JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.S. Chauhan, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Prabhakar Tiwari, learned counsel for the UPSRTC. The petitioner has challenged the order of removal from service dated 4.4.1998 and the orders dated 18.1.1999 and 24.1.2000. 2. The petitioner who came to be appointed as driver on 4.4.1988 served the department continuously, while he was on duty on 11.7.1995 and was taking the bus from Rupaidiha to Sitapur met with certain shortage of diesel and, therefore, the vehicle was parked at the police station Jharekhapur and, thereafter, it is alleged that both the drivers left the bus in search of diesel. Since the depot was lying closed at the relevant time, they could not get the diesel and they went to their home. With a view to secure money, the same was given to the petitioner and one other co-driver Mool Chand to deposit it with the Cashier at the depot. Since the petitioner reached the depot late, the money could not be deposited by him and thereafter he deposited the amount of Rs. 20,763/- on 12.7.1995. The petitioner was placed under suspension by means of order dated 7.9.1995 for depositing the money short by Rs.188/- It was also alleged that the petitioner and co-driver Mool Chand visited the workshop of the depot and misbehaved with the Senior In-charge of the depot. They were charge-sheeted. They filed reply to the charge-sheet. Thereafter an enquiry was held and after enquiry the petitioner was removed from service vide order dated 4.4.1998. The petitioner filed appeal against the said order and the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed vide order dated 18.1.1999. Thereafter the petitioner filed revision challenging the aforesaid two orders which too was dismissed on the ground of limitation. 3. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has been discriminated in the matter of punishment. Co-driver, namely, Mool Chand was equally responsible in the misconduct and who was all along accompanying the petitioner has not been awarded with any such punishment whereas the petitioner has been removed from service fastening the entire liability of the charge. He, therefore, submits that the punishment awarded to the petitioner is discriminatory and it is not uniform. Action of the opposite parties is discriminatory and as such, the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is liable to be quashed. 4. He, therefore, submits that the punishment awarded to the petitioner is discriminatory and it is not uniform. Action of the opposite parties is discriminatory and as such, the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is liable to be quashed. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has submitted that co-driver Mool Chand was reinstated without back wages. He also submits that contention of the petitioner that no action was taken against co-driver Mool Chand is baseless and against the record. Punishment which has been awarded to co-driver Mool Chand has been awarded on the basis of evidence led during the course of the enquiry which was available against co-driver Mool Chand and, therefore, the punishment awarded is not discriminatory. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Petitioner and co-driver Mool Chand both were equally charged with the misconduct and shortage of money. Both have collected the money and both have left the bus. From the evidence, it is evident that the money was recovered from the house of co-driver Mool Chand and the petitioner was also found there. Liability, therefore, of co-driver Mool Chand cannot be said to be of any less degree in comparison to the petitioner. It is a charge of misbehaviour or it is a charge of shortage of money, the opposite parties could not have proceeded in a discriminatory manner violating Article 14 of the Constitution and thereby awarding two punishments in respect of the same charges. This Court in the case of Barnam Singh v. Director, Samaj Kalyan Department, U.P. and another, 2001(4) ESC 1897 (All) held as under : “12. The Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions has relied on a Division Bench Judgment in Jagdish Yadav v. Senior Superintendent of Police, Azamgarh and others, (1990) 3 UPLBEC 1740. In paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment the Division Bench held as under : “8. In para 7 of the supplementary affidavit, it has been stated that the three persons who were similarly situated as the petitioner have been reinstated and they are discharging their duties on their respective posts as police constables, and they are drawing their salaries. In paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment the Division Bench held as under : “8. In para 7 of the supplementary affidavit, it has been stated that the three persons who were similarly situated as the petitioner have been reinstated and they are discharging their duties on their respective posts as police constables, and they are drawing their salaries. The learned counsel for the State did not seek time to controvert these allegations, therefore, we have no option but to rely upon them and we are of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the present petition on the ground of parity alone. In the aforesaid case on similar allegations three persons were terminated while two persons were reinstated. Petitioner of that case was terminated. The Division Bench allowed the writ petition and held that he was entitled for the parity. Counsel for the petitioner further relied on, Dost Mohammad v. Union of India and others, 1981 (3) SLR 274. In the aforesaid case also the Division Bench of this Court took the view that it was not open to the disciplinary authority to deal with petition differently. The writ petitioner was allowed on the plea of hostile discrimination.” 