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2009 DIGILAW 3680 (ALL)

RAM KUMAR v. D. D. C. GAUTAM BUDH NAGAR

2009-12-08

RAKESH SHARMA

body2009
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Sharma, J.—These three connected writ petitions have been preferred by the petitioners challenging the same orders passed by the Consolidation Authorities in respect of the same land involving similar controversy and as such all the three writ petitions are being decided by this one and common judgment. 2. Heard Sri A.K. Sachan, learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition Nos. 32876 of 2007 and 32967 of 2008 as well as Sri P.K.S. Paliwal, learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 28821 of 2007 and Sarvasri Rajesh Yadav, Jai Singh Parihar, R.S. Saroj, U.N. Pandey, M.C. Singh, D.P. Singh, Prabhat Singh, Pradeep Chandra and learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents. Perused the records also. 3. Through these writ petitions, the petitioners have assailed the orders dated 4th May, 2007, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gautam Buddh Nagar, orders dated 2.8.2006 and 27.5.2005 (in Writ Petition No. 28821 of 2007), passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Gautam Buddh Nagar and the orders dated 7.10.1986, passed by the Consolidation Officer, Gautam Buddh Nagar. 4. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the controversy involved in the present writ petitions are that the land in dispute situate in Village Jaganpur Afzalpur, Pargana and Post, Dankaur, Tehsil Sadar, District Gautam Buddh Nagar, measuring 80 Bighas 14 Bisawas, was under the ownership of Charan Singh, Son of Pyare Lal, resident of the said Village. The said agricultural land in dispute was sold by the original tenureholder, Charan Singh, on 2.4.1962 by executing a registered sale-deed registering the same in the office of the concerned Sub Registrar in favour of Rishal, Son of Devi Sahai, Rishal, Son of Ganga, Ramphal, Son of Dhuliya, Tunda, Son of Jahariya and Shanti, Son of Data Ram. The copies of the sale-deeds have been annexed as Annexures to the writ petition. The land was mutated in the revenue records and according to the petitioners’ counsel no one had raised any objection in the year 1962 and therefore the mutation was carried. The land in dispute stood recorded in the name of the above five persons. The entries were made in the Basic Year Khatauni of 1359 Fasali. These entries were carried on in 1371 Fasali and thereafter in the Khatauni of 1389 Fasali, these revenue entries continued in the revenue records. The land in dispute stood recorded in the name of the above five persons. The entries were made in the Basic Year Khatauni of 1359 Fasali. These entries were carried on in 1371 Fasali and thereafter in the Khatauni of 1389 Fasali, these revenue entries continued in the revenue records. The copies of the revenue entries and in the Basic Year Khataunis have been annexed as Annexures alongwith the writ petitions. The numbers and details of the land has been quoted in Paragraph No. 7 of Writ Petition No. 32867 of 2007. The shares of the tenureholders were also defined. At the time of verification of some Khataunis, some mistakes had crept in. A reference was made on 14.1.1986 by the Assistant Consolidation Officer. 5. It has been submitted that the petitioners were residing in the State of Haryana and as such no notice in respect of reference could be received by them. Under these compelling circumstances, the petitioners could not participate in the reference proceedings and pursue their case, but the Consolidation Officer had continued with the proceedings. The allegation is that on 7.10.1986, a forged and fabricated compromise was filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 47 before the Consolidation Officer. A copy of the ordersheet of the proceedings before the Consolidation Officer has been enclosed alongwith the writ petition. On the basis of this forged, fabricated and manufactured compromise, alleged to have been entered into between the parties on 7.10.1986, the Consolidation Officer had rendered his judgment on the same day itself, that is, on 7.10.1986. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners have pointed out several irregularities and illegalities in the proceedings and challenged the compromise as well as the order passed by the Consolidation Officer on the basis of the said alleged forged, fabricated and manufactured compromise. 7. It was highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that this compromise was not duly verified on the same day, that is, on 7.10.1986, when it was filed before the Consolidation Officer. The said compromise was filed without scrutinising the correctness of the compromise, without verifying the signatures of the signatories to the compromise and the authors of the compromise, but the Consolidation Officer had decided the case on the basis of the forged, fabricated and manufactured compromise. The said compromise was filed without scrutinising the correctness of the compromise, without verifying the signatures of the signatories to the compromise and the authors of the compromise, but the Consolidation Officer had decided the case on the basis of the forged, fabricated and manufactured compromise. The long-standing revenue entries, which were continuing in the revenue records since 1359 Fasali, were held to be fraudulent entries, but prior to doing so, no notice was given to the five vendees, that is, Rishal, Son of Devi Sahai, Rishal, Son of Ganga, Ramphal, Son of Dhuliya, Tunda, Son of Jahariya and Shanti, Son of Data Ram or their successors. 8. Against the said order dated 7.10.1986, passed by the Consolidation Officer, statutory appeals were filed by the successors of the vendees. Bansha Ram and others (Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 28821 of 2007), successors of Rishal Son of Devi Sahai, on receiving the knowledge of the order dated 7.10.1986, had filed an Appeal No. 204/2004-05, petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 in Writ Petition No. 32867 of 2007 have filed Appeal No. 330/278 of 2005 and Petitioner No. 3 had filed Appeal No. 277. These Appeals were dismissed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on the ground of delay on 27.5.2005 and 2.8.2006. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation had ignored the submissions made in the Appeals. Revisions preferred by the petitioners have also been dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gautam Buddh Nagar on the ground of delay on 4.5.2007. 9. In reply to the submissions made in the writ petitions, detailed counter-affidavits have been filed by Sri M.C. Singh (Sri Mahesh Chandra Singh) on 24.11.2009 on behalf of Respondent Nos. 4 to 7. The counter-affidavits appears to have been drafted, settled and signed by Sri M.C. Singh, Advocate. It has been submitted in the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 to 7 that the petitioner No. 1 and the husband of petitioner No. 2 (in Writ Petition No. 32876 of 2007) and the respondents entered into a written compromise on 7.10.1986 and on the basis of the said compromise, the Consolidation Office, Dankaur, had passed the order dated 7.10.1986. Thumb impression etc. of Shanti @ Shanta, father of Ram Kumar, the petitioner No. 1, and the husband of petitioner No. 2, Dayawati, were verified by Sri V.K. Gaur, Advocate, Bulandshahr, likewise, signatures of Tunda were also verified by his Advocate. Thumb impression etc. of Shanti @ Shanta, father of Ram Kumar, the petitioner No. 1, and the husband of petitioner No. 2, Dayawati, were verified by Sri V.K. Gaur, Advocate, Bulandshahr, likewise, signatures of Tunda were also verified by his Advocate. The case was concluded on the basis of the compromise by the Consolidation Officer on 7.10.1986. The contesting respondents have, thus, became owner in possession of the land in dispute from 7.10.1986. There existed a Primary School and some constructions have been raised on the land in dispute after obtaining permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on 22.5.2006 as required under Section 5-C of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. There is a mention of an interim order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 41773 of 2009 and there is also mention of certain land acquisition proceedings against which a Writ Petition No. 35021 of 2009 has been filed in which also an order was passed by this Court. The Appeals preferred by the petitioners were barred by law of limitation and were rightly dismissed by the Appellate authority. Thereafter, the revisions were also dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. In fact the Appeals itself were not maintainable before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation under Section 11(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It has been denied in the counter-affidavit that the petitioners were residing in another State. In some paragraph (vide Paragraph Nos. 23, 24 and 25) of the counter-affidavit, the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 have tried to defend the compromise terming it as a legal and valid compromise and all the necessary parties, which were required, were entered into and the compromise was duly recognised and taken note of by the Consolidation Officer. Parties to the compromise put their signatures on the compromise. The other pleas taken in the writ petition have been tried to be rebutted in Paragraph Nos. 33, 34, 36 and 38 of the counter-affidavit, i.e., Sri V.K. Gaur, Advocate, was engaged as Counsel by the parties who entered into compromise. The orders passed by the Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation are well considered and speaking orders. No objections were raised during the life time of Shanti about the compromise. The orders of Consolidation Officer have been placed to demonstrate that a permission to establish a School was obtained from the competent authority. 10. The orders passed by the Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation are well considered and speaking orders. No objections were raised during the life time of Shanti about the compromise. The orders of Consolidation Officer have been placed to demonstrate that a permission to establish a School was obtained from the competent authority. 10. In the counter-affidavits filed in all the cases by Sri M.C. Singh and Sri Dushyant Singh Advocates, more or less, similar pleas have been reiterated, which were taken in the counter-affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 32876 of 2007. Nothing new has been reiterated in other counter-affidavits filed in the connected writ petitions. 11. A counter-affidavit has also been filed by Sarvasri D.P. Singh and Prabhat Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 20, 21 and 26 in Writ Petition No. 32876 of 2007 taking similar stand. 12. Sri Pradeep Chandra, learned counsel, has put in appearance on behalf of Respondent Nos. 41 and 42 in Writ Petition No. 32876 of 2007. He has submitted his arguments at great length. 13. It has been contended by Sri Chandra that if this Court finds that there were some illegalities or infirmities in the orders passed by the Consolidation authorities, the matters could be remanded back to the appropriate Consolidation Court. On the allegations of committing fraud and forgery etc., Sri Pradeep Chandra, learned counsel for the respondents, has submitted that a detailed enquiry may be required to be held and for this purpose the matter may be remanded back to the appropriate Consolidation Court so that a trial may be conducted and the position may become clear on the facts and law enabling the concerned Consolidation Court to deal with the matter taking note of the facts and laws as well as allegations of fraud if committed by the respondents. He has laid stress that the appeals were barred by time and as such were rightly dismissed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the revisions were rightly rejected by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. No explanation for delay was given by the petitioners before the appellate authority and the settled issues cannot be unsettled after such a long period of time. The Deputy Director of Consolidation and other consolidation authorities have recorded findings of fact which cannot be interfered with by this Court. 14. No explanation for delay was given by the petitioners before the appellate authority and the settled issues cannot be unsettled after such a long period of time. The Deputy Director of Consolidation and other consolidation authorities have recorded findings of fact which cannot be interfered with by this Court. 14. Sri M.C. Singh, who has prepared, drafted and settled the counter-affidavits and filed the same in the Court, at the outset has submitted that he has been instructed by his clients not to argue the case. He has submitted that Sri S.P. Singh, Senior Advcoate, will argue the case. It is noteworthy that neither Sri S.P. Singh, Senior Advocate, has appeared when the writ petitions were listed for hearing nor any request has been made on his behalf by his Brief-holder or his Instructing Counsel to adjourn the case. The Court has already ordered by its order dated 20.11.2009 that the matter will not be adjourned and the case shall be dealt with on merits and the learned counsel for the contesting parties must be prepared for final arguments in the case. 15. Rejoinder affidavit has been filed in Writ Petition No. 23821 of 2007 to rebut the submissions put-forth in the counter-affidavit reiterating the submissions made in the writ petitions. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the judgments reported in 2001 AIR (SC) 457, D.P. Chadha v. Triyugi Narain Mishra, 1998 (89) RD 394 , Umesh Chand Paliwal and others v. Board of Revenue at Allahabad and others, 2001 RD 174, Ram Jas v. Ram Asrey, 1998 (89) RD 206 , Dularey v. D.D.C. Basti and others, 1996 (87) RD 576, Lallan and another v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1987 RD 516 SC, Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katji and others and 2003 (95) RD 348, Smt. Prakashwati v. Asst. Director of Consolidation, Ghaziabad and others, in support of his submissions. 17. I have heard learned counsel for the contesting parties and perused the record. 18. In the present case, this Court has taken note of the registered sale-deed executed on 2.4.1962 by the original tenure holder, Charan Singh, in favour of five purchasers, namely, Rishal, Son of Devi Sahai, Rishal, Son of Ganga, Ramphal, Son of Dhuliya, Tunda, Son of Jahariya and Shanti, Son of Data Ram. This sale-deed was duly registered with the appropriate authority. This sale-deed was duly registered with the appropriate authority. The revenue entries of Basic year, that is 1359 Fasali to 1371 Fasali contained names of these persons. There is no mention of the names of respondent Nos. 4 to 47 or their fathers or their ancestors in the Khatauni of 1359 Fasali. It has been mentioned that the consolidation proceedings had been carried out and all the necessary provisions have been noted by the revenue authorities. The law is well settled that the Basic Year entries in the revenue records, which have remained unchallenged and uncontroverted for a long period, cannot be excluded from consideration and ignored by the consolidation or revenue Courts. If the Consolidation Officer had acted on the basis of the alleged forged compromise, it was the duty of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, while exercising its appellate power, under Section 11 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, ought to have dealt with the objections/suspicions raised by the petitioners in the Appeals in which serious irregularity had been pleaded. 19. The land owners, armed with the registered sale-deed, having revenue entries in their favour in the revenue records and also having mutation in their favour were pitted against the persons who had no concern at all with the land in dispute having no entries in the revenue records in their favour, no documents worth the name in their favour, no rent receipt, no irrigation receipts, no Khasra entries or any other documents before the consolidation Courts. The respondents or their ancestors were having no real or substantial connection with the land in dispute. 20. It has been specifically pleaded by the petitioners in Paragraph No. 11 of the Appeal that Jaivir, Son of Asharam, answering respondent No. 29, who has no relation or connection with the land in dispute, is real brother in law of the Reader (Peshkar)-Ranvir Singh of the then Consolidation Officer. Said Jaivir Singh, brother in law of the Reader (Peshkar) of the Consolidation Officer in connivance with the Reader had got the order passed in favour of the respondents. 21. It is relevant to mention here that the alleged compromise was entered into between the parties on 7.10.1986. This alleged compromise was not ordered to be verified nor adjudicated upon by the Consolidation Officer and even no notice was issued to the petitioners or their fathers or their ancestors to verify their signatures. 21. It is relevant to mention here that the alleged compromise was entered into between the parties on 7.10.1986. This alleged compromise was not ordered to be verified nor adjudicated upon by the Consolidation Officer and even no notice was issued to the petitioners or their fathers or their ancestors to verify their signatures. The petitioners specifically denied that their ancestors had never put their signatures on the compromise. The details have been given in Paragraph 12 of the writ petition that on four pages of the alleged compromise, the signatures were forged and the pages 7 and 8 were added subsequently after separating and cancelling page Nos. 1 and 6 of the alleged forged compromise. It is also surprising to note that the alleged compromise had been entered into on 7.10.1986 and the Consolidation Officer had passed the orders on the same day itself, that is, on 7.10.1986 without even verifying the signatures of the parties to the compromise who had put their signatures on the compromise. 22. There is nothing in the order of the Consolidation Officer that the Consolidation Officer had called the parties to the compromise or their Counsel to verify each of the signatures in order to satisfy himself about the bonafide and genuineness of the compromise. It must have taken some time in verifying the signatures of more than fifty persons, who had put their signatures on the compromise. 23. The compromise had been executed on 7.10.1986. It was presented in the Court of Consolidation Officer on the same date, that is, on 7.10.1986, signatures of more than 50 persons were got verified on the same day during the Court hours and the orders were also passed on the same day itself, that is, on 7.10.1986, which itself explains every thing. How it is possible that a compromise could be entered into between the parties, more than 50 in numbers, executed on the same day, presented before the Court on the same day, the Court takes note of appearance of 50 persons, verifies signatures of more than 50 persons and also passed orders on the same day itself. 24. It had been categorically pleaded in the Appeal that Page Nos. 7 and 8 of the compromise were lateron added in order to benefit respondents. These additional pages, added lateron, itself create doubt regarding bonafide and genuineness of the document. 24. It had been categorically pleaded in the Appeal that Page Nos. 7 and 8 of the compromise were lateron added in order to benefit respondents. These additional pages, added lateron, itself create doubt regarding bonafide and genuineness of the document. Even the names of the beneficiaries and their respective shares in the property in dispute have been defined without any basis. The Consolidation Officer did not consider as to which of the respondent on what basis was allocated a particular amount of share in the land in dispute. Even the parentage of some parties was wrongly described. The Consolidation Officer had denied any share to Rishal, son of Devi Sahai and other recorded tenureholders. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also drawn attention of the Court to the procedure prescribed under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for taking into account any compromise entered into between the parties, which reads as under : “3. Compromise of Suit.— Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise [in writing and signed by the parties], or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith [so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit]:” 26. A perusal of the aforesaid Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes it clear that the compromise must be lawfull and the Court has to record its satisfaction in respect of the said agreement or compromise. In the present cases, the very execution of the compromise had been under cloud and doubted and the procedure adopted by the Consolidation Officer while passing the order dated 7.10.1986 cannot be termed as satisfaction of the Court. When the compromise itself was alleged to be forged not lawfull, how the decree passed on the basis of the alleged unlawful compromise can exist. 27. When the compromise itself was alleged to be forged not lawfull, how the decree passed on the basis of the alleged unlawful compromise can exist. 27. The Court has also taken note of the allegation that one Jaivir is the brother in law of the Reader (Peshkar), Ranvir Singh, of the then Consolidation Officer, was one of the beneficiary of Gata No. 43 Mi-0/0-6, who was instrumental in getting the orders passed by the then Consolidation Officer. Said Jaivir or his ancestors had no real or substantial connection with the land in dispute as neither any land or share was purchased nor held by him or his ancestors. He had played an important role in getting this forged, fabricated and manufactured compromise prepared and getting the orders passed on 7.10.1986 by which the petitioners were deprived of their valuable land. 28. The Consolidation Officer, before passing the order dated 7.10.1986 ought to have taken note of the fact that as to who is owner and in possession of the land in dispute, but no finding to this effect has been recorded in the order dated 7.10.1986. Most of the respondents did not have any kind of possession or right over the land in dispute. 