JUDGMENT :- (This writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying to quash the endorsement dated 30-3-2007 issued by second respondent at annexure– C.) 1. Petitioners have questioned the endorsement vide Annexure-c dated 30.3.2007 issued by the Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer, by which the objections filed by the petitioners for the notification issued under Section 3-C(1) of Karnataka Highways Act, 1956, are not considered. Consequently, the petitioners have questioned the final notification acquiring the property of the petitioners bearing Sy.No.58/1A situated at Avalahalli village, Bangalore to an extent of 2393 sq.mtrs for widening up National Highway No.4 in Mulbagal-Kolar-Bangalore section. The petitioners have also sought for declaration that sub-section (4) of Section 3-D of National Highway Act is ultra virus, in as much as it affects Articles 14 & 21 of Constitution of India. The land bearing Sy.No.58/1A situated at Avalahalli village is owned by the petitioners and others. The preliminary notification is issued on 14.12.2006 by the respondents declaring their intention to acquire the lands in question along with the adjoining lands in Mulbagal-Kolar-Bangalore section for widening of National Highway No.4. Preliminary notification reveals that an area of 5019 sq.mtrs. is sought to be acquired in Sy.No.58/1A. Preliminary notification was published in English newspaper “Times of India” and in Kannada newspaper “Samyuktha Karnataka” on 1.2.2007. The petitioners filed statement of objections on 3.2.2007. The said statement of objections is received by the office of the respondents on 3.3.2007. Since the statement of objections is filed beyond 21 days after the publication of the preliminary notification, an endorsement is issued by the respondents as per Annexure-C dated 30.3.2007 intimating the petitioners that the statement of objections filed belatedly cannot be considered. Thereafter the respondents have proceeded to issue the final notification on 14.11.2007 2. Sri Abhinav learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the petitioners were not in India during the relevant period and they came to India only on 14.2.2007 and there after they have filed the objections with in 21 days from the date of their arrival to India. He further submits that the respondents should have considered the statement of objections in all fairness with a view to consider the case of the petitioners. He further submits that the respondents should have considered the statement of objections in all fairness with a view to consider the case of the petitioners. He further submits that sub-section (4) of Section 3- D of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short hereinafter referred to as the ‘act’) is unconstitutional, in as much as the provision cannot prohibit the High Courts and the Supreme Court from hearing the writ petitions questioning the final notifications. Per contra, it is contended by Smt.Shilpa Shah, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the second respondent that the concerned authority is justified in rejecting the statement of objections filed by the petitioners since the same is filed beyond 21 days from the date of publication of the preliminary notification; that the work is under progress with all seriousness and therefore the effort of the petitioners do delay the proceedings may not be entertained. 3. There cannot be any doubt that under certain special circumstances, objections of the aggrieved land owners or interested persons, may be considered in accordance with law even if they are filed beyond 21 days. But such reasons should be acceptable. In this matter, the petitioners rely upon the document at Annexure –D dated 22.2.2007 to contend that they were not in India and they traveled from foreign country to India on that day. The said document at Annexure-D does not disclose that the petitioners have traveled from a foreign country, It merely reveals that one of the petitioners had travelled from Bombay to Bangalore on 22.02.2007. Thus, there is nothing on record to show as to what prevented the petitioners from filing the objections with in the stipulated period of 21 days. It is also the case of the petitioners that newspapers “Times of India & Samuyukta Karnataka” do not have adequate circulation in the area in question. On the other hand, this court can take judicial notice of the fact that the aforesaid two newspapers have wide circulation in the area concerned. Since the work is stated to be under progress with all seriousness and petitioners are the only persons who have objected for widening of the road, this court declines to give one more opportunity of being heard to them. Thus, the court does not find any ground to entertain the writ petition on merits. 4. Since the work is stated to be under progress with all seriousness and petitioners are the only persons who have objected for widening of the road, this court declines to give one more opportunity of being heard to them. Thus, the court does not find any ground to entertain the writ petition on merits. 4. However, this court fully agrees with the submission of Sri Abhinav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the High Courts and the Supreme Court are not barred from hearing the writ petitions questioning the final notifications issued under the Act. The power of the High Court to hear the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the power of the Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, cannot be taken away by the enactments enacted by the State Legislature or by Central Legislature. “Section 3-D of the National Highways Act, 1956, reads thus:- Section 3D: (1) XXXX (2) XXXX (3) XXXX (4) A declaration made by the Central Government under Sub-section(1) Shall not be called in question in any court or by any other authority.” The power given to High Court under Article 226 is an extraordinary power not only to correct the manifest error, but also to exercise it for sake of justice. Under the scheme of the constitution, a High Court is the highest court for purposes of exercising civil, appellate, criminal or even constitutional jurisdiction so far that State is concerned. The jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution is an extraordinary jurisdiction conferred on the High Court to ensure that the subordinate authorities act. Not only in accordance with law, but they also function with in the framework of law. The jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be taken away by the legislation. Since the High Court under the Constitution is a forum for enforcement of fundamental right of a citizen, it cannot be denied the