16. Keeping the overall view of the matter and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the allegations, it is proved that the petitioner has been discriminated with regard to award to punishment. At best the petitioner could have been awarded the same punishment which was awarded to Brij Raj Verma. 19. From the facts of the present case, it is clear that in the disciplinary enquiry, petitioner was not fully exonerated. It was held by punishment authority that petitioner has caused loss to the Government and for that loss, recovery was directed by punishing authority from the petitioner. Petitioner since has succeeded in proving that he has been discriminated in awarding of punishment, he is entitled to be dealt in similar manner as Sri Brij Raj Verma has been dealt. He is not entitled for full salary during the period when he was under suspension. The suspension allowance, which was paid to the petitioner till he was terminated be treated the amount for which petitioner was entitled during that period. He is not entitled for full salary during the period when he was under suspension. The suspension allowance, which was paid to the petitioner till he was terminated be treated the amount for which petitioner was entitled during that period. However, from the date when termination order was passed i.e. 22nd October, 1996 till the petitioner attained the age of superannuation, he is entitled only to 50% of back wages. However, the said period be treated for continuity of service and other service benefits.” 6. The Apex Court in the case of Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Jitendra Pd. Singh and another, (2001) 10 SCC 530 held as under : 2. On an enquiry being held, the enquiry authority found that the allegation of misconduct is proved and the disciplinary authority on consideration of the report of the enquiry authority and the other relevant material dismissed the first respondent from service. Thereafter, a reference to the Labour Court at the instance of the first respondent was made. The Labour Court though held on a preliminary question that the disciplinary enquiry conducted against the first respondent is valid came to the conclusion after perusing the documentary and oral evidence on record that the dismissal was not justified and held that the was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages with continuity in service and other consequential benefits. A writ petition was filed in the High Court which was allowed but on the basis of certain offer made, the learned Single Judge also directed that the appellant shall pay to the first respondent salary from the date of discharge till the date of the order in a lump sum of Rs. 50,000. Thereupon both the management and the workman filed two appeals. In the appeals, several questions were raised as to whether the act attributed to the first respondent would amount to misconduct at all which will entail a disciplinary enquiry at the instance of the management to end up with his dismissal; strong reliance was placed on Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut, (1984) 1 SCC 1 . Ultimately, however, the two learned Judges were agreed on one aspect of the matter that the question, whether on misconduct attributed to the workman there should have been casual connection between misconduct and employment of the workman may not be of much significance when such acts have been taken place within the premises of the factory, should be decided in an appropriate case. What influenced the Court in deciding the matter is that: “Since as many as three workmen on almost identical charges were found guilty of misconduct in connection with the same incident, though in separate proceedings, and one was punished with only one month’s suspension, and the other was ultimately reinstated in view of the findings recorded by the Labour Court and affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, it would be denial of justice to the appellant if he alone is singled out for punishment by way of dismissal from service.” 3. As the judgment is rested upon this position, whatever other views may have been expressed in the course of the judgment may be of no significance. In that view of the matter, we think there is no need to interfere with the order made by the High Court, that too in a proceeding arising under Article 136 of the Constitution. Hence we decline to interfere with the order made by the High Court. The appeals are dismissed accordingly.” 7. The Court, therefore, is compelled to take into consideration the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that similar punishment should have been awarded to the petitioner. In view of the law settled by this Court, instead of proceeding to reduce the punishment which is in the domain of the departmental authorities to reconsider and reduce the punishment if any glaring illegality has been committed by them. The Court is of the opinion that they have passed an order against law and they have not appreciated the facts and evidence correctly as was required by them under law, in aforesaid circumstances the Court can certainly give a direction to the departmental authorities to reconsider the issue for awarding lesser punishment as compared with co-driver Mool Chand. The petition, therefore, in the above circumstances is liable to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed. The orders dated 4.4.1998, 18.1.1999 and 24.1.2000 are hereby quashed. The petition, therefore, in the above circumstances is liable to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed. The orders dated 4.4.1998, 18.1.1999 and 24.1.2000 are hereby quashed. The appointing authority of the petitioner is directed to reconsider the matter in the light of the observation made in the judgment. ————