JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shishir Kumar, J.—This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 24.10.2009 (Annexure 7 to writ petition) passed by Additional District Judge Court No. 9 Agra and order dated 14.10.1997 (Annexure 5 to writ petition) passed by Additional J.S.C.C. Agra. 2. Plaintiff-respondent who is landlord instituted a suit before the Judge, Small Causes Court which was numbered as Suit No. 1 of 1989 against petitioner- Ramesh Kumar for arrears of rent and ejectment. It was alleged in the plaint that defendant is tenant of shop in question on rent of Rs. 200 per month and he is in arrears of rent since 1.2.1987 and taxes from 1.4.1986. Allegations of sub-letting as well as material alterations were also made in the plaint. A notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was sent for termination of tenancy dated 2.11.1988 which was received with a remark of refusal dated 11.11.1988 while the subsequent notice dated 19.11.1988 was again received with a remark of refusal dated 2.12.1988. A written statement was filed specifically stating therein that it was taken on rent about 25 years back from previous owner and now premises in question is on annual rent of Rs. 2,400/- plus taxes to the tune of Rs. 491.90 but same was not accepted by plaintiff. In paragraph 5 of written statement it was also stated that he has never refused to receive notice neither he met with any postman. The Bank draft was sent but same was not encashed after receipt of the same. Admittedly, petitioner has deposited Rs. 11,000/- towards demand of the plaintiff for rent before the first date of hearing, therefore, he is entitled for benefit under Section 20 sub-clause (4) of the Act. Petitioner has never received any notice as alleged in the plaint. The learned trial Court has decreed the suit on two grounds (a) that tenant was served with a valid notice by holding the envelope (showing the endorsement of refusal) (b) that defendant-petitioner failed to establish the deposit of the total demand of the landlord as she claimed i.e. interest, stamp fee, process fee, counsel fee and damages, without any whispering that how much amount should have been deposited on the first date of hearing to get benefit of the provisions of Section 20 sub-clause (4). Petitioner aggrieved by aforesaid order filed a revision. Petitioner aggrieved by aforesaid order filed a revision. Revisional Court vide its order dated 12.1.2000 allowed the revision on the issue of service of notice and matter was remanded with liberty to adduce evidence by the parties. Revisional Court order was challenged by respondent-landlord by filing a writ petition which was allowed and matter was remanded back to revisional Court on 8.4.2009 with a direction to decide the revision on the basis of material available on record. 3. On the basis of remand order, revisional Court vide its judgement and order dated 24.10.2009 has dismissed the revision and held that notice was sufficient and there is no compliance of Section 20 sub-clause (4) of the Act. 4. Sri Rajiv Gupta, learned counsel appearing for petitioner submits that both the Courts have failed to consider that petitioner was not put any question regarding alleged service of notice at the time of cross-examination. The Court below has also failed to take into consideration the fact that neither there was any signature of postman on the endorsement of refusal by petitioner nor even his name was stated. The suit itself was bad because there was no valid notice of termination of tenancy. Various efforts were made by petitioner to pay rent to landlord through money order or pay order but the same was ignored by trial Court because no finding has been recorded that what was the amount due and in spite of fact that total Rs. 11,000/- was deposited by petitioner, it cannot be accepted that it was not a sufficient deposit. The burden upon petitioner has wrongly been shifted regarding service of notice. At no point of time any question was put from petitioner regarding alleged service of notice. Petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgement of Delhi High Court reported in AIR 1976 Del 111 , Jagat Ram Khullar v. Battu Mal. Placing reliance upon aforesaid judgement learned counsel for petitioner submits that Court has held that bare statement on oath by addressee denying tender and refusal to accept delivery is sufficient to rebut the presumption and reliance has been placed upon paras 11 and 12 of the said judgement. The same is being quoted below : 11. Placing reliance upon aforesaid judgement learned counsel for petitioner submits that Court has held that bare statement on oath by addressee denying tender and refusal to accept delivery is sufficient to rebut the presumption and reliance has been placed upon paras 11 and 12 of the said judgement. The same is being quoted below : 11. On the contrary, there is some authority for the proposition that the denial on oath of an addressee that the postal cover was tendered to him and was refused by him would ordinarily be sufficient to dislodge the presumption so as to oblige the other side to establish by evidence that the service has been effected. In the case of Appabhai Motibhai ( AIR 1954 Bom 159 ) (supra) Chagla, C.J. as he then was, expressed the view that the Court must allow a defendant a re trial, if, after the decree has been passed against him on the evidence that the summon was sent by registered post and had been returned with the endorsement that it had been refused, he appeared and denied that the postal cover was ever delivered to him by the postal authorities. Similar view was taken by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in the case of Sundaram (AIR 1957 Trav. Co. 208) (supra) and the judgment of the Bombay High Court was followed. In the case of Mekhji Kanji Patel ( AIR 1968 Bom 387 ) (supra), the earlier view of the Bombay High Court was reiterated by Nain, J, and it was held that a statement on oath by the addressee that the postal cover was never tendered to him dislodged the presumption raised under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In the case of Parshotam Lal (AIR 1971 J & K 20) (supra), the Jammu and Kashmir High Court took a rather extreme position when it expressed the view that mere presence of the post card and the acknowledgement form with certain postal seals and as endorsement will not lead to any presumption that the post card was addressed by and on behalf of the plaintiff to the addressee and its acknowledgement was refused by the latter. It was further held that it was not a public document and required to be duly proved by calling the writer of the post card or one who is conversant with his writing or at least the person who posted it and also by the postman who made the endorsement when the acknowledgement of the post card is denied by the defendant. In the case of Smt. Bhagwanti ( (1965) 67 Pun LR (SN) 12) (supra) it was pointed out by Chief Justice Palshaw as he then was, that where a registered letter was returned undelivered with the endorsement that the addressee has refused to accept service, the addressee could not possibly produce any evidence to show that the cover was never tendered to him except by denying the allegations, and that when there was a denial of particular mode of service, it was upto the other party to produce some evidence and not merely rely on something written by a postman from whom not even an affidavit had been obtained. It was further pointed out that if such a practice was followed, there would be many fraudulent ex parte decrees. 12. It would thus appear that ordinarily a statement of the addressee on oath that the postal cover,said to have been refused by him, was never tendered to him would be sufficient to dislodge the presumption and shift the onus on the other side to establish by evidence that the service had been duly effected. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention that the bare statement on oath of the addressee in such a case would not, as a matter of law, be sufficient to dislodge the presumption that may be raised either under Section 114 of the Evidence Act or under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. A statement on oath of a party to the proceedings is a piece of oral evidence like statement of any other witness and there is no rule of law that such a statement should not be accepted merely because it is made by a person who is interested in the proceedings nor is there any requirement of law that the statement on oath of a party to the proceedings must always be corroborated by any independent evidence before it could be accepted by a Court of law. It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule of law with regard to sufficiency of evidence. If a statement of a party on oath inspires confidence, the Court is entitled to accept it and base its conclusion on it. Learned counsel for the landlord has not been able to point out any discrepancy in the statement or any other feature of it which may justify its rejection. It is also not possible to accept the conclusion of the Rent Control Tribunal that the tenant should have given better evidence such as the existence of an extraordinary situation in which the tender could not have been made. Such an evidence is visualised by the counter illustration referred to above but that is a circumstance which a Court is entitled to consider before raising a presumption. Once the presumption is raised, the manner of rebuttal need not be limited to the instance given in the counter illustration. The only possible evidence that could have been given by the tenant in such a case would be to deny the tender on oath and that is exactly what the tenant has done in the present case. This evidence could not be rejected out of hand merely because it was made by a party to the proceedings or because any better negative evidence could have been given by the tenant.” 5. Further, learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgement of the Apex Court reported in C.L.J. 2007 Volume-VII-355 (SC) A. Rama Rao and others v. Ragu Nath Patnaik and others. Placing reliance upon aforesaid judgement, it has been submitted that if on oath it has been stated that he has not received notice, same will prevail over postal remark unless and until postman is examined. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner further submits that in view of Clause 183 of Posts and Telegraphs Manual Volume VI, the procedure has been prescribed and if it is not satisfied, it cannot be presumed that service is sufficient. Further submission has been made that unless and until postman is examined that notice sent by landlord has been refused, then no finding can be recorded that service upon petitioner is sufficient. Further submission has been made that unless and until postman is examined that notice sent by landlord has been refused, then no finding can be recorded that service upon petitioner is sufficient. Further revisional Court has clearly erred in law by not recording any finding that what was the amount due and what is the deficient and in that circumstances, petitioner is not entitled for benefit of Section 20 of sub-section (4). In that circumstances, order passed by Court below is liable to be quashed. 7. On the other hand, Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel for respondents submits that a cogent finding has been recorded by Courts below regarding sufficiency of service upon petitioner and from perusal of judgement passed by revisional Court it is clear that petitioner himself has not mentioned the fact that what is the amount due and what has been paid, revisional Court has recorded a specific finding that deposit made by petitioner was not sufficient. Learned counsel for respondents has placed reliance upon a judgement of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2002 SC 3557 , Basant Singh and another v. Roman Catholic Mission and has placed reliance upon para 11 of the said judgement. The same is being quoted below : “11. Once it is proved that summons were sent by registered post to a correct and given address, the defendants’ own conduct becomes important. Before the trial Court, the appellants were allowed to lead evidence in support of their contentions. As order to this effect was passed by the trial Court on 11-1-1991. The premises in question is occupied by two defendants jointly Hari Singh and Basant Singh. Hari Singh appeared and examined himself stating that he did not receive the registered letter. However, the defendant-Basant Singh did not appear and no evidence whatsoever, on his behalf, has been led to rebut the presumption in regard to service of summons sent to him under registered post with acknowledgment due. His own conduct shows that the registered summons had been duly served on him. As already noticed, Hari Singh appeared and save and except the bald statement that registered letter was not tendered to him, no evidence whatsoever was led to rebut the presumption. He could have examined the postman, who would have been the material witness and whose evidence would have bearing for proper adjudication. As already noticed, Hari Singh appeared and save and except the bald statement that registered letter was not tendered to him, no evidence whatsoever was led to rebut the presumption. He could have examined the postman, who would have been the material witness and whose evidence would have bearing for proper adjudication. He has failed to discharge the onus cast upon him by the statute. This apart, it is inherently improbable that the registered summons were duly served on Basant Singh but not to Hari Singh when they occupied the tenanted premises jointly.” 8. Another decision relied upon that is also of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 1284 , Har Charan Singh v. Shiv Rani and others and reliance has been placed upon para 7 of the said judgement. The same is being quoted below : “7. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic-‘Meaning of service by post’ and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document. and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus raises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgment due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under .Illustration (f) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by pre-paying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee. Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise. In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept. In other words, there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal. In such circumstances, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope. It would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents thereof and, in our view, this follows upon the presumptions that are raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.” 9. Further reliance has been placed upon a judgement of this Court reported in 2005 (1) ARC 806, Sharda Prasad alias Chhulli (since deceased) v. Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others and reliance has been placed upon para 15 of the said judgement. The same is being quoted below : “15. Further reliance has been placed upon a judgement of this Court reported in 2005 (1) ARC 806, Sharda Prasad alias Chhulli (since deceased) v. Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others and reliance has been placed upon para 15 of the said judgement. The same is being quoted below : “15. In the instant case, both the Courts below after close scrutiny of the evidence on record found that there was presumption of service of notice on the tenant. Section 114 Clause (f) of the Evidence Act provides that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed. It was held by a Full Bench of this Court Ganga Ram’s case (supra) that it is not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the endorsement of refusal on the notice sent by registered post by producing the postman or other evidence in case the defendant denies service on him. The Bench further held that the Court below was right in raising the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in favour of the landlord where notice sent to the tenant was returned with an endorsement of refusal. The presumption regarding service has also to be made under Section 27 of General Clauses Act. This was held by the Supreme Court also in Puwada Venkateshwar Rao v. Chidamana Ventata Ramana, AIR 1976 SC 869 . The Apex Court of the country has also held in Gujarat Electricity Board (supra) that there is presumption of service of letter sent under registered cover, if the same is returned back with a postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same. No doubt the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to pace evidence before the Court to rebut the presumption by showing that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the post authorities never tendered the registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The burden to rebut the presumption lies on the party, challenging the factum of service. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to discharge this burden as he failed to produce material before the Court to show that the endorsement of the postman was wrong. Mere denial by the petitioner in the circumstances of the case was not sufficient to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to discharge this burden as he failed to produce material before the Court to show that the endorsement of the postman was wrong. Mere denial by the petitioner in the circumstances of the case was not sufficient to rebut the presumption. The petitioner deposed in the Courts below that no notice was served on him nor he refused to receive the notice. When he was confronted that he had refused to receive the letter in the presence of Ramesh Chandra, he denied the suggestion. He however admitted that Ramesh Chandra resided in front of his house. In this view of the matter I find that the presumption was not rebutted by the petitioner and he failed to show that letter was not sent on the correct address or there was no occasion for him to refuse. I therefore, find that the Courts below rightly found that notice was served on the tenant by refusal.” 10. Further reliance has been placed upon a judgement reported in 2005 (1) ARC 530, Kali Ram (Sri) v. Mirza Waker Ali and others and reliance has been placed upon paras 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20, The same is being reproduced below : 15. The aforesaid decision has been approved by the Apex Court in Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma, 1990 (2) ARC 542 and the Apex Court has observed that if the notice was not personally served and the plaintiff has, therefore, discharged the initial burden by examining himself presumption lies in favour of the plaintiff. The observations are quoted below : “The principal question that arises for consideration relates to the validity of the notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice was not personally served but there is an endorsement of the postman stating that it has been refused. The case of the tenant was that he was not at all present during the period when the postman visited the premises for service and the endorsement of the postman was, therefore, not correct. He has discharged the initial burden by examining himself and it would be for the other side to prove the valid service.” “In the instant case, the trial Court has considered the evidence of the tenant and was not impressed with it. He has discharged the initial burden by examining himself and it would be for the other side to prove the valid service.” “In the instant case, the trial Court has considered the evidence of the tenant and was not impressed with it. It is indeed impossible to believe that the tenant having the business premises at Ghaziabad would have left it in the hands of the servant and remained at Delhi for a long period from December 19, 1984 to January 1, 1985 where people shuttle between the two places quite often.” 16. The aforesaid decision in the case of Anil Kumar has been relied upon in the case of Pramod Kumar v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, 1996(2) ARC 352, the relevant observations are quoted below : “The controversy was settled by the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma, AIR 1990 SC 1215 : 1990 (2) ARC 542 (SC), , wherein the view taken in Shiva Dutt Singh v. Ram Das, AIR 1980 All 280 and the decision of Delhi High Court in AIR 1976 Del 111 , Jagat Ram Khullar v. Battu Mal, that the bare statement of the tenant was sufficient to rebut presumption was over-ruled. It was held that there could not be hard and fast rule on that aspect. The Court observed “in our opinion, there could not be hard and fast rule on that aspect. Unchallenged testimony of tenant in certain cases may be sufficient to rebut the presumption but if the testimony of the tenant itself is inherently unreliable, the position may be different. It is always a question of fact in each case, whether, there was sufficient evidence from the tenant to discharge initial burden.” “In Radey Shyam Patwa v. Xth ADJ Varanasi and others, 1993 (2) ARC 485, the Court after considering the various decisions held that mere fact that the tenant has denied that he ever refused to receive the notice is itself not sufficient to hold that the presumption stands rebutted. It depends upon the facts of each case. If the Courts below record the finding that notice was served by refusal it is question of fact. It was also not necessary to produce the postman for examination to establish that the tenant had refused to accept the notice.” 17. It depends upon the facts of each case. If the Courts below record the finding that notice was served by refusal it is question of fact. It was also not necessary to produce the postman for examination to establish that the tenant had refused to accept the notice.” 17. Relying upon the aforesaid Full Bench Ganga Ram v. Phulwati, AIR 1870 All 446 (FB), the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court reported in 1984(2) ARC 290 (Ram Nath v. Angan) has held that where a registered envelop containing correct address of the tenant is posted to him and if the addressee tenant either refuses to take notice or could not be met the notice shall be deemed to have been properly served on the addressee. The observations are quoted below : “This question was considered at length by a Full Bench of this Court in Ganga Ram v. Phulwati, AIR 1970 All 446 . The full Bench held that where a registered envelop containing the correct address of the tenant is posted to him and if the addressee tenant either refuses to take notice or could not be mete, the notice shall be deemed to have been properly served on the addressee.” 19. Relying upon the judgements of the Division Bench as well as the Full Bench, it has been held in 1999(2) ARC 651 (Barindra Kumar Baruha v. ADJ, Allahabad ) as under : “Perusal of the said decision show that legal position is fully crystallized. No postman is required to be produced and a presumption is raised, in law, in case a registered letter is received back with the endorsement of refusal provided it was sent on correct address and in the name of correct person.” 20. Relying upon the judgment of Full Bench (supra) in Syed Ahmad Jawwad v. Smt. Qudesiya Saidullah reported in 2004(2) ARC 674, it has been held as under : “The next question is whether the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was validly served on the tenant, defendant No. 1 or not.” 11. Further reliance has been placed by learned counsel for respondents that in Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma reported in AIR 1990 SC 1215 , the Apex Court has held that bare statement of a tenant on oath denying tender and refusal to accept the delivery is not sufficient to rebutt the presumption. Further reliance has been placed by learned counsel for respondents that in Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma reported in AIR 1990 SC 1215 , the Apex Court has held that bare statement of a tenant on oath denying tender and refusal to accept the delivery is not sufficient to rebutt the presumption. Reliance has been placed upon para 3 of the said judgement. The same is being quoted below : “3. In the instant case the trial Court has considered the evidence of the tenant and was not impressed with it. It is indeed impossible to believe that the tenant having the business premises at Ghaziabad would have left it in the hands of the servant and remained at Delhi for a long period from 19-12-1984 to 1-1-1985 where people shuttle between the two places quite often.” 12. Placing reliance upon the judgement of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1989, SC 630, M/s Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, learned counsel for respondents submits that the Apex Court has held that notice sent through registered post on a correct address, letter returned for non-availability of addressee, there is no responsibility of sender or postman to arrange that notice is served. Relevant paragraphs are 6 and 7 the same is being quoted below : “6. We are of opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the Courts below is correct and should be upheld. It is true that the proviso to Cl. (i) of Section 11(l) and the proviso to Section 12(3) are intended for the protection of the tenant. Nevertheless it will be easy to see that too strict and literal a compliance of their language would be impractical and unworkable. The proviso insists that before any amount of rent can be said to be in arrears, a notice has to be served through post. All that a landlord can to comply with this provision is to post a prepaid registered letter (acknowledgment due or otherwise) containing the tenant’s correct address. Once he does this and the letter is delivered to the post office, he has no control over it. It is then presumed to have been delivered to the addressee under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Under the rules of the post office, the letter is to be delivered to the addressee or a person authorised by him. Once he does this and the letter is delivered to the post office, he has no control over it. It is then presumed to have been delivered to the addressee under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Under the rules of the post office, the letter is to be delivered to the addressee or a person authorised by him. Such a person may either accept the letter or decline to accept it. In either case, there is no difficulty, for the acceptance or refusal can be treated as a service on. and receipt by, the addressee. The difficulty is where the postman calls at the address mentioned and is unable to contact the addressee or a person authorised to receive the letter. All that he can then do is to return it to the sender. The Indian Post Office Rules do not prescribe any detailed procedure regarding the delivery of such registered letters. When the postman is unable to deliver it on his first visit, the general practice is for the postman to attempt to deliver it on the next one or two days also before returning it to the sender. However, he has neither the power nor the time to make enquiries regarding the whereabouts of the addressee; he is not expected to detain the letter until the addressee chooses to return and accept it; and he is not authorised to affix the letter on the premises because of the assessee’s absence. His responsibilities cannot, therefore, be equated to those of a process server entrusted with the responsibilities of serving the summons of a Court under Order V of the C.P.C. The statutory provision has to be interpreted in the context of this difficulty and in the light of the very limited role that the post office can play in such a task. If we interpret the provision as requiring that the letter must have been actually delivered to the addressee, we would be virtually rendering it a dead letter. The letter cannot be served where, as in this case, the tenant is away from the premises for some considerable time. Also, as addressee can easily avoid receiving the letter addressed to him without specifically refusing to receive it. He can so manipulate matters that it gets returned to the sender with vague endorsements such as “not found”, “not in station”, “addressee has left” and so on. Also, as addressee can easily avoid receiving the letter addressed to him without specifically refusing to receive it. He can so manipulate matters that it gets returned to the sender with vague endorsements such as “not found”, “not in station”, “addressee has left” and so on. It is suggested that a landlord, knowing that the tenant is away from station for some reasons, could go through the motions of posting a letter to him which he knows will not be served. Such a possibility cannot be excluded. But, as against this, if a registered letter addressed to a person at his residential address does not get served in the normal course and is returned. it can only be attributed to the addressee’s own conduct. If he is staying in the premises, there is no reason why it should not be served on him. If he is compelled to be away for some time, all that he has to do is to leave necessary instructions with the postal authorities either to detain the letters addressed to him for some time until he returns or to forward them to the address where he has gone, or to deliver them to some other person authorised by him. In this situation, we have to chose the more reasonable, effective, equitable and practical interpretation and that would be to read the word “served” as “sent by post”, correctly and properly addressed to the tenant, and the word “receipt” as the tender of the letter by the postal peon at the address mentioned in the letter. No other interpretation, we think, will fit the situation as it is simply not possible for a landlord to ensure that a registered letter sent by him gets served on, or is received by, the tenant. 7. Much emphasis has been placed by the Courts below and counsel for the landlord on the attempt made by the landlord to serve the notice on the premises in the presence of the witnesses. 7. Much emphasis has been placed by the Courts below and counsel for the landlord on the attempt made by the landlord to serve the notice on the premises in the presence of the witnesses. While the counsel for the landlord would have it that the steps show the landlords bona fides, counsel for the tenant submits that the haste with which the ‘substituted service’ was effected and the lack of any real attempt to find out the whereabouts of the tenant (who had, according to him been compelled to be away at Amritsar for medical treatment) throw considerable doubts on the claim of bona fides. We do not think that any statutory significance can at all be attached to the service by affixture claimed to have been effected by the landlord The statute prescribes only one method of service for the notice and none other. If, as we have held, the despatch of the notice by registered post was sufficient compliance with this requirement, the landlord has fulfilled it. But, if that is not so, it is no compliance with the statute for the landlord to say that he has served the notice by some other method. To require any such service to be effected over and above the postal service would be to travel outside the statute. Where the statute does not specify any such additional or alternative mode of service. there can be no warrant for importing into the statute a method of service on the lines of the provisions of the C.P.C. We would therefore not like to hold that a “substituted” service, such as the one effected by the landlord in the present case, is a necessary or permissible requirement of the statute. It may be even an impracticable, if not impossible, requirement to expect some such service to be effected in cases where the landlord lives outside the town, or the State in which the premises are situated. If, in the present case, the landlord attempted such service because he was in the same town, that can only show his bona fides and it is only in this view that we proceed to express our findings in this regard. 13. If, in the present case, the landlord attempted such service because he was in the same town, that can only show his bona fides and it is only in this view that we proceed to express our findings in this regard. 