of an urgency under Section 17 (1) or unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) would not by themselves be sufficient for dispensing with 5A inquiry. If that was not the intention of the Legislature then the latter part of sub-section (4) of Section 17 would not have been necessary and the Legislature in Section 17(1) and (2) itself could have incorporated that in such situation of existence of urgency or unforeseen emergency automatically 5A inquiry will be dispensed with. But then that is not language of the Section which in our opinion requires the appropriate Government to further consider the need for dispensing with 5A inquiry in spite of the existence of unforeseen emergency. This understanding of ours as to the requirement of an application of mind by the appropriate Government while dispensing with 5A inquiry does not mean that in and every case when there is an urgency contemplated under Section 17(1) and unforeseen emergency contemplated under Section 17(2) exists that by itself would not contain the need for dispensing with 5A inquiry. This understanding of ours as to the requirement of an application of mind by the appropriate Government while dispensing with 5A inquiry does not mean that in and every case when there is an urgency contemplated under Section 17(1) and unforeseen emergency contemplated under Section 17(2) exists that by itself would not contain the need for dispensing with 5A inquiry. It is possible in a given case the urgency noticed by the appropriate Government under Section 17(1) or the unforeseen emergency under Section 17(2) itself may be of such degree that it could require the appropriate Government on that very basis to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5A but then there is a need for application of mind by the appropriate Government that such an urgency for dispensation of the 5A inquiry is inherent in the two types of urgencies contemplated under Section 17(1) and (2) of the Act. 33. An argument was sought to be advanced on behalf of the appellants that once the appropriate Government comes to the conclusion that there is an urgency or unforeseen emergency under Section 17(1) and (2), the dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A becomes automatic and the same can be done by a composite order meaning thereby that there no need for the appropriate Government to separately apply its mind for any further emergency for dispensation with an inquiry under Section 5A. We are unable to agree with the above argument because sub-section (4) of Section 17 itself indicates that the “government may direct that provisions of Section 5A shall not apply” which makes it clear that not in every case where the appropriate Government has come to the conclusion that there is urgency and under sub-section (1) or unforeseen emergency under sub-section (2) of Section 17 the Government will ipso facto have to direct the dispensation of inquiry. For this we do find support from a judgment of this Court in the case of Nandeshwar Prasad and another vs. The State of U.P. and others ( 1964 (3) SCR 425 ) wherein considering the language of Section 17 of the Act which was then referable to waste or arable land and the U.P. Amendment to the said section held thus: AIR 1964 SC 1217 , Para 11 “It will be seen that S.17(1) gives power to the Government to direct the Collector, though no award has been made under Section 11, to take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purpose and such land thereupon vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. If action is taken under Section 17(1), taking possession and vesting which are provided in Section 16 after the award under Section 11 are accelerated and cane take place fifteen days after the publication of the notice under Section 9. Then comes Section 17(4) which provides that in case of any land to which the provisions of sub-section (1) are applicable the Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply and if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). It will be seen that it is not necessary even where the Government makes a direction under Section 17(1) that it should also make a direction under Section 17(4). If the Government makes a direction only under Section 17(1) the procedure under Section 5-A would still have to be followed before a notification under Section 6 is issued, though after that procedure has been followed and a notification under Section 6 is issued the Collector gets the power to take possession of the land after the notice under Section 9 without waiting for the award and on such taking possession the land shall vest absolutely in Government free from all encumbrances. It is only when the Government also makes a declaration under Section 17(4) that it becomes unnecessary to take action under Section 5-A and make a report thereunder. It may be that generally where an order is made under Section 17(1), an order under Section 17(4) is also passed; but in law it is not necessary that this should be so. It may be that generally where an order is made under Section 17(1), an order under Section 17(4) is also passed; but in law it is not necessary that this should be so. It will also be seen that under the Land Acquisition Act an order under Section 17(1) or Section 17(4) can only be passed with respect to waste or arable land and it cannot be passed with respect to land which is not waste or arable and on which buildings stand.” 