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2009 DIGILAW 388 (GUJ)

BHAVNAGAR DISTRICT PANCHAYAT v. RAJUBHAI PRAVINBHAI SHAH

2009-05-14

K.M.THAKER

body2009
K. M. THAKER, J. ( 1 ) IN this petitions, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Panchayat has challenged common award dated 28. 11. 1997 whereby the Labour Court, Bhavnagar in Reference (LCB) Nos. 128/92, 129/92, 245/92, 324/92, 327/92, 435/92, 742/93 and 35/94 has directed the petitioner to reinstate the concerned workmen, however, without benefit of back wages. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to present petitions are that, the workmen concerned in the aforesaid reference proceedings were, as per the petitioner's case, engaged purely on fixed tenure basis and that they were engaged to cope up with the increase in work load. It is the further case of the petitioner that after the work for which the concerned workmen were engaged was over, the concerned workmen were relieved in terms of their appointment orders. Upon being aggrieved by their such termination, the concerned workmen raised industrial dispute which culminated into aforesaid reference proceedings. The concerned workmen filed their statement of claim alleging, inter alia, that they were engaged and serving as Junior Clerk / Clerk on daily wage bases and that their services were abruptly and arbitrarily terminated w. e. f. 31. 5. 1989 by oral orders. They also claimed that despite the fact that the demand notices for reinstatement with consequential benefits were given, the same were not considered and therefore, they were compelled to approach the Court. The concerned workmen alleged breach of sections 25 (F), 25 (G) and 25 (H) and also alleged that the action was arbitrary. ( 3 ) THE petitioner herein opposed the said reference proceedings by filing its written statement and claimed that it is a local authority and therefore, provisions of industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"] would not be applicable. It was further claimed in the written statement that the petitioner panchayat was assigned the responsibility of execution of procedures and formalities relating to the selection and recruitment procedure for appointment of Peons which was undertaken by the Public Service commission. It was claimed that the said responsibility entailed sudden increase in the work load and therefore, the petitioner had to engage additional men on daily wage and ad-hoc basis to tie up the situation and to cope up with such temporary additional work load. It was claimed that the said responsibility entailed sudden increase in the work load and therefore, the petitioner had to engage additional men on daily wage and ad-hoc basis to tie up the situation and to cope up with such temporary additional work load. The petitioner claimed that it was for such purpose that the concerned persons were engaged after receiving applications from them and after issuing appointment orders which contained specific condition that they were being engaged for the specified work, limited purpose and period only and that immediately upon completion of the work, they will be relieved and that accordingly upon completion of the work, the concerned persons were relieved w. e. f. 30. 4. 1989. During the pendency of the said reference proceedings, both the sides led their respective oral and documentary evidence and thereafter upon considering the submissions made by both the sides and evidence produced on record, the Labour court passed the impugned award directing the petitioner to reinstate the respondents. The Labour Court has held that there was breach of Section 25 (F) and therefore, the court passed the impugned award. Aggrieved by the said award and directions, the petitioner is before this Court. ( 4 ) DURING the early hearing of the petitions, both the sides jointly requested that the petitions may be heard and decided finally at the admission stage. With the consent of the learned Advocates for the respective parties, Rule is issued and is made returnable forthwith. Mr. Mishra, learned Advocate has waived service of notice of Rule. This Court has heard Mr. Munshaw, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. T. R. Mishra, learned advocate for the respondents at length for final hearing of the petitions. Since all the petitions involve similar and common facts and the reference proceedings have been disposed of by common award, the petitions are also decided by this common judgment. For the purpose of the judgment and order and for the sake of convenience, the facts placed on record of SCA No. 2021 of 1998 are taken into consideration. ( 5 ) MR. Munshaw has more or less reiterated the submissions made by the petitioner before the Labour Court and so far as factual aspects are concerned, he has relied upon the averments made in the written statement filed before the Labour court. ( 5 ) MR. Munshaw has more or less reiterated the submissions made by the petitioner before the Labour Court and so far as factual aspects are concerned, he has relied upon the averments made in the written statement filed before the Labour court. The gist of the factual aspects put forward by the petitioner are mentioned hereinabove earlier. ( 6 ) MR. Munshaw has, in backdrop of the facts, submitted that the concerned persons were engaged with specific clarification and understanding that their engagement is purely ad-hoc and time bound and for limited or specified purpose and as soon as the work would be over, they will stand relieved. Mr. Munshaw submitted that when the concerned persons were engaged with such clear and specific understanding and clarification, they do not get any right to claim continuation in the employment and their termination would not amount to retrenchment and the Labour court has erred in holding that the petitioner violated provisions of Section 25 (F) of the Act. He also submitted that the respondents had not established before the court that they had completed work for 240 days during their tenure and the Labour court has assumed such factual aspect without there being any evidence on record. He submitted that the observations and conclusions recorded by the Labour Court are conjectures not supported by any cogent evidence and the directions based on such conjectures are unsustainable and deserve to be set aside. Lastly, Mr. Munshaw submitted that the concerned persons were engaged only to cope up with the sudden increase in the work load and upon completion of the said specified work, there is no work available with the petitioner to engage the concerned persons and therefore also, the impugned award and directions are unjustified and deserve to be set aside. ( 7 ) PER contra, Mr. Mishra vehemently supported the award and submitted that the labour Court has rightly concluded that there was breach of Section 25 (F) inasmuch as prior to effecting termination of respondents' services, the respondents were not paid terminal dues including retrenchment compensation, etc. , and the requirements under Section 25 (F) were not followed and complied with. Mr. Mishra vehemently supported the award and submitted that the labour Court has rightly concluded that there was breach of Section 25 (F) inasmuch as prior to effecting termination of respondents' services, the respondents were not paid terminal dues including retrenchment compensation, etc. , and the requirements under Section 25 (F) were not followed and complied with. Mr. Mishra also submitted that the termination of the services of the respondents was not by way of punitive measure and that therefore, when the termination was not preceeded by departmental inquiry nor by payment of compensation in accordance with Section 25 (F), ex-facie, the action of the petitioner of relieving the respondents was bad in law and the same has been rightly set aside by the Labour Court. Mr. Mishra submitted that the services of the respondents were terminated w. e. f. 31. 5. 1989. Mr. Mishra has placed reliance on the reply affidavit and claimed that the concerned workmen worked with the petitioner from 21. 9. 1988 to 31. 5. 1989 and they had put in work for more than 240 days. ( 8 ) ANY other submissions have not been made either by Mr. Munshaw or by Mr. Mishra though, of course, both have read over the oral evidence of the witnesses of the contesting parties. ( 9 ) IT emerges from the record that the order dated 21. 9. 1988 was passed whereby the services of about 11 persons, which include present respondents, came to be engaged by the petitioner. The said order dated 21. 9. 1988 categorically records the reason for which the said persons came to be engaged. The said order also contains a condition i. e. a specific intimation to the concerned appointee that his appointment is purely on ad-hoc basis and is also time bound and has been made for limited purpose and will come to an end immediately upon completion of the work for which he was being engaged. It is also clarified in the order that the appointments were not on the regular establishment. On perusal of oral evidence of the concerned workmen, it comes out that the concerned workmen have in their examination-in-chief narrated almost similar facts which, inter alia, include that they were appointed w. e. f. 21. 9. 1988. They have, however, claimed that they were relieved w. e. f. 31. 5. On perusal of oral evidence of the concerned workmen, it comes out that the concerned workmen have in their examination-in-chief narrated almost similar facts which, inter alia, include that they were appointed w. e. f. 21. 9. 1988. They have, however, claimed that they were relieved w. e. f. 31. 5. 1989 and have denied that their services were terminated w. e. f. 30. 4. 1989. In respect of certain factual aspects there are certain differences or additions in evidence of the different workmen, however, by and large, the line of evidence of the concerned workmen remained the same except that one of the concerned persons has. in his cross examination, admitted that the letter dated 28. 4. 