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Gauhati High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 392 (GAU)

Pranab Dhar v. Rajesh Deb

2009-06-05

UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2009
ORDER U.B. Saha, J. 1. The instant writ petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, for quashing the order dated 8-10-2007 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, (for short 'Claims Tribunal'), Court No. 2, West Tripura, Agartala in Case No. Civil Misc. 269 of 2006 whereby and whereunder the Claims Tribunal disallowed the prayer of the petitioner herein for review of the judgment and award dated 22-11-2006 passed in T.S. (MAC) No. 277/04 on the ground that the amendment of the judgment is not authorised under law. 2. Heard Mr. P. Chakraborty, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. D.R. Chowdhury, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 as well as Mr. P. Gautam, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2, Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 3. In T. S. (MAC) No. 277 of 2004, the Claims Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 11,20,780/- in favour of the claimant-respondent No. 1 with interest @ 6% on and from the date of filing of the claim petition, i.e. 29-4-2004 as he sustained injuries on his person due to a vehicular accident, happened on 20-7-2003. The Claims Tribunal in its judgment and award held that the petitioner being the owner of the offending vehicle having no valid permit at the time of accident on 20-7-2003 is to effect payment of the aforesaid amount of compensation to the claimant-respondent No. 1. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and award, the petitioner herein preferred a review application under Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "the Code") to accept the effective permit and review the judgment and award dated 22-11-2006, as due to bona fide mistake, the said effective permit could not be submitted by his engaged counsel at the time of hearing of the claim petition. Instead, his counsel submitted the permit that had already expired on 8-5-2004 along with all other relevant documents, as the engaged counsel could not follow the date of issue, i.e. on 16-2-2004 though the valid permit was there covering the period of accident, which was issued on 27-5-2003 and the date of expiry of which was on 29-9-2003. 4. The learned Claims Tribunal after hearing the parties disallowed the review application as stated supra. 4. The learned Claims Tribunal after hearing the parties disallowed the review application as stated supra. Hence the writ petition, for setting aside the impugned order dated 8-10-2007 and accepting the effective permit submitted by the petitioner for shifting the liability of payment of the awarded amount upon the respondent No. 2, being the offending vehicle was insured with the respondent No. 2, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 5. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that though the provisions of review have not been incorporated in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the Act') as has been provided under the Code, yet the learned Claims Tribunal has the power to review its own judgment and award, if it is satisfied that the judgment and award has been passed due to the mistake of the counsel of the petitioner and not for the mistake of the petitioner herein. He also contended that the power of review is implicit in every Court of civil nature even if the said power is not expressly provided under the statute like the Act. In support of his aforesaid contention he relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Samar Roy and Anr. reported in 2002 (2) GLT 595: (AIR 2003 (NOC) 106 : 2003 AIHC 3982). He further contends that the Apex Court in a recent decision in Sunita Devi Singhania Hospital Trust and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. reported in AIR 2009 SCW 1650 held that every Tribunal has inherent power to recall its order for the interest of justice. 6. Taking note of Sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the Act, he finally contended that in holding an inquiry on the claim application made before the Claims Tribunal, it may, subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit, meaning thereby, the claims tribunal is free to follow any procedure as it considers expedient in the interest of justice. In the instant case, the Claims Tribunal did not consider the aforesaid provisions of the Act, rather misunderstood the law and failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it for which itself the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 7. Mr. In the instant case, the Claims Tribunal did not consider the aforesaid provisions of the Act, rather misunderstood the law and failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it for which itself the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 7. Mr. Gautam, learned Counsel for the respondent insurance Company on the other hand sounded a contra note and would contend that the learned Claims Tribunal rightly rejected the prayer of the petitioner herein for review of the judgment and award as the said judgment and award became final and as such there was no scope for review. More so, the said judgment and award is appealable under Section 173 of the Act. He further contended that in the absence of any procedure for review in the Act, no review is permissible and in support of his aforesaid contention, he relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Patel and Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji reported in AIR 1970 SC 123 and the case of Kewal Chand Mimani (D) by LRs. v. S.K. Sen and Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 512 : AIR 2001 SC 2569 , particularly paragraph 19 whereunder the Appex Court relying on Patel and Narshi Thakershi (supra) noted that, The circumstances under which a review can be, done are provided under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In any event law is well settled on this core that the power of review is not any inherent power and it must be conferred by law, either specifically or by necessary implication". 8. He also contended that the Claims Tribunal is not a Court, subordinate to High Court and the Claims Tribunal is not empowered to exercise all the powers of established Civil Courts excepting certain provisions of the Code as mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 169 of the Act, i.e. the powers of Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and enforcing attendance of the witnesses, of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purpose/s as may be prescribed. To justify his aforesaid contention he cited a Full Bench decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. M/s. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. etc. reported in AIR 2004 Karnataka 1. 9. While reacting to the submission of Mr. Gautam, Mr. To justify his aforesaid contention he cited a Full Bench decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. M/s. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. etc. reported in AIR 2004 Karnataka 1. 9. While reacting to the submission of Mr. Gautam, Mr. Choudhury, learned Counsel for the claimant-respondent would contend that due to the rejection of the review application the claimant respondent is not getting the fruits of award passed by the Claims Tribunal. He also contended that review is permissible even in absence of a specific provision in the statute, like the Act. According to him, vast power exists in the Tribunal to determine its own procedure in dealing with a claim application and the Tribunal has all the trappings of a Court and the proceedings before it closely resemble to the proceedings in a Civil Court He further contended that the legislature purposely did not make all the provisions of the Code applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal which are summary in nature as the whole intent of the legislature was to ensure the speedy disposal of the claim petition filed by the injured, like the respondent No. 1 herein. He also agreed with the submission of Mr. Chakraborty that in view of Sub-section (1) of Section 169, the Tribunal is empowered to evolve its own procedure while dealing with a claim application and it can also resort to any provision of the Code on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience. In support of his aforesaid contention, he relied upon a judgment of Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Jai Singh and Anr. v. N.S. Subramaniyam and Anr. reported in AIR 1982 Pun) & Har 407, particularly paragraph No. 22 of the said law report. 10. He finally contended that when the petitioner owner of the offending vehicle had/has the valid permit covering the period of accident, the learned Claims Tribunal ought to have accepted the valid permit submitted by the petitioner along with the review application and on reviewing its judgment and award, the Claims Tribunal should have shifted the liability of the awarded amount upon the respondent No. 2, insurance company to whom the offending vehicle of the petitioner was insured at the relevant time of accident, for the ends of justice. Unless the said order is reviewed the claimant-respondent would not get the fruits of the award. Hence the Court may set aside the impugned order of rejection of review application. 11. To appreciate the rival contentions of the learned Counsel of the parties appearing in the instant proceeding and the law reports cited by them, it is necessary to refer to the relevant paragraphs of those law reports as well as the provisions of Section 169 of the Act and Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code, to arrive at a proper decision regarding the dispute between the parties in the instant proceeding. Accordingly, the provisions of Section 169 of the Act and Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code are extracted herein under: 169. Procedure and Powers of Claims Tribunal -- (1) In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry. (3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry. Order 47, Rule 1 -- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved -- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. 12. In the case of Patel and Narshi Thakershi AIR 1970 SC 123 (supra) the question that arose before the Apex Court was whether a delegate of the Government can review the order of the Government. At the time of deciding the aforesaid question, their Lordships of the Apex Court held that it is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power; it must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. In that case the Apex Court held that if power of review is not provided under the statute or by necessary implication, orders cannot be reviewed. In that case the Apex Court held that if power of review is not provided under the statute or by necessary implication, orders cannot be reviewed. There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down by their Lordships in the aforesaid case, as by that judgment the Apex Court did not consider whether the Claims Tribunal can exercise the power of review when the procedure is left to its discretion by the legislature in a summary proceeding. Therefore, the said case would not be helpful for the decision of this case as well as to the respondent-Insurance company. 13. In paragraph 19 of Kewal Chand Mimani AIR 2001 SC 2569 (supra), the Apex Court relying on the Patel and Narshi Thakershi (supra) noted that the circumstances under which review can be done are provided under Order 47, CPC and in any event, the power to review is not an inherent power and it must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. 14. From the aforesaid views of the Apex Court, it cannot be ruled out that when the legislature in a statute conferred a power either on a Court or on a Tribunal to adopt its own procedure for deciding an issue, then that Tribunal is not debarred to review its order for the interest of Justice. Therefore, the said case of Kewal Chand Mimani (supra), does not help us to decide the issue involved in the instant case. As it appears from the Sub-section (1) of Section 169 that legislature conferred the power on the Tribunal to decide its own summary procedure in an inquiry under Section 168 of the Act subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal is totally barred from following the general procedure of law as prescribed in the CPC including the provisions of review. 15. In M/s. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. etc. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal is totally barred from following the general procedure of law as prescribed in the CPC including the provisions of review. 15. In M/s. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. etc. ( AIR 2004 Ker 1 ) (supra) a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court while answering the question, "Are Tribunals established under the Motor Vehicles Act, the Karnataka Private Educational (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975, now the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 and the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, Courts subordinate to the High Court for purpose of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure?" Taking note of various judgments of the Apex Court as well as the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Acts, including Section 169 of the MV Act the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court held that Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a Court subordinate to High Court, so as to maintain a revision petition under Section 115 of the CPC. There is also no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court as it is a settled position of law by this time that the Tribunal is not a Civil Court and to revise the order of Tribunal, High Court cannot exercise its revisional jurisdiction vested in it by the provisions of the Code like Section 115 of the Code. In the aforesaid case, the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court had no opportunity to answer whether a Tribunal can exercise the power of review taking aid from the provisions of general procedure like the Code when the power of review is not specifically prohibited by the statute rather what should be the summary procedure in holding any inquiry left to the Tribunal by the legislature subject to any rules that may be made in that behalf. Therefore, the said decision of the Full Bench of Karnataka High Court in M/s. Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. etc. (supra) also has no application in the instant case. 16. In the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal reported in AIR 1981 SC 606 , while considering Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, a question arose before the Apex Court whether an ex parte award passed by the Industrial Tribunal can be set aside under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC in the absence of specific provisions. The Apex Court while distinguishing the case of Patel and Narshi Thakershi AIR 1970 SC 123 (supra) held that sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act makes a distinction between the procedure and powers of the Tribunal under the Act. The procedure is left to be decided by the Tribunal to suit carrying out its functions under the Act. The powers of the Civil Court conferred upon the Tribunal are clearly defined. The question whether a party must be heard before it is proceeded against is one of procedure and not of power in the sense in which the words are used in Section 11. The Apex Court further held that different considerations arise on review in two distinct senses namely, procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal and review on merits. Regarding a second, stage review on merits, it has been held, in Patel and Narshi Thakershi (supra) that no review lies on merits unless the statute specifically provides for it. The Court also held that the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of process of Courts and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal. 17. In Sunita Devi Singhania Hospital Trust and Anr. (2009 AIR SCW 1650) (supra) the Apex Court while considering Sub-section (2) of Section 129(B) of the Customs Act, which prescribes a period of limitation of six months for rectification of mistake, held that "It is true that the period of limitation specified in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 129(B) of the Customs Act is required to be observed but the Tribunal failed to notice that it has inherent power to recall its own order if sufficient cause is shown therefor." The principle of natural justice which in a case of this nature in our opinion envisages that a mistake committed by the Tribunal in not noticing the facts involved in the appeal which would attract the ancillary and/or incidental power of the Tribunal necessary to discharge the functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties, were required to be complied with. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court also took note of the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra) wherein the Apex Court held that Industrial Tribunal has an inherent power to set aside an ex parte award subject to fulfilment of the condition that the same has not been published in the Gazette. From the aforesaid case of Sunita Devi Singhania Hospital Trust and Anr. (supra) a reasonable person can come to a conclusion that the Tribunal has inherent power of recalling its own order if sufficient cause is shown by the party. Recalling of ah order is nothing but a review as "review is the act of looking over something again with a view to correction or improvement" as noted by the Apex Court in the case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224 . 18. In the case of Sarhar Roy and Anr. (supra) the petitioner insurance company filed a review petition before the learned Tribunal and the learned Member of the Tribunal refused to review the order on the ground that the petitioner-insurance company could have preferred an appeal or revision before the, High Court, instead the petitioner moved review petition and as such the petition was rejected. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Member of the Tribunal the petitioner-insurance company preferred civil revision. After taking note of the relevant facts of that case and hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, this Court held that Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is competent to entertain review petition. To understand the reasons for such a decision of this Court, it is necessary to reproduce paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Samar Roy and Anr. (supra). Accordingly the same is reproduced hereinunder: 5. Though the provision of review as has been contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure, has not been incorporated in the MV Act, yet being a Presiding Officer of Civil Tribunal constituted under the MV Act, obviously for limited purpose the learned Member Tribunal has the power to review his own order if he is satisfied that the order is passed contrary to the provision of law or passed inadvertently having by-passed any law and that is apparent on the face of record without taking further evidence. That power of review is implicit in every Court of civil nature regardless of the power expressly provided under the Code of Civil Procedure, of course in exercising such implicit power of review, the Court/Tribunal is supposed to follow the procedure prescribed under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. 6. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the learned Member Tribunal ought to have reviewed his earlier order allowing the maximum permissible amount at Rs. 6,000/- to be paid by the Insurance Company and the balance amount is to be fastened upon the insured (owner of the vehicle), but that was not done. 7. In that view of the legal position, I allow the revision petition and direct the learned Member Tribunal to review the order dated 1-8-2000 passed in Title Suit (MAC) No. 290 of 1998 in the light of the observations made above. 19. In the case of Sri Phanilal Debnath v. Smt. Suniti Debnath and Anr. [WP(C) No. 339 of 2005], the petitioner-owner of the offending vehicle, aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal whereby and whereunder the Tribunal fixed the liability to satisfy the award of compensation on him instead of the insurance company, though his vehicle was insured, preferred an application for review of the award, contending that as the vehicle was insured with the respondent-insurance company at the time of accident, the liability of the compensation could not be on him. The Tribunal dismissed the said review petition basically on the ground that the petitioner did not contest the claim petition even though he was given adequate opportunity of hearing by issuing notice upon him. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the petitioner of that case filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and this Court vide its order dated 22-5-2006, observed that "normally this being the case of an error apparent on the face of the record or the discovery of the fact which could not be produced at the time of trial, the case ought to be remanded to the Tribunal for review and judgment. Further considering the fact that the claim petition was filed in the year 1996, remanding the case at this stage will further delay the payment of compensation to the claimant and as such the entire matter needed to be disposed of by this Court itself at this stage for the ends of justice. As the vehicle was insured with the respondent-Insurance Company, some modification of the judgment and award is called for." Accordingly, this Court set aside the award keeping the quantum of compensation awarded in the Judgment and award undisturbed, only with the modification that the amount of compensation would be paid by the respondent-insurance company and not by the petitioner. 20. From the bare reading of the case of Sri. Phanilal Debnath (supra), it can be opined that in the aforesaid case this Court held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is competent to review its order, on discovery of facts which could not be produced at the time of trial before it, if sufficient cause is shown for such non-production of documents. 21. In paragraph 2 of State of Haryana v. Smt. Darshana Devi and Ors. reported in AIR 1979 SC 855 , the Apex Court observed, "The poor shall not be prised out of the justice market by insistence on court-fee and refusal to apply the exemptive provisions of Order XXXIII, C.P.C. So we are distressed that the State of Haryana, mindless of the mandate of equal justice to the indigent under the Magna Carta of our Republic expressed in Article 14 and stressed in Article 39A of the Constitution, has sought leave to appeal against the order of the 'pauper' provisions to auto-accident claims. The reasoning of the High Court in holding that Order XXXIII will apply to Tribunals which have the trappings of the Civil Court finds our approval. We affirm the decision". 22. In National Insurance Co. Ltd., Jabalpur v. Lachhibai Urf Laxmibai and Ors. The reasoning of the High Court in holding that Order XXXIII will apply to Tribunals which have the trappings of the Civil Court finds our approval. We affirm the decision". 22. In National Insurance Co. Ltd., Jabalpur v. Lachhibai Urf Laxmibai and Ors. reported in AIR 1997 MP 172 a similar question like the case in hand arose and the learned single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court taking note of Patel and Narshi Thakershi (supra) and the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. (supra) as well as the case of Satnam Verma v. Union of India reported in AIR 1985 SC 294 , in paras 12 and 13 of the report held that, The power of review vests with the Tribunal in its inherent power under Section 169 of the MV Act though Rule 240 of the M.P.M.V. Act Rules, 1994 has not expressly provided for application of Order 47, CPC". Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Lachhibai Urf Laxmibai and Ors. (supra) are reproduced hereinunder. The same would help us to reach a proper decision in the instant case. 12. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the power of review vests with the Tribunal in its inherent power under Section 169 of the M. V. Act though Rule 240 of the M.P. MV Rules, 1994 has not expressly provided for application of Order 47, CPC. A review application is maintainable when it is sought due to a procedural defect, or inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal, to prevent abuse of its process. Such power inheres in the Tribunal. The contention of the learned Counsel for the non-applicant cannot be accepted that the power of review is not provided by the statute, therefore, it cannot review its own order. As considered by me earlier, wide powers are vested with the Tribunal under Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, review on limited grounds as mentioned above is permissible. 13. In the result, the order of the Claims Tribunal holding that it has no power to review the award is therefore set aside and the case is remanded to it for deciding the application for review on merits in accordance with law. The revision is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. 23. 13. In the result, the order of the Claims Tribunal holding that it has no power to review the award is therefore set aside and the case is remanded to it for deciding the application for review on merits in accordance with law. The revision is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. 23. Having heard the learned Counsel of the rival parties and after going through the law reports as referred to above and also taking note of the facts of the case in hand and keeping in view the object of the provisions of Section 169 of the Act, it can be easily said that the claims Tribunal is constituted by the State in view of the provisions of the Act, for the purpose of accidents involving the death of/or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles and damage to any property so arising and both, and these disputes have been divested and take away from the jurisdiction of ordinary Courts of civil judicature but that does not mean that due to inclusion of Sub-section (2) of Section 169 excluded the power of review of claims Tribunal of its own order specially to achieve the object and purposes for which the claims Tribunal is established. Now the question arises, for what purpose the claims Tribunals have been established by the State, for doing injustice or to do justice in the real sense forbiding the technical tyrannies. Procedural hurdle should not be a bar in the way of substantive justice, as justice is the prime consideration. The Court should take note of the intent of the legislature while interpreting the provisions of the statute. Procedural hurdle should not be a bar in the way of substantive justice, as justice is the prime consideration. The Court should take note of the intent of the legislature while interpreting the provisions of the statute. In the instant case by way of incorporating Sub-section (2) of Section 169, the legislature vested some specific power of Civil Court to a Tribunal for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the claims Tribunal deems to be a Civil Court for all purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 meaning thereby the legislature in Sub-section (2) of Section 169, speaks only about the power of the Tribunal, not regarding procedure, hence not prohibited the Tribunal to apply the general procedure as stated in the provisions of the Code like Order 47, Rule 1, as the legislature has empowered the claims Tribunal with wide power of discretion to follow such a summary procedure as it thinks fit, for holding of inquiry under Section 168 of the Act subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf. As it is stated from the Bar that in the State of Tripura the Government did not make any rules as authorised by Section 176 of the Act, the claims Tribunal is free from any obstacle to take the aid of provisions of the Code which prescribe the general procedure for the interest of justice and equity. As it is stated from the Bar that in the State of Tripura the Government did not make any rules as authorised by Section 176 of the Act, the claims Tribunal is free from any obstacle to take the aid of provisions of the Code which prescribe the general procedure for the interest of justice and equity. Even if for the argument sake we consider that claims Tribunal are not empowered to exercise all the powers of established Civil Courts except' under certain provisions of the Code as mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 169, then also it cannot be ruled out that the legislature did not specifically prohibit the claims Tribunal to follow the general procedure prescribed in the Code and when there is no specific prohibition for following the general procedure in an inquiry under Section 168 of the Act and more so, when the wide discretion is vested in the claims Tribunals under Sub-section (1) of Section 169 this Court has no hesitation to hold that the claims Tribunal failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it while rejecting the application for review filed by the petitioner, a poor owner of the offending vehicle (Auto Rickshaw) even when the valid permit covering the relevant period of accident was placed before it and the offending vehicle was insured with the Insurance Company-respondent No. 2 herein. It also appears from the application for review filed by the petitioner that due to mistake of his learned Counsel the valid permit could not be placed before the claims Tribunal and instead of placing such valid permit, another permit not covering the period of accident was placed, and sufficient reasons were shown by the petitioner for non-submission of the valid permit before the claims Tribunal at the time of trial. Mistake and/or error cannot be ruled out completely from any human endeavour, much less in matters of pleadings as well as submission of documents. Tribunals or other professional advisors like learned lawyers are by no means to be regarded as a perfectionist, nor their pleadings and acts are always error proof. The review of an order for doing substantive justice cannot be avoided always. Therefore, if necessary, the same should be allowed, even when the provisions of statute do not either expressly or by necessary implication exclude the applicability of those provisions of general procedure. The review of an order for doing substantive justice cannot be avoided always. Therefore, if necessary, the same should be allowed, even when the provisions of statute do not either expressly or by necessary implication exclude the applicability of those provisions of general procedure. It is also settled by this time that for the fault of the lawyer the litigant should not suffer and in the instant case it appears that the petitioner, poor Auto-Rickshaw owner had/has the valid permit for the period covering the accident, but then also the award was passed against him for the mistake committed by his lawyer though his vehicle was insured with the insurance company-respondent No. 2 herein, which is unwarranted and for that also the impugned order is required to be interfered with. 24. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in Patel and Narshi Thakershi AIR 1970 SC 123 (supra) which is again followed by the Apex Court in Kewal Chand Mimani (D) by LRs AIR 2001 SC 2569 power of review is not an inherent power unless the same is conferred either by law specifically or by necessary implication. But these cases are not much helpful for the case in hand as in the present case question arises whether Sub-section (1) of Section 169 of the Act vests the power of review by necessary implication or not in the Tribunal. In view of the decision in Sunita Devi Singhania Hospital Trust and Ann (2009 AIR SCW 1650) (supra) of the Apex Court and also the decision in Lachhibai Urf Laxmibai and Ors. AIR 1997 MP 172 (supra) as decided by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the decision of this Court in Samar Roy and Anr. (supra), this Court has no hesitation to hold that the Tribunal has the power of review as the same is implicit in every Court of civil nature, even when the statute is expressly not armed with power of review, and also the Tribunal is free to follow the general procedure prescribed under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC as the legislature vested wide power to it under Sub-section (1) of Section 169 regarding what should be the procedure for holding inquiry under Section 168 of the Act. 25. 25. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the view that learned Member, Claims Tribunal committed an error by not allowing the review application of the petitioner. Hence, the impugned order dated 8-10-2007 is required to be set aside. Accordingly, the same is set aside. Learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, is directed to review the judgment and award dated 22-11-2006 passed in T.S. (MAC) No. 277/04 in the light of the observations made herein above. Learned Member, Claims Tribunal should have restored the review petition of the petitioner and decide the same afresh. 26. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.