Shree Jajoo Instruments Manufacturing Corporation, a Partnership firm duly registered under the provisions of Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and carrying on business-at P/2, Shree Laxmi Industrial Estate, New Link Road, Andheri (West), Mumbai v. Tamilnadu Electricity Board having the registered office at NPKRR Maaligai, 4th Floor, 800 Anna Salai, Chennai
2009-01-29
V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : 1. The plaintiff filed a suit on the file of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Suit No.1889 of 2002 praying for recovery of a sum of Rs.19,42,461/- together with interest at 18% per annum. The plaint was returned by the High Court of Bombay, by virtue of an order dated 27. 2003 passed by the Court, directing the plaintiff to re-present it before the appropriate Court. 2. In pursuance of the aforesaid, the plaintiff re-presented the suit to this Court. On an examination of the plaint and the documents, the Registry found that a Court Fee of Rs.22,950/- was payable on the plaint, in terms of Section 22 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, read with Appendix I-A of the High Court Fees Rules, But the plaintiff had already paid a Court Fee of Rs.37,245/-, when it was filed in the High Court of Bombay. Therefore, the plaintiff did not pay any Court Fee while re-presenting the same before this Court. 3. The Registry returned the papers with a question as to how the Court Fee paid in Bombay could be adjusted against the Court Fee payable in this State. The learned counsel for the plaintiff re-presented the papers with an endorsement, relying upon a Full Bench decision of this Court and a decision of the Punjab High Court, to the effect that the Court Fee paid could be adjusted. 4. Yet the Registry was not convinced, in view of a rule issued by the Governor of Tamil Nadu in exercise of the power conferred under Section 82(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act 1955, to the following effect: “Court Fee stamps purchased in the State of Tamil Nadu alone shall be used for the payment of all fees chargeable under the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955.” Therefore, the matter was posted before Court for a judicial order of the issue. 5. I have heard of Mr. S. Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel for the plaintiff. 6. There is no dispute about the fees that Section 82(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, empowers the Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act.
5. I have heard of Mr. S. Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel for the plaintiff. 6. There is no dispute about the fees that Section 82(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, empowers the Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. There is also no dispute about the fact that the Government had issued a rule, as extracted above, prescribing that the Court Fee stamps purchased in Tamil Nadu State alone shall be used for the purpose of all the fees chargeable under the Act. 7. However, the learned counsel for the plaintiff drew my attention to the following decisions: 1. S. Viseweswara Sarma v. Dr. T.M. Nair and Another (1910) 21 MLJ 533 (FB) 2. Vasavattula Sarabhamma v. Vasabattula Peda Veeranna and Another AIR 1950 Madras 57. 3. Bhura Mal Dan Dayal v. Imperial Flour Mills Ltd and Others AIR 1959 Punjab 629. 4. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. AIR 1969 Delhi 130. 8. In S. Viseweswara Sarma v. Dr. T.M. Nair and Another (supra) case, a Judge of the City Civil Court, Madras returned a plaint under Order 7, Rule 10 C.P.C. for presentation to proper Court. The plaint was re-presented to the Presidency Small Causes Court. The question as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to credit for the Court Fee paid before the City Civil Court, was referred by the Chief Judge of the Presidency Small Causes Court. Justice KRISHNASWAMY IYER and Justice AYLING, before whom the Reference came up, referred the question to the Full Bench, in view of the importance of the question raised. Answering the Reference in favour of the plaintiff, the Full Bench held that the Court of Small Causes is bound to give credit to the fee paid before the City Civil Court, both on a reading of the provisions of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act and by taking note of a long established procedure in the Presidency. 9. But, the above Full Bench decision cannot be taken to be directly on the point, on account of three reasons viz.; .(i) It was a case where the plaint was returned by the City Civil Court, Madras to be presented to the Small Causes Court, Madras. The Courts of different States were not involved in the case.
