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2009 DIGILAW 3717 (ALL)

MAHAVIR SINGH v. STATE OF U. P.

2009-12-11

SUNIL AMBWANI, VIRENDRA SINGH

body2009
JUDGMENT By the Court.—We have heard Shri N.P. Singh and Shri K.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners. Learned Standing Counsel appears for the State respondents. Shri Ramendra Pratap Singh appears for Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority. 2. The petitioners are Bhumidhars of land in revenue estate of Village Makaura, Pargana Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar. By these writ petitions, they have challenged the notifications dated 12.3.2008 published in official Gazettee of Uttar Pradesh under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the Act) with the opinion of the State Government that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act are applicable, and that the land is urgently required for the ‘Planned Industrial Development’ in District Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida, and in order to eliminate the delay likely to be caused for an enquiry under Section 5A of the Act, provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act are invoked and that the provisions of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply. The notification dated 12.3.2008, was published in daily newspapers ‘Amar Ujala’ and ‘Rashtriya Sahara’ on 18.3.2008. The notification under Section 6 read with sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act was issued on 19.11.2008, and was published in daily newspapers ‘Dainik Jagaran’ and ‘Rashtriya Sahara’ on 27.11.2008. 3. The petitioners have challenged notifications on the ground that the compulsory acquisition of the land is not for any public purpose. The plans of the alleged ‘Planned Industrial Development’ have not been notified and does not conform to the ‘Master Plan 2021’ in which the land is reserved for residential purposes. There was no urgency much less extreme urgency to dispense with provisions of Section 5-A of the Act invoking sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act to the acquisition. The entire acquisition proceedings are tainted with malafides. The notifications have been issued in abuse of the powers vested in the respondents. The mandatory provisions of law have not been followed. Section 5A of the Act instructs the decision making authority with regard to need of particular land for a public purpose and also for safeguarding the authority against any ill formed action. The notifications have been issued in abuse of the powers vested in the respondents. The mandatory provisions of law have not been followed. Section 5A of the Act instructs the decision making authority with regard to need of particular land for a public purpose and also for safeguarding the authority against any ill formed action. Ordinarily the procedural requirements under Section 5A must be followed as has been recognised by the Apex Court in the case of Nandeshwar Prasad v. Government of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1217 upto the judgments in Union of India v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 . 4. It is stated in the writ petition and has been argued vehemently that there are extensive constructions on the abadi site owned by the petitioners. They have their houses and are using the land both for residence and for keeping their cattle and agricultural produce. The acquisition of land is confiscatory and leave the petitioners home less to accommodate others violating Articles 14, 19 and 300A of the Constitution of India. The petitioners have relied upon judgments in Om Prakash and another v. State of U.P. and others, (1998) 6 SCC 1 ; Union of India and others v. Mukesh Hans, (2004) 8 SCC 14 ; Union of India and others v. Krishan Lal Arneja and others, (2004) 8 SCC 453 ; Essco Fabs Private Ltd. v. State of Haryana and another, (2008) XII AD (SC) 481, Mahendra Pal and others v. State of Haryana, 2009 (4) AWC 3464, and the latest decisions in Babu Ram and another v. State of Haryana and another, (2009) XI AD (SC) 37 delivered by the Supreme Court on 7.10.2009. It is submitted that in Om Prakash (supra) the land was acquired for ‘Planned Development of City or Town’. It was held that ground of possibility of encroachment with the area is not a good ground to dispense with the enquiry and that where there are extensive constructions and residential houses, the powers under Section 48 of the Act may be invoked for withdrawing from acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. It was held that ground of possibility of encroachment with the area is not a good ground to dispense with the enquiry and that where there are extensive constructions and residential houses, the powers under Section 48 of the Act may be invoked for withdrawing from acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. In Krishan Lal Arneja and Mukesh Hans (supra) the Supreme Court held relying upon Nandeshwar Prasad’s case and Munshi Singh v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 337 , in holding that right of representation and hearing under Section 5-A is a very valuable right of a person whose property is sought to be acquired. He should have appropriate and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that the acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. If the appropriate government decides to take away this minimal right than its decision to do so must be based on material on record to support the same and bearing in mind the object of Section 5-A. 5. In Babu Ram (supra) following