JUDGMENT 1. Under challenge in this writ petition is the order dated 27/5/1993 passed by Labour Court Jaipur whereby, application filed by respondent No.2-workman Dinesh Khare (now deceased and represented by his legal heirs) who shall hereinafter be referred as "respondent-workman" under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, "the Act") was allowed and the petitioner-Daily Rashtradoot Jaipur (for short "petitioner-management") was directed to pay to him back wage amount for the period from October 1969 to November, 1982 for amenities for newspaper and telephone, gratuity, earned leave, provident fund and bonus in total amounting to a sum of L 1,49,027/- It was argued that bonus is payable only if some contribution is made by the employee in earning of profits by the employer. Bonus does not form part of wages. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner-management has placed reliance on the judgement of Supreme Court in Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand & Anr. : 1978 (2) SCC 144 . 2. Factual matrix of the case is that respondent-workman was working as Editor of the petitioner newspaper 'Daily Rashtradoot'. petitioner terminated the services of the respondent-workman vide order dated 18/2/1967. An industrial dispute was referred to Labour Court, Jaipur at the instance of the respondent-workman. It was the stand of the petitioner before the Labour Court that respondent workman was performing the work of Editor and since his services were managerial in nature, he was not a workman in the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. Labour Court however rejected this argument and held respondent No.2 to be a workman. The Labour Court vide its award dated 7/10/1968 declared his termination having been made without compliance of Section 25F of the Act and therefore illegally held him entitled to reinstatement. Respondent-workman was reinstated in the services of the petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner started disciplinary proceedings against the respondent-workman and in the enquiry conducted against him, he was held guilty of the charges of misconduct. The petitioner decided to again dismiss him from service. Respondent-workman was reinstated in the services of the petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner started disciplinary proceedings against the respondent-workman and in the enquiry conducted against him, he was held guilty of the charges of misconduct. The petitioner decided to again dismiss him from service. Since an industrial dispute pertaining to the employees of the petitioner management was pending before the Labour Court, the petitioner submitted an application for approval of his proposed dismissal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act and the Labour Court vide its order dated 14/12/1971 accorded approval, which order was challenged by the respondent-workman before this court inter-alia, among others, on the ground of short payment of notice pay. According to the petitioner, however, the respondent-workman was correctly paid the notice pay because issue regarding payment of wages in terms of the wage board announced by the Central Government for working journalists was still not settled and therefore the respondent-workman was rightly paid the notice pay as per the emoluments last drawn by him. Learned Single Bench of this court rejected this argument of the petitioner and held that the respondent-workman was not paid full notice pay in accordance with the provisions of the Act. There was thus, violation of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. Approval order passed by the Labour Court was therefore set-aside and matter was remitted back for fresh adjudication on merits to the Labour Court which was unsuccessfully challenged before the Division Bench of this court by the petitioner. In the meanwhile, respondent-workman attained the age of superannuation of 58 years, thereupon, the petitioner filed an application before the Division Bench. The plea of the petitioner-management was that respondent workman has attained the age of superannuation of 58 years whereas stand of the respondent-workman before the Division Bench was that age of retirement was 60 years. Division Bench however dismissed the special appeal leaving this question open to be determined by the Labour Court to which the matter was remanded by the learned Single Bench. Labour Court vide its order dated 6/5/1988 held that there was violation of provisions of Section 33 of the Act on the part of the petitioner because it made short payment of notice pay to the respondent-workman. The Labour Court thus refused to grant approval of the dismissal of the respondent-workman and rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. The Labour Court thus refused to grant approval of the dismissal of the respondent-workman and rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. Respondent-workman thereafter filed an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act for recovery of the aforesaid dues, which was allowed by the Labour Court under the order impugned in the present writ proceedings. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record as well as the cited judgements. 