JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shishir Kumar, J.—Heard Shri S.K. Tyagi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Manu Saxena, for the respondent No. 2. 2. This writ petition has been filed against an order dated 23.10.2002 by which an application filed by the petitioner for impleadment in the appeal filed by the respondent-landlord against one Subhash Chandra Jain has been rejected. 3. It appears that Subhash Chandra Jain who claims to be a land lord of the premises in dispute filed an application for release of the said accommodation against respondent No. 3. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application. An appeal was filed by respondent No. 3 and during the pendency of the appeal, the petitioner moved an application that he is the brother of the original landlord and is living with the respondent No. 3 as well as the property has been purchased in auction and the total amount has already been deposited, therefore, he is a necessary party to be impleaded in the proceedings. 4. But the Appellate Authority after considering the claim of the petitioner has recorded a finding that petitioner does not come under the definition of the ‘family’ as defined under Section 3 (g) of Act No. XIII of 1972. Further, as regards, the purchase of the house in auction, the matter is subjudiced before the High Court. 5. Shri S.K. Tyagi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that it is an admitted case between the parties that the petitioner is residing in the premises in dispute from the time of father of the appellant, further he has purchased this property in auction, therefore, he is a necessary party, but the Appellate Authority without taking into this fact had dismissed the application. 6. On the other hand, Shri Manu Saxena, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submit that in case the petitioner’s case is admitted to this effect that he is residing in the premises in dispute from the time of father of the appellant, then he will be treated to be the joint tenant and if the suit has been filed against one joint tenant, it will be binding upon each and then in that circumstances, petitioner cannot be impleaded as a party. Further, a submission has been made that petitioner does not come under the definition of the ‘family’ as provided under Section 3(g) of the Act No. XIII of 1972. Further, a submission has been made that petitioner does not come under the definition of the ‘family’ as provided under Section 3(g) of the Act No. XIII of 1972. Section 3 (g) is quoted below : “family” in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building, means, his or her— (i) spouse, (ii) male lineal descendants, (iii) such parents grand-parents and any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of residence in that building ;” 7. In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the two judgments of the Apex Court as well as this Court in the case of Hari Gopal v. Vijay Kumar and others, 2007 (1) ARC 533 and K.C.G. Verghese v. K.T. Rajendran and another, JT 2003 (1) SC 377. Para 3 of the judgement of the Apex Court is quoted beow : “The stand of contemnor No. 1 is plainly untenable. When the undertaking was given by him to the Court, he did not indicate that he was in possession of a part of the premises and not the other portion of the premises nor was such a stand taken in any of the pleadings raised before the High Court or the rent controller. In these circumstances, we have to hold that the order of eviction passed against the first contemnor is equally binding upon the second contemnor K.T. Basharan, Indeed a power of attorney has been executed by contemnor No. 1, K.T. Rajendran in favour of K.T. Baskaran to the effect to attend to all the matters relating to the tenancy of house, ground and premises No. 7, IV Main Road, Gandhi Nagar, Adyar-600020, which is the tenanted premises in the present case in that document there is no mention of his independent right to the premises as claimed now. In these circumstances, we overrule the objections raised by the said K.T. Baskaran for vacating the premises in question.” 8. Further he has also placed reliance upon the judgement of Manmindar Singh v. Chandra Cold Storage and others, 2002 (2) AWC 1505 Paras 7 to 10 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced below : "7. In these circumstances, we overrule the objections raised by the said K.T. Baskaran for vacating the premises in question.” 8. Further he has also placed reliance upon the judgement of Manmindar Singh v. Chandra Cold Storage and others, 2002 (2) AWC 1505 Paras 7 to 10 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced below : "7. Coming to the question whether the appellant has any vested right to the sale being confirmed, we may refer to the related provisions. Rule 285-H of Rules provides that any person whose holding or other immovable property has been sold under the Act may, at any time within thirty days from the date of sale, apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in the Collector’s office : (a) for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to 5% of the purchase money; and (b) for payment on account of the arrears, the amount specified in the proclamation in Z.A. Form 74 as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, less any amount which may, since the date of such proclamation of sale, have been paid on that account; and (c) the costs of the sale.” 8. It is further provided therein that on the making of such deposit, the Collector shall pass an order setting aside the same. It may be observed that though earlier there was some dispute at the Bar as to whether the entire amount stipulated in Rule 285H of Rules of 1952 had been deposited by the respondent cold storage but on 7.2.2000 when the matter came up for hearing, it was agreed at the Bar that the respondent cold storage had deposited the entire amount which has already been withdrawn by the