29. The petitioners have highlighted before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Revisional Court, that is, the Deputy Director of Consolidation that most of them were residing in the neighbouring State and as such they were unable to look after and manage the affairs of their property and taking advantage of this situation, the respondents had got success in grabbing their land, but all the please were ignored by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 30. While dealing with the Appeal, the Settlement Officer, Consolidation ought to have taken note of all these irregularities, but the Settlement Officer, Consolidation has failed to consider these irregularities and illegalities. The Revisional Court, that is, the Deputy Director of Consolidation ought to have taken note of these facts while dealing with the revisions, but the said authority, acting mechinally, has also not taken note of these irregularities and illegalities. It is noteworthy that no revenue entries have been placed by any of the contesting respondent to show that their possession or ownership was duly recognised by the revenue authorities. 31. Rishal, one of the vendee, was an Ex-Soldier. It is noteworthy that no revenue entries have been placed by any of the contesting respondent to show that their possession or ownership was duly recognised by the revenue authorities. 31. Rishal, one of the vendee, was an Ex-Soldier. He was represented through Sri J.P. Nagar, Advocate, but one Vinod Kumar Gaur had verified his signatures on the alleged compromise. 32. There is yet another important aspect of the matter. It is highly surprising to note that in the present case, the registered sale-deed dated 2.4.1962 had not been challenged by any of the respondents either in the Civil Court or in the Consolidation Courts and as such till the registered sale-deed executed on 2.4.1962 and the revenue entries made in the revenue records on the basis the said registered sale-deed is declared void by any competent Court, having jurisdiction to declare the sale-deed void, at the instance of some of the interested persons, the legal rights and title of a land tenureholder cannot be disturbed by any Court. 33. There is force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in the light of the provisions contained in the Indian Contract Act and Code of Civil Procedure, such a forged, fabricated and manufactured compromise is wholly illegal and void and is only a waste paper on the basis of which no order could be passed disturbing title of genuine persons. 34. The Consolidation Officer and other superior Courts had not noted as to what was the reason to enter into such a compromise or what was the logic behind entering into compromise. Interestingly, before this Court also no one could be able to explain how the respondents were related to petitioners, their fathers or their ancestors or vendees or what was the connection of the respondents with the land in dispute. 35. The Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer, Consolidation or the Deputy Director of Consolidation, while exercising power under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act had not exercised their powers properly. The Appellate Court or the Revisional Court ought to have taken note of these illegalities, frauds and infirmities glaring on the record. These are cases of land grabbing, evicting the legal title holder and innocent persons from their valuable agricultural land. The Appellate Court or the Revisional Court ought to have taken note of these illegalities, frauds and infirmities glaring on the record. These are cases of land grabbing, evicting the legal title holder and innocent persons from their valuable agricultural land. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation ought to have applied their mind and ought to have considered the submissions put-forth in the memo of Appeal and the Revision, while exercising their appellate and revisional jurisdiction. Too hyper technical view had been taken by both the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation without delving the issues on merits, rather a “plea of convenience” has been taken by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Appellate Court as well as the Revisional Court has not even cared to look into the terms and conditions spelt out in the compromise, whether the signatures of the parties were verified or not and other relevant factors. Such a compromise, which was obtained by playing fraud was not binding on the parties. This vital question ought to have been considered by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, the Appellate Court and the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the Revisional Court, but they did not do so causing injustice to the petitioners. This Court, while entertaining the writ petition, had already stayed operation of the impugned orders. 36. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners strengthens the case of the petitioners. 37. The Consolidation Officer has erred in law in not deciding the controversy referred by the Assistant Consolidation Officer by the order dated 14.1.1986. It has acted beyond the scope of the reference, while deciding the case on the basis of the forged, fabricated and manufactured compromise. There is no hesitation in holding that the entries of the names of the respondents 4 to 47 in the revenue records on the basis of the alleged forged, fabricated and manufactured compromise is wholly illegal, arbitrary and malafide. Even the land acquisition proceedings have been initiated in the Village and it is, therefore, necessary for the Land Acquiring Authority to take note of the fact that who is the land owner as defined under the Land Acquisition Act and strangers to the property cannot be allowed compensation or any benefit. 