4. Shri R.K. Kala, learned counsel for the petitioner-management has argued that in the scope of Section 33C(2) of the Act, rights of the parties cannot be created as it is only meant to grant due amount to a workman which he is entilted to receive from the employer. It is only a pre-determined entitlement which has to be computed in terms of money. The generic procedure for investigation and settlement of industrial dispute cannot be resorted to in the otherwise limited scope of Section 33C(2), course is available only in the event of a reference of industrial dispute under the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Act. Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act acts like an executing court and in doing so it has to abide by the limitations attached to an executing proceedings. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions of an Industrial Tribunal, which alone is entitled to make adjudication in the nature of determination. It was argued that approval for the dismissal of the services of the respondent-workman by the management was held illegal on the technical ground of short payment of notice pay at a very belated stage. Such a belated refusal cannot make the respondent-workman entitled to reinstatement. Labour Court erred in law in treating the respondent No.2 as automatically reinstated. Labour Court further erred in granting him wages for the period from October 1969 to November 1982. It was argued that the question whether respondent-workman could be treated as reinstated or not, could be adjudicated upon only in a reference proceeding under Section 10(1) of the Act. Learned counsel in support of his argument, relied on the judgement of Supreme Court in P.K. Singh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court etc. It was argued that the question whether respondent-workman could be treated as reinstated or not, could be adjudicated upon only in a reference proceeding under Section 10(1) of the Act. Learned counsel in support of his argument, relied on the judgement of Supreme Court in P.K. Singh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court etc. : F.L.R. 1988 (57) 239 , Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak and another : 1995(1) SCC 235 , State of U.P. And another v. Brijpal Singh : 2005(8) SCC 58 , U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Birendra Bhandari : 2006(10) SCC 211 , Divisional Forest Officer v. Magan Lal & Ors. : 2003(1) CDR 434 and Central Inland Water Transport Co.Ltd. v. The Workmen : 1974 Lab.I.C. SC 1018 . 5. Shri R.K. Kala, learned counsel for the petitioner-management further argued that the management has got certified standing orders of its establishment which deals with the age of superannuation of the employees of the Press/Working Journalists engaged in the newspaper establishment. The standing order was produced before the Labour Court. Age of superannuation as contemplated in the said standing order is 58 years and not 60 years. Even the Second Wage Board also, considered the age of superannuation of its employees as 58 years and thereafter working journalist could apply for further extension of his service for another two years provided he submitted along with his application, a certificate of fitness to the petitioner. It was then at the discretion of the petitioner whether or not to grant such extension. Since the respondent-workman remained out of service, there was no question of his submitting such application. Division Bench while dismissing the appeal of the petitioner left this question open. Such question needs adjudication under the Act by a proper reference under Section 10(1) and could not be decided in the scope of Section 33C(2) of the Act. Learned counsel in support of his argument, relied on the judgment of this Court in Divisional Superintendent, South Central Railway, Sholapur and others v. Madhav Kashinath Kulkarni and another : 1982 1 LLJ 64 . 6. Learned counsel in support of his argument, relied on the judgment of this Court in Divisional Superintendent, South Central Railway, Sholapur and others v. Madhav Kashinath Kulkarni and another : 1982 1 LLJ 64 . 6. Citing the order of the Division Bench dated 17/9/1987 under which appeal of the petitioner management herein was dismissed, Shri R.K. Kala, learned counsel for the petitioner-management argued that the Division Bench in that order observed that whatever payments were made to the respondent-workman pursuant to its interim-order, would be liable to be adjusted at the time when final order is passed. Pursuant to the order of the Division Bench dated 19/1/1982 as modified on 31/7/1986, the respondent workman was paid monthly payment of Rs. 800/- per month for the period from January 1982 to 31/8/1986. Respondent-workman remained under the employment of M/s.Jewellers Association, Johari Bazar, Jaipur for the period from March 1974 to June 1980 where he was engaged as an Editor of a periodical known as "Gem World" and was being paid Rs. 1853/- per month and he filed a complaint against M/s.Jewellers Association also for some benefits. Such period was therefore liable to be excluded while computing the benefits payable to the respondent-workman. Labour Court refused to go into this question of gainful employment observing that this question could be raised only when regularisation was made or when order was passed under Section 33(2)(b) or before the High Court and it could not examine such question in the scope of Section 33C (2) of the Act. It was argued that since there was no reference of industrial dispute on the question of termination of the respondent-workman and it was only an application only under Section 33(2)(b), no occasion arose for the petitioner to raise question of gainful employment before the High Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner-management further argued that there was no impediment in law to examine such particular question even while considering the application under Section 33C(2). In support of his argument, learned counsel relied on the judgement of this Supreme Court in Abhinesh Chandra Gautam v. Union Territory of Tripura : AIR 1984 SC 320 as well as judgement of this court in Hariganga Security Service Ltd. v. Member IC Maharashtra : 1991 II LLJ 203 . 