JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—List revised. None has appeared for the petitioner. However, I have perused the record. 2. The petitioner has sought a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay salary to the petitioner at par with the regular/permanent Junior Engineer and also to consider the petitioner for regularisation. It appears that the petitioner was engaged as Junior Engineer on 6.12.1983 by the General Manager, Kanpur Jal Sansthan, Kanpur on daily wage basis at fixed wages for a period of three months. The said engagement continued from time to time. Relying on Government Order dated 6.7.1978 the petitioner claimed for consideration for regularisation having worked for more than three years and having worked for 240 days in a year. However, I find no merit in the petition. 3. A perusal of the Government Order dated 6th July 1978 shows that the same was issued in respect to the employees of Nagar Mahapalikas and the Government sought proposal from the concerned Nagar Mahapalika for creation of regular posts. There is nothing on record to show as to how the said Government Order is applicable to Jal Sansthan which is an independent statutory body constituted under Section 18 of the U.P. Water Supply Sewerage Act 1975. Besides, the recruitment to the post of Junior Engineer, Jal Sansthan is governed by the statutory rules framed under the aforesaid Act, which for the purpose of direct recruitment require advertisement of vacancy, inviting applications from all eligible persons so as to comply with the requirement of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. In the absence of any statutory provision the claim of the petitioner for regularisation cannot be directed to be considered in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 . 4. In Uma Devi (supra) the Apex Court, categorically held that adherence to Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution is a must in the process of public employment and also stressed that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our constitution. It held : “43. 4. In Uma Devi (supra) the Apex Court, categorically held that adherence to Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution is a must in the process of public employment and also stressed that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our constitution. It held : “43. Thus it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution..................” 5. The Apex Court further held in the said case as under : “The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the Constitutional Scheme.” 6. The Apex Court also cautioned the Courts that they must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of the affairs of the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves an instrument to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 7. The authorities cited by the petitioner in the writ petition i.e., The Dharwar District, PWD Literate Daily Wages Employees v. State of Karnataka:(1990) 1 Judgment Today 343; Tejpal and others v. Director of Education and others, 1991 UPLBEC 401; Nyadar Singh v. Union of India and others, 1988 (4) SCC 170 ; Bhullar Nath Yadav and others v. Mayo Hall Sports Complex and others, 1990 Allahabad Civil Journal 429; Jacob M. Puthuparambil and others v. Kerala Water Authority and others, 1991 (1) SCC 28 having been overruled specifically by the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi (Supra) are no longer applicable. 8. So far as payment of salary at par with the regular employees is concerned, the same also cannot be accepted since the petitioner having not been recruited in accordance with law cannot claim parity in the matter of salary with regular employees who have come through procedure prescribed in law. 8. So far as payment of salary at par with the regular employees is concerned, the same also cannot be accepted since the petitioner having not been recruited in accordance with law cannot claim parity in the matter of salary with regular employees who have come through procedure prescribed in law. This aspect has also been considered by a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Chiranjit Singh, JT 2006 (12) SC 475 : AIR 2006 SC 161 and the Court held that the principle ‘’equal pay for equal work’ has no mechanical application in every case. A classification based on factors relating to the service would justify difference in the pay scale. The Court held : “Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of the view that the authorities in the cases of Jasmer Singh, Tilak Raj, Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology and Tarun K. Roy lay down the correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle of “equal pay for equal work” has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications are different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of “equal pay for equal work” requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference. Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ Court can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this regard.” (Para 17) (emphasis added). 9. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in the petition. 10. Dismissed. Interim order, if any, shall stand vacated. ————