JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Petitioner was an Assistant Registrar, Kanungo in the Revenue Department of Government of U.P. He was charge-sheeted and suspended on 20.11.1991. Copy of the charge-sheet is Annexure CA-3 to the counter affidavit. There were five charges against the petitioner. Petitioner filed his reply on 26.12.1991, copy of which is Annexure-8 to the writ petition. Inquiry Officer (I.O.) submitted his report on 30.5.1992, copy of which is Annexure CA-2 to the counter affidavit. Appointing Authority sent notice to the petitioner on 28.10.1992 annexing therewith copy of I.O. report and proposing the punishment of dismissal, copy of which is Annexure-9 to the writ petition. Thereafter, termination order was passed on 18.4.1993, copy of which is Annexure-11 to the writ petition. Said order was passed by District Magistrate/Collector, Sonebhadra. The said termination order has been challenged through this writ petition. The first three charges in the charge-sheet related to entries in the revenue records made by the petitioner in respect of land of other persons and of Forest Department in the names of his own wife and wives of other colleagues/employees of Revenue Department of same Tehsil/District particularly Krishan Kant Pandey, Assistant Registrar, Kanungo. Tehsildar was appointed as Inquiry Officer. 3. First charge was that 70 bighas of Forest land was mutated in the revenue records by the petitioner in the names of his family members and family members of his colleague Krishan Kant Pandey. The explanation of petitioner was that he had received the orders of mutation from Tehsildar on the basis of some judgment of Munsif. In the termination order, it has rightly been stated that no case/suit for mutation under Section 34 of U.P. Land Revenue Act can be instituted in the civil Court. The said mutation order was afterwards cancelled by S.D.O. on the ground that order of civil Court was also fictitious and order of Tehsildar was also forged and it was not signed by the Tehsildar. In the reply petitioner did not deny that the order of Munsif was fictitious. He himself admitted that signatures of Sri Ramnath Bharti, the then Tehsildar on parvana-amal-daramad was not clear. In the reply petitioner did not deny that the order of Munsif was fictitious. He himself admitted that signatures of Sri Ramnath Bharti, the then Tehsildar on parvana-amal-daramad was not clear. The further allegation that he sought clarification and thereupon Ramnath Bharti clearly wrote that he had signed parvana-amal-daramad and thereafter mention was done by the petitioner has been found false as Ramnath Bharti, the then Tehsildar categorically denied his signatures on any such communication. Whenever Tehsildar passes an order in mutation proceedings under Section 34 of U.P. Land Revenue Act, it contains number of the case, names of the parties and complete order. It is inconceivable that Tehsildar will just write to Assistant Registrar, Kanungo or any other subordinate authority to mutate the name of someone on the land of Forest Department or of any other person. Moreover as forest land was mutated by the petitioner in the name of his wife hence he should have produced the order of mutation which was not done. Even if there was any such order then it was result of fraud played by the petitioner who never denied that the land which he mutated in the name of his wife was forest land. 4. The second charge against the petitioner was that he had forged ‘will’ of two persons Birju and Nanak in favour of his own wife Shiv Kumari and wife of his colleague Krishan Kant Pandey and wives of other employees of Revenue Department. It was also stated that those two persons were of Scheduled Castes. Reply of the petitioner was that those two persons were issue-less and were residing at his house. It further appears that no regular case for mutation was instituted and according to the own case of the petitioner during 1984 when correction of papers drive was going on, mutation in the names of his wife and wives of other tehsil employees was made. The matter related to 46 bighas land. It is inconceivable that Birju and Nanak should be residing at the residence of so many revenue staff members of the same Tehsil and executing will in favour of their wives. In any case, the explanation of petitioner was that Birju and Nanak were residing at his house, hence there was no question of executing the ‘will’ in favour of wives of other staff members. In any case, the explanation of petitioner was that Birju and Nanak were residing at his house, hence there was no question of executing the ‘will’ in favour of wives of other staff members. In the termination order, it has been mentioned that absolutely no information of acquisition of land by the wife of petitioner was given to the higher authorities. It is also mentioned that no ‘will’ was filed even in departmental proceedings. 5. In my opinion, these two charges are so serious that each charge even individually warranted no lesser punishment than of dismissal. In the reply, those charges were almost admitted. 6. The petitioner has crossed the age of superannuation on 31.7.2008. 7. The main argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that apart from giving the charge-sheet and perusing its reply no enquiry was done. Neither any witness was examined nor any date in the enquiry was fixed. 8. In the reply to the charge-sheet (Annexure-8), no prayer for adducing oral evidence or any other evidence was made. 9. In any case, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that I.O. should have been fixed some date and in the enquiry without fixing some date, formal enquiry is not complete has got some force. 10. However, in AIR 2000 SC 2783 , Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan and Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India, 2007 (4) SCC 54 , it has been held that if complete opportunity of hearing has not been provided then it is not necessary to quash the impugned order in every case and petitioner will have to show that in case full opportunity of hearing had been provided to him, what possible defence he would have put forward. 11. It is also to be kept in mind that there is a lot of difference in between total denial of opportunity of hearing and denial of full opportunity of hearing. 12. In view of virtual admission of the petitioner on charges No. 1 and 2, I am not inclined to set aside the termination order and direct fresh enquiry merely on the ground that I.O. did not hold a formal enquiry and based its finding only on the charge-sheet, documentary evidence and reply of the petitioner. 12. In view of virtual admission of the petitioner on charges No. 1 and 2, I am not inclined to set aside the termination order and direct fresh enquiry merely on the ground that I.O. did not hold a formal enquiry and based its finding only on the charge-sheet, documentary evidence and reply of the petitioner. It is also important to note that petitioner did not adduce any documentary evidence in support of his case and no oral evidence was adduced by the department. 13. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed. ————