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2009 DIGILAW 3672 (ALL)

Sonu Alias Salman, S/O Sri Sagir Ahmad v. The State Of U. P. Through The Secretary

2009-12-07

S.N.H.ZAIDI, UMA NATH SINGH

body2009
JUDGMENT: Uma Nath Singh, S.N.H. Zaidi, J. By way of this writ petition, detenu Sonu @ Salman, petitioner herein, has prayed for issuance of a writ, order, or direction in the nature of certiorari and has sought for the quashment of detention order dated 02-01-2009 passed by District Magistrate, Unnao, and confirmation order dated 13-01-2009 passed by State of U.P. 2. From the facts, as narrated in this writ petition, it appears that on 05-10-2008 at about 8:00 p.m., the petitioner along with his brothers came to the house of one Prakash Dhanuk, resident of House No. 72, Narendra Nagar, near Santoshi Mata Mandir, P.S.-Kotwali, Unnao, and called his son Vikas. They took out pistol and while hurling abuses at him, demanded Rs. 50,000/- towards Goonda Tax. When the people of the locality gathered, they opened fire at Vikas. His mother Smt. Sheela tried to save him, but one of the co-accused also fired at causing injury into her stomach. She succumbed to the injuries on the way to hospital. Petitioner Sonu fired at Prakash Dhanuk and Vikas but they escaped the gun shots and after the incident, they fled away while leaving their motorcycle on the spot. Report of the incident was lodged at P.S. Kotwali on 05-10-2008 itself, and thus, the case crime no. 4724 of 2008 was registered under Sections 302/307/384/386/504 and 506 I.P.C. and also under Section 3(2)(V) of SC/ST Act, and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. 3. Petitioner was arrested on 07-10-2008 after two days and sent to jail. He also moved an application for bail, that was rejected by the Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Unnao. Petitioner then preferred a bail application before the High Court and during its pendency, District Magistrate, Unnao passed the impugned detention order dated 02-01-2009 in exercise of powers under Sections 3(3) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred as "the NSA") in order to maintain public order. Station Officer of P.S. Kotwali was directed to serve a copy of the order on the family members of petitioner, and that also was finally served upon him. The District Magistrate, Unnao in his affidavit, has made the relevant averments in para-5, 6 and 7 which read as under: "5 That the contents of paras 7, 18, 14, 15, 17, 18 and 25 are not admitted as stated. The District Magistrate, Unnao in his affidavit, has made the relevant averments in para-5, 6 and 7 which read as under: "5 That the contents of paras 7, 18, 14, 15, 17, 18 and 25 are not admitted as stated. The petitioner was in Jail in Crime No. 4724/2008 U/s-302/307/324/384/386/504/506/34 I.P.C. and 3(2)(V) SC & ST Act and 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act. The petitioner was arrested on 07-10-2008. The sponsoring authorities had placed their reports and also some documents before the deponent. The deponent has considered the relevant and cogent materials and was subjectively satisfied with the activities of the petitioner which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The deponent has also recorded his awareness and satisfaction with regard to (i) petitioner in jail, (ii) petitioner is trying for his release by filing bail application before this Hon'ble Court, (iii) there is real possibility of his release from jail and, (iv) after getting himself from jail, he will repeat the similar activities in future. After recording such satisfaction, the detention order 02-01-2009 has been passed against the petitioner, which is just, legal and proper. In fact this Hon'ble Court has granted bail on 13-01-2009 as evident from the order of this Hon'ble Court annexed with the writ petition. This fact clearly demonstrates that the satisfaction recorded by the deponent to the effect that there is real possibility of release of the petitioner in future became true. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly opined that in case, satisfaction so recorded in the order, as stated herein above, it would be of no consequence that bail may be opposed by the State. 6. That the contents of paras 10, 11, 19, 20, 21 and 22 are not admitted as stated. It is further submitted that the petitioner has annexed his representation dated 13-01-2009(Annexure No. 5 to this writ petition). The representation dated 13-01-2009 was received in the office of the District Magistrate, Unnao on 13-01-2009 itself. The said representation was sent to the Police for their comments on 13-01-2009, which was received back on 16-01-2009. 14-01-2009 was a holiday being "Makar Sakranti". On the same date it was sent to the State Government through special messenger and to Central Government through speed post. The State Government rejected representation of the petitioner and sent a message dated 27-01-2009 which has been served upon the petitioner through Jail Authorities. 14-01-2009 was a holiday being "Makar Sakranti". On the same date it was sent to the State Government through special messenger and to Central Government through speed post. The State Government rejected representation of the petitioner and sent a message dated 27-01-2009 which has been served upon the petitioner through Jail Authorities. The deponent has also rejected the representation on 21-01-2009 and sent it to the Jail Authorities, which was served upon the petitioner on 21-01-2009 itself. There is no delay in deciding the representation as alleged by the petitioner in paragraph under reply. 7 That the contents of para 24 are not admitted as stated. It is further submitted that a notice was served upon the petitioner on 06-02-2009 that he can appear before the Advisory Board alongwith his next friend(non-Advocate) on 09-02-2009, but he himself appeared before the Advisory Board on 09-02-2009. The State Government has confirmed the detention order and a confirmation order dated 02-03-2009 was issued for detaining the petitioner for a period of twelve months from the date of detention. The order passed by deponent is approved and confirmed by the State Government, which is perfectly just, legal and proper." 4. The petitioner made representations on 13-01-2009 to the State Government, Governor of U.P., and Secretary(Internal Security), Union of India, New Delhi. The State Government rejected the representation and so the Central Government on 10-02-2009. According to petitioner, the Central Government had taken 28 days in the disposal of representation, and that order was served upon the petitioner with a further delay of 10 days on 20-02-2009. Thus, there was a delay of 38 days from the date of submitting the representation till the communication of rejection order to the petitioner. 5. In the counter affidavit filed by the Superintendent, District Jail, Unnao, he has mentioned that the representation submitted by petitioner was rejected by the District Magistrate, Unnao, vide his order dated 21-01-2009 that was received and served upon the petitioner the same day. Similarly, the radiogram dated 27-01-2009 sent by the State Government regarding communication of rejection of the representation of petitioner by it, was received in jail on 29-01-2009 and that was served upon the petitioner the same day. Petitioner was served the notice dated 04-02-2009 the same day informing him that he was required to appear before the Advisory Board on 09-02-2009. Petitioner was served the notice dated 04-02-2009 the same day informing him that he was required to appear before the Advisory Board on 09-02-2009. The petitioner himself appeared before the Board on that day, and then the detention order was confirmed by the State Government vide the order dated 02-03-2009 which was received in Jail on 04-03-2009 informing that the petitioner is to remain in detention for a period of 12 months with effect from 02-01-2009. In the affidavit, sworn in by Under Secretary, Home, on behalf of the State Government also reiterated the aforesaid facts. 6. It is mentioned in para 4 of the affidavit that the Advisory Board had sent its opinion vide the letter dated 20-02-2009 within seven weeks from the date of detention of petitioner. And on receipt of the opinion of Advisory Board, the State Government took a decision to detain the petitioner for a period 12 months. Coming to the affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government vide paras 4 and 5 thereof, the exercise undertaken towards the disposal of representation of the petitioner has been detailed as under:- "4. In regard to para 10 of the petition, it is submitted that the representation dated 13-01-2009 was received in the concerned section of Ministry of Home Affairs on 23-01-2009 through the Government of Uttar Pradesh, vide letter no. 84/2/01/2009-CX-5 dated 20-01-2009. Contentions made in para nos. 6, 7, 12, 13 and ground no. (x) of the para 26 of the petition are denied as being incorrect. 5. In regard to paras 19, 21, 22 &23 of the petition, it is stated that a representation dated 13-01-2009 was received in the Ministry of Home Affairs in the concerned desk on 23-01-2009 from the State Government of Uttar Pradesh vide their letter no. 84/2/01/2009-CX-5 dated 20-01-2009. This representation was processed for consideration in the section and at the levels of Under Secretary and Joint Secretary, and the same was place before the Union Home Secretary( who has been delegated powers of the Central Government to decide such cases) on 03-02-2009. The Union Home Secretary, due to heavy preoccupation, including matters related to the Parliament Session(12th to 26th February) was able to consider the matter only 10-02-2009. The Union Home Secretary, due to heavy preoccupation, including matters related to the Parliament Session(12th to 26th February) was able to consider the matter only 10-02-2009. After carefully going through the material on record, including the order of detention and grounds for the same, the representation of the detenue and the comments of the detaining authority thereon, he found that the detenue has been unable to bring forth any material cause on grounds in his representation to justify revocation of the order by exercise of powers of the Central Government under Section 14 of the Act, and rejected the representation. The file was received in the section on 16-02-2009(14th & 15th February, 2009 being holidays Saturday and Sunday), through the levels of Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary(Legal) and Under Secretary. Immediately on receipt of the file, a crash wireless message No. II/15028/61/2009-NSA dated 17-02-2009 was sent to Government of Uttar Pradesh and Superintendent, District Jail, Unnao informing about the rejection of the representation of the detenue with the request to inform the detenue of the same. A copy of this wireless message No. II/15028/61/2009-NSA dated 17-02-2009 is enclosed as C.A.I." 7. Thereafter, a supplementary affidavit was also filed on behalf of the District Jail, Unnao, on 07-10-2009 explaining the time taken in the communication of rejection order passed by the Central Government, Para-2 of the affidavit reads as under:- "2 That the representation of the petitioner has been rejected by the Central Government on 10-02-2009 which is clear from the radiogram dated 18-02-2009 sent by the Central Government. Copy of the said letter has already been annexed along with the writ petition. Petitioner has been informed on 19-02-2009 and his thumb impression has been obtained on the said radiogram. Another letter dated 18-02-2009/20-02-2009 has been received in the office of the Opposite Party no. 3 on 06-03-2009 which has also been served on the petitioner on 07-03-2009 and his thumb impression has been obtained as token of receipt on the said letter. Copy of the radiogram and letter dated 18-02-2009/20-02-2009 are being annexed herewith as Annexure No. SCA-1 & SCA-2 to this affidavit." 8. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Advocate General for the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was an inordinate delay of 38 days in the disposal of representation including a period of 10 days in communication thereof to the petitioner. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Advocate General for the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was an inordinate delay of 38 days in the disposal of representation including a period of 10 days in communication thereof to the petitioner. Hence, a valuable right of petitioner under Article 22(5) of the Constitution has been violated in the process. Learned counsel contended that the deceased was shot by co-accused Lucky, whereas in the order it is mentioned that she was shot dead by the detenu. It being a solitary incriminating act, as alleged against the petitioner, could not have caused a serious apprehension in the mind of detaining authority that the petitioner would repeat the act in future. Besides, the propensity of offence and the role attributed to petitioner, cannot be said to have disturbed public order necessitating issuance of a deterrence in the nature of a detention order. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that as per the Juvenile Justice Rules, a High School certificate would be accepted for the purpose of determination of age and in the High School Mark Sheet issued by the Board High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., the date of birth of petitioner has been recorded as 12-03-1991, meaning thereby, that on the date of issuance of detention order i.e. 02-01-2009, he was below 18 years. Learned counsel referred to a Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in 1986(23) ACC 398(Islam Vs. State of U.P.) wherein the detention order passed against a boy of 14 years on the ground that he was found loading a Jeep with stolen electric wires, was quashed on the ground that the detenu, who was only 14 could not have indulged in wire-cutting and there was nothing to indicate that he had a criminal past to suggest some repetitive tendency compelling the detaining authority to pass the order of detention. 10. Learned counsel also referred to judgments of Supreme Court reported in 1997(8) SCC 114 (Gaurav Jain Vs. Union of India) wherein the Court has highlighted the aims and objects of the Juvenile Justice Act and 1982 SCC (Criminal) 502 (Jaya Mala Vs. Home Secretary, Government of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors,) wherein the Court quashed the detention order while taking into account the nature of offence and age of detenu. 11. Union of India) wherein the Court has highlighted the aims and objects of the Juvenile Justice Act and 1982 SCC (Criminal) 502 (Jaya Mala Vs. Home Secretary, Government of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors,) wherein the Court quashed the detention order while taking into account the nature of offence and age of detenu. 