JUDGMENT Honble Imtiyaz Murtaza, J.—By means of this petition, the petitioner has assailed the impugned detention order dated 24.3.2009 whereby the petitioner has been detained for his involvement in the criminal activities and citing him as a recidivist having to his discredit criminal history, the order of detention was passed. The relief sought in this petition is excerpted below. “issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Habeas Corpus to produce the corpus namely, Shahrukh before this Hon’ble Court and direct the respondents to set at liberty the corpus/petitioner by quashing the impugned detention order dated 26.3.2009, 2.4.2009 and 30.4.2009/1.5.2009 passed by respondents (Annexure Nos. 5, and 11 to the writ petition).” 2. Recapitulating the events leading to passing of impugned detention order, it is enumerated in the order that since both the petitioner and Mashkoor Alam were embroiled in litigation, on 10.2.2009, when Mashkoor Alam and his brother Masood, and Iqbal, Mansab, Mohd. Hanif Abid, Arif and Khursheed had left the village for Bulandshahr and as soon as they reached near Mangal Chowk Gulaoti at about 9.30 am, the petitioner and his accomplices who lay in wait there, started firing indiscriminately at the party and as a result, three of the persons namely Masood, Arif and Iqbal were seriously wounded on account of sustaining bullet injuries and slumped on the ground. It is stated in the order of detention that daredevil act of firing with intention to kill was executed by the petitioner and his accomplices in broad day light and further that the petitioner and his brother threatened the people who dared to come forward as a witness and fired in the air to intimidate them as a result of which chaotic situation was created and the people fled away without having feast. On account of daredevil act, the people were terror stricken and they ran helter and skelter and tempo of normal life was disturbed. In order to restore normalcy police reinforcement was rushed and situation was brought to control with great difficulty. It is further stated that the petitioner had applied for bail and it is likely that he may be enlarged on bail. Looking to the gravity of the crime,it is spelt out, in case the petitioner is admitted to bail it would indulge in acts which would affect the public order. It is further stated that the petitioner had applied for bail and it is likely that he may be enlarged on bail. Looking to the gravity of the crime,it is spelt out, in case the petitioner is admitted to bail it would indulge in acts which would affect the public order. The order further recites that the petitioner escaped from the scene leaving behind their vehicles i.e. motor cycle, and indica Car. The injured, the order recites, were removed to hospital and subsequently on the basis of written report, case was registered at case crime No. 43 of 2009 under Section 307/506, IPC. On 25.2.2009, the petitioner and his accomplice were arrested from tri-junction Chhaprawat and on being interrogated, the petitioner and his accomplices confessed to have committed the crime and on their pointing out, the country made pistols were recovered and on that basis case was registered at case crime No. 79 of 2009 and 80 of 2009 under Section 25, Arms Act. The order further recites that the petitioner was also involved in criminal activities particularly at the time of election for the office of Gram Pradhan and also at the time of general election. It is further recited that the petitioner has got criminal antecedents. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and also learned A.G.A at prolix length. Although various arguments were advanced across the bar, but the argument substantially raised is that there was inordinate delay in deciding the representation of the detenue by the Union of India. It is argued that the detenue preferred representation dated 30.3.2009 with accompanying prayer to set aside the detention order but the same was rejected on 28.4.2009 which by itself would bespeak that its decision was inordinately delayed. It is further argued that the impugned order has been passed without any material basis and the same has been passed in a routine course. It is further argued that in the cases cited to the discredit of the petitioner, most of the cases have culminated in acquittal and thus there was no basis for invoking the National Security Act against him. It is also argued that there was delay between the incident on which the detention order is founded and the passing of the detention order. 4. It is also argued that there was delay between the incident on which the detention order is founded and the passing of the detention order. 4. In connection with the submissions on the count of delay on the part of Union of India, we have scrutinized the counter-affidavits on record. It would appear that the petitioner preferred representation on 30.3.2009. The matter was processed and the State Government rejected the representation on 13.4.2009 and the order was communicated through radiogram dated 13.4.2009 which was received and communicated to the petitioner on 17.4.2009. The representation addressed to Union of India, it would appear was rejected on 28.4.2009 and the same day communication was made by radiogram which was intimated to the petitioner on 29.4.2009. We have also scrutinized the affidavit filed by Smt. L.P. Srivastava working as under Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India New Delhi. In para 4, it is stated that representation dated 30.3.2008 was received at the concerned Desk of Ministry of Home Affairs on 9.4.2009 and after being processed the same was placed before the Home Secretary on 27.4.2009. The Home Secretary, it is further averred, rejected the representation after due deliberation on 28.4.2009 and on 29.4.2009 the radiogram was sent followed by letter dated 1.5.2009. By way of explanation for the delay, it is averred in para 7 that the section had received large number of representations during the period and especially from U.P and that the concerned dealing Asstt had proceeded on medical leave for 20 days, hence there was delay in dealing and disposing of the representation. 5. The learned counsel subduing his arguments on the point of delay, pressed into service the arguments that there was considerable delay between the incident and the passing of the impugned detention order. 