Krishan Lal Arneja (supra) and Mukesh Hans (supra) the Supreme Court held that the right under Section 5A is not merely statutory but also has the flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. In reference to the observations made in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471 and Om Prakash (supra) and keeping in mind that even if the right to property was no longer a fundamental right, the observations relating to Article 14 will continue to apply in full force with regard to Section 5A of the Act. In these decisions the right to property was elevated to the status of a fundamental right and that is sufficient to indicate that care had to be taken by the authorities before resorting to Section 17 (4) of the Act, and that they had to satisfy themselves that there was an urgency of such nature as indicated in Section 17 (2) of the Act which could brook no delay whatsoever. 6. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the land acquisition proceedings had commenced strictly as per the provisions of the Act to acquire land measuring 205.0282 hectares in village Makaura for ‘Planned Industrial Development’ of District Gautam Budh Nagar. There is no abadi on the land of any of the petitioners. 6. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the land acquisition proceedings had commenced strictly as per the provisions of the Act to acquire land measuring 205.0282 hectares in village Makaura for ‘Planned Industrial Development’ of District Gautam Budh Nagar. There is no abadi on the land of any of the petitioners. There are only boring and a few trees and in some cases the boundary walls covering kuchcha constructions and that the petitioners are not residing on the land in dispute. The State Government has excluded all the clusters of abadi from acquisition. He relies upon First Land Acquisition Collector v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and another, JT 2002 (2) SC 620 in which it was laid down, ‘The question of urgency of an acquisition under Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily it is not open to the Court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. He has also relied upon the judgments in Jage Ram and others v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1971 SC 1033 ; Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, AIR 1984 SC 1721 ; S.S. Darshan v. State of Karnataka and others, AIR 1996 SC 697 ; Union of India v. Praveen Gupta and others, AIR 1997 SC 170 ; Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1999 SC 436 ; and Amar Singh v. State of U.P., 2003 ALR 486, M/s Sheikhar Hotels Gulmohar Enclave and another v. State of U.P., 2008 (6) ADJ 307 (SC) and the judgment of this Court in Smt. Manju Lata Aggarwal v. State of U.P., 2007 (9) ADJ 447 , in Sudhir Chandra Agarwala v. State of U.P. and others, 2008 (3) ADJ 289 (DB) and in Munshi Singh v. State of U.P., 2009(8) ADJ 360 (DB). 7. Shri M.C. Tripathi has relied upon the records and the material submitted by the District Magistrate for acquisition of the land for ‘Planned Industrial Development’ collected by the Collector and forwarded to the State Government and the consideration of such materials by the State Government by application of mind on record. The Collector found that the land is urgently required for ‘Planned Industrial Development’ of District Gautambudh Nagar and that there is possibility of continued encroachments on the land. 8. The Collector found that the land is urgently required for ‘Planned Industrial Development’ of District Gautambudh Nagar and that there is possibility of continued encroachments on the land. 8. After the notifications were published, notice under Section 9 (1) of the Act was issued on 7.2.2009 and the possession of the land was taken on 16.2.2009. 9. Shri Ramendra Pratap Singh appearing for Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority states that the fact, that the land is shown as residential in the master plan, is not a ground on which the acquisition for ‘Planned Industrial Development’ can be questioned. The amendment of master plan or the change of user of the land is within the powers of the State Government. 10. In the counter affidavit of Shri G.P. Srivastava, Land Consultant in Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar it is stated that after the publication of notifications of the notice under Section 9 the possession was taken and handed over by the State Government to Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority free from all encumbrances and that after the possession has been taken the provisions of Section 48 have no application. A survey was made by the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority along with the District administration and where there was original abadi the land was not proposed to be acquired. He has given details of the trees and kuchcha constructions standing on each of the plot of the petitioners. In all the cases the gata numbers show that there were crops sown in 1398 Fasali. He submits that there is no restriction in the Act to acquire abadi land for the ‘Planned Industrial Development’. The abadi land can also be acquired by the State Government and that there is no policy of the State Government to exempt the entire land on which constructions are made. He has relied upon Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 164 . 11. Where a large area is acquired for planned industrial development, the public purpose cannot be said to be vague on the ground that a detailed plan as to how each and every bit of the land would be used has not been prepared and notified. 