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2009 DIGILAW 378 (ORI)

PRAFULLA KUMAR MOHANTY v. AKSHYA KUMAR BISWAL

2009-04-30

B.K.PATEL

body2009
JUDGMENT : B.K. Patel, J. - By judgment dated 28.2.2001 passed in I.C.C. Case No. 499 of 1997, instituted by the O.P. complainant against the Petitioner-accused, by the learned J.M.F.C., Bhubaneswar the Petitioner was convicted u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short the 'Act') and sentenced to undergo R.I. for six months and pay fine of Rs. 5000/- in default to undergo R.I. for six months, and also was directed to pay Rs. 1, 60, 000/- as compensation to the complaint. By judgment and order dated 05.01.2002 in Criminal Appeal No. 77/9 of 2001, preferred by the Petitioner, the learned First Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar confirmed the orders of conviction, sentences and compensation. However, it was directed that in default of payment of sentence of fine, as awarded, the Petitioner shall undergo R.I. for three months. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner has preferred this revision. 2. Complainant's case is that he is a wholesaler of foreign liquor. The accused who has a retail liquor shop used to take liquor from the complainant on credit basis and pay the credit amount by cash or cheques. On such account Rs. 1,65,000/- was payable by the accused to the complainant. Initially the accused issued two cheques bearing Nos. 136595 for Rs. 15,000/- and 285015 for Rs. 35,000/-. Balance of Rs. 1,15,000/- was outstanding against him. The complainant presented the cheques in the Bank for payment. However, both the cheques were dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds in the credit of the accused. As the accused failed to pay the cheque amount despite service of advocate's notices, I.C.C. Case Nos. 30 and 31 of 1997 were instituted against the accused u/s 138 of the Act. The accused however, paid Rs, 35,000/- in connection with I.C.C. Case No. 30 of 1997 had been instituted. Therefore, the complainant withdrew said complaint. Thereafter, the accused issued Anr. cheque bearing Nos. 287935 for balance amount of Rs. 1,15,000/- outstanding against him. The complainant presented the cheque in the Bank for payment to his account. The cheque was returned to the complainant unpaid. The complainant gave advocate's notice asking the accused to pay the cheque amount. However, the accused failed to pay the amount within the stipulated period. Defence took the plea of the denial In order to substantiate his allegations complainant examined himself as P.W.1 and relied upon documents Exts. 1 to 5. The cheque was returned to the complainant unpaid. The complainant gave advocate's notice asking the accused to pay the cheque amount. However, the accused failed to pay the amount within the stipulated period. Defence took the plea of the denial In order to substantiate his allegations complainant examined himself as P.W.1 and relied upon documents Exts. 1 to 5. No defence evidence was adduced from the side of the accused. 3. Contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner were confined to assailing the concurrent findings of the learned courts below. However, scope of interference by invoking revisional jurisdiction is well defined. The revisional jurisdiction is not to be invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record. If the revisional court on appreciation of evidence on record and reappraisal of the evidence, takes a view different from and contrary to the view taken by the lower court, then also it cannot be a ground for interfering in revision. However, where the conclusion of a Magistrate is grossly and palpably unjust or is based upon manifestly erroneous approach and erroneous appraisal of the evidence, and further the Magistrate has misconceived the evidence and has come to an obviously wrong conclusion the revisional court would be fully justified to go into facts and correct the error that has cropped up into the judgment of the trying Magistrate. In such case, the revisional court is not interfering on the ground of inadequacy of evidence, but on the ground that there has been a clear case of miscarriage of justice. 4. It is also pertinent to point out that in a criminal case burden lies on the prosecution to establish the accusations made against an accused. Standard of proof so far as the prosecution is concerned is proof beyond reasonable doubt; the one of the accused is only mere preponderance of probability. Accused may substantiate his defence from the materials placed before the court by the prosecution. To substantiate the probability of defence plea, burden of proof on the defence is not as onerous as the prosecution. Therefore, even if, as in the present case, no defence evidence has been adduced from the side of the accused, that, does not deprive the accused to urge that evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant does not improbablise his plea. Therefore, even if, as in the present case, no defence evidence has been adduced from the side of the accused, that, does not deprive the accused to urge that evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant does not improbablise his plea. In this context, decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan (2008) 39 OCR (SC) 41 and M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Ant. (2006) 35 OCR (SC) 43 may be referred to. 5. Now coming to the defence plea, it is found that in his statement u/s 313 Code of Criminal Procedure accused bluntly stated that he does not recognize the complainant and that he never issued any cheque to him. In response to the question with regard to complainant's assertion that advocate's notice sent on his behalf on 7.11.1997 was received by accused on 10.11.1997, accused retorted that he did not receive any letter. Not only evidence of complainant P.W. 1, corroborated by documentary evidence on record, substantiates the accusation made by the complainant but also there is no material on record to support, howsoever remotely, the stance of complete denial adopted by the accused. Complainant testified regarding initiation of complaint cases bearing I.C.C. No. 30 of 1997 and I.C.C. No. 31 of 1997 earlier against the accused and to have withdrawn I.C.C. No. 30 of 1997. Such assertion finds support from Ext.4, certified copy of the order dated 17.11.1997 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar in I.C.C. No. 30 of 1997 initiated by the complainant against the accused and Anr. as well as Ext. 5, advocate's notice sent to the accused prior to institution of I.C.C. No. 30 of 1997; postal receipts Exts. 5/1 & 5/2 and postal acknowledgements Exts. 5/3 & 5/4 indicating despatch and receipt of the notice. Therefore, there is not scope to urge that there was no acquaintance between the parties. Rather evidence adduced by the complainant shows that there were prior transactions between them and such evidence has not been discredited in any manner. So far as the transaction in the present case is concerned, complainant's testimony is corroborated by Ext 1, the disputed cheque on which Ext.1/1, signature of the accused as well as the seals of the Bank appear. The cheque was returned to the complainant by the Bank along with intimation slip Ext.2. So far as the transaction in the present case is concerned, complainant's testimony is corroborated by Ext 1, the disputed cheque on which Ext.1/1, signature of the accused as well as the seals of the Bank appear. The cheque was returned to the complainant by the Bank along with intimation slip Ext.2. Though it was urged on behalf of the Petitioner that evidence on record did not indicate that there was compliance of giving statutory notice under the Act before filing of the complaint, complainant's evidence on this score got square support from the copy of advocate's notice Ext.3 as well as postal receipt Ext.3/1 and postal acknowledgment Ext.3/2. Not only the complainant is entitled to presumption of due service of notice in view of the provisions u/s 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1987 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, but also both the learned courts below have concurrently held that in postal acknowledgment Ext.3/2 accused has acknowledged the receipt of advocate's notice by appending his signature Ext.3/3. In view of unimpeachable evidence substantiating complainant's assertion that there was due despatch by registered post with A.D. of the advocate's notice under postal receipt Ext.3/1 and that postal acknowledgement Ext.3/2 was received back by him, the contention regarding non-receipt of advocate's notice is without substance. There is nothing on record to raise any probability in support of such defence. In this context, decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayaprakash M. Shah and Anr. (2008) 41 OCR (SC) 358 : 2007 (II) OLR (SC) 384 C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed and Anr. (2007) 38 OCR (SC) 58; and K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Anr. (1999) 17 OCR (SC) 555 may be referred to. 6. Thus, having scrutinized the materials on record upon reference to the contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioner, there appears no infirmity in any of the findings recorded by the trial Magistrate and affirmed by the learned Appellate Court so as to justify interference. 7. In the result, the revision is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed