Judgment :- This Criminal Revision case by the petitioner-sole accused under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. is directed against the judgment, dated 21-10-2003, in Criminal Appeal No.364 of 2003, on the file of VI Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad, in confirming the judgment, dated 22-08-2003, in C.C.No.801 of 2001, on the file of the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, wherein the petitioner-accused was convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of two years and also to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of four months of all the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (for brevity 'IPC'). 2. Brief facts, that are necessary for disposal of the prosecution case may be stated as follows: One Gopalachary was working as General Manager of Automotive Manufacturers Limited, Secunderabad (hereinafter referred to as 'the company'). The accused was working as RTA office agent in the company. He used to collect charges from the customers of the company for the purpose of getting registration of the vehicles and other certificates for the vehicles purchased from the company. The accused was rendering such services for a period of ten years. On 20-12-1997, one person belonging to Oswal Trading Company, who was one of the customers of the company complained to the company that the Regional Transport Office acknowledgement receipt given to him by the accused was not genuine. Similarly, several complaints were received from various customers of the company alleging that the registration certificates books were not genuine and that the fabricated registration certificates have been issued to the customers. Therefore, the said Gopalachary lodged Ex.P1-complaint on 20-12-1997. P.W.10- the then Sub Inspector of Police registered a case in Cr.No.322 of 1997 under Sections 420, 467 and 471 IPC. During the course of investigation, he recorded the statements of the complainant, S.V.R. Chary, the then Superintendent of RTA, Karkhana, Secunderabad. On 29-12-1997, he arrested the accused and sent him to Court for remand and before sending him to Judicial custody, he obtained the specimen hand writings and signatures of the accused. Thereafter, his successor P.W.12 filed the charge sheet. P.W.12 continued investigation and obtained the specimen signatures of three RT officers, Senior Assistants and office Superintendents and also collected the office correspondence of the accused. Thereafter, his successor P.W.12 filed the charge sheet. P.W.12 continued investigation and obtained the specimen signatures of three RT officers, Senior Assistants and office Superintendents and also collected the office correspondence of the accused. The specimen handwritings of the accused along with the disputed writings of the accused were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory with a letter of advice. The FSL opined that the sample handwritings and the forged handwritings are written by the same person. Thereafter, he filed the charge sheet. 3. Charges under Sections 420, 467 and 471 IPC were framed against the accused, read over and explained to him, for which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 to 13 and got marked Exs.P1 to P44. 5. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with reference to the incriminating material found against him in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. He denied the same and reported no evidence. 6. The trial Court after considering the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the prosecution established its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and accordingly, convicted and sentenced the accused as above. Challenging the same, the accused preferred an appeal before the VI Addl. Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad and the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, vide impugned judgment, dismissed the appeal confirming the conviction and sentence recorded against the accused. Hence, this Revision. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-accused contended that P.W.1 who lodged the complaint alleging that the petitioner committed forgery of documents died after giving evidence in chief and therefore, the trial Court rightly rejected the in completed evidence of P.W.1, that there is no other evidence to show that the accused cheated the customers of the company or fabricated the registration certificates of the vehicles sold by the company, that P.W.13 who was examined by the prosecution had no personal knowledge about fabricating or forging the documents by the accused, that the findings are not based upon any legal admissible evidence and in view of perverse findings of both the courts below, the impugned judgments have to be set aside and the accused has to be acquitted. 8. 8. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that it is a clear case of accused fabricating the documents like registration certificates by forging the signatures of the officials of the Transport Authorities and delivered the same to the customers of the company and thereby he cheated the customers, that the evidence of P.W.1 would clearly go to show that the accused was responsible for issuing the forged registration certificates of the vehicles relating to the company, that the evidence of P.W.13 coupled with P.W.11-expert would clearly indicate that it is the accused and none else, who committed the offence, that none of the findings is shown to be incorrect or illegal, that this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence sitting as if in an appeal and hence, he prays to dismiss the revision. 9. Now the point that arises for consideration is whether the findings of both the courts below are legal, proper and correct? 10. Revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. are truncated one. Unless the findings are illegal or improper or incorrect, normally this Court will not interfere with the same. It is well settled that it is normally to be exercised in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. The revisional Court is however not expected to act as if it is hearing an appeal and the jurisdiction is not to be ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record. 11. Charges levelled against the petitioner-accused are under Sections 420, 467 and 471 IPC. The revisional Court is however not expected to act as if it is hearing an appeal and the jurisdiction is not to be ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record. 11. Charges levelled against the petitioner-accused are under Sections 420, 467 and 471 IPC. Necessary ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating which is defined under Section 415 I.P.C. are: (1) There should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, (2) (a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and (3) in cases covered by (2)(b) the act or omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. Under Section 467 IPC, whoever forges a document, which purports to be a valuable security or a will or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquaintance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquaintance or receipts for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, he shall be punishable. Under Section 471 IPC, whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, he shall be punishable. 12. One of the contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the findings are not based upon legal admissible evidence. Therefore, it is necessary to refer to the evidence of prosecution witnesses to know whether the findings are based upon any evidence on record or findings are perverse or not tenable in law. 13. 12. One of the contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the findings are not based upon legal admissible evidence. Therefore, it is necessary to refer to the evidence of prosecution witnesses to know whether the findings are based upon any evidence on record or findings are perverse or not tenable in law. 13. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the specimen handwritings and the signatures of the accused were not taken on the directions and in the presence of the Metropolitan Magistrate and therefore, the opinion of the expert needs to be rejected and no reliance can be placed upon the evidence of P.W.11 and her report. 14. P.W.10 is the Sub Inspector of Police. He deposed that he registered the case and obtained the specimen handwritings and signatures of the accused in the Police Station during the course of investigation. By the date of taking the specimen handwritings and signatures of the accused, the charge sheet was not filed. 15. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on a decision reported in MOHD.AMAN AND ANOTHER V STATE OF RAJASTHAN (1997 SCC (Crl) 777), wherein it was held thus: "Even though the specimen fingerprints of Mohd.Aman had to be taken on a number of occasions at the behest of the Bureau, they were never taken before or under the order of a Magistrate in accordance with Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act. It is true that under Section 4 thereof police is competent to take fingerprints of the accused but to dispel any suspicion as to its bona fides or to eliminate the possibility of fabrication of evidence it was eminently desirable that they were taken before or under the order of a Magistrate." No doubt, the above decision would go to show that it was imminently desirable that the fingerprints or specimen handwritings have to be taken before or under the order of a Magistrate. That is also case where the specimen fingerprints and footprints of the accused were taken by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation. In the aforesaid decision, no ratio was laid down that during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer has to take the specimen handwritings before or under the orders of the Magistrate. 16. That is also case where the specimen fingerprints and footprints of the accused were taken by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation. In the aforesaid decision, no ratio was laid down that during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer has to take the specimen handwritings before or under the orders of the Magistrate. 16. He also relied on another decision reported in DEPUTY CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, HYDERABAD V BODDULA MALLESHAM (1997 (1) ALD (CRL) 752 (A..P.)), wherein by referring to the judgment of the apex Court reported in 1994 SCC (Crl), 1376, it was held thus: "From a reading of the above judgment of the Supreme Court it is clear that, whenever specimen signature is required to be taken from the accused, the same shall be obtained in the presence of the Court or the Court itself may take such signatures during the trial in terms of Section 73 of the Evidence Act and by any chance such specimen signatures were taken by some other authority or Court, the same cannot be made available to the Court trying the case for the purpose of comparison, as per Section 73 of the Evidence Act.” 17. He also relied on another decision reported in SUKHVINDER SINGH AND OTHERS V STATE OF PUNJAB ( 1994 (5) SCC 152 ), wherein it was held thus: "Section 73 of the Evidence Act in our opinion cannot be made use of for collecting specimen writings during the investigation and recourse to it can be had only when the enquiry or the trial court before which proceedings are pending requires the writing for the purpose enabling it to compare the same. A court holding an enquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure is indeed entitled under Section 73 of the Evidence Act to direct an accused person appearing before it to give his specimen handwriting to enable the court by which he may be subsequently tried to compare it with the disputed writings. Therefore, in our opinion the court which can issue a direction to the person to give his specimen writing can either by the court holding the enquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure or the court trying the accused person with a view to enable it to compare the specimen writings with the writings alleged to have been written by such a person. A court which is not holding an enquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure or conducting the trial is not permitted, on the plan language of Section 73 of the Evidence Act, to issue any direction of the nature contained in the second paragraph of Section 73 of the Evidence Act." On a perusal of the above decision, it is clear that no where it is stated that the Investigating Officer cannot take the specimen handwritings and signatures of the accused person during the course of investigation. That is the decision which deals with taking of specimen handwritings and signatures of the accused by the Court during the course of holding an enquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure or conducting trial. There cannot be any dispute that the trial shall deemed to have been commenced after framing of the charge. 18. It is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in AMARJIT SINGH V STATE OF U.P. ((1998) 8 Supreme Court Cases,613), wherein it was held thus: "Admittedly, the SDM was neither conducting the inquiry into the case nor was the trial of the case fixed before him. The specimen writings obtained with the directions of the SDM, therefore, were not meant to assist the "Court to form its opinion" as envisaged by Section 73 of the Evidence Act. The specimen writing, under the circumstances, could not be used against the appellant and in taking this view we are fortified by a judgment of this Court in Sukhvinder Singh v State of Punjab. This lacuna affects the relevancy of the evidence of the expert in the case." The above decision has no application because the specimen signatures of the appellant therein were obtained in the Court of Sub Divisional Magistrate, as it was not conducting an enquiry or trial of a case. 19. Similarly, in a decision reported in STATE OF U.P. V RAMBABU MISRA ( AIR 1980 SC 791 ), it was held thus: "S.73 of the Evidence Act was considered by us in State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram, AIR 1979 SC 14 where we held that a Court holding an enquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code was entitled under S. 73 of the Evidence Act to direct an accused person appearing before it to give his specimen handwriting to enable the Court by which he may be tried to compare it with disputed writings. The present question whether such a direction, under S. 73 of the Evidence Act, can be given when the matter is still under investigation and there is no proceeding before the Court was expressly left open." 20. Similarly, in the decision reported in STATE OF HARYANA V JAGBIR SINGH ( (2003) 11 SCC 261 ), it was held thus: "The second paragraph of Section 73 enables the Court to direct any person present in the Court to give specimen writings 'for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare' such writings with writings alleged to have been written by such person. The clear implication of the words 'for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare' is that there is some proceeding before the Court in which or as a consequence of which it might be necessary for the Court to compare such writings. The direction is to be given for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare and not for the purpose of enabling the investigating or other agency 'to compare'. If the case is still under investigation there is no present proceeding before the Court in which or as a consequence of which it might be necessary to compare the writings. The language of Section 73 does not permit a court to give a direction to the accused to give specimen writings for anticipated necessity for comparison in a proceeding which may later be instituted in the Court." 21. Therefore, none of the decisions indicates that police are precluded from obtaining the specimen handwritings or signatures of the accused person during the course of investigation. When the police obtained the signatures, can it be said that it is violative of Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution of India, which reads that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In M.P.SHARMA V SATISH CHANDRA ( AIR 1954 SC 300 ), it was held: "The compulsory process for the production of evidentiary documents against a person who has been accused of an offence contravened Article 20 (3)of the Constitution of India if the documents are reasonably likely to support the prosecution against such person. " 22. In M.P.SHARMA V SATISH CHANDRA ( AIR 1954 SC 300 ), it was held: "The compulsory process for the production of evidentiary documents against a person who has been accused of an offence contravened Article 20 (3)of the Constitution of India if the documents are reasonably likely to support the prosecution against such person. " 22. But, in a decision reported in STATE OF BOMBAY V KATHI KALU OGHAD ( AIR 1961 SC 1808 ), 11 Judges bench of apex Court has narrowed down the above proposition in Sharma's case by laying down that the protection does not extend to any kind of evidence, but only to self-incriminating statements made by the accused (including oral or written testimony) relating to the charge brought against him. The apex Court in Kathi Kalu's case (9 supra) held thus: "It is well established that cl. (3) of Art. 20 is directed against self- incrimination by an accused person. Self-incrimination must mean conveying information based upon the personal knowledge of the person giving the information and cannot include merely the mechanical process of producing documents in court which may throw a light on any of the points in controversy, but which do not contain any statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge. For example, the accused person may be in possession of a document which is in his writing or which contains his signature or his thumb impression. The production of such a document, with a view to comparison of the writing or the signature or the impression, is not the statement of an accused person, which can be said to be of the nature of a personal testimony. When an accused person is called upon by the Court or any other authority holding an investigation to give his finger impression or signature or a specimen of his handwriting, he is not giving any testimony of the nature of a 'personal testimony.' The giving of a 'personal testimony' must depend upon his volition. He can make any kind of statement or ay refuse to make any statement. But his finger impressions or his handwriting, in spite of efforts at concealing the true nature of it by dissimulation cannot change their intrinsic character. He can make any kind of statement or ay refuse to make any statement. But his finger impressions or his handwriting, in spite of efforts at concealing the true nature of it by dissimulation cannot change their intrinsic character. Thus, the giving of finger impressions or of specimen writing or of signatures by an accused person, though it may amount to furnishing evidence in the larger sense, is not included within the expression 'to be a witness.' 23. Investigation defined under Section 2 (h) of Cr.P.C., which includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf. Under Section 156 (1) Cr.P.C., any officer in charge of a police station may without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having a jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Therefore, the object of investigation is to collect the evidence. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH V MUBARAK ALI ( AIR 1959 SC 707 ), wherein it was held thus: "Under the Code, investigation consists generally of the following steps - (i) proceeding to the spot, (ii) ascertainment of facts and circumstances, (iii) discovery and arrest of suspected offender, (iv) collection of evidence relating to the commission of offence which may consist of (a) the examination of various persons (including accused) and the reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit (b) the search of places of seizure of things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial; and, (v) formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the same by filing of a charge sheet under Section 173." 24. From the above decisions, it is clear that during the course of investigation accused person can be called upon by an investigating officer to give finger impression or signature or specimen of his hand writing, because he is not giving testimony of the nature of a 'personal testimony'. From the above decisions, it is clear that during the course of investigation accused person can be called upon by an investigating officer to give finger impression or signature or specimen of his hand writing, because he is not giving testimony of the nature of a 'personal testimony'. It is needless to observe that a court holding an inquiry code of Criminal Procedure or conducting trial of a case, can direct the accused to give finger impression, signature or specimen of his hand writing with a view to comparison of hand writing. 25. There is no direct evidence to show that the accused committed the offences for which he was charged. The entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence. When a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, the following circumstances have to be proved by the prosecution in view of the decision reported in SHARAD BIRIDHICHAND SARDA V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ( AIR 1984 SC 1622 ). (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 26. Now, coming to the evidence with reference to the allegations, there is no difficulty in rejecting the evidence of P.W.1 because he died after he was examined in chief in part. 27. P.W.2 is working as Superintendent in RTA, Hyderabad. When the police officer showed the registration certificate with the Bajaz Check Scooter in the name of Premier Explosives, he stated that it is forged document. He did not state that the accused was the person who forged the registration certificate in respect of the vehicle A.P.10A 2247. 28. P.Ws. 27. P.W.2 is working as Superintendent in RTA, Hyderabad. When the police officer showed the registration certificate with the Bajaz Check Scooter in the name of Premier Explosives, he stated that it is forged document. He did not state that the accused was the person who forged the registration certificate in respect of the vehicle A.P.10A 2247. 28. P.Ws. 3 and 4 stated that in their presence, the Sub Inspector of Police obtained the writings and signatures from Ramesh Rathi, but P.W.10 has not stated that he obtained the handwritings and signatures of the accused in the presence of P.Ws. 3 and 4. Exs.P5 and P6 are the specimen handwritings of the accused. 29. P.W.5 is the Junior Assistant in the Transport Office of East Zone. He did not state anything against the accused. 30. P.W.6 does not know the accused and the police officials had shown the documents relating to AP 10 J 1986. On verifying the same, it was found that the document belongs to Kinetic Honda, but not Bajaj Chetak. 