CHETAN KOTHAWALE v. BRANCH MANAGER, CENT BANK HOME FINANCE LTD.
2009-02-02
CHAIRPERSON, J.M.MALIK
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT JUSTICE J.M. MALIK, CHAIRPERSON.--This is an appeal filed by the tenant against the borrowers owners of Flat No. 103, Makesure Plaza, Scheme No. 54, Near Hotel Taj Residency, Indore (M.P.), namely Smt. Uma, Vishal Bansal and Shri Kanhaiyalal, who have been arrayed as respondent Nos. 3 (a), 3 (b) and 3 (c) in this appeal, on the ground that the tenant was illegally evicted by the S.D.M., Indore (M.P.) Smt. Urmila Chaurasiya after service of notice under section 13 (4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (to be referred in short as "S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act"). 2. Brief facts leading to filing this appeal may first be recapitulated. Respondent Nos. 3 (a) and 3 (b) took the loan from Cent Bank Home Finance Limited on 12th February, 1999 but no such evidence was produced before the Court. However, the impugned judgment dated 19th Decemoer, 2007 clearly reveals that the flat in question was mortgaged with the bank on 12th February, 1999 by respondent No.3 (a) and 3(b). On the other ham, the appellant took flat in question on rent on 15th August, 2000 for a fixed period of 11 months from respondent Nos. 3 (a), 3 (b) and 3 (c). 3. In the meantime, a case for ejectment of the flat was filed by the owners against the appellant on 5th April, 2004, which is pending before the Additional District Judge, Indore (M.P.). In the said proceedings, the owners have admitted that the flat in dispute was leased out to the appellant for a fixed period of 11 months. It is explained that if tenancy is fixed for a period of 11 months and it is continued even after expiry of 11 months, it will become permanent tenancy from which no one can be evicted without taking recourse of provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1960. It is also explained that the owners have filed an ejectment suit on the grbund of personal requirement. 4. Therefore, against the debt, the respondent No. 1 sent notice under section 13 (4) of S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act on 16th February, 2005, after obtaining the order under section 13 (4) of S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act on 16th November 2005, the bank instructed the S.D.M., Indore (M.P.) to take the possession of the said mortgaged property.
4. Therefore, against the debt, the respondent No. 1 sent notice under section 13 (4) of S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act on 16th February, 2005, after obtaining the order under section 13 (4) of S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act on 16th November 2005, the bank instructed the S.D.M., Indore (M.P.) to take the possession of the said mortgaged property. The appellant was forcefully evicted from the premises in dispute by the order of District Magistrate, Indore. The appellant contends that he has been evicted from the premises in dispute illegally. The provisions of S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act were given the go bye. The District Magistrate is entitled to take symbolic possession only, learned D.R.T. has misinterpreted section 14 (3) of S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act which says "no act of District Magistrate done in pursuance of this section shall be called in question in any Court or before any authority" and lastly the S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act does not have any retrospective effect. 5. The learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the order passed by the learned D.R.T. is contrary to the well established canons of law. He pointed out that the appellant is an aggrieved party due to his dispossession from the disputed flat in terms of section 17 (4) of the S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act. He explained that this Court is authorized to put the clock back by restoring status quo in order to bring him back to the possession of the flat. In order to buttress his argument he has cited a judgment of Madras High Court delivered by a Division Bench headed by the then Hon'ble A.P. Shah, Chief Justice in 5hree Lakshmi Products v. S.B.I.1 1. 2007 (3) Banker's Journal 281. 6. I see no force in the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant. It appears that during the arguments he has read the partial portion of para 9 of the said judgment. The whole para makes the clear position and tips the scales in favour of the bank. Thus para 9 reads: "9. On a plain reading of the observations made in Transcore's case it is clear that the bank/financial institution is entitled to take actual possession of the secured assets from the borrower or from any other person in terms of section 13 (4) of the S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act.
Thus para 9 reads: "9. On a plain reading of the observations made in Transcore's case it is clear that the bank/financial institution is entitled to take actual possession of the secured assets from the borrower or from any other person in terms of section 13 (4) of the S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act. Any transfer of secured assets after taking possession of the same by the bank/financial institution shall vest in the transferee all rights in relation to the secured assets as if the transfer has been made by the owner of such secured assets. Any party aggrieved by such dispossession will have to take recourse to approaching the D.R.T. under section 17 (4) of the S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act. If the party is dispossessed, not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, then the D.R.T. is entitled to put the clock back by resorting the status quo ante. By virtue of section 17 (4) read with section 35 of S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act if in a given case the measures undertaken by the secured creditor under section 13 (4) come in conflict with the provisions of any State Law then notwithstanding to such conflict, the provisions of section 13 (4) shall override the local law. Section 13 (3) of the S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act operates as an attachment/injunction restraining the borrowers from disposing off the secured assets and, therefore, any tenancy created after such notice would be null and void. Any tenancy created by the mortgagor after the mortgage in contravention of section 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act would not be binding on the bank/financial institution, and in any event such tenancy rights shall stand determined once action under section 13 (4) has been taken by the bank/financial institution. When the petitioner is claiming a tenancy prior to the creation of mortgage and such tenancy is disputed by the bank the remedy of the petitioner to approach D.R.T. by way of an application under section 17 of S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act to establish its rights." 7. The crux of the matter is whether the appellant was inducted as a tenant in consonance with section 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The answer is that the said tenancy created by mortgagor after the mortgage is in contravention of section 65-A on various grounds, for example duration of lease has already exceeded three years.
