JUDGMENT (Para 8) Govada (Para 8) These two revisions are between the same parties, and arise out of the execution proceedings in O.S.No.148 of 1990. Hence, they are disposed of through common judgment. 2. The array of the parties is identical in both the revisions. Respondents 1 to 5 filed O.S.No.148 of 1990 in the Court of Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati, against the petitioner and respondent No.7, for recovery of Rs.51 ,928/-. The suit was decreed on 26-12-1995. After the decree became final, the respondents 1 to 5 filed E.P.No.40 of 1996. About Ac. 4.50 cents of land in Sy.No.48/2 of Durgasamudram village, Tirupati Rural Mandai, owned by the petitioner, was attached. Subsequently, it was brought to sale. The 6th respondent, by name, Y. Rajesh, emerged as the highest bidder for a sum of Rs.2,66,000/- in the auction, conducted on 17-02-2002. The amount was deposited and. the sale was confirmed on 13-07-2004. A sale certificate was issued on 09-08-2004. 3. The 6th respondent, i.e. the auction purchaser filed E.A.No.37 of 2007 under 18 Rule 95 of Order 21 C.P.C., for delivery of the property, purchased in the Court auction. The application was resisted on several grounds, including the one, of limitation. It was ordered .on 27-02-2007. The matter underwent several adjournments, and the delivery of possession could not be effected. The 6:0 respondent filed E.A.No. 453 of 2007 under Section 151 C.P.C., with a prayer to direct the Tahsildar, Tirupati Rural Mandai, to depute a Mandai Surveyor to assist the Court Al')1in, in delivering the possession of property. On 27-03-2008, the Executing Court noted that delivery warrant issued on 27-02-2007 was not returned and accordingly directed that warrant be issued once again for delivery of possession of property and that the matter be reported on 17-04-2007. C.R.P.No. 1589 of 2008 is filed against the docket order dated 27-03-2008 in E.A. No. 453 of 2007. 4. After filing that revision, the petitioner realized that the actual direction for delivery of possession was issued in E.A.No. 37 of 2007 on 27-02-2007, and that the same needs to be challenged. He filed revision with delay against that order. On condonation of the delay, it is numbered as C.R.P. No. 2634 of 2009. 5. The common question that is urged in these two revisions is mainly the one, relating to limitation in filling the application under Rule 95 of Order 21 C.P.C. 6. He filed revision with delay against that order. On condonation of the delay, it is numbered as C.R.P. No. 2634 of 2009. 5. The common question that is urged in these two revisions is mainly the one, relating to limitation in filling the application under Rule 95 of Order 21 C.P.C. 6. Sri V. Jagapathi, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that whether one goes by the date of sale, confirmation of sale or date on which the sale certificate was issued the E.A37 of 2007 filed by the 6th respondent is barred by limitation, stipulated under Article 134 of Schedule to the Limitation Act, and that it ought not to have been entertained. He contends that though appeal and revision are filed against the sale of the property, no interim or final relief was granted therein and there did not exist any factor, to arrest the running of limitation. He submits that the 6th respondent categorically stated in his application, that C.M.A.No.26 of 2004 filed by the petitioner was dismissed on 28-06-2004 (sic. 13-11-2007), and despite the same, he filed the revision on 02-01-2007, nearly 21/2 years after the dismissal of the C.M.A. 7. Learned counsel further submits that there was no justification for the Executing Court to sell the entire property, which is of the value of more than RS.10 lakhs, for recovery of a sum of, less than RS.1 lakh. He places reliance upon the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Balakrishnan v. Malaiyandi Konarj 2006 (2) SCJ 671 = (2006) 3 SCC 49 = 2006 (3) ALT 5.3 (DNSC). 8. Sri M. Surender Rao, learned counsel for the 6th respondent, on the other hand, submits that the sale becomes absolute only after the appeal and revision, if any, filed against the order passed by the Executing Court, refusing to set aside the sale, are disposed of. He contends that the petitioner filed EA No. 446 of 2002, with a prayer to set aside the sale, and after it was dismissed on 28-06-2004, he filed C.IVL A.No. 26 of 2004. It is stated that the Appellate Court dismissed the C.M.A., on 13-11-2007, and thereupon, the petitioner filed the C.R.P. No. 1589 of 2008, Before this Court, which, in turn, was dismissed on' 15-03-2008. It is stated that the Appellate Court dismissed the C.M.A., on 13-11-2007, and thereupon, the petitioner filed the C.R.P. No. 1589 of 2008, Before this Court, which, in turn, was dismissed on' 15-03-2008. Learned counsel contends that if' these developments are taken into account, the sale can 5e said to have assumed finality, only with the dismissal of the C.R.P., and viewed in that context, it cannot be said that the application filed by his client is barred by limitation. He places reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rama Krishna Rao v. Chellayamma AIR 1953 SC 425 , and a judgment rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court in Kuchanpudi Sundararamaraju v. Gavada Parandhamayya 1969 An.W.R. 498. 9. The relevant facts, that gave rise to the filing of these revisions, have been stated in the preceding paragraphs. The sale of the property, owned by the petitioner, took place on 17-06-2002. The decretal amount, as on the date of filing of the E.P., was, RS.76,868/-. The 6th respondent emerged as the highest bidder for a sum of Rs.2,66,000/-. The petitioner filed EA No. 446 of 2002 with a prayer to set aside the sale. That application was dismissed on 28-06-2004. Thereupon, the petitioner filed C.M.A. No. 26 of 2004 before the Appellate Court. He also filed IA No. 1261 of 2004 for stay. Since no relief was granted in the I.A., the Executing Court proceeded to confirm the sale, on 13-7-2004. This was followed by issuance of sale certificate, on 09-08-2004. Long thereafter, the C.M.A. was dismissed on 13-07-2007. A revision filed by the 6th respondent (sic. petitioner) against the order in C.M.A was dismissed on 15-03-2008. No interim order was passed therein. 