7. In support of his argument, learned counsel relied on the judgement of this Supreme Court in Abhinesh Chandra Gautam v. Union Territory of Tripura : AIR 1984 SC 320 as well as judgement of this court in Hariganga Security Service Ltd. v. Member IC Maharashtra : 1991 II LLJ 203 . 7. It was argued that payment of cash towards earned leave could not be directed to be paid in absence of any provision and more particularly when there was no actual working of the respondent-workman. In support of his argument, he placed reliance on the judgement of Supreme Copurt in Abhinesh Chandra Gautam and Hariganga Security Service Ltd. Supra. Moreover, when the respondent-workman had not discharged duties actually with the management, he also could not be paid bonus. Bonus cannot be treated as part of wages. Reliance in this connection was placed on the judgement in M/s.Hamdard Laboraties supra, Registrar Manager SBI v. CGIT and another : 1993 FLR (67) 1036 and M/s.Indian Potash Ltd. v. Sapan Kumar Bhattacharjee : 2007 LLR 440 . For the same reason, benefits and amenities like newspaper and telephone could not be claimed in the scope of Section 33C(2). Number of newspapers were provided to the Editor so that he could keep his knowledge updated for effective discharge of his duties as an Editor. Since the respondent-workman did not actually work, such payments could not be paid to him. Reliance was placed on the judgements of Supreme Court in P.K. Singh, Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Brijpal Singh, Birendra Bhandari, Magan Lal & Ors. and Central Inland Water Transport Co.Ltd. supra. 8. It was therefore prayed that the writ petition be allowed and the impugned order passed by the Labour Court be quashed and set-aside. 9. Per contra, Shri Rajendra Prasad, learned counsel appearing as amicus-curiae on behalf of respondent No.2-workman has opposed the writ petition and argued that Labour Court has passed a just and reasonable order within the scope of Section 33C(2) of the Act. While it granted the other benefits, it refused to grant gratuity and provident fund holding that this could only be claimed under the specific provisions of law and not under Section 33C(2) of the Act. While it granted the other benefits, it refused to grant gratuity and provident fund holding that this could only be claimed under the specific provisions of law and not under Section 33C(2) of the Act. It was therefore justified in holding that question whether or not the respondent-workman was in the gainful employment elsewhere could not be gone into and determined by the Labour Court in the scope of Section 33C(2) as its jurisdiction is confined to only execute an award/order. Learned amicus-curiae argued that as far as the age of retirement of 58 years is concerned, this is the discretion of the petitioner of the newspaper to decide upon medical fitness of the journalist whether or not to grant extension of 2 years beyond 58 years. In the present case however, respondent-workman was kept out of employment pursuant to the order which ultimately has been held to be illegal, he could not furnish such medical fitness certificate. The Labour Court was therefore justified in granting benefits as there was no reason to presume that respondent-workman would not be granted extension. Learned counsel argued that effect of refesul for approval of dismissal is that employee continues to be in service and it will have to be deemed that the order of dismissal was never passed. Learned counsel in this connection has placed reliance upon the judgement of Supreme Court and argued that the judgement of Supreme Court relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner-management in Punjab Beverages Pvt.Ltd. supra has since been overruled by the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Shri Ram Gopal Sharma and others : (2002) 2 SCC 244 . Supreme Court in this case held that "entitlement of monetary benefits crystalizes immediately on passing of order of refusal to approval and therefore the workmen is entitled to move application under Section 33C(2) without any prior declaration by way of reference in this regard so as to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings". 10. On the ambit of jurisdiction of Labour Court under Section 33C(2), learned amicus-curiae argued that powers of the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act are limited being in the nature of executing proceeding. 