13. In such circumstances, learned counsel for respondents submits that taking into all these facts and circumstances, the Court below has held that presumption of law is that service upon petitioner was sufficient in case registered envelope containing correct address of tenant has been sent and tenant refusal to take notice, then legally it will be presumed that notice has been properly served upon the addressee. Notice terminating lease under the registered envelope containing correct address of a tenant then presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act can be made regarding sufficiency of service. It is not necessary for the landlord to prove that tenant after having receipt of notice has actually read it and understood the contents. 14. As regards the finding that admittedly sufficient amount which was due to be deposited by petitioner-tenant has not been deposited because in consonance of Section 20 sub-clause (4) rent has not been deposited, therefore, he is not entitled for the benefit. Sri Manish Goel, learned counsel for respondents submits that it cannot be believed that being a shop endorsement was made regarding that he was out of station for a long period. Postman has visited various times and there is an endorsement by postman, therefore, there cannot be a presumption under the law that service upon tenant is not sufficient. 15. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of parties and have perused the record. This Court has remanded the matter on a writ filed by respondent-landlord on the ground that whether service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was sufficient or not and whether there is any compliance of Section 20 sub-clause (4). I have perused the judgement. From the perusal of judgement it is apparent that Revisional Court has recorded a cogent finding based on evidence that service upon petitioner is sufficient, as notice was sent by registered post and receipt to that effect was filed before the Court. I have perused the judgement. From the perusal of judgement it is apparent that Revisional Court has recorded a cogent finding based on evidence that service upon petitioner is sufficient, as notice was sent by registered post and receipt to that effect was filed before the Court. Witness has clearly stated before the Court that notice dated 19.11.1988 and paper No. 48 Gha are the receipts issued by the post-office and 49-Ga is the registry including envelope plus A.D. in which notice was kept and it is the same envelope which was returned from the post office and the name of petitioner on the correct address was mentioned and there is an endorsement of the postman that it has been refused that was also form part of the record. The Court has taken into consideration the various Rules of the Posts and Telegraph like 63 and 64 (1) and has recorded a finding that if registered letter has been sent on correct address, then there will be a presumption that service upon addressee is sufficient. In AIR 1970 All 446 , Ganga Ram v. Smt. Pulwati, the Full Bench of this Court which has been approved in AIR 1981 SC 1284 , Har Charan Singh v. Shiv Rani and others the Court has held that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act provides mode of service of notice and therefore, provisions of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, shall apply and once it is established that a registered notice was delivered at receiving post office containing the correct address of the tenant, a presumption of law can be made that the notice has been served on the addressee. When a registered article or a registered letter is handed over to an accepting or receiving post office, it is the official duty of the postal authorities to make delivery of it to the addressee. Human experience shows that except in a few exceptional cases, letters or articles received by the post office are duly, regularly and properly taken to the addressee. Consequently as a proposition it cannot be disputed that when a letter is delivered to an accepting or receiving post office, it is reasonably excepted that in the normal course it would be delivered to the addressee. That is the official and normal function of the post-office. Consequently as a proposition it cannot be disputed that when a letter is delivered to an accepting or receiving post office, it is reasonably excepted that in the normal course it would be delivered to the addressee. That is the official and normal function of the post-office. From the perusal of record it is clear that notice was sent by registered post on a correct address, an endorsement of postman dated 2.12.1988 is there, that it has been refused. 