appellant herein. The auction sale has not been confirmed till date. True, on the expiration of the 30 days from the date of sale, the Collector was enjoined to pass an order confirming the sale after satisfying himself that the purchase of the land in question by the bidder would not contravene the provisions of Section 154 of Act of 1950 provided that no application as mentioned in Rules 285H and 285-I of the Rules of 1952 had been made for cancellation of the auction sale or if made had been rejected by the Collector. A learned Single Judge of this Court has held in Raghunath Prasad v. Board of Revenue, 1987 RD 380, that the highest bidder would acquire right, title or interest in the property only after the confirmation of the sale and till then he would not acquire any interest in the property merely on his depositing the amount of highest bid offered at the auction sale and further that the Collector, apart from having a power regarding making of confirmation of sale or its refusal as envisaged under Rule 285J of the Rules has also an inherent power either to accept or reject the highest bid on the ground that the bid offered was inadequate. We agree with the view taken in Ragunath Prasad (supra) and accordingly, held that the appellant herein acquired no right in the property merely because he has deposited the entire amount offered by him at the auction sale. On merit also, the auction sale was liable to be set aside firstly due to the reason that 30 days clear notice was not given and secondly, because 25% of the amount of the bid was not deposited “immediately” as stipulated by Rule 285-D of the Rules of 1952 inasmuch as the deposit as per law laid down by the Apex Court in Mahmood Ahmad Khan (dead) through L.Rs. v. Ranbir Singh and others, 1995 AWC 896. We are of the view that the auction sale was no sale at all in the eye of law and 25% of the purchase money had not been deposited “immediately” on the appellant being declared as the highest bidder. In the circumstances, it would be deemed that no sale had taken at all as held by the Apex Court in Mani Lal Mohan Lal v. Syed Ahmad, AIR 1954 SC 349 . 9. In the circumstances, it would be deemed that no sale had taken at all as held by the Apex Court in Mani Lal Mohan Lal v. Syed Ahmad, AIR 1954 SC 349 . 9. In so far as the question whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge has the effect of defeating the provisions of Rules 285-H and 285-I of the Rules 1952 is concerned, it has been submitted by Shri Y.K. Saxena, learned counsel for the appellant that the statute provides 30 days time to deposit the amount or move an application before the Commissioner within the same period for setting aside the sale to get an order of cancellation on the ground that there had been material irregularity to avoid confirmation thereof stands defeated by the order passed by the learned Single Judge who gave time up to 30.4.1999 to deposit the entire amount. In our opinion, the submission made by the learned counsel is misconceived. As stated (supra), the appellant acquired no vested right to get the auction sale confirmed automatically and that apart the power of this Court to extend the period of depositing the amount stipulated in Rule 285H of the Rules of 1952 is not in any manner fettered by Rule 285J of the Rules. In Gulab Chandra v. Bahuria Ram Murat Koer, 1911 Ind Cas 268 : 13 Cal LJ 432, a question arose as to whether the Court had the power under Section 11 of the Court Fees Act to enlarge the time fixed for payment of Court fees even when the application to enlarge the time was made after the expiry of the time within which the Court fees were ordered to be paid. It has been held by Calcutta High Court in that case that, “It is not reasonable construction of Section 11 of the Court Fees Act to hold that the Court has no power to enlarge the time originally fixed for the payment of Court fees” and further that the application to the Court to enlarge the time for giving security might be made either before or after the expiration of the time within which the security had been ordered to be furnished, and the Court might thereupon enlarge the time according to any necessity which might arise, where it was proper that they should do so.” The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has the power not only to issue prerogative writs but it can also issue such orders or directions as may be deemed fit and proper in the ends of justice for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III and “for any other purpose.” In the fact situation of the case discussed above, the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, was justified in giving time to the respondent cold storage to make necessary deposits and avoid confirmation of the auction sale. The appellant suffered no loss since he had acquired no vested right to get the auction sale confirmed. The auction sale suffered from serious infirmities and irregularities in conduct thereof. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 10. The appeal fails and is dismissed without there being any order as to costs.” and Pattam Khader Khan v. Pattam Sardar Khan and another, 1996 (3) AWC (SC) 1340. Para 11 is being reproduced below : "11. Order XXI, Rule 95 providing for the procedure for delivery of property in occupation of the judgement-debtor, etc., requires an application being made by the purchaser for delivery of possession of property in respect of which a certificate has been granted under Rule 94, of Order XXI. There is nothing in Rule 95 to make it incumbent for the purchaser to file the certificate along with the application. On the sale becoming absolute, it is obligatory on the Court to issue the certificate. That may, for any reason, get delayed. There is nothing in Rule 95 to make it incumbent for the purchaser to file the certificate along with the application. On the sale becoming absolute, it is obligatory on the Court to issue the