JUDGMENT:- Rule, Rule is made returnable forthwith. With consent of the Universal Ferro and Allied Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Maharashtra Ferrio Alloys Mazdoor Sangh learned counsel for the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing, immediately. 2. The petitioner is a public limited Company engaged in manufacturing activities since 1956. The petitioner has Ferro Alloys manufacturing Unit at Tumsar, Distt. Bhandara. According to the petitioner, due to frequent and prolonged disruption in the electric supply, the Company could not reach the production targets. On account of the accumulated losses, the Company also came under the preview of the Board for Industrial and Financial reconstruction under the Sick Industrial (Special provisions) Company's Act, 1985 w.e.f. 30th May, 1998. In view of the reasons, which were beyond the control of the Company, it was not possible for the Company to carry out the manufacturing activities at the Ferro Alloys Manufacturing Unit. The Company continued to maintain its full strength of staff and workers for over three years but there was no improvement. Finally the company took decision to close down the Ferro Alloys Manufacturing Units at Tumsar as it had become totally unviable. Therefore, as per the said decision, on 1/3/2006, the petitioner/ complainant sought permission from the Commissioner of Labour, Maharashtra S tate to close down the manufacturing Unit under section 25-0 of the Industrial Disputes Act. After some modification, the application was treated to have been filed on 21/6/2006. On 18/8/2006 the Commissioner of Labour granted permission to close down the manufacturing units. The said Unit was closed down on 19/8/ 2006 itself as per the permission granted by the Labour Commissioner. After closing down, services of all the workman-employees in the said Unit were terminated by paying all the legal dues including the closure compensation to the entitled workers. 3. On 28/8/2006, respondent no.1, which is a Union of the workers working in the said manufacturing Unit, made an application under Section 25-0(5) of the ~.- Industrial Disputes Act, seeking reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. By order dated 15/912006, the Commissioner of Labour referred the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Court at Bhandara and it was registered as Ref.(LT.)1/2006. By order dated 15/912006, the Commissioner of Labour referred the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Court at Bhandara and it was registered as Ref.(LT.)1/2006. According to the petitioner, the order of closure was passed on 18/8/2006 and in view of the provisions of Section25-0(4), the said order would be effective only for a period of one year and would cease to have effect from 18/8/2007 onwards. It is contended that as the Industrial Tribunal had not decided the reference made to it before the expiry of that period of one year, the Industrial Tribunal has become functus officio and has no longer any jurisdiction to continue with the reference proceedings. Accordingly, the petitioner made an application before the Industrial Tribunal. That application was resisted by respondent no. I as per reply dated 13/912007. After hearing both the parties, the Industrial Court passed the impugned order dated 22nd April, 2008 holding that it continues to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the reference inspite of lapse of one year. According to the petitioner, the said order is illegal, improper, unsustainable and against the provisions of Section 25-0(4) and liable to be set aside. Hence, this petition. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Mr. Puranik, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that in view of the provisions of Section 25-0(4) an order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission to close down an Undertaking shall be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. The finality is subject to provisions of sub-section 5 i.e. review by the Government or reference made to the Tribunal. According to the learned counsel, the Tribunal has to pass an award of the said reference within a period of 30 days from the date of such reference and this has to be done before the expiry of one year from the order passed by the Government granting or refusing to grant a permission, He vehemently contended that once that period of one year is over, the order passed by the Government itself comes to an end and therefore, the reference cannot be continued if it is not already decided. In support of this contention, the learned counsel placed reliance upon Vazir Glass Works Ltd. Vs. In support of this contention, the learned counsel placed reliance upon Vazir Glass Works Ltd. Vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and anr., AIR 1996 SC 1282 as well as United White Metal, Ltd. Vs. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena and others, 2006(2)L.L.N.628, wherein the learned Single Judge of this court has, after relying upon Vazir Glass Works Ltd., held that the period of 30 days is mandatory and not directly and has also observed that a contrary judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Association of Engineering Workers Vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co.Ltd. [1985(2) LLN 652] was no more a good law. 5. Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, urged that the Supreme Court in Vazir Glass Works Ltd. was dealing with the case where the permission to close down the Industrial Unit was refused and as held by the Supreme Court that order remains in force for one year and on expiry of period of that order the employer is at liberty to move fresh application for seeking permission to close down the Industrial Unit and if review is not decided before the expiry of one year from the date of the order under review, it would become infructuous because the employer could file fresh application and that fresh application may be decided on its own merits on the basis of the material and circumstances which may be available at the time of deciding the second application. According to the learned counsel, when the Government has granted permission to close down the Industry, the workers would be adversely affected and therefore, the workers may either move an application for review or for reference of the dispute to the Industrial Court. Such review has to be made within one year and if the reference is to be made, it should be also within one year from the date of the original order. But once the reference is made to the Industrial court within the said period of one year, Industrial Court does not become the functus officio merely because it is not decided within the period of one year. The learned counsel contended that if it is held that the Industrial Court ceases to have jurisdiction on expiry of one year, the workers will be rendered without any remedy about the grievances which they may have about the closure of the Industry. The learned counsel contended that if it is held that the Industrial Court ceases to have jurisdiction on expiry of one year, the workers will be rendered without any remedy about the grievances which they may have about the closure of the Industry. It is contended that the Industrial Court is discharging the public function and, it is not within the control of the workers' Union to compel the Industrial court to decide the reference and to pass an award within the specified period and if the employer succeeds in getting the matter prolonged with some ulterior motive, for no fault, the workers would be rendered jobless and remedy less. He contended that in view of this, the period of thirty days or even the period of one year is not mandatory for the decision of the reference by the Industrial court. In support of this, he placed reliance upon the Division Bench Judgment of this court in Association of Engineering Workers Vs. Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. and others, 1985(2) LLN, 652. The learned counsel also countered the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and contended that in Ambica Silk Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union.and anr., 1988 I CLR 425, the learned Single Judge of this court has considered the observations of the Supreme Court in Vazir Glass Works Ltd. as well as Association of Engineering Workers and had distinguished the two cases and had come to conclusion that the period of thirty days is not mandatory but directory for a reference to the Industrial Court. Mr. Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent, also contended that this judgment in Ambica Silk Mills Co. was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge while deciding United White Metal Ltd. and therefore the observations in United White Metal Ltd. by Single Judge without reference to a judgment of another single judge rendered earlier cannot be binding precedent. He pointed out that this fact was taken into consideration by another single judge of this court in Bon Limited, Mumbai Vs. Hindustan Lever Employees Union and anr., 2008(1) Mh.L.J.683 and had followed Ambika Silk Mills Company. The learned counsel contended that the judgment rendered in United White Metal Ltd. being per curium, this court is bound to follow the law consistently laid down in number of cases by this court. 6. Hindustan Lever Employees Union and anr., 2008(1) Mh.L.J.683 and had followed Ambika Silk Mills Company. The learned counsel contended that the judgment rendered in United White Metal Ltd. being per curium, this court is bound to follow the law consistently laid down in number of cases by this court. 6. To appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for both the parties, it will be useful to quote provisions of Section 25(0) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It reads as follows: " 25-0. Procedure for close in down an undertaking. (1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate Government, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work. (2) Where an application for permission has been made under subsection (I), the appropriate Government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and the persons interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen. (3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate Government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days. (4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (5) The appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under Subsection (2) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this subsection, it shall pas an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference. (6) Where no application for permission under sub-section (I) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order. (8) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under such section (2) or whether permission for closure is deemed to be granted under subsection (3), every workman who is employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent of fifteen days' average pay for every completed of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. " 7. " 7. From this, it is clear that if the employer intends to close down an Industrial Establishment, he may apply for the prior permission at least 90 days before the date on which he intends to close down the establishment to the appropriate Government stating the reasons for the same and shall serve the copy of that application to the representative of the worker, and