JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Sharma, J.—Heard Sri Brajesh Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ramesh Chandra Misra, holding brief of Sri D.D. Chauhan, learned counsel for Gaon Sabha, respondent No. 3 as well as learned Standing Counsel, who has put in appearance on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Perused the records also. 2. Through this writ petition, the petitioner has sought for quashing of the proceedings of Revision No. 1134/2009 pending before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Bulandshahr and the orders dated 21.10.2009 and 29.10.2009, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 3. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, without condoning delay, as required under the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, has entertained the revision and proceeded with the same. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation had rendered a judgment in favour of the petitioner on 12.6.2009. Assailing the said judgment, a revision was preferred on 28.8.2009. The Deputy Director of Consolidation could not have entertained the revision without dealing with the application for condonation of delay. No proper application and affidavit seeking condonation of delay was filed. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon two judgments as reported in Mst. Bilqees v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1989 RD 214 and Ram Baran v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gonda and others, 1987 RD 89 in support of his submissions that the revisional Court must have taken into account the point of limitation while proceeding with the case. 4. While opposing the motion, learned counsel for Gaon Sabha and learned Standing Counsel, have submitted that the petitioner has not even filed a objection raising question of limitation before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director has not passed any substantial order affecting the rights of the petitioner and it is still open for the petitioner to raise his grievance before the Deputy Director of Consolidation about maintainability of the revision on the ground of limitation. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. It is evident from perusal of the record that the appeal was disposed of by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on 12.6.2009. The State of U.P. and Gaon Sabnha etc. had admittedly preferred the revision on 28.8.2009. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. It is evident from perusal of the record that the appeal was disposed of by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on 12.6.2009. The State of U.P. and Gaon Sabnha etc. had admittedly preferred the revision on 28.8.2009. An application, under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, duly signed by the D.G.C.(Revenue) seeking condonation of delay has also been filed on 28.8.2009. This application discloses that the authorities learnt about this order for the first time on 24.8.2009 during the proceedings in Revision No. 123/2009. On learning about the said order, certified copy of the order was immediately obtained and the revision was preferred. It was further submitted in the application seeking condonation of delay that the land in dispute is Gaon Sabha’s property. It is a public land and as a result of the appellate order, the public land will be misappropriate and encroached upon by the petitioner. 7. Copies of the order-sheet dated 3.9.2009, 25.9.2009 and 15.10.2009 have been annexed alongwith the writ petition. These orders only indicate that the file was produced and the lower Court’s record was ordered to be summoned fixing 29.10.2009. Thereafter, 20.11.2009 was fixed. No copy of the objection, raised by the petitioner before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, has been filed nor any plea to that effect has been taken in the writ petition. If the petitioner was aggrieved by mere entertainment of the revision by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, he ought to have reacted immediately before the Deputy Director of Consolidation by filing an objection regarding maintainability of the revision or made a categorical statement taking a stand before the revisional Court that the revision is barred by limitation. In the absence of any such written objection, it cannot be said that this plea was ever raised before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the objections made were not considered or the request of the petitioner was rejected. There is nothing on record to show that the Deputy Director of Consolidation had declined to entertain any such objection/application alleged to have been submitted by the petitioner. 8. This Court has taken note of the fact that the State of U.P. and Gaon Sabha had acted within two months, which according to the Court, appears to be a reasonable time. 8. This Court has taken note of the fact that the State of U.P. and Gaon Sabha had acted within two months, which according to the Court, appears to be a reasonable time. When counsel of Gaon Sabha or Pradhan of the Village or other concerned Officer could have gathered the knowledge only thereafter they might have processed the file and taken a decision to file a revision, therefore, it cannot be said that the revision was highly belated or there was any deliberate delay on the part of the State of U.P. or Gaon Sabha in approaching the revisional Court. 9. In the present set of facts and circumstances, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no bearing on this case. 10. In the case reported in 1987 RD 89 (supra), the Deputy Director of Consolidation had finally disposed of the revision and the same was challenged whereas in the present case the revision has yet to be heard on merits and yet to be decided finally, but instead of raising objection before the Deputy Director of Consolidation about maintainability of the revision on the ground of limitation, the petitioner has immediately rushed to this Court even without raising any preliminary objection before the Deputy Director of Consolidation regarding limitation. In fact, the petitioner wants to save his illegal encroachment over the land in dispute and, therefore, he is taking pre-emptive measures. 11. In the other case reported in 1989 RD 214 (supra) also the similar situation exists. 12. In these cases, with great respect to the observations made by their Lordships in these judgments, it is relevant to mention that in the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, it has been repeatedly held that the Courts must refrain from taking too technical or hyper technical view in the case of limitation. In the cases where objections regarding limitation have been raised, the Courts have to dispense substantial justice and the Courts should not be guided by the mere technicalities of law. 13. In the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, 1987 (13) ALR 306 (SC) it has been observed as follows : “Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. 13. In the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, 1987 (13) ALR 306 (SC) it has been observed as follows : “Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.” In yet another judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 (98) RD 607 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under : “............................. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object for providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury.......” 14. This Court, in a judgment reported in Smt. Nirmala Tandon and others v. H.N. Tandon, 1998 (89) RD 80 has observed as follows : “............................. 6(3) It may also be added that the Courts are expected to decide the case as they are not to indulge in technicality and there is no stage of filing application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 15. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the State of U.P. and the Gaon Sabha were expected to act with a lightening speed and instantly approaching the revisional Court. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also observed that in the matter of State litigation, it takes some time in taking a decision to challenge an order in Appeal or Revision, therefore, the Courts must not take a rigid view while condoning the delay. 17. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also observed that in the matter of State litigation, it takes some time in taking a decision to challenge an order in Appeal or Revision, therefore, the Courts must not take a rigid view while condoning the delay. 17. In the present case, as it appears from the order-sheet, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has merely entertained the revision and as such it is still open for the petitioner to raise any objection, factual or legal, whatever he desires and if the same is raised it can be dealt with by the revisional authority. In fact, no cause of action has accrued to the petitioner for filing the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18. In view of the discussions made above, the writ petition, being devoid of merits, is dismissed with costs. ————