1989 was received by about 6 workmen. So far as oral evidence on behalf of the petitioner is concerned, the witness has given evidence on the basis of the available record. So far as date of termination of the concerned persons is concerned, he has given evidence on the basis of the record available in the office that the service of the respondents' were terminated w. e. f. 30. 4. 1989. ( 10 ) THE allegation by the respondents that they were never issued and/or served with the order dated 21. 9. 1988 is not palatable inasmuch as the concerned workmen have without reservation admitted that they were appointed w. e. f. 21. 9. 1988. The said allegation and defence is an afterthought which has not been made good and has not been duly established by the concerned persons and the learned Labour court has erred in accepting such unsubstantiated defence which is contrary to other evidence which corroborates the petitioner's case. It is undisputed position that the concerned persons had applied in response to the advertisement of which reference is made in the preamble (Sr. No. 1)of the order dated 21. 9. 1988 and that the said order also shows that the same was forwarded to all concerned persons. Further, the concerned persons have admitted that they were engaged w. e. f. 21. 9. 1988. One of the concerned persons, namely Mr. Ashokhai Samjibhai has admitted letter dated 28. 4. 1989 and also admitted that his name figures at Sr. No. 8 in the said letter and yet he has denied that his service was terminated w. e. f. 30. 4. 1989. 9. 1988. One of the concerned persons, namely Mr. Ashokhai Samjibhai has admitted letter dated 28. 4. 1989 and also admitted that his name figures at Sr. No. 8 in the said letter and yet he has denied that his service was terminated w. e. f. 30. 4. 1989. ( 11 ) THE short and relevant facts of present matters are that the respondents were engaged w. e. f. 21. 9. 1988 and that their engagement was made with a view to cope up with the additional work or sudden increase in the work which arose on account of assignment of the procedures and formalities required to be carried out for effecting selection and recruitment procedure for appointment of Peons by the public Service Commission. When the respondents were engaged for such work i. e. for additional work on ad-hoc basis and without following regular and prescribed procedure for recruitment, the respondents would not acquire any right to continue in employment. ( 12 ) IN view of the fact that the appointment was made with specific stipulation and subsequently the termination came to be made upon completion of the work for which they were engaged, such termination would not be covered within the purview of retrenchment and would fall within the purview of Section 2 (oo) (bb ). ( 13 ) THE Labour Court has committed error in holding that there was breach of section 25 (F) at the time when the respondents were terminated. The Labour court has erred in coming to such conclusion and has consequently also erred in holding that the termination was in violation of Section 25 (F) and has also committed error in directing the petitioner to reinstate the respondents. The learned labour Court also missed the point that if the concerned persons refuse and disown the order dated 21. 9. 1988 and such stand of the concerned persons were to be accepted then the very basis of their entry would be lost and their entry would be wholly unauthorized, without order of any competent authority and in violation of all procedures which would even otherwise disentitle them from claiming a right to continue in employment. 9. 1988 and such stand of the concerned persons were to be accepted then the very basis of their entry would be lost and their entry would be wholly unauthorized, without order of any competent authority and in violation of all procedures which would even otherwise disentitle them from claiming a right to continue in employment. The Labour Court has rejected the submission of the petitioner that the concerned persons were engaged for limited and specified period and purpose on the ground that in response to the demand notice-served by the workmen, the petitioner had not given any reply stating that their appointments were for limited purpose and period. On such ground, the factual aspect borne out from the record and evidence could not have been ignored or discounted. ( 14 ) FURTHER when it was shown that the appointments of the concerned persons were not on regular establishment and were not made after following regular procedure and when the respondents could not establish that their appointments were made on sanctioned posts which were vacant and when it emerges from evidence that the persons were engaged for limited and specified time and purpose and were relieved upon completion of work, there was no justification to hold the action of relieving such persons as illegal and in breach of Section 25 (F ). Such conclusion runs contrary to evidence and is not sustainable. Hence, the impugned order deserves to be set aside and is, accordingly set aside. ( 15 ) IN view of the above, the petitions are allowed. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. ( 16 ) A copy of this order be maintained in each petitions. Rule made absolute.