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2009 DIGILAW 3742 (ALL)

NEELAM DEVI v. STATE OF U. P.

2009-12-14

SANJAY MISRA

body2009
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sanjay Misra, J.—Heard Sri Ashok Khare learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Siddharth Khare learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and Sri Irshad Ali and A.K. Rai for respondent No. 6. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 19.2.2009 and 25.11.2009 passed by the respondent Nos. 5 and 3 respectively. According to learned counsel when the petitioner had appeared in the high school examination of 2007 she had been issued the mark-sheet dated 5.6.2007 wherein her date of birth had been shown as 20.7.1986. The petitioner alleges that she applied for selection as Aganbadi Karyakatri and made an application that her date of birth as given in the high school certificate is to be corrected for which the petitioner has made an application however she submitted the form by giving the date of birth as mentioned in the high school certificate namely 20.7.1986. The petitioner was selected but her selection was cancelled on the ground that on 1.7.2007 she was under 21 years of age having been born on 20.7.1986. The petitioner in the meantime got her date of birth corrected in the high school mark-sheet to read as 20.1.1986. 3. Sri Khare submits that when the date of birth was corrected to 20.1.1986 the petitioner was 21 years of age on 1.7.2007 and hence made a representation which was not decided and ultimately by an order dated 5.5.2009 passed in earlier writ petition No. 2334 of 2009 her representation has been decided by the impugned order dated 25.11.2009. It is stated that the aforesaid aspect that the date of birth stood corrected as 20.1.1986 has not been properly considered by the District Magistrate, Mau inasmuch as he has erroneously recorded that since the petitioner had shown her date of birth as 20.7.1986 and her original high school mark-sheet also showed the same date hence subsequent amendment in the date of birth in the high school mark-sheet cannot give any right to the petitioner for engagement being under age. 4. The reason given in the impugned order is also the submission of learned counsel for the respondent No. 6 who further states that there is nothing on record to indicate as to when the date of birth in the high school certificate has been amended. 4. The reason given in the impugned order is also the submission of learned counsel for the respondent No. 6 who further states that there is nothing on record to indicate as to when the date of birth in the high school certificate has been amended. Having considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record it is no doubt correct that once the date of birth in the high school certificate has been corrected to read as 20.1.1986 the same would be date of birth of the petitioner for all purposes. The District Magistrate had erred in holding that subsequent correction of the date of birth in the high school certificate cannot entitle the petitioner to the benefit and say that she was 21 years of age on 1.7.2007. Such view is patently erroneous. However in so far as the subsequent high school certificate where date of birth 20.1.1986 has been given is concerned the District Magistrate should first verify the same through the issuing authority and then consider the grievance of the petitioner afresh in light there of. For the aforesaid reasons the impugned order dated 25.11.2009 (Annexure 13 to the writ petition) is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the District Magistrate to take a decision afresh and in view of the observations made above. 5. A further submission has been made by learned counsel for respondent No. 6 that in view of the observation made by the writ Court in the earlier writ petition the petition has an efficacious alternative remedy of filing a Civil Suit before the Civil Court hence this writ petition cannot be entertained. Sri Khare has disputed it to say that it was only an observation of the Court and it did not debar the petitioner from filing this writ petition. 6. In so far as the aforesaid submission is concerned there is no doubt that Civil Suit may be an alternative remedy but there was no bar created by the writ Court in the earlier order dated 5.5.2009. Since the matter is required to be re-examined by the District Magistrate there is no reason why this Court should up hold the objection taken by the respondent No. 6. The writ petition stands allowed. No order is passed as to costs. ————