10. On the ambit of jurisdiction of Labour Court under Section 33C(2), learned amicus-curiae argued that powers of the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act are limited being in the nature of executing proceeding. He in this connection placed reliance on the judgement of Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. The Workmen and another : AIR 1974 SC 1604 and argued that Supreme Court in that case held that question whether plaintiff has right to relief and whether the defendant has corresponding liability to grant the same are not available for decision to the executing court. However, said court can decide the extent of liability of the defendant. It was argued that with refusal to grant of approval, it would be as if there has been no dismissal at all and therefore it would be deemed that the respondent-workman continued in service and thus he would be entitled to receive all benefits. As regards payment of amenities towards newspapers and telephone, gratuity etc., it was argued that this court in its judgement dated 2/7/1977 while dismissing SBCWP No.1981/75 filed by the petitioner management, held that these amenities were part of the wages of the respondent-workman and he is entitled to wages in lieu of these amenities. This question was therefore no longer res-integra and Labour Court has committed no error in awarding such benefits. On the question of age of retirement of 58 years, it was argued that when the order of dismissal has been held to be illegal due to refusal of the Labour Court to grant approval, the question of retirement is only an ancillary issue and not a principal dispute and therefore it need not require any separate adjudication. This court has held that benefit of extention of age of superannuation beyond 58 years years will not be available to the working journalists and therefore he is only entitled to monetary benefits. Respondent-workman would also be entitled to bonus and the order of Labour Court in this regard cannot be fauled with because effect of non-approval is not restricted to only backwages. once the respondent-workman is deemed to be continued in service in the eye of law, he would be entitled to all the benefits as if he was never removed and on the same analogy, he was therefore also be entitled to earned leave. once the respondent-workman is deemed to be continued in service in the eye of law, he would be entitled to all the benefits as if he was never removed and on the same analogy, he was therefore also be entitled to earned leave. On the question of gainful employment, Labour Court has rightly held that question of gainful employment itself is a disputed question of fact requiring adjudication, therefore, Labour Court could not decide this question in the scope of Section 33(2) (b) of the Act. This was not a case of gainful employment because if the employer does not take the work from the workman, he cannot be expected to die out of starvation. Therefore, whether or not the workman was under the gainful employment, is also an issue which requires adjudication which could not be decided by the executing court. It is therefore prayed that writ petition be dismissed. 11. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments aforesaid and perused the material on record. 12. The award of back wages, earned leave, bonus, amenities is primarily challenged by the petitioner-management on the ground that this being a proceeding under Section 33C(2), only such entitlements which are predetermined and which can be computed in terms of money , could be granted since there was no regular reference of a i n d u s trial dispute under Section 10, generic procedure for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes cannot be resorted to in the otherwise limited scope of Section 33C(2) of the Act. In order therefore to test the argument that whether all these benefits could be granted to the respondent-workman only because Labour Court refused to grant approval of his dismissal, it has to be seen as to what would be the effect of refusal to grant approval. 13. Supreme Court in T.N. State Transport Corporation v. Neethivilangan, Kumbakonam : (2001) 9 SCC 99 held that requirement of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act was mandatory and if apoproval is not granted, order of discharge or dismissal would be rendered void and inoperative. It was further held that rejection of approval application by the court would give rise to consequential right in favour of the workman. As such, Supreme Court held, the dismissal order would become non-east and the employer was bound to treat the workman as continuing in service with all consequential benefits. It was further held that rejection of approval application by the court would give rise to consequential right in favour of the workman. As such, Supreme Court held, the dismissal order would become non-east and the employer was bound to treat the workman as continuing in service with all consequential benefits. It was further observed that workman concerned could get that right enforced even under Article 226 and need not raise a new industrial dispute for that purpose. Later, this very view was reiterated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. supra, which over-ruled an earlier judgement of the Supreme Court in M/s.Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand and another : (1978) 2 SCC 144 . 14. Clearly, it would be seen that legislative scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act is such that affords protection to workman to safeguard his interest and such protection is writ large in the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act which is in the nature of shield against the victimisation and exploitation by the employee of an employee during pendency of an industrial dispute. Though, reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner-management on the judgement of Supreme Court in Punjab Beverages supra but that judgement was expressly over ruled by the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Supra. In para 13 of the report in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. supra, it was held by the Supreme Court that Section 33(2)(b) is a mandatory provision which is evident from the fact that its contravention invites a punishment under Section 31(1). On the question as to what would be the consequence of refusal to grant approval, in para 14 of the report, it was held by the Supreme Court as under:- "If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. It was further held that order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. It was further held that order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. This being the position, there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement." 15. Law thus authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila supra clearly show that once the approval under Section 33(2)(b) is prayed for and it is refused, its consequences are just the same as that of an affirmative answer to the industrial dispute reference of which is made under Section 10. 16. Reliance has been placed by the petitioner management on various judgements of Supreme Court on the scope of Section 33(2)(b) to argue that the various claims such as back wages, earned leave, bonus, benefit of amenities etc. could not be granted as they would require investigation into the facts, marshalling of evidence and then adjudication of disputes. 17. Contention that limitations attached to the executing court would be applicable to proceeding under Section 33C(2) become the court in the scope of proceedings of this nature cannot arrogate to itself the functions of an industrial tribunal entertaining reference of an industrial dispute also to be appreciated in the context of refusal to grant approval of dismissal and the consequences in law flowing therefrom. When approval has been refused, it cannot be accepted that the workman would not be reinstated because there had been no adjudication on the question of reinstatement and when workman is deemed to have continued in service, it would have to be assumed that had he continued, he would have received all such benefits which a workman continuing in normal circumstances receives. But at the same time, the view taken by the learned Labour Court that since the petitioner-management has not raised the question of gainful employment of the respondent workman with M/s.Jewellers Association, Johari Bazar Jaipur for the period from April 1974 to June, 1980 either before the Labour Court during approval proceeding or before this court in the writ petition/special appeal filed the re-against, which question could not be raised before it, cannot be accepted. Labour Courts conclusion on this aspect is that such question was open to be raised only in regular proceedings of industrial reference and not in the scope of Section 33C(2) is wholly misconceived. Petitioner-management is justified when it contends that there was no occasion for it to raise industrial dispute on this aspect because the application was filed by it under Section 33(2)(b) for approval of dismissal of the respondent. Law does not envisage that even if workman is found, when he is dismissed/retrenched, in the gainful employment elsewhere, yet, in the scope of Section 33C(2), he would be entitled to receive monetary benefits for the same period while getting his unpaid wages computed. Even if industrial dispute on the question of validity of reinstatement of the workman is referred to the Labour Court, the question of gainful employment elsewhere while deciding the entitlement of the workman for the back wages is a relevant consideration. There was in the present case no occasion for the employer to raise this plea while prosecuting their application for approval of the dismissal or even in writ proceedings before this court while challenging the order passed by the Labour Court refusing to grant such an approval. Supreme Court in Abhinesh Chandra Gautam supra was dealing with a case of Section 33C(2) of the Act, where question was whether back wages payable to the appellant for the period he remained out of service, his earnings as a Teacher with another employer should be taken into consideration and was liable to be deducted? Workman in that case admitted in his evidence that he was serving as a teacher on monthly salary @Rs.100/- per month. It was held that such amount which he received for salary for the relevant period was liable to be deducted while computing total amount payable as back wages. Apart from the fact that petitioner-management asserted the fact of gainful employment with supporting evidence. Respondent workman himself in his cross-examination clearly admitted having worked with M/s.Jewellers Association Jaipur and stated that initially he was received Rs. 700/- per month + Rs. 200/- as special pay and his pay was later revised and was raised to Rs. 1685/- per month. It must therefore be held that workman would not be entitled to back wages for the aforesaid period. 700/- per month + Rs. 200/- as special pay and his pay was later revised and was raised to Rs. 1685/- per month. It must therefore be held that workman would not be entitled to back wages for the aforesaid period. Although, for grant of other benefits, he would be deemed to have continued in service even for the aforesaid period. 18. Coming now to the claim of the respondent workman for leave encashment, argument of the petitioner-management before the Labour Court in fact was that encashment of leave could not be granted to the respondent-workman because such leave could be earned only after actual discharge of duties. Labour Court however was persuaded by the respondent-workman to hold that he was entitled to leave encashment for 90 days. Now, before this court, the petitioner management would argue that there is no provision of encashment of leave for employees who do not actually attend his duties. Implicit in this argument is the fact that petitioner-management does not deny that though those who are actually working, benefit of leave encashment is admissible as per the applicable rules. When the respondent-workman is deemed to have continued in service, his inability to discharge the duties cannot be attributed to him as it was owing to the order of dismissal which ultimately on judicial scrutiny was adjudged to be legal and not worth approval, thus, was treated in law void ab initio and non-est. It would therefore be assumed that respondent had throughout continued in service. Labour Court in my considered view was perfectly justified in awarding the benefit of leave encashment. In none of the judgements cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner-management of Supreme Court in U.P. Electric Supply Co.Ltd. v. R.K. Shukla : AIR 1970 SC 237 and Madras High Court in Bhagavathi Vilas Cigar Co. v. Labour Court, Madurai : F.J.R. 1978 Vol.54 444 and this Court in Kalyan Mal v. RSRTC : 1996(3) SLR 728 Rajasthan, was there any rule making payment of leave encashment admissible to the workman concerned. 19. Award of bonus to the respondent-workman has also been questioned by the petitioner-management on the ground that bonus being part of profit is payable only such workman, who in actual discharge of duties has contributed for earning of such profit. 19. Award of bonus to the respondent-workman has also been questioned by the petitioner-management on the ground that bonus being part of profit is payable only such workman, who in actual discharge of duties has contributed for earning of such profit. Labour Court relying on the judgment of Karnataka in 1989 Lab.I.C. 1950 and in 1969(1) LLJ 416 held that if removal/dismissal of the workman has been held to be illegal, he would be deemed to have continued in service and consequently entitled to bonus. Learned counsel for the petitioner-management has however argued that Supreme Court in M/s. Hamdard Laboraties v. Deputy Labour Commissioner : JT 2007(6) 329 held that bonus may be deferred pay but same is used in the context of back wages, it would not be being included therein. Supreme Court in that case while dealing with the case of Payment of Wages Act held that bonus does not come within the purview of wages even under the Payment of Wages Act. But that view was taken by the Supreme Court because it was held that Labour Court in that case was not determining any rights under the Payment of Wages Act. It was passing its award while determining rights and liabilities under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an Act analogous to the Industrial Disputes Act. Supreme Court held that a claim for bonus in the context of Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act can be examined only when there is an industrial dispute. It cannot be raised by way of an execution application. It could not be subject matter of application filed under Section 6(h)(1) of the Act, which corresponds to Section 33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, like the one in the present case. It would thus be evident that even if the respondent-workman is deemed to have continued in service, right to claim bonus could not be conceded as a matter of course. It would depend on relevant consideration, that even if he would have actually continued or for that matter, is deemed to have continued in service, would he still be entitled to payment of bonus. Such question obviously could not be determined in the scope of proceedings under Section 33C(2) which is in the nature of execution proceeding. It would depend on relevant consideration, that even if he would have actually continued or for that matter, is deemed to have continued in service, would he still be entitled to payment of bonus. Such question obviously could not be determined in the scope of proceedings under Section 33C(2) which is in the nature of execution proceeding. It is trite law that bonus may be termed as deferred wages but as per the definition of bonus as given in Section 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputed Act, it is not considered as part of the wages which clearly provides that wages does not include any bonus. Similarly, definition of wages as given in Section 2 (vi) of Payment of Wages Act also expressly excludes bonus from the purview of wages. In the same line, definition of salary or wages as provided by Section 2(21) of the Payment of Bonus Act. It does not include any bonus but rather expressly excludes bonus for the purpose of calculating the amount of bonus to be determined in terms of Section 10 thereof. A claim for payment of bonus has thus to be necessarily predetermined only in the scope and spirit of Section 2 (21) of the Payment of Bonus Act, which could have been raised only in an industrial dispute. Claim of the respondent to the extent of payment of bonus to him is liable to be disallowed and is hereby disallowed. 