power to entertain a petition by a citizen claiming that the State machinery was abusing its power and was acting in violation of the constitutional guarantee. Rather the High Court has a constitutional duty and responsibility to ensure that the State machinery was acting fairly and not on extraneous considerations. Rather the High Court has a constitutional duty and responsibility to ensure that the State machinery was acting fairly and not on extraneous considerations. It is relevant to note in this context that the Apex Court in the case of Fertilizer Corporation kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri & Others vs. Union of India & Others, reported in AIR 1981 SC 344 , while considering the distinction between Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution has observed thus:- “10. Article 32 of the Constitution which guarantees by clause (1) the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by part 111, provides by clause (2) that: “The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders to writs, including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part.” It is manifest that the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 32 can be exercised for the enforcement of the rights conferred by part III and for no other purpose. Clause (1) as well as clause (2) of Article 32 bring out this point in sharp focus. As contrasted with Article 32, Article 226(1) of the Constitution provides that: “Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have power through out the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Governmnet, within those territories direction, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.” “The difference in the phraseology of the two Articles brings out the marked difference in the nature and purpose of the right conferred by these Articles. Whereas the right guaranteed by Article 32 can be exercised for the enforcement of fundamental rights only, the right conferred by Article 226 can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights but for any other purpose.” From the above, it is clear that right of the High Court Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is not only for enforcement of fundamental rights, but also for any other purpose and whereas the right guaranteed by Article 32 can be exercised by the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights. The jurisdiction conferred on this court by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, it is an important and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India and no act of Parliament can abrogate it or take it away except by way of impermissible erosion of fundamental principles of the Constitutional Scheme (see AIR 2007 SC 861 – 1. R. Coelho (dead) by LRs., vs. State of Tamil Nadu) In the case of S.R.Bommai & Others vs. Union of India & Others, reported in (1994) 3 SCC 1 , it was reiterated that the judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution and that the power of judicial review is a constituent power which cannot be abrogated by judicial process of interpretation. It is a cardinal principle of our Constitution that no one can claim to be the sole judge of the power given under the Constitution and that its actions are within the confines of the powers given by the Constitution. It is the duty of this court to uphold the constitutional values and enforce constitutional limitations as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. The Apex Court in the case of L. Chandrakumar vs. Union of India, reported in (1997)3 SCC 261 , has ruled that the power of judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution. Hence, the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, and the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, is held to be a part of the basis structure of the Constitution. The Constitution while conferring the power of judicial review of legislative/executive action upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. Hence, the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, and the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, is held to be a part of the basis structure of the Constitution. The Constitution while conferring the power of judicial review of legislative/executive action upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. An analysis of the matter in which the framers of our constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were very much concerned with securing the independence of judiciary. These attempts were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of effectively discharging its vide powers of judicial review. The Supreme Court has always considered the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively, enabling legislative/executive action to be subjected to the scrutiny of superior Courts, to be integral to our constitutional scheme. It is now by well settled that the power of judicial review or legislative/executive action is needed in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting parts of its basic structure. While interpreting the similar section, the full Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Shripatrao Dajisaheb Ghatge & Another vs. The State of Maharashtra and Another, reported in AIR 1977 Bombay 384 has opined that in the absence of any definition of the word “Courts” in the Constitution, it should be taken as its ordinary meaning to include (a) Civil and Criminal Courts Act, the Criminal Procedure Code and the like and also (b) such Tribunals as exercise the sovereign judicial power of the State and render definitive judgments in the exercise thereof. I fully concur with the said views of the Bombay High Court. The word “Courts” refers to Section 3-D of the National Highways Act, 1956 cited supra, refers to courts, subordinate to High Court and the same will not include the High Court and the Supreme Court. In view of the above, this Court is of the clear opinion that sub-section (4) of Section 3-D will not be applicable to High Courts and the Apex Court of the Country. In view of the above, this Court is of the clear opinion that sub-section (4) of Section 3-D will not be applicable to High Courts and the Apex Court of the Country. The words “any Court” used in the sub-section (4) of Section 3-D of the Act will not be applicable to the High Courts and the Supreme Courts of India. The said provision will have to be read down to exclude High Court and Supreme Court from the word “Court”. However, on merits, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the acquisition notifications. Hence, the challenge to acquisition notification fails. Writ petition is disposed of accordingly.