38. Even the land acquisition proceedings have been initiated in the Village and it is, therefore, necessary for the Land Acquiring Authority to take note of the fact that who is the land owner as defined under the Land Acquisition Act and strangers to the property cannot be allowed compensation or any benefit. 38. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/ office by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent Authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical or temporal.” (vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 853 . In Lazarus Estate Ltd. v. Besalay, 1956 All ER 349, the Court observed without equivocation that “no judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything.” 39. In Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation v. M/s. GAR Re-Rolling Mills and another, AIR 1994 SC 2151 ; and State of Maharashtra and others v. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that a writ Court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the Courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. “Equity is,also, known to prevent the law from the crafty evasions and sub-letties invented to evade law.” 40. In Smt Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Brothers, AIR 1992 SC 1555 , it has been held as under : “Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.” 41. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others, (2000) 3 SCC 581 , the Apex Court observed that “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. 42. The ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud by entertaining the petitions on their behalf. In Union of India and others v. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Suppl. In Union of India and others v. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 100, the Apex Court, after placing reliance upon and approving its earlier judgment in District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram and another v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655 , observed as under : “If by committing fraud any employment is obtained, the same cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a Court of Law as the employment secured by fraud renders it voidable at the option of the employer.” 43. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 ; Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and others, (2003) 8 SCC 319 ; and Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and another v. Girdharilal Yadav, (2004) 6 SCC 325. 44. The Common Law doctrine of public policy can be enforced wherever an action affects/ offends public interest or where harmful result of permitting the injury to the public at large is evident. 45. More so, if initial action is not in consonance with law, the subsequent conduct of a party cannot sanctify the same. Subla Fundamento cedit opus”—a foundation being removed, the superstructure falls. A person having done wrong cannot take advantage of his own wrong and plead bar of any law to frustrate the lawful trial by a competent Court. Nullus Commodum capere Potest De Injuria Sua Propria. (vide Union of India and others v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav (Retd.), AIR 1996 SC 1340 ). The violators of law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subject matter of inquiry, trial or investigation. (vide Lily Thomas and others v. Union of India and others, JT 2000 (5) SC 617). 46. No person can claim any right arising out of his wrong doing. (Juri Ex Injuria Non Oritur). 47. The violators of law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subject matter of inquiry, trial or investigation. (vide Lily Thomas and others v. Union of India and others, JT 2000 (5) SC 617). 46. No person can claim any right arising out of his wrong doing. (Juri Ex Injuria Non Oritur). 47. This Court also following the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court has expressed similar views, in respect of the orders obtained and getting entries recorded in the revenue records by playing fraud, in the decisions reported in 2003 (52) ALR 185, (Dr.) Raghvendra Pratap Singh v. Director of Higher Education, U.P., Allahabad and others, 2004 (1) AWC 6 , Virendra Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. and others and 2006 (100) RD 787, Rajveer and others v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dadri, Gautam Buddh Nagar and others. 48. In view of the discussions made above, the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders dated 4.5.2007, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gautam Buddh Nagar, in respect of Revision Nos. 99/146, 105/152, 107/154 and 135, Bansha Ram and others v. Hanshraj and others, orders dated 2.8.2006 and 27.5.2005 (in Writ Petition No. 28821 of 2007), passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Gautam Buddh Nagar and the orders dated 7.10.1986, passed by the Consolidation Officer, Gautam Buddh Nagar are quashed. All the necessary consequences shall immediately follow. The State respondents are directed to implement this order immediately by making necessary entries in the revenue record in consequence of the order passed by this Court as the land acquisition proceedings are going on in the Village. The State Respondents are directed to evict the Respondent Nos. 4 to 47 from the land in dispute and hand over vacant possession of the disputed land to the petitioners immediately. No order as to cost. ————