9. But, the above Full Bench decision cannot be taken to be directly on the point, on account of three reasons viz.; .(i) It was a case where the plaint was returned by the City Civil Court, Madras to be presented to the Small Causes Court, Madras. The Courts of different States were not involved in the case. .(ii) At the time when the Full Bench decided the case, there was no separate Enactment relating to Court Fees, in the State of Tamil Nadu. (iii) It appears from a careful reading of the decision of the Full Bench that the ratio laid down therein was not even intended to cover cases where the plaint returned by the City Civil Court, was to be re-presented to the High Court. In his opinion, SIR CHARLES ARNOLD WHITE, Kt, the Chief Justice, who led the Full Bench, said that when the transfer of the suit or the re-presentation of the plaint, is to the High Court, on the original side, there may be a special need for a special provision as regards the deduction of the fee already paid as the system of charging Court fees is essentially different under the Rules of Practice applicable to the Original Side. Therefore, I have my own doubts as to what extent, the decision of the Full Bench may be of assistance to the plaintiff. 10. In Vasavattula Sarabhamma v. Vasabattula Peda Veeranna and Another (supra) case, RAGHAVA RAO, J., followed the Full Bench in S. Viseweswara Sarma v. Dr. T.M. Nair and Another (supra) case and held as follows: “Where a Court after receiving a plaint and canceling the stamp affixed thereto returns the plaint for presentation to the proper Court under Order 7, Rule 10, the latter Court to which the plaint is presented is bound to give credit for the fee already levied by the former Court. But this applies only to cases in which the same plaint is presented to the Court.
But this applies only to cases in which the same plaint is presented to the Court. Where the plaint as presented to the proper Court is not substantially if not verbatim et literatim, the same and there are substantial changes made in the allegations part as well as in the causes of action part, no credit can be given for the Court-fee paid on the original plaint which had been filed in the Wrong Court.” But, the above decision also arose out of the return of the plaint by the Court at Peddapuram and its re-presentation to the Court at Coconada, within the jurisdiction of the same High Court, within the Presidency of Madras, before reorganisation of States. 11. In Bhura Mal Dan Dayal v. Imperial Flour Mills Ltd and Others (supra) case, the plaint was originally presented in the City Civil Court at Delhi. It was returned ant represented before the Court at Ambala in the State of Punjab. Thus, two different States were involved. Even then, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held in Bhura Mal Dan Dayal v. Imperial Flour Mills Ltd and Others (supra), as follows- “When a Court after receiving a plaint and canceling the stamp affixed thereto returns the plaint for presentation to the proper Court under Order 7, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the latter Court to which the plaint is re-presented is bound to give credit for the fee already levied by the former Court. Civil Revn. No.428-D of 1956 (Punj) Foll.” “Courts should put a liberal interpretation on fiscal statutes like the Court-fees Act, so as to lessen and not add to the burden of litigation. This of course does not mean that where a provision is clear and explicit, it should not be enforced; it merely means that while dealing with fiscal statutes letter of the law is of paramount importance.” 12. In a reversal of situation, a similar view was expressed by the Delhi High Court in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. AIR 1969 Del 130 . It was a case where a plaint was returned by a Court in Punjab to be re-presented to a Court in Delhi.
In a reversal of situation, a similar view was expressed by the Delhi High Court in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. AIR 1969 Del 130 . It was a case where a plaint was returned by a Court in Punjab to be re-presented to a Court in Delhi. The Delhi High Court held as follows: “Where a plaint bearing Court-fee is re-turned by Civil Court of one State, for presentation to a competent Court of another State, the Court-fee purchased by the plaintiff for use in Civil Court of the first State can lawfully be received in the Civil Court of the latter State, as proper Court-fee stamps.” But the said decision may not be of any assistance to the plaintiff for the reason that in paragraph-4 of the same decision, it was held as follows: “Unless there is a specific bar in the Court-fees Act or any statutory rules lawfully framed against the use of Court-fee stamps purchased by a citizen in one State from being used in another State in the Union of India, there is no legal Justification for depriving a citizen from using these stamps in a State other than that of the purchase. The various States in the Union of India are not foreign countries and there is no law providing that Court-fee purchased in one State can be valid in law only in that State and cannot be used in a different State. Justice is not sold by the States in Indian Republic, Nor entry No.3 of List 11 of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution contemplates that payment of price of the Court-fee into the coffers of the particular State, the Courts of which are lawfully approached by a citizen seeking justice, is a constitutional condition precedent.” Interestingly, the decision of the Punjab High Court in Bhura Mal Dan Dayal v. Imperial Flour Mills Ltd and Others (supra) case as well as the decision of the Delhi High Court in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. (supra) case were both rendered by the very same learned Judge, the former as a puisne Judge of the Punjab High Court and the latter as the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court. 13.
13. Apart from the above decisions cited by the learned counsel, I also came across a decision of a learned Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. S.M. Balasundaram (1961) 2 AP Weekly, Reporter 262 and a decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Hira v. B.D. Kashyap AIR 1956 HP 38. In the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, a plaint filed in the Madras City Civil Court, was returned under Order 7, Rule 10 C.P.C. and it was re-presented before the Sub Court at Kurnool. While holding that the Andhra Court is bound to give credit to the Court Fee paid in Madras, the learned Judge held as follows: “It may be noted that Section 69, which provides for the collection of fees chargeable under the Act in stamps, does not contain the further requirement that those stamps should be purchased within the territories of the State. It is also conceded that no rules have been made by the board of revenue or the State Government pursuant to the powers conferred on them by Section 76 and Section 77 respectively. It is relevant to note that under the Indian Stamp Act, there is a Madras Amendment and an Andhra Pradesh Amendment, both of them, dated the 30.12.1957: The State of Madras, by an amendment notified in G.O. Ms. No.1365, Revenue, dated 30.12.1957, promulgated a rule which reads: “Stamps purchased in Madras State shall alone be used on instruments chargeable with duty as in force in that State.” The Andhra Pradesh Government have with a slight verbal alteration notified in G.O.Ms.No.2434, Revenue, dated 30.12.1957, as follows: “Stamps purchased in Andhra Pradesh State alone shall be used on instruments chargeable with duty as in force in that State.” There is, therefore, no difficulty in concluding that with regard to the use of stamps, the Madras Government as well as the Andhra Pradesh Government have felt a need to notify to the public that stamps purchased in the respective States alone shall be used on instruments chargeable with duty under the Stamp Act. It is to be observed that a similar notification was not issued under the provisions of the Court fees Act in force before the enactment of the Andhra Act or even subsequently thereunder.
It is to be observed that a similar notification was not issued under the provisions of the Court fees Act in force before the enactment of the Andhra Act or even subsequently thereunder. It is not within my province to speculate upon the reasons for the omission to issue a similar notification as the one issued under the Stamp Act by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The fact that no notification has been issued is, however, common ground.” 14. Thus the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was on the basis that there was no notification under the Andhra Pradesh Court Fee Act, restricting the use of the Court Fee stamps purchased in Andhra Pradesh alone in the proceedings before the Courts in Andhra Pradesh. But unfortunately, the State of Tamil Nadu has issued a rule in exercise of the power conferred under Section 82(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. Therefore, the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court would stand distinguished. 15. In the decision of the Judicial Commissioner in Hira v. B.D. Kashyap (supra), the plaint was presented in the Small Causes Court at Simla (Punjab). It was later returned and re-presented in a Court in Himachal Pradesh. The suit was tried and ultimately decreed. Therefore, the Court expressed the view that it would not interfere, in the peculiar circumstances, in view of the practice that was in vogue in the State prior to July 1953. Hence that decision is also not on the point. 16. In Brindala v. Gokal and Haffman Ltd., AIR 1960 Bombay 96, a learned Judge of the Bombay High Court considered the issue in elaborate detail, with regard to the provisions of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the changes brought forth by the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Constitution of India and the Court Fees Act enacted by individual States. Since there is an elaborate discussion, with regard to the above, it may be useful to extract the important portion of the above decision as follows: “(3) Originally the Court-fees Act was an Act of the Central Government and, therefore, the Court-fee was payable to the Central Government.
Since there is an elaborate discussion, with regard to the above, it may be useful to extract the important portion of the above decision as follows: “(3) Originally the Court-fees Act was an Act of the Central Government and, therefore, the Court-fee was payable to the Central Government. If there was any provision in any Act which was in force before the Government of India Act, 1935 came into operation which required or authorised that Court-fee should be paid otherwise than to the Central Government then of course Court-fee could have been paid in accordance with the provisions of such Act. I am, however, not concerned with the position that prevailed before the Government of India Act, 1935 came into operation. The Government of India Act, 1935 or at least the provisions thereof which are material to this case came into operation in 1937 and it is sufficient for me to consider what was the position that ensued thereupon. (4) Section 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935, provided as follows: “Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of the Government of India Act, but subject to the other provisions of this Act, all the law in force in British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of this Act, shall continue in force in British India until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.” The Court Fees Act, 1870 was a law in force in British India immediately before the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935 and, therefore, by reason of the said provisions of the said Section 292 it continued to be in force in British India. Now, under the Government of India Act, 1935 legislation could be either of the Centre or of a Province and the question arises whether the Court-fees Act, which was originally a Central Act, continued to be in force under the provisions of the said Section 292 as a Central Act or was it to be deemed to have continued in force as a Provincial Act passed by the Provincial Legislatures of the respective provinces.