after making an enquiry, if the Government thinks fit and after giving reasonable opportunity to the employer, workmen and the persons interested in such closure, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons, the interest of general public and all other relevant factors, the Government may by an order and for the reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission. If there is no communication about the grant or refusal within a period of 60 days from the date on which the application is made, the permission shall be deemed to have been granted on expiration of the period of sixty days. Such permission, subject to provisions of subsection (5), shall be final and binding and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. Such order may be reviewed within the said period of one year by the Government suo motu or on the application of the employer or the workmen or the dispute may be referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. If such reference is made, the proviso to sub-section (5) requires that the Tribunal shall pass an award within period of 30 days from the date of such reference. As per sub-section 8, if the permission is granted to close down Undertaking or if the permission for closure is deemed to have been granted. the concerned workman shall be entitled to receive compensation generally known as closure compensation. 8. There is no dispute that in the present case the Commissioner of Labour had granted permission on 18/8/2006 to close down the Ferro Alloys Manufacturing Unit and on 28/8/2006 the workers Union made an application to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 25-0(5) and on 15/9/ 2006 the dispute was actually referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the Commissioner of Labour. That reference was not decided on or before 18/8/2007 i.e. within one year from the date when permission to close down was granted by the Labour Commissioner and therefore, the petitioner made an application to the Industrial Court to hold that it had become functus officio and has no longer jurisdiction to continue the reference proceedings. 9. The provisions of Section 25- 0(4) and (5) are pari materia with provisions of section 25-N, (5) and (6). Section 25-N pertains to retrenchment of workman, however, as these provisions are similar, it will be useful to note that in Association of Engineering Workers, the Division Bench of this court while considering the question as to whether the provision contained in proviso to sub-section (6) to Section 25-N is mandatory or not, held that the requirement that award may be made within 30 days from making a reference is directory and not mandatory. The Division Bench observed in para nos.9 and 10 as follows. "9. This question can also be considered from another angle. Under sub-section (4). a legal fiction is provided about the grant of permission on the expiry of the period of sixty days. By sub-sec.(6) a review is provided by the appropriate Government or the specified authority, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman. Then the subsection provides that an appropriate Government or specified authority may review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (3) or refer the matter or. as the case may be, cause it to be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication. The words "refer the matter" and "for adjudication" are important. What is sought to be referred is the matter and not the question of legality of the order. In the context, the expression "refer the matter" will mean refer the application for permission made by the employer for adjudication. The Tribunal is expected to pass an award. The term 'Award' is defined by Sec.2(b) to mean an interim or final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto. The provision providing for a period of thirty days for adjudication indicates that a long drawn process is not contemplated, though the nature and extent of enquiry must depend on the facts of each case. The term 'Award' is defined by Sec.2(b) to mean an interim or final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto. The provision providing for a period of thirty days for adjudication indicates that a long drawn process is not contemplated, though the nature and extent of enquiry must depend on the facts of each case. This has been done so as to avoid delay in adjudication with a view to ensure speedier justice in the matter. It means that the period of thirty days was considered by the legislature as reasonable for the adjudication of the matter referred. But that does not mean that after the expiry of the said period, ipso facto the reference lapses or the Tribunal becomes functus officio." 10. It will not be fair to assume that, if it is held that the provision is directory and not mandatory, the Industrial Tribunal will not act with expedition. The Tribunal is expected to perform its duty within the said period. It is only in exceptional cases where it is found that it is impossible to complete the adjudication proceedings within the prescribed period that the Tribunal can complete the proceedings beyond the said period. Exception cannot be permitted to become a rule. The Tribunal is expected to adhere to the time schedule unless it becomes impossible to adjudicate the matter within the prescribed period. The Tribunal is also expected to record reasons in writing as to why the proceedings could not be completed within the time prescribed by the Legislature. However, only because time is prescribed by the legislature, it cannot be held that after the expiration of the said period, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter referred to it. If the contention raised by the petitioner is accepted that the Tribunal becomes functus officio after the expiration of thirty days, it will result in injustice and general inconvenience. To say the least, it will defeat the very object of sub-sec.(6) of Section 25-N which contemplates a reference of the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication. To hold that after the expiry of the period of thirty days, the reference lapses and the Tribunal becomes functus officio, will amount to a premium on negligence or inaction and will work serious inconvenience or injustice to the persons who have no control over the Tribunal which is entrusted with a public duty. To hold that after the expiry of the period of thirty days, the reference lapses and the Tribunal becomes functus officio, will amount to a premium on negligence or inaction and will work serious inconvenience or injustice to the persons who have no control over the Tribunal which is entrusted with a public duty. In our view, it would not promote the main object of the matter by the Tribunal. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly right in coming to the conclusion that the said provision is directory and the Tribunal does not become functus officio, nor will the reference lapse, only because the period of thirty days is over. In the view which we have taken, it is not necessary to make a detailed reference to the various decisions cited before us at the Bar." 10. After referring to above observations of the Division Bench In Association of Engineering Workers, the learned judge in Ambica Silk Mills Co. Ltd. observed as follows in para no.26. "26. I have also no hesitation for the reasons afore stated in holding that the proviso in Section 25-0(5) that the Tribunal shall pass an award within 30 days from such reference is directory and not mandatory and therefore. the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal on 30/6/1 995 cannot be rendered bad-in-law on that count." It is material to note that in Ambika Silks Mills Co. Ltd. a reference was made to the relevant observations of Supreme Court in Vazir Glass Works Ltd. 11. In Vazir Glass Works Ltd. permission to close down the Industrial Unit was refused by the Government and the question was as to whether the Government has jurisdiction to review its decision after expiry of one year from the date of the order and further question was as to within how much period the review application should be decided by the Government, particularly when there is no specific provision in section 250(5) about the period within which the review should be decided though such a provision is made for decision of the reference by the Industrial Court. In Vazir Glaes Works Ltd., Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follow - "28. In Vazir Glaes Works Ltd., Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follow - "28. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that it is quite evident from the Scheme of various subsection of section 25-0 of the Act that whenever an application for closure of an industrial unit is made by an employer, the State Government before whom such application is made is required to dispose of such application within sixty days from the date of making the application and communicate its decision within the said period of sixty days so that an employer does not suffer any hard ship on account of failure on the part of the State Government to dispose of such application for permission for closure expeditiously. In order to impel the State Government to dispose of such application expeditiously not exceeding sixty days, provision has been made that if the decision of the State Government on the application for permission to close an industrial unit is not communicated within the said period of sixty days, it will be deemed that such permission has been granted. Since the decision on the application for permission for closure is to be taken by the executive authority namely the State Government and since no provision for statutory review before other authority has been made, the Legislature has incorporated the provision of review by the State Government of its decision on the application for closure either on its own motion or on the basis of the application to be made by the aggrieved party. 29. As the decision made by the State Government on the question of closure of an industrial unit cannot but bring about serious consequence affecting productivity, employment opportunities etc. the decision taken on the application for closure, has been made operative for one year only, so that after such period, if an employer still desires that the industrial unit should be closed, it may make a fresh application for permission to close the said unit. the decision taken on the application for closure, has been made operative for one year only, so that after such period, if an employer still desires that the industrial unit should be closed, it may make a fresh application for permission to close the said unit. 30.Since the decision made on an application for permission for closure is to remain operative only for a year, in our view, it will be only proper to hold that an order by way of review either on the aggrieved party's application or on own motion of the State Government, must be made within the said period of one year. Otherwise, the right to make fresh application for permission to close after expiry of one year from the date of rejection of permission for closure will lose its relevance. It also appear to us that anamolous situation may rise if the application for review, when presented within the said time frame of one year is allowed to be decided even after the expiry of the said time frame of one year when the order passed by the State Government has already ceased to be operative. As an illustration, it may be