20. Adverting now to the question whether amenities such of the telephones and newspapers could be computed in terms of money, it is to be noticed that all these facilities were provided at the residence of the respondent when he was working as Editor of the petitioner-newspaper. Section 33C(2) provides for computation of such entitlements of the workman, whether any due money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. Though learned counsel for the petitioner-management has argued that amenities were provided to the respondents only when he was actually discharging the duties and even otherwise since part of such dues he is claiming, such amenities is covered by that period during which he was serving M/s.Jewellers Association, he in any case could not be granted benefits of such amenities in terms of money. Learned counsel for the petitioner management relying on the judgement of Allahabad High Court in UOI v. Central Government supra has argued that benefit of amenities cannot be computed in terms of money. But then Labour Court in para 11 of its order, has referred to the specific judgement of this Court dated 2/5/1977 passed in favour of the petitioner-management specifically directing that pursuant to the judgement of this court, payment of telephone and newspaper to the respondent-workman cannot be taken away or otherwise reduced. Neither in the pleadings of the parties nor in Ground (E) of the writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner management has taken a plea in this regard disputing such judgement. But the learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has again relied on the judgement of this Court dated 2/7/1977 passed in SBCWP No.1981/1975. Although copy of that judgement has not been produced before me by either of the parties but at the same time, learned counsel for the petitioner management has not submitted in the pleadings of the writ petition including Ground (E) thereof or even orally asserted that relevant discussion in the order of the Labour Court with reference to the judgement of this court dated 2/7/1977 was passed on misreading, findings of the Labour Court on that aspect has to be treated as correct because if there was any such judgement, Labour Court obviously could not go beyond the same. 21. Adverting now to the question whether respondent-workman was entitled to the salary for the extended period of service from 58 years to 60 years, the contention of the petitioner-management is that under their standing orders, prescribed age of superannuation is 58 years and not 60 years and as per the provisions of the Second Wage Board also, age of superannuation is 58 years. However, working journalist could apply for further extension of his service for another two years provided he submitted along with his application, a certificate of fitness to the management. It was then at the discretion of the management whether or not to grant such extension to such working journalist. However, working journalist could apply for further extension of his service for another two years provided he submitted along with his application, a certificate of fitness to the management. It was then at the discretion of the management whether or not to grant such extension to such working journalist. The Labour Court has examined this aspect of the matter relying on judgement of Supreme Court in Heavy Engineering Corporation v. Labour Court : 1990 Lab.I.C. 1057 wherein it was held that if the journalist produces his fitness certificate from the District Medical Officer, his age of retirement would be treated as 60 years. Respondents produced before the Labour Court his medical fitness certificate Exh.W2 duly signed by the Chief Medical Officer, Jaipur dated 31/12/1987 when he was 60 years of old. Even otherwise, petitioner management themselves have asserted that respondent workman was engaged with M/s.Jewellers Association till June, 1980. In view of the deeming fiction that the respondent-workman continued to serve the petitioner-management till attaining the age of superannuation and if that his age is taken as 58 years, then also, fact remains that there was no reason for the Labour Court to presume that the respondent-workman would not be fit to apply for the extension of his age of retirement. No doubt, as per the provisions of the Second Wage Board, whether or not to give extension to a respondent-workman upon his producing medical fitness certificate, was discretion of the petitioner which was required to exercise such discretion judiciously only in the event of working journalist not being found medically fit. In view of the judgement of Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Labour Court : 1979 SCC 1981 relied on by the labour court, I do not find that it has committed any error in computing all the wages of the respondent upto 60 years. 22. In view of the discussion made above, the writ petition is allowed in part. Award of the monetary benefits towards backwages for the period from April 1974 to June 1980 as directed to be paid by the petitioner-management to the respondent-workman and bonus in the sum of Rs. 11,866/- is disallowed. However, for rest of the claims/benefits, the impugned-order passed by the Labour Court is upheld. Amount of Rs. Award of the monetary benefits towards backwages for the period from April 1974 to June 1980 as directed to be paid by the petitioner-management to the respondent-workman and bonus in the sum of Rs. 11,866/- is disallowed. However, for rest of the claims/benefits, the impugned-order passed by the Labour Court is upheld. Amount of Rs. 1,49,027/- awarded by the Labour Court would accordingly liable to be reduced.The writ petition is thus allowed in part in the manner indicated above with no order as to costs.Petition partly allowed. *******