117. The original records, which were produced before the Court, reveals following with regard to invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act : “(i) The Collector in his letter dated 24th January, 2004 has observed that for acquisition it is necessary to take proceedings under Section 17 of the Act (It is relevant to note that there was no specific recommendation for dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A of the Act by invoking Section 17(4). (ii) The Director, Land Acquisition in his recommendation dated 28th January, 2004 to the State Government observed that notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act be issued after completion of proceeding of agreement (It is to be noted that there is no independent consideration or recommendation for dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A of the Act). (iii) In the note of the Revenue Department dated 3rd February, 2004 it was noticed that note with regard to justification of applying Section 17 has not been made available by the administrative department. It was further stated in the recommendation that specific opinion from the Law Department be obtained before giving permission for issuance of notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act as to whether it is not necessary to get the entire compensation deposited looking to applicability of urgency clause and for immediate taking possession of the land. The Law Department of the State on the same day, i.e., 3rd February, 2004 gave its opinion that under Section 4/17 of the Act the Collector after taking possession shall transfer the land to the acquiring body during which the agreement under Section 41 of the Act can be executed. It was further opined that deposit of the compensation is necessary. It was further opined that deposit of the compensation is necessary. (iv) There is also a note of the Revenue Department on the record dated 8th February, 2004, which noticed that note of the Energy Department is based merely on the report of the Collector dated 24th January, 2004 whereas departmental urgency has not been specifically mentioned but the note of the Collector be relied for the purpose. (v) The Revenue Department gave its concurrence for issuance of notification under Section 4(1)/17 of the Act on 11th February, 2004. 118. From a perusal of the original records, it is clear that neither there was any specificrecommendation for dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A by invoking Section 17(4) of the Act nor in any report or note any reason or material was mentioned for dispensation of inquiry. The land of thousand of farmers was being sought to be acquired on the application of respondent No. 2 measuring 2500 acres. The farmers were dependent on the land for their livelihood, the necessity of establishment of power project was being felt in the State for decades, hence there has to be some special reason for dispensing with the inquiry. The Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980)2 SCC 471 , while considering the question of dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A had laid down “....compulsory taking of a man’s property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons.....”. There being no application of mind regarding necessity of dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A of the Act by invoking Section 17(4), the dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A cannot be sustained. This is thus an additional reason for disapproving the dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A. 119. At this stage one more aspect of the matter needs to be noted. When there is large scale acquisition of agricultural land of farmers, who along with their family are dependent for livelihood on the land, there has to be very strong reason for dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A of the Act especially when the urgency is not of that magnitude that by giving opportunity under Section 5A the purpose and object shall be frustrated. Non giving of opportunity under Section 5A to large number of persons generates anger, protest and disruption of a public peace, which cannot be ignored especially by the Government which is duty bound to maintain peace and harmony in the society. There being no recommendation for dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A, there being no application of mind by the Collector or any Governmental department and no reason having been placed before the Court by the State as well as by respondent No. 2 for dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A, we are fully satisfied that dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A of the Act was fully unjustified and cannot be sustained. 120. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners further is that notification under Section 4 was in colourable exercise of power. The doctrine of colourable exercise implies that when authority attempts to indirectly achieve a purpose which it cannot achieve directly. Colourble exercise was explained by Krishna Iyer, J in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh’s case (supra). 121. Following was laid down in paragraph 9 which is quoted below : “9. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power-sometimes called colourable exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions and satisfaction - is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested the Court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the mark even in law when he stated. “I repeat..... that all power is a trust- that we are accountable for its exercise that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist.” Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed.” 122. “I repeat..... that all power is a trust- that we are accountable for its exercise that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist.” Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed.” 122. In Smt. Somawanti’s case (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that purpose for which the land is needed is a public purpose or not is for the State Government to be satisfied which is with one exception that if there is a colourble exercise of power the declaration will be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. Following was laid down in paragraph 36 : “36. Now whether in a particular case the purpose for which land is needed is a public purpose or not is for the State Government to be satisfied about. If the purpose for which the land is being acquired by the State is within the legislative competence of the State the declaration of the Government will be final subject, however, to one exception. That exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration will be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. The power committed to the Government by the Act is a limited power in the sense that it can be exercised only where there is a public purpose, leaving aside for a moment the purpose of a company. If it appears that what the Government is satisfied about is not a public purpose but a private purpose or no purpose at all the action of the Government would be colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the Act and its declaration will be a nullity. Subject to this exception the declaration of the Government will be final.” 123. From the facts and discussions as noted above, it is clear that the acquisition in question in the present case was an acquisition for a “Company” and there was a clear recommendation by every authority that acquisition be undertaken after compliance of Part VII. The acquisition could not be treated as an acquisition for “public purpose” specially after the amendment of Section 3(f) by Act No. 68/84. The acquisition could not be treated as an acquisition for “public purpose” specially after the amendment of Section 3(f) by Act No. 68/84. The State invoked Sections 17(1) and 17(4) which was not available for acquisition for a company, thus, in the notification dated 11.2.2004 under Section 4 invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) and notifying the acquisition as for public purpose was colourable exercise of power. 124. Now remains one more submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners based on Section 43 of the Act. Section 43 of the Act is quoted below : “43.Sections 39 to 42 not to apply where Government bound by agreement to provide land for Companies.- The provisions of Sections 39 to 42, both inclusive, shall not apply and the corresponding sections of the Land Acquisition Act, 1870 (10 of 1870), shall be deemed never to have applied, to the acquisition of land for any Railway or other Company, for the purposes of which, under any agreement with such Company, the Secretary of State for India in Council, the Secretary of State, The Central Government or any State Government is or was bound to provide land." 125. The submissions of Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 is that the State Support Agreement was executed on 16/6/2004 between the respondent No. 1 and 2 which agreement falls within the meaning of Section 43, consequently Sections 39 to 42 are not applicable. It is contended that the State Support agreement had come into existence before issuance of Section 6 notification, hence the State is bound to provide land. It is further submitted that Section 43 uses the word “shall not apply” hence once there is an agreement as contemplated under Section 43, Sections 39 to 42 would mandatorily and automatically become inapplicable. 126. Section 43 of the Act provides for acquisition of land for Railway or for other Company for the purpose by which under any agreement with such company Central Government or any other State Government is or was to be bound to provide land. The agreement which is contemplated under Section 43 is not an agreement which is to be entered into between the State Government and the Company after issuance of Section 4 notification. The agreement contemplated is a pre-existing agreement which obliges the State to provide land for any Railway or other Company. The agreement which is contemplated under Section 43 is not an agreement which is to be entered into between the State Government and the Company after issuance of Section 4 notification. The agreement contemplated is a pre-existing agreement which obliges the State to provide land for any Railway or other Company. The agreement dated 16/6/2004 i.e. State Support Agreement executed between the Company and the State cannot be said to be an agreement which is contemplated under Section 43 of the Act and the submissions of Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 based on Section 43 of the Act, cannot be accepted. 127. By accepting the interpretation as put by Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 the provisions of the Act, specially the provisions of Part VII can be easily defeated by entering into such agreement to provide land. Provisions of Section 43 cannot be read in a manner so as to defeat the very object and purpose of the Act. The statement of object by Amendment Act 68/1984 as extracted above clearly provide that the acquisition of land for non-government companies under the Act shall henceforth be made in pursuance of Part VII of the Act in all the cases. In case the State Support Agreement dated 16/6/2004, is treated to be an agreement within the meaning of Section 43, the very purpose and object of the Amendment Act 68/1984 shall be defeated and the State Government and other interested parties can easily defeat the statutory requirement of Part VII by just entering into an agreement. It is well settled that interpretation of the provisions of an Act which defeats the very purpose and object of the Act has to be avoided. 128. One of the submissions of the petitioners as noted above is that acquisition proceedings at the instance of Reliance Delhi Power Pvt Ltd, it being a private Company was prohibited under Section 44B. The petitioners’ case is that the said Company was a Private Ltd Company which continued as such till 31/3/2004 when it was registered as a Public Company. One of the submissions of the petitioners as noted above is that acquisition proceedings at the instance of Reliance Delhi Power Pvt Ltd, it being a private Company was prohibited under Section 44B. The petitioners’ case is that the said Company was a Private Ltd Company which continued as such till 31/3/2004 when it was registered as a Public Company. The submissions of Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 is that the Reliance Delhi Power Private Ltd was a subsidiary of M/s. Reliance Patal Ganga Private Limited a Public Company which Company held 67 percent equity in Reliance Delhi Power Private Ltd. Petitioners reply is that it is revealed from their own documents of the respondent No. 2 that M/s Reliance Patal Ganga Power Ltd. held 1700 shares representing only 17 percent of the total equity till 19/1/2004. It is emphatically submitted that on the date of application dated 19/1/2004 and the date of execution of the agreement dated 19/2/2004, Reliance Delhi Power Private Ltd was a private Company and its application was hit by prohibition under Section 44B. It is submitted that it was only on 31/3/2004 that the certificate of incorporation was made certifying change of the Company from a Private Limited Company to a Public Ltd Company which was intimated to the Government on 10/4/2004. 129. Learned counsel for the parties have referred to various documents filed in support of their respective claim. Admittedly, according to own case of the petitioners, the Company had subsequently become Public Ltd. Company. We do not find it necessary to enter into the question as to whether the Reliance Delhi Power Pvt. Ltd can be treated as subsidiary company of M/s Reliance Patal Ganga Ltd, subsequent change of the company from Private Ltd. to Public Limited Company having taken place, we leave the matter here without entering into any further discussion. 130. Now the challenge by the petitioners to the acquisition of the year 2006 i.e. notification dated 29/8/2006 needs to be considered. Submission of the petitioners is that the invocation of Urgency Clause 17(1) and dispensation of the inquiry under Section 17(4) was unjustified. There was no material with the State Government to form any opinion that there are sufficient ground for invoking Sections 17(1) and 17(4). Submission of the petitioners is that the invocation of Urgency Clause 17(1) and dispensation of the inquiry under Section 17(4) was unjustified. There was no material with the State Government to form any opinion that there are sufficient ground for invoking Sections 17(1) and 17(4). Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Union of India and others v. Krishan Lal Arneja and others, 2004 (8) SCC 453 . After considering the provisions of Sections 4, 5A and 17 following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraphs 15 and 16 which are quoted below : “15. These provisions clearly provide protection to a person whose land is to be acquired by providing right to object to the proposed acquisition of any land notified under Section 4; opportunity of hearing is also provided to show that the proposal to acquire the land was unwarranted; such opportunity available under Section 5A cannot be denied except in case of urgency. 16. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however laudable it may be by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a land owner of his right in relation to immovable property to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. The Authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor i.e. whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the land owners and the inquiry under Section 5A of the Act could be completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen’s property can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority, while applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration.” 131. The notification of acquisition of land was already issued on 11/2/2004, which was followed by declaration under Section 6 dated 25/6/2004. The case of the respondent No. 2 was that possession was taken by the State and conveyance deed was executed in favour of the Company on 23/11/2005. The Company claimed possession of the land, but from the pleadings of the parties it is established that no work with regard to project in question had commenced even after more than 2 years of declaration under Section 6 on 25/6/2004. 132. As noticed above, the Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. Mukesh Hans has laid down that inquiry under Section 5A can be dispensed with only after the appropriate Government forms an opinion that along with the existence of urgency under Section 17(1) or unforeseen urgency under Section 17(2), there was also a need to dispense with Section 5A inquiry. 