indicated that a party aggrieved makes an application for review of the order of the State Government within a year during which the order is operative, but for some reason, such application is not disposed of within one year. After expiry of one year, the aggrieved party makes a fresh application for permission to close and on such application an order is made by the State Government or the party obtains a deemed order. This order on a fresh application, subject to any review of the same, will remain in force for one year. If the State Government is permitted to pass order on the review application made against the first order when the right to make fresh application and to obtain an order has already accrued, any order on review to be enforceable must conform to the order passed or deemed to have been passed on subsequent application for permission to close. Any other order is not conceivable because an order by way of review supersedes the order reviewed but not the subsequent order on a fresh application made and such subsequent order being operative for the next one year cannot be passed by any order of review of the earlier order. Any other order is not conceivable because an order by way of review supersedes the order reviewed but not the subsequent order on a fresh application made and such subsequent order being operative for the next one year cannot be passed by any order of review of the earlier order. 31. Although it has not been expressly indicated within what period a review application validity made is to be disposed of, but the provision that order on an application for closure would remain in force for one year and in the absence of any embargo to make fresh application for such permission after expiry of one year even if a review application remains pending. makes it abundantly clear that in the scheme of Section 25-0, the review application is to be made before expiry of the said time frame of one year and such application is to be disposed of within such time frame otherwise such review application will become infructuous. The argument that a party should not be made to suffer simply on account of failure on the part of a statutory authority to dispose of review application within a time frames and thereby rendering it infructuous is not tenable because after expiry of the said time frame of one year. the party aggrieved has a right to make a fresh application by incorporating all the material factors germane for consideration of its application for permission to close. including the factors in dated in review application. Neither the general principle of retaining jurisdiction to dispose of review application validly made nor the principle that an authority if clothed with the power of review will not become functus officio after expiry of the time frame of one year but it will retain its authority to dispose of the pending review application will arise in the context of the scheme of Section 25-O." 12. In view of the facts before the Supreme Court and the observations made by Their Lordships, it would be clear that as per the provisions of Section 25-0(5), on the application of the employer, the order refusing the permission should be reviewed and naturally that could be reviewed before expiry of one year from the date of the order because on expiry of one year if the employee still wanted to close down the Industry he could move fresh application on the grounds which would be available at that time. Therefore, it was necessary that the review should be decided before the expiry of one year from the date of the order under review and Their Lordships also found that if the period of 30 days for decision of reference was provided by the Legislature, normally the same period should be reasonable for the decision of the review also. The Supreme Court was not dealing with the question as to whether after expiry of 30 days or after expiry of one year the Industrial Court would become functus officio and have no jurisdiction to entertain reference when it related to permission granted by the Government to close down the Industrial Unit, particularly when the reference is made within one year. 13. In United White Metal, Ltd. Vs. Bharliya Kamgar Sena and ors., after making reference to the observations made by the Supreme Court in Vazir Glass Works, the learned Single Judge observed as follow – "9. The view taken by the Apex Court is that once the period of one year has expired and even if review application is pending then the said review application does not survive. While considering the review application the Apex Court has also considered the case where there is a reference to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication that once there is a reference under S.25-0(5) and not under S.IO(1) then in that even the reference must fail on expiry of period of one year and cannot be proceeded with. In the present case also reference is under S.25-N and not under S.IO(1) and thus the reference must fail on the expiry of period of one year. 10. In the present case also reference is under S.25-N and not under S.IO(1) and thus the reference must fail on the expiry of period of one year. 10. In the light of the Judgment of Vazir Glass Works Ltd. [1996(1) L.L.N.430] (vide supra), the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of association of Engineering Workers (1985 (2) L.L.N. 652] (vide supra), cannot be treated as correct law. In my opinion the Division Bench judgment stands impliedly overruled by the judgment of the Apex Court because the Apex court has held that period of time limit prescribed under the Act is mandatory and on expiry of period of time State Government would cease to have jurisdiction because the order which is songht to be adjudicated upon in reference does not survive any more. If that is the view then it cannot be stated that the time limit prescribed is directory and not mandatory. In my opinion, in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court the view expressed by the Division Bench in the case of Association of Engineering Workers is no longer a good law and thus stands impliedly overruled." 14. The learned counsel for the respondent vehemently contended that Ambica Silk Mills Co. Ltd. was decided in October, 1997 and was also reported in 1998 i.e. more than 8 years before United White Metal Ltd. was decided, however, the judgment in United White Metal Ltd. does not show that Ambica Silk Mills Co.Ltd. was either referred to or brought to the notice of learned Judge while deciding United White Metal. The learned counsel contended that in Ambica Silk Co. Ltd. this court had considered the observations of the Supreme Court in Vazir Glass Works Ltd. as well as in the Association of Engineering Workers V s. Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. and after having distinguished the facts in two cases. had come to conclusion that the period or the time frame for decision of the reference by the Industrial court is not mandatory but only directory. had come to conclusion that the period or the time frame for decision of the reference by the Industrial court is not mandatory but only directory. The learned counsel contended that if this decision would have been brought to the notice of the learned single judge in United White Metal, the learned Single judge could not have observed that the view taken by the Division Bench in Association of Engineer Workers was not correct law and if the learned Single judge would hold that the view taken in Ambica Silk Mills Co. was not correct, the judicial propriety would require the learned Single judge to refer the matter to a larger Bench, which was not done. In view of this, he contends that the judgment in United White Metal, which was rendered without reference to judgment in Ambica Silk Mills Co. could not be binding precedent for the court in subsequent matters and for this he finds support from Bon Limited, Mumbai Vs. Hindustan Lever Employees Union and anr., 2008(1) Mh.L.J. 683 . 15. The learned Single judge in Bon Limited, Mumbai referred to all the above referred authorities including United White Metal and he followed Ambica Silk Mills Ltd. The facts in Bone Limited and the present matter are almost identical. The learned Single judge in Bon Limited, Mumbai distinguished the facts in Vazir Glass Works Ltd. and Bone Limited, Mumbai and made following observations in para nos.l7 and 18. "17. In the present case, the situation that falls for my consideration and the situation that fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court in Vazir Glass Works Ltd. is exactly contrary to each other. In Vazir Glass Works Ltd., as pointed out earlier, the application of the employer under Section 25-0 was rejected and the review was sought and instead of reviewing the order of rejection a reference was made to the tribunal after the period of one year stipulated under Section 25-0(4). While in the present case, initially the application was rejected and the order was reviewed at the instance of the employer well within time so also the application made by the union seeking reference under section 10 read with section 25-0 of the ill Act. While in the present case, initially the application was rejected and the order was reviewed at the instance of the employer well within time so also the application made by the union seeking reference under section 10 read with section 25-0 of the ill Act. The Supreme Court in paragraph 31 of the judgment in Vazir Glass Works Ltd. has considered an illustration and has observed that any order on the review passed by the appropriate Government is not conceivable because an order by way of review supersedes the order reviewed but not the subsequent order on a fresh application made and such subsequent order being operative for the next one year cannot be superceded by any order of review of the earlier order. Let me consider an illustration exactly opposite to one that was taken by the Supreme Court. If an application seeking closure of an undertaking is allowed, as in the present case, either at the very inception under Section 25-0(2) or on the review under Section 25-0(5) the party aggrieved would be only workmen, who have a remedy of either seeking review of such an order or to seek reference to a tribunal for its adjudication if a review or reference, though made within the time stipulated, is not disposed of within one year as contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 25-0, the proceedings would lapse, if the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is accepted. In that case the employee will be either rendered remedy less or for no reason will have to apply afresh under sub-section (4) of Section 25-0 and pursue a new beginning, which does not appear to be the intention of the legislature. Such interpretation put on the language of section 25-0(4) and (5) cannot be accepted to render the remedies available to the workmen infructuous. 