10. The record discloses that E.A. No. 37 of 2007 was filed by the 6th respondent, even while C.MANo. 26 of 2007 (sic. 2004) was pending. 11. The principal contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is, about limitation. Under the Limitation Act, 1908, (for short 'the 1908 Act'), the time for filing an application for delivery of possession under Rule 95 of Order 21 of C.P.C. was three years. Under the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'the 1063 Act'), it is reduced to one year. The time under both the provisions begins to run, from the date on which, 'the sale becomes absolute'. Judicial opinion differed, as regards interpretation of this phrase. Under the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'the 1063 Act'), it is reduced to one year. The time under both the provisions begins to run, from the date on which, 'the sale becomes absolute'. Judicial opinion differed, as regards interpretation of this phrase. The predominant opinion was to the effect that, if the auction sale is the subject matter of various proceedings before different Courts, it can be said to have become absolute, only on conclusion thereof. In some cases directly, and in others, indirectly, it was pointed out that the date of confirmation of sale, on issuance of sale certificate, by the Executing Court cannot be treated as conclusive, in this regard. 12. In Rama Krishna Rao's case (supra), the question did not arise directly, and it was discussed as one of the subsidiary or secondary issues. The observations made by their Lordships was more in the form of obiter dicta, than ratio decidendi. The reason appears to be that, the main case was decided on a different issue. The context in which the issue was discussed and the observations made on the issue can be gathered from the following paragraphs of that judgment: "Para-11: At this stage, it will be useful to refer to certain provisions of Civil P.C., which directly bear on the question as to when title to immovable property which is sold in execution of a decree is deemed to pass to the purchaser. One of the provisions is Order 21, Rule 92, which provides that "where no application is made under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute." The second relevant provision is Section 65 (which?) runs thus: "Where immovable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute..." 13. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Privy Council in Chandra Mani Saha v. Anarjan Bibi AIR 1934 Privy Council 134. It needs to be noted that the expressions such as, "generally speaking", or that "the position seems to be", would indicate what is observed is something short of authoritative proposition. 14. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Privy Council in Chandra Mani Saha v. Anarjan Bibi AIR 1934 Privy Council 134. It needs to be noted that the expressions such as, "generally speaking", or that "the position seems to be", would indicate what is observed is something short of authoritative proposition. 14. This Court in Kuchanpudi Sundararamaraju's case (supra), explained the position of law, in the following paragraph: "Therefore, it is well settled that a Court sale does not become absolute by the mere reason of an order confirming the sale under Order 21, Rule 92(1), Civil Procedure Code, but is becomes absolute only when the proceedings initiated to set aside the Court sale or the confirmation of the sale terminate. In other words where there is an appeal from the order of the Subordinate Judge disallowing the application to set aside the sale, the sale will not become absolute within the meaning of Article 180. Limitation Act, until the disposal of the appeal even though the Subordinate Judge may have confirmed the sale as he was bound to do when he dismissed the application for setting aside the sale vide Chandramani Saha v. Anarjan Bibi (AIR 1934 P.V. 134)". 15. The three precedents referred to above were rendered in relation to the cases to which the 1908 Act applied. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of the fact that the Parliament felt that there is adequate justification warranting reduction of period of limitation from three years, under Article 180 of 1908 Act, to one year, under Article 134 of the 1963 Act. It was also observed that the intervening circumstances, that may result in delay in issuance of sale certificate, cannot be taken as the basis for enlargement of limitation, or to relocate the starting point for computation of limitation. In Balakrishnan v. Malaiyandi Konar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "Para-13: The limitation for the purpose of Article 134 starts from the date of confirmation of sale. (See Ganpat Singh v. Kailash Shankar (1987) 3 SCC 146 ). In Pattam Khader Khan v. Pattam Sardar Khan [ (1996) 5 SCC 48 ] this Court held that it is not from the date when sale certificate is issued that the limitation starts running. The sale becomes absolute on confirmation under Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code effectively passing title. In Pattam Khader Khan v. Pattam Sardar Khan [ (1996) 5 SCC 48 ] this Court held that it is not from the date when sale certificate is issued that the limitation starts running. The sale becomes absolute on confirmation under Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code effectively passing title. It cannot be said to attain finality only when sale certificate is issued under Order 21 Rule 94. There can be variety of factors conceivable for which delay can be caused in issuing a sale certificate. The period of one-year limitation now prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act in substitution of a three year period prescribed under Article 180 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is reflective of the legislative policy of finalizing proceedings in execution as quickly as possible by providing a quick forum to the auction-purchaser to ask for the delivery of possession of the property purchased within that period from the date of the sale becoming absolute rather than from the date of issuance of the sale certificate. On his failure to avail such a quick remedy the law relegates him to the remedy of a regular suit for possession based on title, subject again to limitation." 16. With this authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, virtually nothing further remains to be examined, except that the situation may be slightly different, if the sale is stayed by a superior Court in an appeal or a revision. Here again, it needs to be noted that the stay, if any, granted by a superior Court may disable the Executing Court to proceed further, and it hardly comes in the way of the auction-purchaser to file an application for delivery of possession. 17. The sale, in the instant case, was confirmed on 13-07-2004 and the sale 21 certificate was issued on 09-08-2004. Either way, the application ought to have been filed by 9th of August, 2005. However it was presented on 27-01-2007. 18. Assuming that the observations made by the Supreme Court in Rama Krishna Rao's case (supra), constitute ratio, and still hold the field, they can be applied only to cases where the auction purchaser felt himself incapacitated, on account of pendency of proceedings initiated by the judgment-debtor. The logical extension of such situation must be, that he must wait till the proceedings assume finality. The logical extension of such situation must be, that he must wait till the proceedings assume finality. In this case it is noteworthy, that the sale itself was confirmed after dismissal of E.A. No. 446 of 2002, filed by the Petitioner for setting aside the sale, and dismissal of• IA No.1261 of 2004 in C.MANo.26 of 2004. To be precise, the sale was held on 17-06-2002, E.A.No.446 of 2002 was dismissed on 28-06-2004, I.A.No.1261 of 2004 was dismissed shortly thereafter, and the sale was confirmed on 13-07-2004. About a month later, the sale certificate was issued. E.A.,No.37 of 2007 was filed, at a time when C.M.A.No. 26 of 2004 was very much pending. It means, that the petitioner was of the view that mere pendency of an appeal, without there being an interim order in it, is not an impediment for filing an application for delivery of possession. Therefore, it is too late in the day for the 6th respondent to contend that filing of C.M.A. No. 26 of 2004 by the petitioner and thereafter a revision before this Court could have the effect of shifting the starting point for computation of limitation. As a matter of fact, there is a clear self-contradiction. 19. There would have been a chance for the 6th respondent to drive home the point urged by him to a level of success, if only he presented the application under Rule 95 of Order 21 C.P.C., after the revision filed by the petitioner was dismissed, on 15-03-2008. Having filed that application, even while the G.M.A. was pending, and much before the C.R.P. was presented, he cannot plead that the sale did not assume finality till the disposal of the revision. If that were to be so, his application ought to have been rejected as premature, and the various orders passed on it cannot be sustained in law. Either way, the orders under revision are liable to be set aside. 20. The second point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Executing Court has chosen to put the large extent of property to sale, though a part of it is sufficient to meet the liability under the decree. This plea has a strong foundation. Either way, the orders under revision are liable to be set aside. 20. The second point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Executing Court has chosen to put the large extent of property to sale, though a part of it is sufficient to meet the liability under the decree. This plea has a strong foundation. The Executing Courts are under obligation to ensure that only such extent of property attached in a decree, as is sufficient to meet the liability under the decree, is brought to sale. Selling of large extents of property, whose value far exceeds the decretal amount; is totally unjustified. 21. The petitioner has already deposited a sum of Rs. 1 lakh towards the obligation under the decree, in compliance with the conditional interim order passed by this Court, on 16-04-2008. The result of the discussion undertaken above is that the application filed by the 6th respondent for delivery of property cannot be sustained in law. At the same time, he deserves to be compensated for parting Rs.2,66,000/-, way back in the year 2002. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Mangal Prasad (dead) by LRs. v. Krishna Kumar Maheshwari AIR 1992 SC 1857 that, in matter of this nature, the judgment-debtors must be required to pay interest at 12% per annum, on the amount, that is liable to be refunded. 22. Hence, the C.R.Ps are allowed, and the orders under revision, and the warrants issued therein, are set aside. E.A.No.37 of 2007 is dismissed, as barred by limitation. E.A.No. 453 of 2007, which is ancillary to that, is also dismissed. The petitioner shall be under obligation to pay interest at 12% per annum, on the amount deposited by the 6th respondent, from the date of deposit, till the date of this judgment, within one month from today. In case, any portion of the decree still remains unsatisfied, it shall be open to the petitioner to comply with the same, and in default thereof, it shall be open to the decree-holders to take necessary steps, in accordance with law. 23. There shall be no order as to costs.