.(5) Now, the said Section 292 provided that the existing legislation, which in this case was the Court-fees Act, was to continue in force in British India until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature and, therefore, one must find out which, was the competent legislature which was entitled to so alter, repeal or amend the Court-fees Act. The relevant provision is contained in Section 100 of that Act. Under sub-section .(1) of the said Section 100 the Federal Legislature has been given the exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule to that Act and it has been made clear that in respect of those matters a Provincial Legislature has no such power, sub-section (2) of that Section provided that subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) a Provincial Legislature also had power to make laws with respect to any of the matters, enumerated in List III in the said Schedule and sub-section (3) of that Section provided that the Federal Legislature had not the power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the said Schedule. The appropriate item about Court-fees was Item No.1 in the List II in Seventh Schedule and that item included fees to be taken in all Courts except the Federal Court. Therefore, the Legislature competent to legislate in connection with Court-fees was Provincial Legislature and not the Federal or Central Legislature because of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 100. “Court-fees” was very clearly within the exclusive legislative powers of a Provincial Legislature after the coming into operation of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Federal Legislature did not have any such power. It is quite clear that it was a Provincial Legislature alone which could alter, repeal or amend the Court-Fees Act after the coming into operation of the Government of India Act, 1935. The provision as regards the powers of a competent Legislature to alter, repeal or amend an existing Act contained in Section 292 was considered by the Federal Court in United Provinces v. Mt.
The provision as regards the powers of a competent Legislature to alter, repeal or amend an existing Act contained in Section 292 was considered by the Federal Court in United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum AIR 1941 FC 16: 1940 FCR 110 and it was held that Section 292 did not prevent the appropriate Legislature, which was in that case the Provincial Legislature, from giving even retrospective effect to legislation passed by it. Therefore there are two significant facts to be observed about the effect of the Government of India Act, 1935 upon the Court-Fees Act. The first is that since the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935, as the subject of Court-fees fell within the said List II, the Provincial Legislatures alone had and the Central Legislature did not have the power to legislate in respect of Court-fees and the second is that the Provincial Legislature had the power to alter, repeal or amend the Court-fees Act, 1870, which included the power to do so with retrospective effect. It is, therefore, clear that although originally the Court-fees Act was a Central Act, since the coming into operation of the Government of India Act, 1935 it ceased to have the essential characteristics of a central legislation and complete plenary powers of legislation, including the power to legislate retrospectively, with regard to Court-fees vested in the Provincial Legislatures. Therefore, since the date of the coming into operation of the Government of India Act, 1935 the Court-fees Act must be deemed to have continued to be in operation in the various Provinces of India as a Provincial Act passed by the appropriate Provincial Legislature and not as a Central Act because the Provincial Legislatures alone had the power to legislate in respect of Court-fees. (6) The next position is the one arising under the Constitution of India after the same came into operation. So far as the question under consideration is concerned, Article 372(1) provides that notwithstanding the repeal by the Constitution of the Government of India Act, 1935, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority.
This provision in the said Article 372(1) is, for the purpose of the present consideration, identical with that of Section 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Court-fees Act which, because of the reasons already stated, must be deemed to have been a Provincial Act before the coming into operation of the Constitution has, because of the said, provisions of Article 372, continued in force as legislation passed by the appropriate State Legislatures. As the Court-fees Act cannot be deemed to have been continuing as a Central Act when the Constitution came into operation it cannot, after the coming into operation of the Constitution, be considered to be an Act of the Union of India what is more, under Article 246(3) the Legislature of a State has exclusive power to make laws for such State of any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and Item No.3 of the said List II includes fees taken in all Courts except the Supreme Court. The position, therefore, is the same as that under the Government of India Act, 1935 and it is the State Legislature alone which has the exclusive power to legislate in respect of Court-fees payable in that particular State. Article 266 of the Constitution provides that all revenues received by the Government of a State, all loans raised by that Government by the issue of treasury bills, loans or ways and means advances and all moneys received by that government in repayment of loans shall form one consolidated fund to be entitled “the Consolidated Fund of the State.” It is clear, therefore, that Court-Fees in respect of which the State Government has the exclusive power to legislate under the Constitution would form part of the Consolidated Fund of the State which is to be deemed to have passed the Court-fees Act for the particular State and which levies and recovers the Court-fees. It is, therefore, clear that the provision in Section 6 of the Court-fees Act about payment of Court-fees must mean payment to the government of the State within which State the particular Court in which the Court-fee is payable is situated. That payment of Court-fee is to be made to the appropriate State is also clear because of another reason.
