JUDGMENT 1. These references have been made at the instance of the Revenue in six assessment cases for the years ranging from 1973-74 to 1978-79. The factual and legal issues involved are identical, the same are being decided by this common order. 2. The assessee-respondent filed wealth-tax returns. A notice under section 17 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, was issued and served upon the assessee for the valuation of the Hotel Nagpal in question, against book value. The property known as Nagpal Hotel was referred to the valuation cell of the Department and the Valuation Officer, vide his order dated September 20, 1977, valued the interest of the assessee in the property. The Wealth-tax Officer issued demand under section 16(3)/17 of the Wealth-tax Act vide his order dated March 26, 1980. The order of the Wealth-tax Officer was challenged by way of appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth-tax who upheld the order of the Wealth-tax Officer. Against the appellate order, further appeal was preferred before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal granted the benefit of exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth-tax Act. Under such circumstances, the following reference has been made seeking opinion of this court : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in directing the Wealth-tax Officer to grant exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, to the assessee ?" 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. It has been brought to our notice that the relevant section 5(1)(iv), as it existed originally, was amended on April 1, 1972, taking away the words "exclusively used for dwelling purposes" and the relevant position of the law after the amendment for our purpose reads as under : "5. Exemption in respect of certain assets.-(1) Subject to the pro visions of sub-section (1A), wealth-tax shall not be payable by an assessee in respect of the following assets, and such assets shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee-.. . (iv) one house or part of a house belonging to the assessee." 5. The house has neither been defined in the Wealth-tax Act nor in the General Clauses Act. However, the word "building" has been used in section 5(1)(iii) and the word "property" has been used in section 5(1)(i) of the Wealth-tax Act. . (iv) one house or part of a house belonging to the assessee." 5. The house has neither been defined in the Wealth-tax Act nor in the General Clauses Act. However, the word "building" has been used in section 5(1)(iii) and the word "property" has been used in section 5(1)(i) of the Wealth-tax Act. In a common parlance, the "house" means a dwelling place where the people live. However, a residential building or house can also be used for commercial purposes. The dictionary meaning of "house" reads as under : "In New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word 'house' is defined as follows : 'a building for human habitation, a dwelling, a home'. In Legal Thesaurus by William C. Burton, a house is defined as 'abode, dwelling place, home, habitation, living place, living quarters, residence, etc.' " In Chapman v. Royal Bank of Scotland (1881) 7 QB 136, 140 , it was held that a house means a permanent building in which the tenant, or the owner and his family, dwells or lies." 6. Learned counsel for the respondent-assessee has submitted that the order of the Appellate Tribunal is just and proper and in support of his plea, he has relied upon the judgment delivered in case titled CWT v. Smt. Shushila Devi Tamakuwala reported in (1995) 212 ITR 203 (Patna) . The reasoning given by the learned Division Bench is in favour of the assessee and are extracted below (page 204) : "In determining the assets of the assessee under the Wealth-tax Act, one house belonging to the assessee shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee. The question which arises for consideration is whether the residential house will take within its fold the factory building belonging to the assessee ? The Central Board of Direct Taxes in Circular letter F. No. 317/23/73 W.T., dated July 24, 1973, referring to the exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act states thus : 'After the amendment of the above section from April 1, 1972, it reads as under : One house or part of a house belonging to the assessee. The point for consideration is whether exemption is available for residential house only or to business premises also (of course within the limit laid down in the section). The point for consideration is whether exemption is available for residential house only or to business premises also (of course within the limit laid down in the section). In this connection, attention is invited to sections 22 to 27 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which refer to income from house property. These sections are applicable to income from house property whether the house property is residential or it is used for business. In the circumstances, it is presumed that the exemption to house property under section 5(1)(iv) is available both to residential as well as business premises whether used by the association or let out.' " 7. Responding to the similar reference, the court relied upon the judgment delivered in the case title CWT v. Tulsi Dass reported in (2002) 256 ITR 73 (Raj) of the Rajasthan High Court and the case title CWT v. Smt. Shushila Devi Tamakuwala (1995) 212 ITR 203 (Patna) and decided in favour the assessee observing as under (page 78) : "Thus, while construing that section, it has been held that the house should be used for residential purposes which would necessarily mean-the house is a residential house for claiming exemption. The decision of the Full Bench has also no application to the present section wherein the assessee is entitled to exemption under clause (iv) of section 5(1) in regard to one house or part of a house belonging to the