133. It is thus to be examined as to whether before issuing notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and (17(4) there was sufficient material for formation of opinion that dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A is necessary. The original records pertaining to 2006 acquisition indicates that the proceedings for additional acquisition of land was initiated on the request of Reliance Energy Generation that certain land has been left to be acquired. The original records pertaining to 2006 acquisition indicates that the proceedings for additional acquisition of land was initiated on the request of Reliance Energy Generation that certain land has been left to be acquired. The Collector was asked by the Government to submit proposal. The State Government wrote to the Collector for submitting proposal as to how much additional land is required. The Collector wrote letter dated 8th July, 2005 proposing to acquire 92.52 acres additional land, which falls within the limits of the project. From the original records submitted by the Government it does not appear that there was any recommendation or materials for dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A for issuance of notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and 17(4). 134. The 2006 acquisition was connected and in furtherance of 2004 acquisition. After the notification under Section 6 dated 24th June, 2004 the possession was claimed to have been taken by the State and conveyance deed was executed on 23rd November, 2005. The Company claimed possession of the land but from the pleadings of the parties it is established that no work with regard to project in question has commenced even after more than two years of declaration under Section 6. The case of the respondent No. 2, as noted above, was to the effect that a barbed fencing was erected by the Company, which was damaged and thereafter a eight kilometres boundary wall was constructed by the Company. No construction of project apart from construction of a site office is claimed by the Company. The farmers had already started agitating much before issuance of notification under Section 4 on 29th August, 2006. Thus we are of the view that there was no material on the record nor there was any application of mind by the State for dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A before issuance of notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and 17(4) dated 29th August, 2006. Thus the invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) in the notification dated 29th August, 2006 is clearly invalid. The farmers were entitled for hearing in inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. It is also to be noted that in consequence of 2006 notifications under Sections 4 and 6, the farmers neither executed any Kararnama with regard to compensation nor accepted compensation for the land sought to be acquired by 2006 notification. 135. The farmers were entitled for hearing in inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. It is also to be noted that in consequence of 2006 notifications under Sections 4 and 6, the farmers neither executed any Kararnama with regard to compensation nor accepted compensation for the land sought to be acquired by 2006 notification. 135. There is one more reason for not sustaining the invocation of Section 17(4) of the Act in notification dated 29th August, 2006. The 2006 acquisition is connected with and consequent to the acquisition undertaken by notification dated 11th February, 2004. With regard to 2004 acquisition, we have already held that invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act was unjustified and the farmers were entitled for hearing in proceeding under Section 5A of the Act. When hearing is to be given to the farmers with regard to main acquisition proceedings of 2004, denying the hearing with regard to connected and consequential acquisition proceedings of 2006 is unjustified. Thus dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A by the notification dated 29th August, 2006 is liable to be struck down. 136. In view of the above, we are of the view that invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) in the notification dated 29th August, 2006 is unjustified and is clearly unsustainable. 137. Now remains the Civil Misc. Writ Petition (PIL) No. 8968 of 2008 (Vishwanath Pratap Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others). The farmers whose land has been acquired having themselves come up in this Court by filing various writ petitions, which we have proceeded to consider and decide, we see no justification for considering the issues raised in this public interest litigation. No decision is needed in public interest litigation. The public interest litigation is dismissed accordingly. 138. In view of the foregoing discussion, we arrive at following conclusions : 1. The proceedings for acquisition of land was initiated by application dated 19/1/2004 by Reliance Delhi Power Pvt. Ltd after identification of the land measuring 2500 acres. The application was made after payment of 10 percent of the acquisition cost and 10 percent of the estimated compensation . 2. The Collector processed the application submitted by the Reliance Delhi Power Pvt. Ltd on 19/1/2004 and forwarded the proposal to the Director, Land Acquisition Directorate, Board of Revenue, U.P. Lucknow vide letter dated 24/1/2004. The application was made after payment of 10 percent of the acquisition cost and 10 percent of the estimated compensation . 