11. Where a large area is acquired for planned industrial development, the public purpose cannot be said to be vague on the ground that a detailed plan as to how each and every bit of the land would be used has not been prepared and notified. In State of T.N. and another v. L. Krishnan and others, AIR 1996 SC 497 the land was acquired for Tamil Nadu Housing Board, the public purpose stated in the notification was the implementation of the housing schemes to meet the demand made by various sectors of the population under ‘Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Further Extension Scheme’ and for increasing housing accommodation for the development. It was held after noticing the judgment in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2077 in which the land was acquired for planned development of Delhi, that the acquisition of land does not depend upon the preparation and approval of a scheme and that it is not necessary that a final and effective scheme is framed by the Housing Board before the proposal for acquisition is given. In Aflatoon (supra) the Constitution Bench dealt with the question whether the acquisition of a large extent of land is for public purpose viz. ‘Planned Development of Delhi’. The Supreme Court held that it is only necessary to state in the notification that the land is needed for a public purpose for filing objections under Section 5A. In Leela Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2112 another Constitution Bench held that the public purpose mentioned in the notification concerned therein viz. ‘for the execution of the Intermediate General Plan for the Greater Delhi’ is specific in the circumstances and does not suffer from any vagueness. The Court pointed out that where the notification does not pertain to a small plot but a huge area covering thousands of acres, it is difficult to insist upon greater precision for specifying the public purpose because it is quite possible that various plots covered by the notification may have to be utilised for different purposes set out in the Intermediate General Plan. 12. It was also pointed out in State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Krishnan (supra) that if public purpose is not sufficiently specified, the Court should enquire whether the petitioner made a grievance of it, at the appropriate time. 12. It was also pointed out in State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Krishnan (supra) that if public purpose is not sufficiently specified, the Court should enquire whether the petitioner made a grievance of it, at the appropriate time. If the appellant had really been prejudiced by the non-specification of the public purpose, they should have taken steps to get the notification quashed within a reasonable time. They should not wait until declaration under Section 6 is published and the notices under Section 9 are issued. In this case the notification under Section 4 was published on 12.3.2008. The writ petitions were filed on 8th June, 2009, after the notice under Section 9 (1) was issued on 7.2.2009, and possession of the land was taken on 16.2.2009. 13. The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority has been constituted under the U.P. Industrial Development Act, 1976, for the purposes of planned industrial development in the notified area. In this case the land in village Makaura, Pargana Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar was required for the purpose of planned industrial development which is without any doubt a public purpose. There are no pleadings or any material brought on record to show that the land in village Makaura has been selected for any other purpose or that the respondents have used the powers of acquisition of land for any collateral purpose. There are no pleadings of malafide exercise of powers for acquisition of land. So far as invoking the urgency provisions under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are concerned, the legal position for invoking the powers under Section 17 has come up for consideration of the Supreme Court in many cases. The principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court may be summerised with reference to the decided cases as follows. 14. In para 16 of Krishan Lal Arneja’s case (supra) the Supreme Court held : “Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a land owner of his right in relation to immovable property to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The Authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor i.e. whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the land owners and the inquiry under Section 50-A of the Act could be completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen’s property can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority, while applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration.” 15. In Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli (supra) the Supreme Court held in para 5 as under : “The question of urgency of an acquisiton under Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and ordinarily it is not open to the Court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. In this view of the matter when the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant considerations into account and is satisfied that there exists emergency for invoking powers under Section 17 (1) and (4) of the Act, and issues notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with by the Court unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the appropriate authority mala fide. Whether in a given situation there existed urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the concerned authorities. If an order invoking power under Section 17 (4) is assailed, the Courts may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant materials before it or whether the order has been passed by non-application of mind. Any post notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-A by invoking powers under Section 17 (1) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself specially when no malafides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Opinion of the State Government can be challenged in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that action of the State Government is mala fide. Though the satisfaction under Section 17 (4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a Court of law, except for the grounds already indicated, but the said satisfaction must be of the Appropriate Government and that the satisfaction must be, as to the existence of an urgency. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency even though cannot be conclusive but is entitled to great weight, as has been held by this Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1971 SC 1033 . Even a mere allegation that power was exercised mala fide would not be enough and in support of such allegation specific materials should be placed before the Court. The burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Even a mere allegation that power was exercised mala fide would not be enough and in support of such allegation specific materials should be placed before the Court. The burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles if the circumstances of the case in hand are examined it would appear that the premises in question was required for the students of National Medical College, Calcutta and the notification issued in December, 1982 had been quashed by the Court and the subsequent notification issued on 25.2.1994 also had been quashed by the Court. It is only thereafter the notification was issued under Sections 4 (1) and 17 (4) of the Act on 29.11.1994 which came up for consideration before the High Court. Apart from the fact that there had already been considerable delay in acquiring the premises in question on account of the intervention by Courts, the premises was badly needed for the occupation of the students of National Medical College, Calcutta. Thus, existence of urgency was writ large on the facts of the case and therefore, said exercise of power in the case in hand, cannot be interfered with by a Court of law on a conclusion that there did not exist any emergency. The conclusion of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, therefore, is unsustainable.” 16. In Mahender Pal v. State of Haryana (supra) following the judgements in Mukesh Hans (supra) and Krishan Lal Arneja (supra) the Supreme Court held in para 13 and 14 as follows : “13. The purported public purpose for which the land is to be acquired is for laying down a road. We are not unmindful of the fact that the road connection is one of the purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act in respect whereof sub-section (4) thereof would apply. But the same would not mean that for the purpose of road connection irrespective of the nature of cases and/or irrespective of the nature of the road to be constructed; sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act could be invoked. 14. But the same would not mean that for the purpose of road connection irrespective of the nature of cases and/or irrespective of the nature of the road to be constructed; sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act could be invoked. 14. As an extraordinary power has been conferred upon the Appropriate Government in terms whereof the normal procedure laid down under Section 5A of the Act could be dispensed with, the High Court, in our opinion, should have entered into the merit of the matter. [See Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2008) 12 SCC 418 : 2008 (3) SCCD 1152: 2008(3) AWC 2966 (SC)].” 17. In M/s Sheikhar Hotels Gulmohar Enclave (supra) the Supreme Court held : “Therefore, it depends upon case to case where in a given situation Section 5-A has been correctly invoked and the authorities were satisfied in an objective manner. In the present case, there is no two opinion that because of the globalization of economy Indian economy is progressing with fast speed, therefore, in order to keep pace with the speed, invocation of Section 5-A has become imperative. Traffic congestion is a common experience of one and all and it is very difficult to negotiate with the traffic congestion in Delhi and National Capital region. Therefore, in the present situation, it cannot be said that the invocation of Section 5-A was for ulterior purpose or was arbitrary exercise of the power. Since the Master Plan has already been prepared and it has been approved by the Planning Board and they have sanctioned a sum of Rs. 20.65 crores for the development of this Transport Nagar and widening of the National High No. 91 into four lanes. Therefore, the proposal was approved by the Board and it got the sanction from the National Capital Region Planning Board and ultimately the Government invoked the power under Section 17 (4) read with Section 5-A of the Act dispensing with the objections. In the light of these facts it cannot be said that invoking of power was in any way improper exercise. There is need for decongestion of the traffic and it is really the dire need of the hour and earliest it is implemented, better for the people at large.” 