It is, therefore, clear that the provision in Section 6 of the Court-fees Act about payment of Court-fees must mean payment to the government of the State within which State the particular Court in which the Court-fee is payable is situated. That payment of Court-fee is to be made to the appropriate State is also clear because of another reason. Since the coming into operation of the Government of India Act, the Provincial Legislatures, and since the coming into operation of the Constitution the State Legislatures have the power to alter and amend the Court-Fees Act, 1870. The various Provinces or States may, in exercise of that power, increase or decrease the rates of Court-fees as leviable within that Province or State and the Court-fee payable in respect of the same item may vary from Province to Province and State to State. In such a State of affairs, the adequacy of the amount of Court-fee payable in a particular State must be judged in accordance with the Court-Fees Act as amended and applicable in the particular State. Moreover, under the Court-Fees Act, 1870, even without reading therein the amendments made by any of the Provinces or States, there are provisions for the refund of Court-Fess paid, e.g., when a decree is obtained by consent of parties before issues are framed in the suit. Let me now consider what would be the effect if such a contingency were to arise in the present case. Court-Fee has been paid in the Delhi Court and if none was payable in Bombay and if occasion hereafter arises for refunding any part of the Court-fee paid by the plaintiffs in this case, it would be this Court which would make the necessary order and thereupon how can the State of Bombay make any refund when the Court-fee was initially paid not in Bombay but in Delhi? This again shows that the Court-fee is payable to the State in whose territory the Court where the Court-fee is payable is situated, and that the reason for the same is that the Court-Fees Act is a legislation of that State and the revenue derived thereunder is to form part of the Consolidated Fund of that State.” I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge of the Bombay High Court in the above case for some more additional reasons. 17.
17. The fee payable in any proceedings before the Supreme Court, is covered by Entry 77 of List I (Union List) of the VII Schedule to the Constitution. But the fee payable in any proceedings before all other Courts, is covered by Entry 3 of List II (State List). Therefore, the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, was enacted by the State to replace the Court Fees Act 1870 and the Suits Valuation Act 1887. The Act received the assent of the President on 15. 1955, Section 87(1) of the said Act, repealed both the Court Fees Act, 1870 and the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, in their application to the State of Tamil Nadu, in relation to the fees and stamps. Therefore, on and from the date of coming into force of the said Act, all issues relating to Court Fees stand fully governed by the provisions of the said Act and hence, it is necessary to take a note of some of the provisions. 18. Section 74 stipulates that all fees chargeable under this Act, shall be collected by stamps. Section 75 prescribes that the stamps used towards any fee, shall be impressed or adhesive or partly impressed and partly adhesive, as the State Government may notify. Section 78 speaks of deductions to be made by the Collector, in respect of damaged or spoiled stamps. Section 79 makes a stamp vendor liable for imprisonment or fine or both, if he disobeys any rule made under the Act. Section 81 empowers the Board of Revenue to make rules with regard to the matters enlisted under sub-section (1). Under Clauses (e), (f), (g), (i) and (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 81, the rules framed by the Board of Revenue, may provide for the following: .(e) the supply of stamps to be used under this Act; .(f) the number of stamps to be used for denoting any fee chargeable under this Act; .(g) the keeping of accounts of all stamps used under this Act; .(i) the circumstances in which, the manner in which, and the authorities by which, allowance for used, damages or spoiled stamps may be made; and .(j) the regulation of the sale of stamps to be used under this Act, the persons by whom alone such stamps may be sold and the duties and remuneration of such persons. 19.
19. Section 82 (1) empowers the State Government to frame rules. In exercise of the said power, the Government issued a Notification in G.O.Ms.No.1730, Home Department, dated 26. 1955, which reads as follows: “(G.O.Ms.No.1730, Home, 26. 1955) In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 82 of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 (Madras Act 14 of 1955), the Government of Madras hereby makes the following rule: Rule Court-fee stamps purchased in the Madras State shall alone be used for the payment of all fees chargeable under the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955.” 20. The above rule is not without a purpose. Sections 66 to 69 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and suits Valuation Act, 1955, provide for refund of either the full Court Fee or a portion of the Court Fee, under certain contingencies. The refund is to be made by the Collector of the District, in accordance with the directions issued by the Court. The money, so refunded, actually goes out of the coffers of the State. If for instance, an occasion arises even in the present case, for the refund of the full or part of the Court Fee, the question as to who would be liable to make the refund would loom larger. The plaintiff in the present case has made payment of a Court Fee of Rs.37,245/- while presenting the plaint in the High Court of Bombay, If at present, the payment so made is adjusted towards the Court Fee payable before this Court and later a contingency contemplated under any of the provisions of Sections 66 to 69 arises, then the State of Tamil Nadu will be compelled to refund the fee which they never collected. It is only to avoid such a situation that the Notification extracted above, appears to have been issued under Section 82(1) of the Act. If the Court which returns the plaint and the Court to which it is re-presented, are both situate within the same State, there will be no difficulty in accepting the contention that the Court Fee paid in the first instance should be adjusted. But, when these Courts are situate in different States, it is not possible to accept the contention that the plaintiff would be entitled to get credit for the payment already made.
But, when these Courts are situate in different States, it is not possible to accept the contention that the plaintiff would be entitled to get credit for the payment already made. It is for the simple reason that it is not paid to the State which charges the Court Fee and to which the Court Fee is actually payable. 21. It is well settled that the object of levying Court Fee was to secure revenue for the benefit of the State (4 IC 503 (FB)). A fee, as distinguished from a tax, is for the services rendered and as such, there is an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays the fees and the public authority which imposes it Srinivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1983 SC 1246 : (1983) 4 SCC 353 . 22. In Government of Madras v. Zenith Lamp and Electrical Limited AIR 1973 SC 724 : (1973) 1 SCC 162 , a question arose as to what was nature of the “fees taken in Court” in Entry 3, List II, Schedule VII of the Constitution and as to whether there should be a correlationship between “fees taken in Court” and the cost of administration of civil justice. Tracing the history of levy of fees in England, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the above case, found (in paragraph-15) that in England, a very close connection existed between fees and cost of administration of civil justice. Insofar as India is concerned, it was found by the Apex Court (paragraph-24) that Court Fees were some times levied with the object of restricting litigations and sometimes with the object of increasing the revenue. Ultimately, after analyzing the Constitutional Scheme, the Supreme Court held in paragraph-31 as follows: “The fees must have relation to the administration of civil justice. While levying fees the appropriate Legislature is competent to take into account all relevant factors the value of subject-matter of the dispute, the various steps necessary in the prosecution of a suit or matter, the entire cost of the upkeep of Courts and Officers administering civil justice, the vexatious nature of a certain type of litigation and other relevant matters. It is free to levy a small fee in some cases, a large fee in others, subject of course to the provisions of Article 14.
It is free to levy a small fee in some cases, a large fee in others, subject of course to the provisions of Article 14. But one thing the Legislature is not competent to do, and that is to make litigants contribute to the increase of general public revenue. In other words, it cannot tax litigation, and make litigations (sic litigants) pay, say for road, building or education or other beneficial schemes that a State may have. There must be a broad correlationship with the fees collected and the cost of administration of civil justice.” 23. In the light of the above observations of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the fee levied by the respective States in terms of the Court Fees Acts, prevailing in the States, is to meet the cost of administration of civil justice. Since the cost of administration of civil justice is borne in the first instance by the States, the revenue out of the Court Fees should also go to the respective States. This is why Section 20 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, prescribes that in any enquiry relating to the fee payable or the valuation of the subject matter, the Court is empowered to give notice To the State Government and hear their views, with regard to the Court Fee payable and the valuation. Section 73 also empowers the State Government to reduce or remit the whole or any part of the fees chargeable under the Act. Therefore, it may not be possible to ask one State to give credit to the Court Fee paid in another State, where the plaint was originally presented. To do so, would negate the very purpose of levy of Court Fees. Moreover, it would be in violation of the statutory rule issued by the Government in exercise of the power conferred under Section 82(1) of the Act, to direct such adjustment. 24. Therefore, I uphold the objections of the Registry and hold that the plaintiff should pay Court Fees only in the form of stamps purchased in the State of Tamil Nadu. The Registry is therefore directed to return the plaint, giving sufficient time to the plaintiff to re-present it with necessary Court Fees purchased in the State.
24. Therefore, I uphold the objections of the Registry and hold that the plaintiff should pay Court Fees only in the form of stamps purchased in the State of Tamil Nadu. The Registry is therefore directed to return the plaint, giving sufficient time to the plaintiff to re-present it with necessary Court Fees purchased in the State. It will be open to the plaintiff to take the Court Fee stamps purchased in the State of Maharashtra and claim refund of the value from the state of Maharashtra.