2. The Collector processed the application submitted by the Reliance Delhi Power Pvt. Ltd on 19/1/2004 and forwarded the proposal to the Director, Land Acquisition Directorate, Board of Revenue, U.P. Lucknow vide letter dated 24/1/2004. The letter stated that the proposal for acquisition has been received from Reliance Delhi Power Pvt. Ltd, Mumbai. It was also stated that the required 10 percent amount of the land acquisition cost and 10 percent of the estimated cost has already been deposited by the Company. 3. The Director, Land Acquisition vide recommendation dated 28.1.2004, wrote to the Principal Secretary Energy, U.P. Lucknow stating that notification under Section 4(i)/17 be issued in accordance with the provisions of Part VII and Part VIII of the Act (Sections 38 to 55). 4. The recommendation of the Director, Land Acquisition dated 28/1/2004, was examined by Energy Department of the State and the matter was referred to the Bhoomi Upyog Parishad for its recommendation. Bhoomi Upyog Parishad through Principal Secretary (Niyojan) submitted the recommendation on 31.1.2004 recommending for proceeding with the land acquisition subject to condition that acquisition be undertaken after compliance of Part VII. The recommendation of Bhoomi Upyog Parishad was endorsed by the Hon’ble The Chief Minister who has signed the recommendation on the same date i.e. 31/1/2004. 5. The Secretary Revenue whose recommendations were also considered submitted recommendation on 03/2/2004 that before issuance of notification Section 4 (1)/17, the agreement under Section 41 with the company be got executed. According to para 59 to 65 of the Land Acquisition Manual it was recommended that the entire cost of compensation be got deposited as per para 65 of the Land Acquisition Manual. 6. There is no material on record that State at any point of time before issuing notification under Section 4 on 11/2/2004 identified any land or decided to acquire land for any power project. The State having never decided to acquire any land for power project, all actions taken leading to issuance of notification under Section 4(1) were on the basis of the proposal submitted by the Company for acquisition for a company. Thus, the acquisition in question cannot be termed acquisition for public purpose. 7. The State having never decided to acquire any land for power project, all actions taken leading to issuance of notification under Section 4(1) were on the basis of the proposal submitted by the Company for acquisition for a company. Thus, the acquisition in question cannot be termed acquisition for public purpose. 7. The acquisition proceeding initiated on application of the Company dated 19th January, 2004 being acquisition for a company, Section 17 of the Act was no more available after the amendment brought in the Act by Act No. 68 of 1984. The invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) in the notification dated 11th February, 2004 was clearly impermissible. Even otherwise, there was no material on the record nor there was any application of mind for dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A of the Act. 8. The invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) in the notification dated 11th February, 2004 being illegal, the entire proceedings subsequent there on is vitiated including issuance of notification under Section 6 dated 25th June, 2004. 9. According to Section 44B of the Act no acquisition in favour of a private company can be made for a purpose other than the purpose as provided under Section 40(1)(a) of the Act. 10. In the acquisition, which was initiated by the Company by application dated 19th January, 2004, although there was clear recommendation of Director, Land Acquisition and subsequent approval of Hon’ble the Chief Minister dated 31st January, 2004 that acquisition be proceeded after compliance of Part VII of the Act, there has been no compliance of Part VII of the Act in the acquisition in issue. 11. For acquisition for a Company compliance of provisions of Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 is mandatory, which was not at all done in the present case. 12. The issuance of notification under Section 4 referring the acquisition as acquisition for public purpose although the acquisition was for a company, was in colourable exercise of power by the State Government with object to bye pass the provisions of Part-VII of the Act and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. 13. The invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) in the notification dated 29th August, 2006 was unjustified and unsustainable consequently all subsequent proceedings thereon is vitiated. 139. Now, remains the last issue as to what relief the petitioners are entitled. 13. The invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) in the notification dated 29th August, 2006 was unjustified and unsustainable consequently all subsequent proceedings thereon is vitiated. 139. Now, remains the last issue as to what relief the petitioners are entitled. For considering the issue of relief we have to look into the facts and events which have taken place consequent to acquisition proceedings. The total land which has been acquired under 2004 notification is 2250 Acres. 140. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 has placed much stress on two facts, firstly, sufficient number of farmers have not come up before this Court and total land which is a subject matter now in these writ petitions is much less as compared to the land acquired and, secondly, more than 90 percent of farmers have accepted compensation after execution of Kararnama. In the writ petition of Pooran Singh it is claimed that the petitioners who were 389 in numbers represent 800 acres of land (certain petitioners out of 389 were permitted to be deleted also). The respondent No. 2 in the counter-affidavit has stated that the land represented by the petitioners in Pooran Singh is not more than 550 acres. Apart from writ petition of Pooran Singh there are 42 other writ petitions in which substantial area of land which has been acquired is in issue. It cannot be said that only handful of farmers have come to this Court challenging the acquisition of the land which is subject matter of acquisition or number of petitioners is insignificant as compared to the total area of land. With regard to 2006 acquisition, it has come on record that neither possession has been taken by the Company nor farmers have executed Kararnama nor accepted any compensation. Large number of farmers have accepted compensation and have come up before this Court challenging the acquisition proceedings. The question has rightly been posed by Shri Rakesh Dwivedi that what will happen to acquisition qua the land which is not under challenge. We have to balance the equities of the parties. 141. After taking into consideration overall facts and circumstances, we are of the view that all the writ petitions (except Civil Misc. The question has rightly been posed by Shri Rakesh Dwivedi that what will happen to acquisition qua the land which is not under challenge. We have to balance the equities of the parties. 141. After taking into consideration overall facts and circumstances, we are of the view that all the writ petitions (except Civil Misc. Writ Petition (PIL) No. 8968 of 2008 (Vishwanath Pratap Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others) deserve to be and are hereby partly allowed with following directions : 1. The notification dated 11th February, 2004 under Section 4 of the Act is partly quashed to the extent it invokes Section 17(1)/17(4) and mentions the acquisition as an acquisition for “public purpose”. All subsequent proceedings consequent to the notification dated 11th February, 2004 including the notification under Section 6 dated 25th June, 2004 are quashed. 2. The Collector shall proceed with the inquiry under Section 5A in continuation of the notification dated 11th February, 2004 and proceed with the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The notice be issued by the Collector inviting objection under Section 5A of the Act in newspaper having wide circulation by not giving less than 30 days period for filing objection. 3. The notification under Section 4 dated 29th August, 2006 is partly quashed insofar as it invokes Section 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act. All subsequent proceedings consequent to the notification dated 29th August, 2006 including the notification under Section 6 dated 20th February, 2007 are quashed. 4. The Collector shall proceed with the inquiry under Section 5A in continuation of the notification dated 29th August, 2006 and proceed with the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The notice be issued by the Collector inviting objection under Section 5A of the Act in newspaper having wide circulation by not giving less than 30 days period for filing objection. 5. As a result of quashing of the notification dated 25th June, 2004 and 20th February, 2007, the petitioners are liable to refund the compensation received from the respondents. However, we provide that it shall be open for those tenure holders, who have no objection to the acquisition, to indicate so in their objection to be filed under Section 5A in which event they may seek exemption from the Collector for refunding the compensation. However, we provide that it shall be open for those tenure holders, who have no objection to the acquisition, to indicate so in their objection to be filed under Section 5A in which event they may seek exemption from the Collector for refunding the compensation. The Collector shall proceed to decide the objection under Section 5A of the Act of only those tenure holders who have refunded the compensation received by them. 6. The Collector may recover the compensation as arrears of land revenue from the tenure holders who before the Collector do not in writing indicate their no objection with the acquisition. 7. The Collector in the proceedings for acquisition and hearing of the objection under Section 5A of the Act shall be entitled to pass such orders and take such proceedings as may be necessary with regard to refund/deposit of the compensation. 8. We further direct the Collector to get the substance of this order published in all the leading newspapers, both in English and Hindi, for information to all concerned. 142. Before we conclude, we record our appreciation for valuable assistance rendered by counsel for the parties, especially Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, whose assistance has made our task easy in deciding the important issues, which had arisen in these writ petitions. 143. In result all the writ petitions (except Civil Misc. Writ Petition (PIL) No. 8968 of 2008 (Vishwanath Pratap Singh and another v. State of U.P. and others) are partly allowed and Writ Petition (PIL) No. 8968 of 2008 is dismissed. 144. Parties shall bear their own costs. ————