The crux of the matter is whether the appellant was inducted as a tenant in consonance with section 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The answer is that the said tenancy created by mortgagor after the mortgage is in contravention of section 65-A on various grounds, for example duration of lease has already exceeded three years. It may be recalled that the inception of tenancy started w.e.f. 15th August, 2000. The appellant was evicted in the year 16th November, 2005. Again no proof was adduced to show that appellant had paid up to date rent. The pleadings go to reveal that the appellant would pray for a relief that he had become a permanent tenant under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1960. 8. The judgment passed by Delhi High Court in the case Sanjeev Bansal v. Oman International Bank,1 which was relied upon by the learned D.R.T. and Shree Lakshmi Products v. S.B.I. neatly dovetails with the facts of this case. In that case a similar contention was raised by the petitioner that he being a tenant and in physical possession of the mortgaged property is protected under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act and cannot be dispossessed without taking recourse to the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Repelling this contention the Court held that the protection afforded by the Rent Control Act to a tenant is from the landlord of the premises and the landlord of the premises cannot recover possession from the tenant unless he takes recourse to any of the grounds as available to him under Rent Control Act and the right of the tenant is fully protected notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other law or contract. This protection is, however, not available against the mortgagee who seeks to enforce his right under the S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act against the principal borrower who had mortgaged the property in question by duly and validly executing the memorandum of mortgage in favour of the mortgagee. The Court further held that section 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act clearly mandates that the duration of lease to be executed by the mortgagor cannot exceed 3 years. The Court, therefore, concluded in para 6 as follows: 1. SA 2006 (1) BC 299.
The Court further held that section 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act clearly mandates that the duration of lease to be executed by the mortgagor cannot exceed 3 years. The Court, therefore, concluded in para 6 as follows: 1. SA 2006 (1) BC 299. "Manifestly the said unregistered lease was created for the alleged unlimited period through unregistered lease deed in complete contravention of section 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act. As per the said provision of section 65-A, the lessee can enjoy the protection if the lease is created by the mortgagor in conformity with the mandate of requirements laid down in section 65-A of Transfer of Property Act and not otherwise. Neither the mortgagor nor the lessee can defeat the right of mortgagee and no lessee can claim any protection unless his tenancy is as per the requirements of section 65-A of the Transfer of Property Act." 9. In S. Shameem v. City Police Commissioner,1 a Division Bench of Kerala High Court has held that in respect of the transactions governed by S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act, the overriding provisions effectively nullify the rights normally admissible even to a tenant as available under the Rent Control Laws. In paras 13 and 14 of the Bench observed as follows ; 1. C.D.J. 2005 Ker. 638. "under section 13 (4) of S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act, in case the borrower fails to discharge his liability, the secured creditor is authorized to take recourse to the measures stipulated by the section. This is in recognition of the provisions of the Act that any security interest created in favour of the secured creditor may be enforced without the intervention of the Court or Tribunal. Thus a creditor is entitled to take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realizing the secured asset. The right also includes taking over management of the secured assets by right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale. The appointment of person to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor is also contemplated.
The right also includes taking over management of the secured assets by right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale. The appointment of person to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor is also contemplated. Sub-section (6) also lays down that any transfer of secured asset after taking possession thereof shall vest in the transferee all rights in, or in relation to, the secured asset transferred as if the transfer had been made by the owner of such secured asset. The only circumstance that the guarantor (third respondent herein) was the owner of the secured asset need not saddled him with any disability. In any case, the Act does not provide for any such restriction. By the operation of the section, the transfer brings with it all the proprietary rights that are usually available in respect of the holding. Although it is contended by Sri Jayakumar that so far as a tenanted premises, to which provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act applies the tenancy could have been terminable only in the manner authorized by the said law, we do not think the above argument can have any relevance in view section 35 of S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act. The provisions of the S.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. In respect of transactions governed by the said Act, the overriding provisions effectively nullify the rights normally admissible even to a tenant, as available under the Rent Control Act, as it can be only subservient to a later central enactment." 10. The appeal is liable to be dismissed not only on this score but there is another reason for its dismissal, as a matter of fact, the appellant has no bone to pick with the bank as no cause of action survives in favour of the appellant qua the bank. The Counsel for the bank submitted during the arguments that the bank has already received the arrears of entire debt and returned the mortgaged documents to the mortgagor alongwith "no objection certificate" and as such the bank has no more role to play with the then mortgaged property. The mortgage, if any, stands redeemed. In view of the findings given on the first point, the controversial matters stand restricted between the tenant and owner.
The mortgage, if any, stands redeemed. In view of the findings given on the first point, the controversial matters stand restricted between the tenant and owner. The right to take decisions in the case of private parties sans bank rests with the Civil Court. It is not desirable that this Court should arrogate to itself the right to make decision of those cases which is not vested within the parameters of its jurisdiction. 11. The D.R.T. has rightly handed down a verdict favouring the bank. He has nowhere missed the wood for the trees. I add my voice to his. The appeal is dismissed. Copies of the judgment be furnished to the parties as per law and another copy of the judgment be sent to the D.R.T., Jabalpur forthwith. Appeal Dismissed.