11. On the other hand, learned Advocate General referred to a judgment of the High Court, reported in 1983 Crl. L.J. 1429 (Mohd. Alim versus Superintendent, District Jail, Moradabad) to contend that a juvenile can also be detained under the provisions of N.S.A. He cited para 3 of the judgment in particular, as under: "3. The petitioner's father has admitted in his affidavit that the petitioner's date of birth as recorded in the school records is incorrect. In School records his date of birth has been given as 15th Dec., 69 and accordingly his age comes to about 13 years. The petitioner's father admits in the affidavit that this is an under- estimate and according to him the real age of the petitioner is about 15 years and a few months. He has not given the exact age of the petitioner. The petitioner's father has further admitted that according to Police records the petitioner's age is about 19 years but according to him that is wholly incorrect. He admits that the petitioner appeared before the Advisory Board on 10th of Nov., 82. A photograph of the petitioner has been filed as Annexure to the petition but it is not possible to find out the exact age of the petitioner on the basis of the photograph. The petitioner undoubtedly appears to be a young boy aged in between 16 to 18 years. We find no material on the record to give a definite finding that the petitioner is below 16 years of age. We find no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that he is not capable of acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. As we have observed above the petitioner appears to be a young boy aged between 16 to 18 years. The District Magistrate has deposed that he was fully satisfied that the activity of the petitioner as set out in the grounds of detention that he was a potential threat to the maintenance of public order and that his detention was necessary. The District Magistrate has deposed that he was fully satisfied that the activity of the petitioner as set out in the grounds of detention that he was a potential threat to the maintenance of public order and that his detention was necessary. The order of detention against the petitioner has thus been passed by the District Magistrate after full application of mind in respect of the alleged activities of the petitioner including the fact that he was a young boy aged about 18 to 19 years. We see no substance in the petitioner's contention that he could not be detained under the National Security Act simply because he happens to be a young boy. The ratio of the decision in Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir ( AIR 1982 SC 1297 ): (1982 Cri.LJ 1777) is not that a young boy aged about 16 to 18 years would not be capable of indulging in any activity prejudicial to maintenance of public order. The provisions of U.P. Children Act 1952 also do not in any way bar the detention of a minor under preventive laws. The facts of the instant case are clearly distinguishable from the facts on which the aforesaid ruling is based. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on S. 27 of the Act but the 'proviso to S. 27 provides that a child who is 12 years of age or upward may be committed to prison when the court certified that he is of so unruly or of a depraved character that he is not fit to be sent to an approved School and that none of the other methods in which the case may legally be dealt with is suitable.' In the instant case the petitioner is not below 12 years of age and as discussed above there is no convincing evidence to show that he is even below 16 years of age. The District Magistrate was satisfied from the Police Records that the petitioner was a potential threat to the maintenance of public order and admittedly the police records mentioned his age as 19 years. Hence it cannot be said that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was not based on adequate material or that the case suffers from non-application of mind to the relevant material." 12. Hence it cannot be said that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was not based on adequate material or that the case suffers from non-application of mind to the relevant material." 12. Learned Advocate General referred to Section 1, sub-section (4) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, which reads as under: "4. Notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all cases involving detention, prosecution, penalty or sentence of imprisonment of juveniles in conflict with law under any such law." 13. Learned Advocate General read out Section 7 of the said Act, which provides for procedure to be followed by a Magistrate not empowered under the Act to decide the issue of juvenility. The said Section, on reproduction, reads as under:- "7. Procedure to be followed by a Magistrate now empowered under the Act.- (1) When any Magistrate not empowered to exercise the powers of a Board under this Act is of the opinion that a person brought before him under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence), is a juvenile or the child, he shall without any delay record such opinion and forward the juvenile or the child and the record of the proceeding to the competent authority having jurisdiction over the proceeding. (2) The competent authority to which the proceeding is forwarded under sub-section (1) shall hold the inquiry as if the juvenile or the child had originally been brought before it." 14. Besides, learned Advocate General also read out the provisions of Section 15, sub-section (3) of the said Act to contend that in a case of preventive detention, a juvenile can be sent to special home. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the records. On enquiry from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Unnao, he has informed the Court that no such application to determine the age and status of petitioner-detenu in regard to his juvenility has been made so far, whereas in the charge-sheet, his age is mentioned as 22 years. 15. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the records. On enquiry from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Unnao, he has informed the Court that no such application to determine the age and status of petitioner-detenu in regard to his juvenility has been made so far, whereas in the charge-sheet, his age is mentioned as 22 years. 15. In so far as the delay in disposal of the representation of detenu is concerned, we find considerable force in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and there is a dearth of plausible explanation in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India, that contains the averments that the representation dated 13.1.2009 was received from the State in the Ministry on 23.1.2009 and the same was placed before the Union Home Secretary on 3.2.2009, and as the Union Home Secretary was busy in important works including the matters relating to Parliament in Session, he could not get time to consider the representation till 10.2.2009 when it was rejected. Immediately on receipt of file, a wireless message dated 17.2.2009 was sent to the Government of U.P. and the Superintendent, District Jail, Unnao. In the supplementary affidavit filed by the Superintendent, District Jail, Unnao, it is averred that on receipt of radiogram dated 18.2.2009, the petitioner was informed on 19.2.2009 about the order on his representation passed by the Central Government. Thus, there is no sufficient explanation for the delay in the disposal of representation. This Court has quashed detention orders in several such cases where there was dearth of explanation for delay on the basis of the Supreme Court's Judgments as under: 1. Harish Pahwa versus State of U.P. and others, 1981 SCC (Cri.)589, 2. R. Paulsamy versus Union of India and another, 1999 SCC (Cri.) 549, 3. Rama Dhondu Borade versus V.K.Saraf, Commissioner of Police and others, 1989 SCC (Cri.) 520, 4. Solomon Castro versus State of Kerala and others, 2001 SCC (Cri.) 650, 5. Rajammal versus State of T.N and another, 1999 SCC (Cri.) 93, 6. Usha Agarwal versus Union of India and others (2007) 1 SCC (Cri.) 342, and 7. Harshala Santosh Patil versus State of Maharashtra and others, (2007) 1 SCC (Cri.) 680. 16. Solomon Castro versus State of Kerala and others, 2001 SCC (Cri.) 650, 5. Rajammal versus State of T.N and another, 1999 SCC (Cri.) 93, 6. Usha Agarwal versus Union of India and others (2007) 1 SCC (Cri.) 342, and 7. Harshala Santosh Patil versus State of Maharashtra and others, (2007) 1 SCC (Cri.) 680. 16. That apart, this detention order would not be sustainable also on the ground that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, which is a beneficial piece of legislation, would also be applicable in the cases of detention, vide Section 1, sub-section (4) (supra). There is no doubt that a juvenile can be detained and sent to a special home in cases on a report from the probation officer or otherwise, that the juvenile in conflict with law has not been of good behaviour during the period of supervision or that the concerned institution under whose care the juvenile was placed is no longer able or willing to ensure the good behaviour and well-being of the juvenile, but that does not mean that a juvenile can be detained in all cases of preventive detention like an ordinary detenu and the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act would automatically stand suspended and eclipsed by the operation of the provisions of National Security Act invoked for the purpose of maintaining 'public order'. Apex Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi versus State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 584 (paras 25 and 26) while dealing with the question of determination of age of a juvenile accused has held as under: "25. In terms of the aforementioned decision of the Constitution Bench such determination is required to be made even if at the relevant time, the juvenile crossed the age of eighteen years. In the absence of any other statute operating in the field, Section 35 will have application and the court while determining such age would depend upon the materials brought on record by the parties which would be admissible in evidence in terms of Section 35 of the Act. 26. In Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit (1988 Supp. In the absence of any other statute operating