16. The contention of learned counsel for petitioner that notice was never served by landlord upon tenant and therefore, the tenancy has not been terminated and suit is liable to be dismissed, cannot be accepted in view of the fact that if a notice has been sent on correct address, presumption lies with regard to service of notice on the defendant. Petitioner has failed to discharge of burden and has failed to prove that either the notice was not sent on correct address or the same has not been served upon him, therefore, finding of fact recorded by Courts below cannot be interfered by this Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The presumption of notice has been interpreted by the Full Bench in Ganga Ram (supra) case. In Pramod Kumar v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut and others reported in 1996 (2) ARC 352, the Court has observed that the “controversy was settled by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Verma reported in AIR 1990 SC 1215 ". That bare statement of tenant was sufficient to rebut the presumption was over-ruled. It was held that there could not be hard and fast rule on that aspect. The Court observed “in our opinion, there could not be hard and fast rule on that aspect. Unchallenged testimony of a tenant in certain cases may be sufficient to rebut the presumption but if the testimony of the tenant itself is inherently unreliable, the position may be different. It is always a question of fact in each case whether there was sufficient evidence from the tenant to discharge initial burden. Unchallenged testimony of a tenant in certain cases may be sufficient to rebut the presumption but if the testimony of the tenant itself is inherently unreliable, the position may be different. It is always a question of fact in each case whether there was sufficient evidence from the tenant to discharge initial burden. In 1999 (2) ARC 651, Birendra Kumar Baruha v. A.D.J. Allahabad, the Court has observed as follows “No postman is required to be produced and a presumption is raised, in law, in case registered letter is received back with the endorsement of refusal as provided it was sent on correct address and in the name of correct person”. 17. In such situation, I am of view that there is a presumption of due service when the registered letter had contents the correct address was returned by the post man with report that addressee has refused to accept it. As regards the contention raised by learned counsel for petitioner that no finding has been recorded by Court below regarding deposit made by petitioner. From the perusal of judgement, it is clear that notice was sent through counsel for rent due as well as tax and a finding has been recorded that on the date of filing suit, rent due was Rs. 6300.04p as well as the means profit, house tax and water tax and the expenses on the notice. A finding has been recorded that admittedly on the first date of hearing, rent of only 21 months have been sent and the tax as well as other amount required under Section 20 sub-clause (4) has not been deposited. From the record, it clearly appears that on the first date of hearing according to law, rent, tax, interest as well as other amounts has not been deposited, therefore, tenant is not entitled for any benefit of Section 20 sub-clause (4) of the Act. So far as the finding recorded by the Court below that petitioner was in arrears of rent, a finding of Civil Judge to this effect is quoted below : “KI VARSH 1988 MAY DINAK 10.11.88 KO DIWALI KA PARWA ATHWA DIWALI KE AWKASH KE PACHAT DUSRA DIN THA. So far as the finding recorded by the Court below that petitioner was in arrears of rent, a finding of Civil Judge to this effect is quoted below : “KI VARSH 1988 MAY DINAK 10.11.88 KO DIWALI KA PARWA ATHWA DIWALI KE AWKASH KE PACHAT DUSRA DIN THA. PRATIWADI PAR NOTICE LENE SE INKAR KARNE KA PRISTHANKAN DINAK 2.12.88 KA HAI YAISI DASHA MAY PANJIKRIT LIFAFA KAGAJ SANKHA 49GA/1 KE PUSHT PAR DINAK 24.11.88 SE 1.12.88 TAK KI AWADI MAY PRAPTKARTA PRATIWADI/PUNARIKSHANKARTA KA NA MILNA AVAM DINAK 2.12.88 KO LENE SE INKAR KARNE SAMANDI PRISTHANKAN APRAKRITIK NAHI HAI. ESKE TAMILA KI ANYATH VAIDHANIK UPDHARNA BHI UPAR KIYE GYE VISLESHAN KE ANUSAR VIDI SAMMAT HAI.” 18. It has been held in various cases that water tax and house tax is a part of rent and if the same has not been deposited, tenant is not entitled to get benefit of Section 20 sub-clause (4). Both the Courts have recorded a finding that petitioner is a defaulter and has failed to pay rent inspite of notice having being received. In such circumstances, I find that there cannot be any interference by this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Both the Courts have recorded a finding of fact of rent that inspite of notice, no compliance has been made. Therefore, in view of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander reported in 2003, (6) SCC 675 the Apex Court has held that Court has no jurisdiction to exercise re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence of correcting the error in drawing inference like Court of appeal. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is exercised for keeping subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction, which it does have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or a jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned, thereby, the High Court may step into exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. In the present case I found that findings recorded by Courts below is based on cogent reason on the basis of relevant record, therefore, in my opinion, there cannot be any interference by this Court. 19. In the present case I found that findings recorded by Courts below is based on cogent reason on the basis of relevant record, therefore, in my opinion, there cannot be any interference by this Court. 19. In view of above, finding with regard to notice and default cannot be a matter of interference by this Court under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 20. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. 21. No order as to cost. ————