18. In the light of these facts it cannot be said that invoking of power was in any way improper exercise. There is need for decongestion of the traffic and it is really the dire need of the hour and earliest it is implemented, better for the people at large.” 18. In Babu Ram (supra) the Supreme Court held : “In the present case, we are not concerned with technicalities but the likelihood of a health-hazard to the inhabitants of the area if the STP was set up in the acquired site. The stand taken by the respondent that the appellants could have filed objections to the proposed acquisition is difficult to appreciate since the right to file such objections had, in fact, been taken away by invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act. Such a stand taken on behalf of the respondent authorities only serve to strengthen the case of the appellants that an opportunity should have been given to them to file objections to the proposed acquisition. As indicated hereinabove in the various cases cited by Mr. Pradip Ghosh and, in particular, the decision in Krishan Lal Arneja’s case (supra), in which reference has been made to the observations made by this Court in Om Prakash’s case (supra), it has been emphasized that a right under Section 5-A is not merely statutory but also has the flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Such observations had been made in reference to an observation made in the earlier decision in Gurdial Singh’s case (supra) and keeping in mind the fact that right to property was no longer a fundamental right, an observation was made that even if the right to property was no longer a fundamental right, the observations relating to Article 14 would continue to apply in full force with regard to Section 5-A of the L.A. Act. The observations made both in Gurdial Singh’s case (supra) and in Om Prakash’s case (supra) assign a great deal of importance to the right of a citizen to file objections under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act when his lands are being taken over under the provisions of the said Act. The observations made both in Gurdial Singh’s case (supra) and in Om Prakash’s case (supra) assign a great deal of importance to the right of a citizen to file objections under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act when his lands are being taken over under the provisions of the said Act. That in the said decisions, such right was elevated to the status of a fundamental right, is in itself sufficient to indicate that great care had to be taken by the authorities before resorting to Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act. and that they had to satisfy themselves that there was an urgency of such nature as indicated in Section 17(2) of the Act, which could brook no delay whatsoever. Since Section 5-A of the L.A. Act had been dispensed with, the stage under Section 9 was arrived at within six months from the date of the notice issued under Section 4 and 17(2)(c) of the L.A. Act. While such notice was issued on 23rd November, 2005, the Award under Section 11 was made on 23rd May, 2006. During this period, the appellants filed a suit, and, thereafter, withdrew the same and filed a writ petition in an attempt to protect their constitutional right to the property. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was either any negligence or lapse or delay on the part of the appellants. The only other aspect of the matter which requires consideration is whether the lands in question have already been utilized for the Sewage Treatment Plant. From the averments made and photographs which were brought to our notice, it appears that the site is still lying unutilized. In such circumstances, we consider it only proper that the appellants should get an opportunity to file their objections to the proposed acquisition under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act and the respondents would be at liberty to take consequential steps after disposal of the same. We, accordingly, dispose of the appeal by directing that notwithstanding the invocation of Section 17(2)(c) of the L.A. Act in its application to the States of Punjab and Haryana, the appellants will be at liberty to file objections under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act within a month from the date before the concerned authority, who will, thereafter, dispose of the same upon giving the objectors, if any, an opportunity of hearing and placing their respective cases. The learned Advocate for the appellants is directed to communicate this order to the L.A. Collector-cum-District Revenue Officer, Jind, Haryana, within a week from date. There will be no order as to costs.” 19. This Court has consistently followed the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matter of invoking Section 17 (4) and dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. In Smt. Manju Lata Agrawal v. State of U.P. and others, 2007 (9) ADJ 447 (DB); Sudhir Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., 2008 (3) ADJ 289 (DB) and Munshi Singh v. State of U.P., 2009 (8) ADJ 360 (DB). In Manju Lata Agrawal (supra) this Court summed up the legal position as follows : “Thus, from the aforesaid settled legal propositions, it is apparent that the Government must be satisfied that demand of land by invoking urgency powers is bona fide and persons interested cannot be deprived of their legal right to file objection just to avoid lethargy on the part of the officers of the State Government or for achieving some other ulterior purpose. It is a settled legal proposition that the scope of judicial