ORDER 1. This writ appeal has been filed by the Appellant seeking to challenge the order and Judgment dated 8.12.2008 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) 2307 of 2007 whereby, Learned Single Judge has been pleased to dismiss the writ application filed by the present Appellant and confirmed the order passed by the Labour Court finding no impropriety or illegality in the said A ward. 2. Mr. D.P. Mohanty, Learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the Petitioner, inter alia, submitted that the scope and ambit of Section 33C(1) and 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called 'the Act') are distinct and separate from each other. Accordingly, he submitted that the Learned Single Judge has failed to properly interpret the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. Vs. Rameswar and Others. Learned Counsel submitted that Section 33C(2) of the Act, had been enacted for quick and speedy remedy and for calculation or determination of benefit by the Tribunal. In this respect, Learned Counsel has submitted that the Petitioner had worked continuously from the year 1995 to 2003 for the Opposite Party No. 2 and in order to substantiate such fact, he had filed exhibit under Annexures-1 to 7 before the Learned Single Judge which according to him have not taken into consideration. 3. In view of the submissions made by the Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant, we have also perused the impugned Order Dated 8.12.2008 passed in W.P.(C) No. 2307 of 2007 and the award made by the Labour Court. We find from the said Award that on consideration of the facts on record that although the Appellant claimed that he had continuously worked under the Opposite Party No. 2 from 20.10.1995 to March 2003, yet, the Petitioner could not prove any letter of appointment nor any order from the competent Court of law to establish that the applicant was a workman under the Opposite Party No. 2. The Labour Court's further finding has been that Appellant had also not provided any order from any competent Court of law declaring the Petitioner to be entitled to the benefits of Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. 4. The aforesaid findings of the Labour Court have been taken note of and has been extracted by the Learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 4. The aforesaid findings of the Labour Court have been taken note of and has been extracted by the Learned Single Judge in the impugned order. On a query from this Court, Learned Counsel for the Appellant could not produce any document to satisfy the aforesaid requirements of law. On the other hand, Learned Counsel sought to place reliance upon Annexures 1 to 7 of the writ application in order to justify his claim. We are afraid that such a point cannot be agitated before us in the present appeal since it is well settled in law that if a point has not been raised/agitated before the Court below, the same is incapable of being raised in appeal. 5. In the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Another, the Supreme Court while dealing with a similar case, held as under: We are afraid that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public Policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena...if a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a Judgment, it is incumbent upon the party to...call the attention of the very Judges.... While deciding the said case the Apex Court placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Privy Council in Madhusudan Chowdhri and Ors. v. Mst. Chandrabati Chowdhrain and Ors. AIR 1917 PC 30 ; and R.M.K.R.M. Somasundaram Chetty v. M.R.M.V.L. Subramanian Chetty AIR 1926 PC 136 . In the later case, it has been observed as under: Judgment cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation. A similar view had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sarat Chandra Maiti and Ors. v. Bibhabati Debi and Ors. AIR 1921 Cal 584, observing that the record of the Judge is conclusive and it is not permissible either for the lawyer or litigant to contradict it except by moving application before the same Judge. In the case of The King Emperor Vs. v. Bibhabati Debi and Ors. AIR 1921 Cal 584, observing that the record of the Judge is conclusive and it is not permissible either for the lawyer or litigant to contradict it except by moving application before the same Judge. In the case of The King Emperor Vs. Barendra Kumar Ghose the Full Bench of Calcutta High Court reiterated the same view observing that the Judgment of the Court "is not to be criticized or circumvented; much less has to be exposed to any animad version." In the case of Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. N.V. Phaneendran the Apex Court has held that if a party has taken various grounds before the Court below and not made submissions on all of that, it is not even desirable to remit the matter to the said Court. The Court held that "no doubt, several contentions had been raised on merit,-the Tribunal dealt with only one issue. The prayer of the party that they may be given an opportunity to agitate those issues/questions by remitting the matter to the Tribunal, cannot be accepted as the party itself had chosen to agitate a limited number of issues and there can be no justification to remit the matter." The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Kanwar Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Others, ; and in the case of The Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. and Others Vs. P. Surya Bhavagan, . In the case of Mohd. Akram Ansari Vs. Chief Election Officer and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there is a presumption in law that a Judge deals with all the points which has been pressed before him, it often happens that several points are taken in the petition/appeal but at the time of argument, only some of these points are pressed. The Court is supposed to deal with the points which are pressed before him in the arguments and it will be presumed that the party had given up other points, otherwise he would have dealt them also. If a point is not mentioned in the Judgment of a Court, the presumption is that point was