certificate. That may, for any reason, get delayed. Whether there be failure to issue the certificate or delay of action on behalf of the Court or the inaction of the purchaser in completing the legal requirements and formalities, are factors which have no bearing on the limitation prescribed for the application under Article 134. The purchaser cannot seek to extend the limitation on the ground that the certificate has not been issued. It is true though that order for delivery of possession cannot be passed unless sale certificate stands issued. It is manifest, therefore, that the issue of a sale certificate is not “since qua non” of the application, since both these matters are with the same Court. The starting point of limitation for the application being the date when the sale becomes absolute, i.e., the date on which title passed, the evidence of title, in the form of sale certificate, due from the Court, could always be supplied later to the Court to satisfy the requirements of Order XXI, Rule 95. See in this regard Babulal v. Annapurnabai, AIR 1953 Nag 215, which is a pointer. It therefore, becomes clear that the title of the Court auction-purchaser becomes complete on the confirmation of the sale under Order XXI, Rule 92, and by virtue of the thrust of Section 65, C.P.C., the property vests in the purchaser from the date of sale; the certificate of sale, by itself, not creating any title but merely evidence thereof. The sale certificate rather is a formal acknowledgement of a fact already accomplished, stating as to what stood sold. Such act of the Court is pristinely a ministerial one and not judicial. It is in the nature of a formalisation of the obvious.” and in case of Navalkha and sons v. Sri Ramanya Das and others, AIR 1970 SC 2037 Para 6 is reproduced below : "6. The principles which should govern confirmation of sales are well established. Where the acceptance of the offer by the Commissioner is subject to confirmation of the Court the offerer does not by mere acceptance get any vested right in the property so that he may demand automatic confirmation of his offer. The principles which should govern confirmation of sales are well established. Where the acceptance of the offer by the Commissioner is subject to confirmation of the Court the offerer does not by mere acceptance get any vested right in the property so that he may demand automatic confirmation of his offer. The condition of confirmation by the Court operates as a safeguard against the property being sold at inadequate price whether or not it is a consequence of any irregularity or fraud in the conduct of the sale. In every case, it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that having regard to the market value of the property the price offered is reasonable. Unless the Court is satisfied about the adequacy of the price, the act of confirmation of the sale would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion. In Gordhan Das Chuni Lal v. Kanthimathinatha Pillai, AIR 1921 Mad 286, it was observed that where the property is authorised to be sold by private contract or otherwise, it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that the price fixed is the best that could be expected to be offered. That is because the Court is the custodian of the interests of the Company and its creditors and the sanction of the Court required under the Companies Act has to be exercised with judicial discretion regard being had to be interests of the Company and its creditors as well. This principle was followed in Rathnasami Pillai v. Sabapathi Pillai, AIR 1925 Mad 318 and S. Soundararajan v. Mohammad Ismail, M/s. Roshan and Co., AIR 1940 Mad 42 . In A. Subbaraya Mudaliar v. K. Sundararajan, AIR 1951 Mad 986 , it was pointed out that the condition of confirmation by the Court being a safe-guard against the property being sold at an inadequate price, it will be not only proper but necessary that the Court in exercising the discretion which it undoubtedly has of accepting or refusing the highest bid at the auction held in pursuance of its orders, should see that the price fetched at the auction is an adequate price even though there is no suggestion of irregularity or fraud. It is well to bear in mind the other principle which is equally well settled namely that once the Court comes to the conclusion that the price offered is adequate, no subsequent higher offer can constitute a valid and for refusing confirmation of offer already received. (See the decision of the Madras High Court in Roshan and Co.’s case, AIR 1940 Mad 42 .” 9. Placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgements, learned counsel for the respondents submit that as regards, the purchase in the auction proceedings, unless and until it is confirmed, no right could be accrued to the petitioner. 10. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. The petitioner alleged himself to be an Uncle of the respondent No. 3. In case he was residing with him and claims himself to be a joint tenant, then in that contingency without impleading him the proceeding can go on and if any order is passed that will be binding upon him because he will be treated to be a joint tenant, therefore, there is no question of impleadment, but as regards, question of purchase of the property in auction, in my opinion, it is an admitted case between the parties that it has not been finalised and matter is pending before the High Court in a writ petition filed by the landlord being writ petition No. 16385 of 2001, in which the interim order is still operating. In such a situation, in my opinion, the Appellate Authority was justified in rejecting the application filed by the petitioner. 12. In view of the above, writ petition lacks merit and is, hereby, dismissed. No order as to costs. 13. As the appeal filed by respondent No. 3 is pending from a considerable period so it should be decided within three months from the date of filing the certified copy of the order. ————