review is limited to the decision making procedure and not against the decision of the authority. The Court could review to correct errors of law of fundamental procedural requirements, which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in exceptional circumstances. In judicial review, the Court cannot trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and arrive at its own conclusion as it is not an appeal from a decision. Review of the decision is not permissible where the findings are recorded by an authority on the basis of legal evidence and the said findings are not based either on ipsi dixit or conjectures or surmises. The Court cannot interfere on the ground that the matter requires appraisal of evidence. “Between appraisal of evidence and total lack of evidence, there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sight of.” 20. In Sudhir Chandra Agrawal (supra) once again the legal position was summed up as follows : “The sufficiency or insufficiency of the material, and the names of industries, which may have applied with concrete proposals for establishment of industrial units, is not material for the purposes of judicial review of the subjective satisfaction of the State Government. In Sudhir Chandra Agrawal (supra) once again the legal position was summed up as follows : “The sufficiency or insufficiency of the material, and the names of industries, which may have applied with concrete proposals for establishment of industrial units, is not material for the purposes of judicial review of the subjective satisfaction of the State Government. When there exists material before the State Government, in the shape of recommendations and that material is relevant for applying the mind for recording subjective satisfaction of invoking the urgency clause for acquisition of the land, the law does not permit the Court to consider the material as if it was weighing the evidence for the purposes of recording subjective satisfaction of invoking the urgency clause for acquisition of the land. If the material is relevant, on which competent authority, as reasonable person may invoke the urgency clause for acquisition of the land, the Court would not put such material on the scales, to weigh or measure such urgency. The Court is not competent to carry out judicial review of the sufficiency or insufficiency on the material placed before it. What the Court required to see is whether such material is relevant, and that the competent authority in the State Government could have formed an opinion without their being any motive or ill-will for invoking the urgency clause. In the present case the State has given in the counter affidavit, the material on which it had placed reliance and has produced the material before us, which we find to be relevant for the purpose of invoking urgency clause. Even if we may, after perusing the record arrive on different conclusion, we would restrain ourselves from interfering, as in such case we would be substituting our opinion in place of opinion of the competent authority in the State Government. If we do so, we would be sitting in appeal over the subjective satisfaction recorded by the State Government. The legal position obtained from the judicial precedents restrain us from doing so.” 21. In these cases we are satisfied that there was sufficient material before the State Government on which it recorded its subjective satisfaction that there was urgency to acquire the land for ‘Planned Industrial Development’ in District Gautam Budh Nagar of Greater Noida. The legal position obtained from the judicial precedents restrain us from doing so.” 21. In these cases we are satisfied that there was sufficient material before the State Government on which it recorded its subjective satisfaction that there was urgency to acquire the land for ‘Planned Industrial Development’ in District Gautam Budh Nagar of Greater Noida. The competent authorities in the State Government considered the entire materials collected by the District Magistrate with justification for invoking Section 17 (4) given along with the Form ‘X’ for acquisition of the land. 22. All the relevant and concerned authorities agreed with the office note, giving details of the material on the file with the recommendation of the District Magistrate to invoke Section 17 (4) and to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The record clearly demonstrates that after considering the object of acquisition and making enquiries and spot inspections including the survey of the revenue records, District Magistrate had recommended that looking into the purpose of the acquisition and the large area involved, as well as the fact that in future there is strong possibility of encroachments over the subject land, Section 17 (4) was required to be invoked for dispensing with the enquiry. 23. The State Government and Greater Noida authorities had carried out detailed survey. They were conscious and have excluded the land covered with clusters of thick residential areas, and have only acquired the agricultural land with some abadi constructions far and in between. The land use shown in the Master Plan 2021 does not affect the power of the State Government to acquire the land for ‘Planned Industrial Development’ in District Gautam Budh Nagar through Greater Noida. We further find that since the possession of the land has been taken by the State Government and handed over to Greater Noida the land has vested in the State free from all encumbrances, the provisions of Section 48 (1) of the Act are not applicable. 24. All the writ petitions are dismissed. ————