18. Upon plain reading of section 25-O it is clear that none of the sub-sections, except sub-section (7), is prefaced by non-obstinate provision overriding the other provisions in the ill Act. It is true that section 25-0 is a special provision but that does not exclude the remedy available to the workmen to apply for reference against the order of closure, passed under subsection (2), under section 10 read with section 25-0(5) of the ill Act. It is true that section 25-0 is a special provision but that does not exclude the remedy available to the workmen to apply for reference against the order of closure, passed under subsection (2), under section 10 read with section 25-0(5) of the ill Act. If a reference made at the instance of workmen, as in the present case, is not decided within one year that would close the doors for the workmen and they would not have any remedy available in law. The basic proposition that a party cannot be rendered remedy less has to be borne in mind while interpreting a provision such as the one that falls for my consideration in the present case. At the highest, Section 25-0 is a special procedure seeking permission to close if the predicates set out therein are satisfied. So read, a balance would be struck between the special provision seeking permission to close and general remedy to the workmen under section 10 to raise an industrial dispute before the Tribunal to look into all aspects of the legality or otherwise of closure. The tests, which the tribunal has to consider while adjudicating an industrial reference, can be different from those which the appropriate Government considered while granting permission to close under Section 25-0(2) of the ID Act." 16. I respectfully agree with these observations and illustration given by the learned Single Judge in Bon Limited. If it is held that on expiry of period of one year from the date of order of the Government permitting closure or on expiry of 30 days from date of reference, the Industrial Court ceases to have jurisdiction, there is every possibility that tactful and resourceful employer would succeed in prolonging the matter and seeing that the reference is not decided within the time frame and thus workers may be rendered without remedy against the closure. The Labouri industrial Legislations were enacted basically to promote cordial relationship between the employer and the workers, to create congenial atmosphere in the Industry and to protect the workers against any arbitrary action which could be taken by the employer. The Labouri industrial Legislations were enacted basically to promote cordial relationship between the employer and the workers, to create congenial atmosphere in the Industry and to protect the workers against any arbitrary action which could be taken by the employer. It is true that if the Industrial Unit becomes unviable, after hearing the concerned parties and taking into consideration all the circumstances including interest of workers and employer and general interest, the Government may take a appropriate decision to permit or to refuse permission for closure of the Industrial Unit. Some time it is possible that the employer may intentionally reduce a production and create a situation for closure of the Unit only with an intention to get better facilities and benefits which may be offered in different areas and in different States, who may be interested in inviting the investment and Industry in their own States. Keeping this in mind, the employer may prolong the matter and after expiry of the period prescribed in Section 25-0(5) may take a plea that the Industrial court has no jurisdiction and the resultantly the workers may be left without any remedy against injustice which might have been done to them. In the impugned order, the Industrial court noted that a reference was received on 3/10/2006. The management filed statement of claim on 12/10/2006 and the workers Union filed written statement on 19/ 10/2006. Thus, the pleadings were completed on 19/10/2006. However, evidence of one witness for management was completed by 30/ 8/2007. The employees Union had filed affidavit in examination-in-chief of its Secretary Pavan Ratan Bais on 2/11/2006. From this, it would be clear that as far as workers Union is concerned they had filed their affidavit in examination-in-chief within fifteen days after filing the written statement while the management took more than 10 months to complete the evidence of one witness and by that time even the cross-examination of witness of the employees Union was not completed. The learned counsel for the respondent makes a statement that the respondent-Union does not want to lead any more evidence except the evidence of Pavan Ratan Bais, which is already filed on 2/11/2006 and that the reference could not be decided only he cause the management failed to cross-examine that witness. The learned counsel for the respondent makes a statement that the respondent-Union does not want to lead any more evidence except the evidence of Pavan Ratan Bais, which is already filed on 2/11/2006 and that the reference could not be decided only he cause the management failed to cross-examine that witness. The Industrial court has noted in para no.7 of the impugned order that on one or the other ground the management had sought the adjournments and therefore, the matter is delayed. He also noted that the matter is not delayed because of the workers Union. From this it would be clear that the management had, with some ulterior motive and intention prolonged the matter and did not allow the reference to be decided within the period of one year from the original order i.e. 18/8/2006 and as soon as that period of one year was over, the management moved an application before Industrial Court contending that it had ceased to have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the reference. If such application is allowed and if the interpretation put to the provisions of Section 25-0(5), as made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, the workers, who cannot compete with the management in the matter of financial resources, can never be successful and cannot expect to get justice. Therefore, in my considered opinion, merely because the reference is not decided within the frame work, it does not fail and it must be held that the once the reference has been made within the period of one year from the date of the order, it is expected from the Industrial court to decide that reference within 30 days or within one year from the date of original order but that timeframe would be only directory and not mandatory. To hold it otherwise would cause injustice to the workers class. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent-Union vehemently contended that when certain responsibility is put on the public authority and that authority is expected to take a decision within the specified period, and if it cannot or does not. it is beyond the control of the parties seeking justice and therefore, the time-frame for decision should not be treated as mandatory. In support of this, he placed reliance on several authorities. In Dattatraya Moreshwar Vs. it is beyond the control of the parties seeking justice and therefore, the time-frame for decision should not be treated as mandatory. In support of this, he placed reliance on several authorities. In Dattatraya Moreshwar Vs. The State of Bombay and others, AIR 1952 SC 181 , Their Lordships observed as follows - " In my opinion, this contention of the learned Attorney-General must prevail. It is well settled that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done." " Again in State of V.P. V s. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912 , Their Lordships observed in para no.9 as follows. "9 The question whether a certain provision in a statute imposing a duty on a public body or authority was mandatory or only directory, arose before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy, Council in the case of Montreal Street Rly. Co. Vs. Normandin, 1917, a.C. 170(B). In that case the question mooted was whether the omission to revise the jury lists as directed by the statute, had the effect of nullifying the verdict given by a jury. Their Lordships held that the irregularities in the due revision of the jury lists, will not ipso facto avoid the verdict of a jury. The Board made the following observations in the course of their judgment: " The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequent arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statute must be looked at, the cases on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th ed., p. 596 and following pages. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done," In State of Punjab Vs. I. Satya Pal Dang and others, AIR 1969 SC 903 , Their Lordships observed as follows- "In those cases where strict compliance is indicated to be a condition precedent to the validity of the act itself the neglect to perform it is indicated as fatal. But in cases where although a public duty is imposed and the manner of performance is also indicated in imperative language, the provision is usually regarded as merely directory when general injustice or inconvenience results to others and they have no control over those exercising the duty." 18. In my opinion, above observations of the Supreme Court are aptly applicable to the present case while interpreting the provisions of section 25-0(5), particularly when it is the responsibility of the Industrial Tribunal to dispose of the reference within the specified period. The law has put the responsibility on Industrial Tribunal but it is not within the control of the parties in the particular dispute to decide that matter within that time frame though the conduct of the parties may affect the time frame and in some cases may cause delay. Besides the delays which may be attributed to either or both of the parties, there may be several other reasons due to which the reference cannot be decided within the time-frame. The dispute in the present case is pending before the Industrial Tribunal at Bhandara and the learned counsel for the respondent workers Union makes a statement that this post is lying vacant for long time. If the Government could not fill in the post and provide the sufficient number of judges, inspite of the time frame prescribed by the law, sometimes it becomes impossible for the concerned Tribunal to dispose of the reference within the time frame. If the Government could not fill in the post and provide the sufficient number of judges, inspite of the time frame prescribed by the law, sometimes it becomes impossible for the concerned Tribunal to dispose of the reference within the time frame. Time and again the Supreme Court of India has reiterated the need of increase in the number of judges and it has been pointed out that the number of judges in the country is hardly 10 to 12 per million of population while the ideal number would be around 50 per million. If the Government is unable to provide the infrastructure and sufficient number of the judges, it may not be possible for such courts to dispose of the matter within the period prescribed by the Legislature. There are several laws which provide for disposal of the disputes within the specified period but it is not feasible due to shortage of judges. Taking into consideration these circumstances and the observations of the Supreme Court in above authorities, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Industrial Court ceases to have jurisdiction and becomes functus officio as soon as period of one year is over from the date of initial order passed by the Labour Commissioner. In view of this legal position and facts noted above, I find no fault with the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court rejecting the contention of the petitioner. 19. for aforesaid reasons, writ petition stands dismissed. As the reference is pending in the labour court for last about 2Yz years, the learned Member in-charge of Industrial Court. Bhandara shall dispose of the said reference within two months from this day. Petition dismissed.