never pressed before the Court and it was given up. If a point is not mentioned in the Judgment of a Court, the presumption is that point was never pressed before the Court and it was given up. However, such a presumption is rebuttable and if a party feels aggrieved, it is always open to the Court concerned to pass appropriate order on his review application, but ordinarily the higher Court should not entertain the submissions that some of the issues agitated by the parties have not been dealt with by the Court. Similarly, in the case of Mount Carmel School Society v. DDA (2008) 2 SCC 141 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed the similar view. Thus, in view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, it emerges that this Court cannot conduct an enquiry as to what issues had been agitated before the Learned Single Judge and if a party is aggrieved that some of the issues agitated by it have not been dealt by the said Court, the only remedy available to it is to file an application of Review before the same judge as those issues cannot be dealt with by the Court in special appeal. 6. We have given option to Sri Mohanty at the threshold but he did not accept our suggestion that he should file a review petition in case he was sure that he had agitated the issue and the Learned Single Judge has not dealt with it. The party may take large number of ground as explained hereinabove, the Apex Court has repeatedly held that merely taking the ground in the petition or memo of appeal is not enough. Rather, it required to be agitated. There is no affidavit by the Learned Counsel that he had made the submission before the Learned Single Judge but that particular issue has not been taken note of by the Court. The issue as to whether the Court can deal with the point not raised/agitated before it, was considered by nine Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal Committee Vs. State of Punjab, etc. etc. and observed as under: We have only the Rule of caution in mind which warns that ordinarily, Courts should, particularly in constitutional matters, refrain from expressing opinions on points not raised or not fully and effectively argued by Counsel on either side. State of Punjab, etc. etc. and observed as under: We have only the Rule of caution in mind which warns that ordinarily, Courts should, particularly in constitutional matters, refrain from expressing opinions on points not raised or not fully and effectively argued by Counsel on either side. Such a view has been expressed for the reason that if the Issue is decided without being raised by the Learned Counsel for one side, the Opposite Party did not have a fair opportunity to answer the line of reasoning agitated in that behalf and to that extent, the Judgment would be in violation of principles of natural justice. 7. We also had carefully gone through the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Chief Mining Engineer (supra). In paragraph-5 of the said Judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has noted as follows: Section 33C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. It is open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which the workmen's right rests. 8. The aforesaid proposition of law is clear and distinct and has been clearly understood and interpreted by the Hon'ble Single. Judge. We find no substance in the submission by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that the Learned Single Judge had misread and/or misinterpreted the aforesaid Judgment. Accordingly, the contention of the Appellant is rejected. 9. Before parting, we feel it obligatory to take note of certain contentions made in the present appeal which is placed hereunder: (i) Learned Counsel for the Petitioner wanted to submit a note of argument, but the Hon'ble Single Judge said that he would deliver the order today and did not allow the Petitioner's Counsel to submit books and note of argument (ii) Hon'bie Single Judge asked the Learned Counsel for the Opposite Party to submit the books referred but disallowed the Petitioner's advocate to submit books. Abruptly the Single Judge delivered the ?Judgment on the same day on 8.12.2008, as such, the Judgment was drastic, casual and without any comprehension.... Abruptly the Single Judge delivered the ?Judgment on the same day on 8.12.2008, as such, the Judgment was drastic, casual and without any comprehension.... We are constrained to note the aforesaid contentions made in the body of the appeal memo and that too, an appeal memo which has been settled by a Senior Advocate of this Court, which is clearly in most intemperate language and rendered in a most reckless manner. While we condemn such language used in the pleadings of the appeal, we also note our strong disapproval of such language being used in the pleadings. 10. We, accordingly, direct that the aforesaid pleadings shall be struck off from the records and although we are of the view that strong action should be taken against the Counsel for having use such intemperate and offensive language, we feel that. In the present case, the Learned Counsel may be warned not to commit such act in future. 11. In view of the above and particularly considering the facts and law we reach the following inescapable conclusions. (i) The Labour Court recorded the finding that Appellant-Petitioner was not a workman. (ii) Such a finding was recorded by the Labour Court after appreciating the evidence on record and taking note of the fact that Petitioner-Appellant failed to produce any document to substantiate his claim that he was a workman. (iii) The finding of the Labour Court had been that he was a contract labourer and was given work for a particular amount. (iv) The Appellant failed to Rroduce any document before the Learned Single Judge or before us on the basis of which it could be held that the findings so recorded by the Labour Court are perverse being contrary to the evidence on record. (v) If the Appellant, Petitioner was not a workman, he could not maintain a application u/s 33C(2) of the Act. In view of the above, we find no force in the appeal which is totally misconceived. It lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed