JUDGMENT : 1. This group of petitions involve similar issue and common order dated 21.9.2002 is challenged in this petitions, hence all the petitions are decided by this common judgment. 2. The petitioner, Chief Engineer (construction) has challenged a common order dated 21.9.2002 passed by the labour Court, Ahmedabad in Recovery Applications No. 2023 of 1995 to 2112 of 1995 whereby the labour Court has partly allowed the said recovery applications and has directed present petitioner to pay the amounts mentioned in the order against the names of each of the concerned 90 applicants. 3. The facts involved in and which have give rise to present petitions are as follows : 3.1 Over a period of about 3 years between 1972 to 1975 at different point of time the petitioner engaged the concerned persons as "Project Casual Labourers" and then the concerned persons were granted the "temporary status" in 1981 and since then they continued to work as such. 3.2 Before proceedings further it is necessary to note that as per the case of the petitioner, the Casual Labourers, in the Railway Establishment, are engaged in 2 different categories viz (1) Open Line Casual Labourers and (2) Project Casual Labourers. It is the case of the petitioner that Open Line Casual Labourers have to perform jobs like loading and unloading the material, special repair and maintenance of tracks and other structures etc. whereas the Project Casual Labourers have to perform jobs such as execution of Railway projects of laying new lines, converting the existing lines, construction of building, track renewals etc. The petitioner has further claimed and asserted in the memo of petition that the expenses as regards open line casual labourers are borne from amongst the day to day revenue of the Railway whereas the expenses as regard the project casual labourers are borne from the Capital Fund provided by the Government of India. The petitioner has also claimed and asserted that the relevant provisions in present petitions are to be found in para 2001 of IREM 1990 (Vol. II). The said assertion has not been denied by the respondents. Thus this Court will proceed to examine the matter on the premise that the provisions contained in IREM 1990 (Vol. II) and in particular para 2001 thereof are relevant and applicable in present case. II). The said assertion has not been denied by the respondents. Thus this Court will proceed to examine the matter on the premise that the provisions contained in IREM 1990 (Vol. II) and in particular para 2001 thereof are relevant and applicable in present case. 3.3 Thus the nature of jobs required to be performed by said 2 categories of Casual Labourers are broadly distinguished and there exists distinction between the nature of jobs preferred by said 2 categories of Casual Labourers. 3.4 It emerges from the record that at one point of time the Railway Administration decided to grant, subject to the specified conditions and requirements, "temporary status" to the Project Casual Labourers and after certain deliberations, a scheme was framed which provided that the Project Casual Labourers who were in service as on 1.1.1984 and who had completed work for 360 days would be granted "temporary status." 3.5 It appears that some of the persons felt aggrieved by various provisions of the scheme and therefore they challenged the same. 3.6 Ultimately the dispute was taken up before Hon'ble Apex Court Hon'ble Apex Court, after considering the dispute and the scheme, directed certain modifications in the said scheme. The decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case between Inder Pal Yadav and others v. Union of India is reported in 1985 (II) SCC 648 . One of the modifications directed by Hon'ble Apex Court was that the scheme should be made applicable to the Project Casual Labourers with effect from 1.1.1981 (instead of 1.1.1984) i.e. should be available to the employees who were in service as on 1.1.1981. 3.7 The petitioner claims that the necessary modifications as per the direction of the Hon'ble Apex Court came to be made by Railway Establishment by issuing circular dated 11.9.1986. 3.8 It is claimed that as a result of this policy approximately 60% of the Project Casual Labourers became eligible for the said benefit i.e. "temporary status." 3.9 It is the case of the petitioner that as per the modified scheme the temporary status was to be given to the Project Casual Labourers in phased manner. According to the petitioner the concerned 90 persons (i.e. the respondents) were covered under the scheme and that therefore they were granted temporary status in accordance with the provisions of the scheme read with the circular dated 11.9.1986. According to the petitioner the concerned 90 persons (i.e. the respondents) were covered under the scheme and that therefore they were granted temporary status in accordance with the provisions of the scheme read with the circular dated 11.9.1986. Consequently the benefit came to be granted to them with effect from 1.1.1981. 3.10 The concerned 90 respondents were, however aggrieved by the action of the petitioner of granting the benefit with effect from 1.1.1981 and that therefore they raised a claim that they should be granted the benefit from date on which they completed 120 days of service as they were working as Project Casual Labourers since long time and therefore they were entitled for "temporary status" much earlier (i.e. when they completed 120 days of service). 3.11 The concerned 90 respondents took their grievance and their claim before the labour Court Ahmedabad by preferring applications under Section 33 (C) (2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). The said applications came to be registered as application Nos. 2023 of 1995 to 2112 of 1995. It is in the said applications that the impugned common order has been passed by the labour Court. The labour Court has by the impugned judgment, directed the petitioner to pay the benefits on the basis of "temporary status" to each of the concerned 90 applicants from the date on which they completed 360 days of service after their initial appointment (and not upon completion of 120 days of service as claimed by them). The other claims regarding permanency etc. have not been granted by the Court. 3.12 The petitioner is aggrieved by the said directions granting benefits to concerned workmen from the date when they completed 360 days of service and approached this Court. 4. Mr. Shastri learned advocate has appeared for the petitioner and Mr. P.H. Pathak learned advocate has appeared for the respondents. Heard learned advocate for the parties. 5. Mr. Shastri learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that he relies on the memo of petition and raises the contentions mentioned therein. 4. Mr. Shastri learned advocate has appeared for the petitioner and Mr. P.H. Pathak learned advocate has appeared for the respondents. Heard learned advocate for the parties. 5. Mr. Shastri learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that he relies on the memo of petition and raises the contentions mentioned therein. On perusal of the petition memo it comes out that the crux of the contentions is that the impugned order is without jurisdiction and authority in law and that the concerned persons did not have any pre-existing right or crystallized claim which could have been placed before the labour Court with a request for order for appropriate direction in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33 (C) (2) of the Act. The labour Court has failed to appreciate that the nature of proceedings under Section 33(C)(2) of the Act are in the nature of execution proceedings and that therefore the impugned order is without jurisdiction and authority in law. Mr. Shastri learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had relied on certain judgments before the learned trial Court viz the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in case between Inderpal Yadav and others (supra) and the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in case between Controller of Defence Accounts Dehradun & ors v. Dhani Ram & ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 2650 : (2007 Lab IC 3259). He submitted that he relies on same judgment. 6. Per contra Mr. P.H. Pathak learned advocate for the respondents submitted that besides the scheme the status of the concerned persons is recognised by virtue of the provisions in the manual and that therefore the rights of the concerned respondent flows from the manual itself. Beside this, the right also flows from the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and that therefore petitioner is not right in claiming that the concerned respondent did not have pre-existing right or crystallized claim which could have been entertained under Section 33(C)(2) of the Act. Mr. P.H. Pathak learned advocate for the respondents vehemently supported the order of the labour Court and submitted that the order is legal, just and proper and does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction and it does not warrant any interference. Mr. P.H. Pathak learned advocate for the respondents vehemently supported the order of the labour Court and submitted that the order is legal, just and proper and does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction and it does not warrant any interference. He relied upon judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case between Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd., and another reported in AIR 1999 SC 1351 : (1999 Lab IC 1435). Since any contention on the ground of limitation in preferring the application before the labour Court had not been ever urged against the claim the said judgment would not be applicable. Mr. P.H. Pathak learned advocate for the respondents also relied upon the judgment in case between L Robert D'souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway & another reported in 1982 (1) SCC 645 : (1982 Lab IC 811) and urged that person rendering more than 6 months continuous service as peon/lascar in construction division and not in any Project of Railway would be temporary workman and not a Casual Labourer and that such person is entitled to the temporary status automatically on his completing specified length of service as per the manual. Mr. P.H. Pathak learned advocate for the respondents has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon,ble Supreme Court in case between The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan etc., reported in 1964 SC 743 so as to substantiate his contention that the labour Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the workman has right to receive benefits or not, even if the right to benefit is disputed by the employer. 7. Except the aforesaid submissions no other submissions have been raised. 8. At the outset it deserves to be noted that the claimants had approached the Court with application under Section 33 (C)(2) and the said provision confers limited jurisdiction on the Court, which is akin to the execution proceedings and in such proceedings the labour Court cannot adjudicate and/or determine the respective rights and obligations of the parties but can execute pre-existing right and/or crystallised claim. 9. So far as the present case is concerned, it is not in dispute between the parties that the concerned persons are "Project Casual Labourers. 9. So far as the present case is concerned, it is not in dispute between the parties that the concerned persons are "Project Casual Labourers. The concerned persons approached the labour Court claiming that they were working with the opponent i.e. present petitioner since last about 10 years and that they have been conferred with the temporary status, w.e.f. 1.1.1981 however such benefits ought to be granted on completion of 120 days as per the provisions in the manual but the opponent i.e petitioner granted such benefits with much delay. On such allegations the concerned persons claimed the benefits with effect from completion of 120 days of service from date of their initial joining. The workmen also claimed other benefits like permanency etc. however such other benefits have been denied by the Court and such denial has not been challenged by the workmen. 10. It transpires from the record that after considering rival contentions the labour Court had framed 2 issues viz whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim and whether the applicants proved that they were eligible to receive benefits claimed in the application. On the first issue regarding jurisdiction, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to decide the claim and on the second issue the Court held that the persons were entitled for the benefits upon their completing service of 360 days. 11. At this stage it should be noted that the persons claimed the right and the benefits upon completion of 120 days of service from the date of joining whereas the labour Court has held that they are entitled for such benefits upon completion of 360 days of service and not 120 days of service as claimed by them. 12. The labour Court has recorded in the judgment that "The applicants claim for claiming the benefits for T.S. is based on the guideline issued by the Railway Administration by circular dated 11.9.1986 by R.B. No. 167 of 86 which is issued as per the directions contending in the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Inderpal Yadav v. Union of India." Thus, even according to the labour Court the base of the respondent's claim was "the scheme framed by Railway Administration" for the "Project Casual Labour". From the said observation of the learned trial Court in opening part of para 9 of the impugned judgment it becomes clear that claimants advanced the claim on the basis of 11.9.1986 circular and that even the learned trial Court has granted the benefit by construing and applying the provision of 11.9.1986 circular and this aspect becomes clear from the learned Court's observation in para 11 which reads thus :- "Therefore in totality of circumstances, and more particularly since it is undisputed that the employees applicants are eligible to receive T.S. benefits on the completion of 360 days even as per the scheme framed by the opponent itself. There is no reason not to accept the claim of the applicant which is in my view is their existing right and they have successfully proved their eligibility." 13. It is pertinent that the original scheme was modified by the Railway Administration pursuant to the the direction of Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment in case of Inderpal Yadav V/s. Union of India (reported in 1985 (2) SCC page 648). The earlier scheme was circulated by circular dated 1.6.1984. The relevant provision was incorporated in para No. 5.1 of said circular dated 1.6.1984 which read thus :- "5.1. As a result of such deliberations the Ministry of Railways have now decided in principle that casual labour employed on project (also known as 'project casual labour') may be treated as temporary on completion of 360 days of continuous employment. The Ministry have decided further as under : (a) These orders will cover: (i) Casual labour on projects who are in service as on 1.1.84; and (ii) Casual labour on projects who, though not in service on 1.1.84, had been in service on Railways earlier and had already completed the above prescribed period (360 days) of continuous employment or will complete the said prescribed period of continuous employment on re-engagement in future.(A detailed letter regarding this group follows). (b) The decision should be implemented in phases according to the schedule given below : Length of service (i.e. continuous employment) Date from which may be treated as temporary Date by which decision should be implemented (i) Those who have completed five years of service as on January 1, 1984 January 1, 1984 December 31, 1984 (ii) Those who have completed three years of service as on January 1, 1984 January 1, 1985 December 31, 1985 (iii) Those who have completed 360 days but less than three years of service on January 1, 1984 January 1, 1986 December 31, 1986 (iv) Those who complete 360 days after January 1, 1984 January 1, 1987 or the date on which 360 days are completed whichever is later March 31, 1987 14. The Hon'ble Apex Court examined the aforesaid provision and observed, in para 5 & 6, as follows :- "5. The Scheme envisages that it would be applicable to casual labour on projects who were in service as on January 1, 1984. The choice of this date does not commend to us, for it is likely to introduce an invidious distinction between similarly situated persons and expose some workmen to arbitrary discrimination flowing from fortuitous court's order. To illustrate, in some matters, the court granted interim stay before the workmen could be retrenched while some other were not so fortunate. Those in respect of whom the court granted interim relief by stay/suspension of the order of retrenchment, they would be treated in service on 1.1.1984 while others who fail to obtain interim relief though similarly situated would be pushed down in the implementation of the Scheme. There is another area where discrimination is likely to rear its ugly head. These workmen come from the lowest grade of railway service. They can ill afford to rush to court. Their Federations have hardly been of any assistance. They had individually to collect money and rush to court which in case of some may be beyond their reach. Therefore, some of the retrenched workmen failed to knock at the doors of the court of justice because these doors do not open unless huge expenses are incurred. Choice in such a situation, even without crystal gazing is between incurring expenses for a litigation with uncertain outcome and hunger from day to day. It is a Hobson's choice. Therefore, some of the retrenched workmen failed to knock at the doors of the court of justice because these doors do not open unless huge expenses are incurred. Choice in such a situation, even without crystal gazing is between incurring expenses for a litigation with uncertain outcome and hunger from day to day. It is a Hobson's choice. Therefore, those who could not come to the court need not be at a comparative disadvantage to those who rushed in here. If they are otherwise similarly situated, they are entitled to similar treatment if not by anyone else at the hands of this Court. Burdened by all these relevant considerations and keeping in view all the aspects of the matter, we would modify part 5.1 (a) (i) by modifying the date from 1.1.1984 to 1.1.1981. With this modification and consequent rescheduling in absorption from that date onward,the Scheme framed by Railway Ministry is accepted and a direction is given that it must be implemented by re-casting the stages consistent with the change in the date as herein directed. (emphasis supplied) 6. To avoid violation of Article 14, the scientific and equitable way if implementing the scheme is for the Railway administration to prepare, a list of project casual labour with reference to each division of each railway and then start absorbing those with the longest service. If in the process any adjustments are necessary, the same must be done. In giving this direction, we are considerably influenced by the statutory recognition of a principle well known in industrial jurisprudence that the men with longest service shall have priority over those who have joined later on. In other words, the principle of last come first go or to reverse it first come last go as enunciated in Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been accepted. We direct accordingly. 15. In view of the said directions by the Hon'ble Apex Court the said provision came to be modified by circular dated 11.9.1986. The modified paragraph No. 5.1 in the Circular dated 11.9.1986 thus: "5.1 As a result of such deliberations, the Ministry of Railways have now decided in principle that casual labour employed on projects (also known as "Project casual labour") may be treated as temporary (temporary status) on completion of 360 days of continuous employment. The modified paragraph No. 5.1 in the Circular dated 11.9.1986 thus: "5.1 As a result of such deliberations, the Ministry of Railways have now decided in principle that casual labour employed on projects (also known as "Project casual labour") may be treated as temporary (temporary status) on completion of 360 days of continuous employment. The Ministry have decided further as under:- (a) These orders will cover:- (i) Casual labour on projects who were in service as on 1.1.1981; and (ii) casual labour on projects, who though not in service on 1.1.1981, had been in service on Railways earlier and had already completed the above prescribed period (360 days) of continuous employment or have since completed or will complete the said prescribed period of continuous employment on re-engagement after 1.1.1981. (b) The decision should be implemented in a phase manner according to the schedule given below : Sr. No. Length of service (i.e. continuous employment) Date from which may be treated as temporary (temporary status 1. Those who have completed five years of service as on 1.1.1981 1.1.1981 2. Those who have completed 3 years but less than 5 years of service as on 1.1.1981 1.1.1982 3. Those who have completed 360 days but less than 3 years of service as on 1.1.1981 1.1.1983 4. Those who complete 360 days after 1.1.1981 1.1.1984 or the date on which 360 days are completed whichever is later. 16. So as to appreciate the contentions and objections of the petitioner against the impugned judgment of labour Court, it is necessary to read para 1 and 2 of the Hon'ble Apex Court's judgment in the case of Inderpal (supra) which read thus : "1. Articles 41 and 42 of the Constitution notwithstanding, there are certain grey areas where the rule of hire and fire, a legacy of laissez-faire even in Government employment still rules the roost. Casual labour employed on projects also known as 'projects casual labour' is one such segment of employment where one may serve for years and remain a daily rated worker without a weekly off, without any security of service, without the protection of equal pay for equal work.In short at the sweet will and mercy of the local satraps. Even the formidable railwaymen's unions least cared for these helpless and hapless workmen. Even the formidable railwaymen's unions least cared for these helpless and hapless workmen. Suddenly a torrent of writ petitions and petitions for special leave awakened this Court to the plight of these workmen. In quick succession, 48 writ petitions and 32 petitions for special leave flooded this Court. In each writ petition / S.L.P., the grievance was that even though the workmen styled as 'project casual labour' had put in continuous service for years on end to wit ranging from 1974 till 1983, yet their services were terminated with impunity under the specious plea that the project on which they were employed has been wound up on its completion and their services were no more needed. No one is unaware of the fact that Railway Ministry has a perspective plan spreading over years say decades and projects are waiting in queue for execution and year these workmen were shunted out (to use a cliche from the railway vocabulary) without any chance of being re-employed. Some of them rushed to the court and obtained interim relief. Some were not so fortunate. At one stage some of these petitions were set down for final hearing and the judgment was reserved. When some other similar matters came up, Mr. K.G. Bhagat, the then learned Additional Solicitor General, requested the Court not to render the judgment because he would take up the matter with the Railway Ministry to find a just and humane solution affecting the livelihood of these unfortunate workmen. As the future of lakhs of workmen going under the label of casual project labour was likely to be affected, we repeatedly adjourned these matters to enable the Railway Ministry to work out a scientific scheme. 2. Railway Ministry framed a Scheme and circulated the same amongst others to all the General Managers of Indian Railways including production units as per its circular No. E(NG)II/84/CL/41 dated June 1, 1984. In the Scheme it was stated that all the General Managers were directed to implement the decision of the Railway Ministry by the target dates It was further stated that a detailed letter regarding group 5 1(ii) would follow. Such a letter was issued on June 25, 1984. Thereafter, these matters were set out for examining the fairness and justness of the Scheme and whether the Court would be in a position to dispose of these petitions in view of the Scheme. Such a letter was issued on June 25, 1984. Thereafter, these matters were set out for examining the fairness and justness of the Scheme and whether the Court would be in a position to dispose of these petitions in view of the Scheme. That is how these matters came up before us. (emphasis supplied) 17. From the reading of para 1 and 2 with paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and para 2001 to 2004 of IREM 1990 (Vol-II) read with the scheme it appears that prior to the formation of the scheme probably there was no provision for automatic conferment of "temporary status" upon completion of service of particular number of days/years and such concept was introduced only by the scheme. 18. From the award it emerges that apparently the basis of the claim of the respondents is the scheme framed by the Railway Administration. This position is recognised by the learned trial Court also in the impugned order. It, however, would not be out of place to take into account the relevant provisions in the manual i.e. IREM which are addressed to the Project Casual Labourers. As noticed at the outset, the relevant provisions on which, as observed in the award, the claimants placed reliance and which have been referred to by the leaned tribunal also, are to be found in para 2001 of IREM 1990 (Vol. II). The petitioner has produced a copy of the said provisions at annexure-B page 35. The relevant provisions read thus : CASUAL LABOUR 2001(i) Definition of Casual Labour-Casual Labour refers to labour whose employment is intermittent, sporadic or extends over short periods or continued from one work to another. Labour of this kind is normally recruited from the nearest available source. They are not ordinarily liable to transfer. The conditions applicable to permanent and temporary staff do not apply to casual labour. Casual Labour on Railways should ordinarily be employed only in the following types of cases. (a)"Casual Labour (open line)"..... (b) Casual Labour (Project)- Casual Labour are also engaged on Railways for execution of railway projects, such as new lines, doubling, conversion, construction of buildings, track renewals, Route Relay Interlocking Railway Electrification, setting up of new units etc. Casual Labour so engaged are referred to as 'Project Casual Labour'. (a)"Casual Labour (open line)"..... (b) Casual Labour (Project)- Casual Labour are also engaged on Railways for execution of railway projects, such as new lines, doubling, conversion, construction of buildings, track renewals, Route Relay Interlocking Railway Electrification, setting up of new units etc. Casual Labour so engaged are referred to as 'Project Casual Labour'. Such of those casual labour engaged on open line (revenue) works, who continue to do the same work for which they were engaged or other work of the same type for more than 120 days without a break will be treated as temporary (i.e. given 'temporary status') on completion of 120 days of continuous employment. Casual Labour on projects who have put in 180 days of continuous employment on works of the same type are entitled for 1/30th of the minimum of the appropriate scale of pay plus dearness allowance. Before giving regular scale of pay or 1/30th of the minimum of the scale plus dearness allowance on completion of 120 days or 180 days continuous employment as the case may be, a preliminary verification in regard to age and completion of requisite number of days of continuous service should be done by the Assistant Officer and the person should also be got medically examined and only if found fit he should be granted regular scales of pay. (ii) Grant of temporary status to project casual labour is regularised by instructions separately issued by the Railway Board. As far as possible, casual labourers required for new projects must be taken from amongst those casual labourers, who have worked on the open line/projects in the past in preference to outsiders. (iii) Seasonal Labour.... 19. Now it can be noticed that the above referred provisions in the manual do not very expressly provide that any "Project Casual Labourer" who completes service for 360 days will be automatically entitled for temporary status. Further, the said provision permits temporary status on completion of 120 days continuous employment to "casual labour on open line (revenue)" and not to "casual labour project" i.e. project casual labour for whom there is separate provision which prescribes 1/30th of the minimum of appropriate pay scale on completion of 180 days. These aspects are not addressed in the impugned order. 20. These aspects are not addressed in the impugned order. 20. The petitioner has assailed the order on the ground that there was no "pre-existing right" in favour of the respondents to claim the benefit from period prior to 1.1.1981 and from the date or point of time when they completed service for 120 days as claimed by them, or 360 days as granted by the Court. 21. The labour Court has held that since the administration framed and brought in effect the scheme, it can be held that there was pre-existing right in favour of the claimants. Thus according to the labour Court the scheme furnished pre-existing right. As such, to this extent the said conclusion of the labour Court cannot be said to be incorrect or erroneous. The scheme did confer a right in favour of the claimants. This aspect of the matter is fortified by the action of the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner has implemented the scheme qua the claimants as well and has granted the benefit of "temporary status" w.e.f. 1.1.1981 which led the Court, and rightly so, that even the petitioner i.e. Railway Administration accepted that the scheme conferred right in favour of the claimants. Hence, from the relevant date i.e. with effect from the date on which the scheme came in operation, there did exist a right in favour of the claimants and thereafter i.e. from the succeeding date it would get converted into pre-existing right. However that would be so only to the extent of the rights provided for and granted by virtue of the scheme and do not go beyond the provisions of the scheme. The point at which the claim goes out of the area available under the scheme, it ceases to be "existing right". Consequently the view and decision of the labour Court to the extent it holds that the scheme provided a right in favour of the workman and therefore on the date of application (which was subsequent to the date of the scheme) there was a pre-existing right in favour of the workmen/claimants cannot be termed as in correct. However the labour Court seems to have crossed this boundary and gone beyond that while adjudicating the matter and when it granted the relief which has been granted by the impugned award i.e. conferring the temporary status from a date anterior to the effective date prescribed by the scheme. However the labour Court seems to have crossed this boundary and gone beyond that while adjudicating the matter and when it granted the relief which has been granted by the impugned award i.e. conferring the temporary status from a date anterior to the effective date prescribed by the scheme. 22. The question before the labour Court, under Section 33 (C) (2) would be only of construing the provisions and converting them into tangible/monetary benefit but beyond that, the exercise would become process of adjudication and determination of rights and obligations, which is impermissible and beyond scope of Section 33 (C) (2). 23. This position is explained and illustrated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment in the case between Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak reported in 1995 Lab. I.C. 330. Wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos. 12-13 held that : "12.The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefitis disputed, there being, no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under Section 33 - C (2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33- C(2) like that of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. 13. In these matters, the claim of the respondent-workmen who were all daily-rated/casual workers, to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workers, had not been earlier settled by adjudication or recognition by the employer without which the stage for computation of that benefit could not reach. 13. In these matters, the claim of the respondent-workmen who were all daily-rated/casual workers, to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workers, had not been earlier settled by adjudication or recognition by the employer without which the stage for computation of that benefit could not reach. The workmen's claim of doing the same kind of work and their entitlement to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workmen on the principle of "equal pay for equal work" being disputed, without an adjudication of their dispute resulting in acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33- C(2). The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the claim of entitlement to the benefit before computation of such a benefit could be sought. Respondents' claim is not based on a prior adjudication made in the writ petitions filed by some other workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an adjudication enuring to the benefit of these respondents as well. The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some reference was casually made, particulars of which are not available in these matters, have, therefore, no relevance for the present purpose. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court as well as the High Court were in error in treating as maintainable the applications made Linder Section 33-C(2) of the Act by these respondents. 24. In present case the labour Court has granted benefit from the date prior to the effective date mentioned in the scheme framed/modified as per the direction of the Hon'ble Apex Court. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 33 (C) (2) the Court could not have granted any benefit beyond the terms of the scheme. The labour Court has also overlooked the point that any benefit which would be dehors the scheme could not have been granted and/or made available to the claimants in exercise of power under Section 33 (C) (2) of the Act. As per the scheme it was to become effective from 1.1.1981 and in phased manner. The labour Court has also overlooked the point that any benefit which would be dehors the scheme could not have been granted and/or made available to the claimants in exercise of power under Section 33 (C) (2) of the Act. As per the scheme it was to become effective from 1.1.1981 and in phased manner. Despite such clear specification and restriction inbuilt and inherent in the scheme, the claimants demanded the benefit from period prior to 1.1.1981 and by virtue of the impugned directions the learned Court has directed, in substance and in effect, that the benefit flowing from the scheme should be granted from a date/period anterior to 1.1.1981. Thus, the benefit is granted/extended dehors the scheme inasmuch as the said benefit, for the period prior to the effective date (i.e. 1.1.1981) would not, be and cannot be termed as, an existing right since it came in existence only from 1.1.1981. The direction given by the learned labour Court will obliterate and make redundant the provision in clause (b) of para 5.1 and also the phases-schedule mentioned in and provided under the said clause. Such direction could not have been granted in exercise of power under Section 33 (C) (2) of the Act. Differently put, any direction such as the impugned direction cannot be granted without undertaking adjudication process and without determining respective rights and obligations. 25. Further the labour Court has also missed the point that any duly and legally established cogent evidence, to conclusively demonstrate that each of the concerned 90 persons had completed 360 days of service (on the date alleged in the application and/or accepted/mentioned by the labour Court in the order) was not available on record. Besides this though the issue as to the date on which each of the applicants might have, as alleged by them, completed 360 days of service is an issue of fact and should have been established by proper evidence, the labour Court has merely on the basis of evidence of 2 persons presumed without any proper evidence that each one of them had completed service of 360 days on the dates alleged and/or accepted and mentioned by the labour Court. Without there being any cogent evidence, acceptable and tenable in law, labour Court could not have proceeded on the basis of presumption. Without there being any cogent evidence, acceptable and tenable in law, labour Court could not have proceeded on the basis of presumption. From the perusal of award it does not emerge that there was any material on record which could have led the Court safely to such conclusion and/or which would justify such conclusion in respect of all 90 persons. In view of this Court such presumption, without any evidence to support it, cannot be sustained. Even to this Court any material from the record is not shown on which Court can rely and accept the claim about continuous employment for 360 days and/or other requirements. The impugned direction, to the aforesaid extent, therefore, deserves to be set aside and is hereby accordingly set aside. 26. In light of the foregoing discussion and in view of the fats and circumstances of the case, the captioned petitions, with the aforesaid clarifications and directions, are partly allowed. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs. Patition partially allowed