assessee. It is not required that the house should be exclusively used by the assessee for residential purposes and as a necessary corollary-it should be a residential house. It is a well established rule of interpretation that when the taxing statute is interpreted, the words used in the section have to be given strict meaning. The section does not require that for claiming exemption the house should be a residential house : the exemption can certainly be claimed for non-residential as well as residential accommodation. The only requirement is that the house or part of the house should belong to the assessee. The section does not require that for claiming exemption the house should be a residential house : the exemption can certainly be claimed for non-residential as well as residential accommodation. The only requirement is that the house or part of the house should belong to the assessee. The letter/circular F. No. 317/23/73-WT, dated July 24, 1973, issued by the Department reads- 'After the amendment of the above section from 1st April, 1972, it reads as under : One house or part of a house belonging to the assessee.' The point for consideration is whether exemption is available for a residential house only or to business premises also (of course within the limit laid down in the section). In this connection, attention is invited to sections 22 to 27 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which refer to income from house property. These sections are applicable to income from house property whether the house property is residential or it is used for business. In the circumstances, it is presumed that the exemption to house property under section 5(1)(iv) is available both to residential as well as business premises whether used by the association or let out. Please con firm." 8. In rebuttal, the learned counsel for the Revenue has relied upon the judgment of this court where a different view has been taken to that what has been taken by the earlier Division Bench in the case title Prakash Chand Modi v. CWT (1997) 225 ITR 541 (Raj) . This judgment has been referred to in the judgment delivered in Tulsi Dass' case (2002) 256 ITR 73 (Raj) . We find from the perusal of both the judgments that the judgment delivered in Tulsi Dass' case (2002) 256 ITR 73 (Raj) is mainly based on the circular letter of the Department. The circular letter has been issued to seek confirmation as to whether the words "house" or "part of the house", which is referred to in section 5(1)(iv) of the Wealth-tax Act mean the house used for commercial purposes and would the assessee be entitled to get the benefit of exemption. On a perusal of the circular letter, we find that a doubt was raised where some observation was recorded by the concerned officer of the Department and he sought confirmation with regard to his observation as to whether the benefit of exemption can be extended to the assessee. On a perusal of the circular letter, we find that a doubt was raised where some observation was recorded by the concerned officer of the Department and he sought confirmation with regard to his observation as to whether the benefit of exemption can be extended to the assessee. It has not been shown that the issue raised in the circular was clarified and confirmed. Thus, such observation seeking clarification has no statutory force and cannot be applied for determining exemption and otherwise it was only a circular letter. 9. Similar reference was before the Allahabad High Court in the case title CWT v. Smt. Angoori Devi (2005) 273 ITR 500 , where the Division Bench has answered the reference in favour of the Revenue observing as under (page 502) : "So far as the first question is concerned, we are of the opinion that under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act exemption has been granted to one house or part of the house belonging to the assessee. House is a building where people live and reside. It is mainly for residential purposes. Cinema building cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated as a house. This court in I.T. R. No. 238 of 1983, CIT v. J. K. Gupta, decided on September 23, 2003 , has held that cinema building is not a house and, therefore, the assessee is not entitled for exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act. This court in the case of Vinod Kumar (1999) UPTC 606 has proceeded on the assumption that exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act is available to immovable property whereas under the aforementioned section exemption is available to a house and not immovable property. Thus, the aforesaid decision is not applicable." 10. In view of the aforesaid position of law, we are of the considered view that the hotel cannot be said to be a house. A factory building, hotel or a cinema house are different and distinct things and cannot fall within the definition of house. House has been explained in the dictionary as noted above. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the findings recorded by the learned Division Bench in Tulsi Dass' case (2002) 256 ITR 73 (Raj) are not based on correct interpretation of statutes rather it is based on a circular letter which is not having statutory force. House has been explained in the dictionary as noted above. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the findings recorded by the learned Division Bench in Tulsi Dass' case (2002) 256 ITR 73 (Raj) are not based on correct interpretation of statutes rather it is based on a circular letter which is not having statutory force. Therefore, we hold that it is not a correct law. The correct law has been laid down in the case of Prakash Chand Modi (1997) 225 ITR 541 (Raj) . Thus, we confirm the aforesaid judgment and hold that a hotel cannot be considered to be house so as to qualify for the exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act. 11. The reference are accordingly, answered in favour of the Revenue. *******