in the field, Section 35 will have application and the court while determining such age would depend upon the materials brought on record by the parties which would be admissible in evidence in terms of Section 35 of the Act. 26. In Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit (1988 Supp. SCC 604) this Court held: SCC p. 619, para 15) "To render a document admissible under Sectin 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry starting a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 17. Thus, even if the age of a juvenile accused is mentioned to be above 18 years in contemporaneous police records filed with charge-sheet, it would still be open for the juvenile to raise the plea of juvenility and for the competent court to determine the age and status of juvenility and thus the Chief Judicial Magistrate being the Head of Juvenile Board cannot rest assured that in the absence of an application to that effect, it would not be necessary for him to determine the age of juvenile. 18. In the case of D.K.Basu versus State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416 , amongst the directions issued towards the requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention are two such directions (nos. 18. In the case of D.K.Basu versus State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416 , amongst the directions issued towards the requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention are two such directions (nos. 7 and 8) which deal with the medical examination of the arrestee, which may prima facie provide some informations regarding the approximate age of the juvenile arrestee for the purpose of Chief Judicial Magistrate suo motu requiring detailed information in the light of the judgment of Surender Singh Gorkhi (supra) to determine the age of juvenile in order to avoid undertaking a futile exercise of regular trial of such accused before a criminal court to subsequently fail at appellate stage on being declared contrary to the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act. Besides, if the date of birth recorded in the certificates issued by State/Central Education Boards are ex facie accepted for the purposes of giving employment and superannuation, then in all such cases where the status of juvenility is claimed on that basis, in our opinion, a competent court would not be required to undertake a long exercise towards the determination of age for the purpose of declaration of an accused a juvenile. In the instant case, the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh has recorded the date of birth of detenu as 12.3.1991, thus obviously, he was a juvenile on the date of offence i.e. 5.10.2008 and the date of issuing impugned detention order on 2.1.2009. Apex Court while elucidating the aims and objects of the Juvenile Justice Act, has observed as follows in the case of Gaurav Jain (supra): "18. The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for short "the JJAct") was enacted to prove for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent juveniles and for the adjudication of such matters relating to disposition of delinquent juveniles. The pre-existing law was found inadequate to tie over social knowledge, instrument, delinquency or improvement of the child. The Act sought to achieve a uniform legal framework for juvenile justice in the country as a whole so as to ensure that no child, in any circumstance, is lodged in jail and police lock-up. This is being ensured by establishing Juvenile Welfare Boards and Juvenile Courts to deal adequately with the subject. The Act sought to achieve a uniform legal framework for juvenile justice in the country as a whole so as to ensure that no child, in any circumstance, is lodged in jail and police lock-up. This is being ensured by establishing Juvenile Welfare Boards and Juvenile Courts to deal adequately with the subject. The object of the Act, therefore, is to provide specialised approach towards the delinquent or neglected juvenile to prevent recurrence of juvenile delinquency in its full range keeping in view the developmental needs of the child found in the situation of social maladjustment. That aim is secured by establishing observation homes, juvenile houses, juvenile homes for neglected juveniles and special homes for delinquent or neglected juveniles. The JJ Act is consistent with the rights of the child to development; the established norms and standards for the administration of juvenile justice and special mode of investigation, prosecution, adjudication and disposition of the juvenile.........." 19. Further, this Court, in the case of Islam (supra) had taken into consideration the age and nature of offence, and hence, quashed the detention order. In view of all the aforesaid, we allow this writ petition and quash the detention order dated 2.1.2009 passed by the District Magistrate, Unnao, as also the confirmation order dated 13.1.2009, passed by the State of U.P. with direction to release petitioner-detenu Sonu alias Salman forthwith if not required in any other case.