6. It would appear from the record that the incident occurred on 10.2.2009 while the petitioner and his accomplice were arrested on 25.2.2009. The application for bail, it would further appear from the impugned order of detention, was preferred initially before the Court below and thereafter, before the Sessions Judge in which 17.3.2009 was fixed. The order of detention was passed on 16.3.2009. It would thus transpire that it was passed after subjective satisfaction by the District Magistrate that the petitioner might obtain bail in the matter. The order of detention was passed on 16.3.2009. It would thus transpire that it was passed after subjective satisfaction by the District Magistrate that the petitioner might obtain bail in the matter. In connection with it, we feel called to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate Burdwan, 1964 (4) SCR 921. It is a five Judge decision in which Apex Court in paras 12 and 13 observed as under : 12. As abstract proposition of law, there may not be any doubt that Section 3(1) (a) does not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person whilst he is in detention or in jail; but the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order may differ and that may make a difference in the application of the principle that a detention order can be passed against a person in jail. Take for instance, a case where a person has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. It cannot be seriously suggested that soon after the sentence of imprisonment is pronounced on the person, the detaining authority can make an order directing the detention of the said person after he is released from jail at the end of the period of the sentence imposed on him. In dealing with this question, again the considerations of proximity of time will not be irrelevant. On the other hand, if a person who is undergoing imprisonment, for a very short period, say for a month or two or so, and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority is bona fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid order of detention a few days before the person is likely to be released. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary. It may not be easy to discover such rational connection between the antecedent history of the person who has been sentenced to ten years rigorous imprisonment and the view that his detention should be ordered after he is released after running the whole of his sentence. Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances of each case. 13. The question which still remains to be considered is : can a person in jail custody like the petitioner, be served with an order of detention whilst he is in such custody? In dealing with this point, it is necessary to state the relevant facts which are not in dispute. The petitioner was arrested on January 25, 1963. He has been in custody ever since. On February 15, 1963, when the order of detention was served on him, he was in jail custody. On these facts, what we have to decide is : was it open to the detaining authority to come to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner when the petitioner was locked up in jail ? We have already seen the logical process which must be followed by the authority in taking action under Section 3(1) (a). The first stage in the process is to examine the material adduced against a person to show either from his conduct or his antecedent history that he has been acting in a prejudicial manner. If the said material appears satisfactory to the authority, then the authority has to consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in a prejudicial manner in future if he is not prevented from doing so by an order of detention. If this question is answered against the petitioner, then the detention order can be properly made. If the said material appears satisfactory to the authority, then the authority has to consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in a prejudicial manner in future if he is not prevented from doing so by an order of detention. If this question is answered against the petitioner, then the detention order can be properly made. It is obvious that before an authority can legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner, the authority has to be satisfied that if the person is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner and that inevitably postulates freedom of action to the said person at the relevant time. If a person is already in jail custody, how can it rationally be postulated that if he is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner ? At the point of time when an order of detention is going to be served on a person, it must be patent that the said person would act prejudicially if he is not detained and that is a consideration which would be absent when the authority is dealing with a person already in detention. The satisfaction that it is necessary to detain a person for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner is thus the basis of the order under Section 3 (1)(a), and this basis is clearly absent in the case of the petitioner. Therefore, we see no escape from the conclusion that the detention of the petitioner in the circumstances of this case, is not justified by Section 3 (1)(a) and is outside its purview. The District Magistrate Burdwan who ordered the detention of the detenu acted outside his powers conferred on him by Section 3 (1)(a) when he held that it was necessary to detain the petitioner in order to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner.............................” 7. In Vijay Kumar v. State of J.&K., ( 1982 (2) SCC 43 ), it was held as under : “If the detenu is already in jail charged with a serious offence, he is thereby prevented from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State. May be, in a given case there yet may be the need to order preventive detention of a person already in jail. May be, in a given case there yet may be the need to order preventive detention of a person already in jail. But in such a situation the detaining authority must disclose awareness of the fact that the person against whom an order of preventive detention is being made is to the knowledge of the authority already in jail and yet for compelling reasons a preventive detention order needs to be made.” 8. From the facts on record, it would transpire that the District Magistrate was satisfied on the facts on record that the act has been an organized one and was a manifestation of organized activities. It is well settled that it is the gravity and nature of the act which is the determining factor as to whether it had been a case of law and order or the public order. It is further settled that that there has to be a subjective satisfaction of the authority that the detenu would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activities. There must be credible chain between the offending acts and the order of detention and also there must be live links between the grounds of criminal activity and the purse of detention. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is borne out from the record that the petitioner has got criminal antecedents to his discredit and further the incident having been committed in broad day light by the petitioner and his accomplices had the adverse impact on the public order. Further, the pistols used in the crime were recovered on the pointing out of the petitioner and his accomplices. The order of detention clearly mentions the fact that the petitioner was involved in criminal activities and had indulged in committing heinous crimes and many cases had been registered against him in various police stations and it had become his habit to commit offences. It also recites the likelihood of petitioner being released on bail. In view of the above, the order of detention does not suffer from any infirmity warranting. There was clearly sufficient material before the District Magistrate to justify to form his opinion. 9. In the above conspectus, the order of detention is found to be well merited and does not suffer from any infirmity and therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. It is accordingly dismissed. ————