31. The evidence of P.W.7 would go to show that when the police enquired him with reference to the vehicle bearing No. AP 13 A 5189, he verified and stated that it stands in the name of Premier Padmini Fiat Car, standing in the name of Rakesh Raj. 32. P.W.8 is the person who introduced the accused to the company as an agent for doing road transport work. Though he stated that the accused issue fake registration certificates for two wheeler sold by the company, he admitted in the cross-examination that the company people told him that the accused gave forged documents. Therefore, he has no personal knowledge about the accused forging the documents. As a matter of fact, he knows the accused since ten years. There were no complaints during his period of knowing the accused. 33. P.W.9 is one of the customers of the company who purchased the scooter and he came to know that the bogus registration was done by the agent. He did not say that the accused was the said agent who created or fabricated the registration certificate. 34. P.W.13 is the Assistant Sales Manager of the company. He stated that the accused worked in RTA office for the purpose of getting registration of new vehicles. He did not say that the accused was the said agent who created or fabricated the registration certificate. 34. P.W.13 is the Assistant Sales Manager of the company. He stated that the accused worked in RTA office for the purpose of getting registration of new vehicles. He also stated that the accused used to collect registration charges from the customers and the customers used to give the said transport charges to the accused and get the registration. He also stated that in the year 1997, he received seven complaints from the customers stating that the registration certificates issued by the accused were not genuine. On demand made by the customers, company paid Rs.3,00,000/- who are provided with fake registration certificates inclusive of penalties. According to him, Exs.P2 to P4 and P19 to P44 are the fake registration books issued by the accused. He admitted that he is not having any personal knowledge about this case. Admittedly, in this case police have not examined him. He also admitted that P.W.1 was the right person to file the complaint on behalf of the company. It is not in his evidence that in his presence, the registration certificates have been forged or that he used to collect the registration charges from the customers or that the customers entrusted the registration charges to the accused in his presence in respect of the vehicles purchased from the company. P.W.13 was examined in the Court for the first time on 17-02-2003. He was cited as an additional witness. He has not stated that the fake registration certificates of the vehicles were given by the accused to the customers of the company. He has not stated about the nature of his duties in the company as Assistant Sales Manager. It is not his case that the accused collected transport charges from the customers to get registration certificates from the RT authority. It is also not his case that he directed the customers who purchased the vehicles to give the registration charges to the accused. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.13 is not at all reliable so as to fix the responsibility on the accused as the person who created/fabricated the registration certificates of the vehicles. 35. The only remaining evidence available on record is the evidence of P.W.11 who was the handwriting expert. No doubt, she was having 19 years experience in the document section. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.13 is not at all reliable so as to fix the responsibility on the accused as the person who created/fabricated the registration certificates of the vehicles. 35. The only remaining evidence available on record is the evidence of P.W.11 who was the handwriting expert. No doubt, she was having 19 years experience in the document section. She examined the disputed signatures and gave opinion that the person who wrote the red enclosed writings marked as S1 to S55 also wrote the red enclosed writings marked as Q9 to Q16. No doubt, her evidence would clearly go to show that the signatures in the registration certificates are forged because those signatures were not tallying with the specimen handwritings of the concerned person, but at the same time, her evidence is silent that the handwritings of the accused was tallying with the signatures in the registration certificates. Even otherwise, there is no dispute that the evidence of an expert under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is opinion evidence. On this aspect, it is pertinent to refer to a decision reported in MAGAN BIHARILAL V STATE OF PUNJAB ( AIR 1977 SC 1091 ), wherein it is pointed out that if he risks to found a conviction solely on the evidence of hand writing expert and before acting upon such evidence the Court must always try to see whether it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or circumstantial. Basing on the expert's evidence alone, the accused cannot be convicted. At best, it can be taken as corroboration to the other evidence, if any available on record. These aspects have not been considered by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court. Therefore, the findings are perverse and call for interference by this Court. Hence, the petitioner is entitled for acquittal. 36. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed, setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the petitioner-accused by the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, vide judgment, dated 22-08-2003, in C.C. No.801 of 2001, and as confirmed by the Appellate Court, vide judgment, dated 21-10-2003, in Criminal Appeal No.364 of 2003. Petitioner-accused is found not guilty of the charges under Sections 420, 467 and 471 IPC and accordingly, he is acquitted of the said charges. Bail bonds of the petitioner-accused shall stand cancelled. Fine amount, if any, paid by the petitioner-accused shall be returned to him.